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The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) is 
an international foundation whose mission is to assist the international com-
munity in promoting good governance and reform of the security sector. 
Beyond a range of publications linked to its research and operational pro-
grammes, each year DCAF dedicates an entire volume to a selected topic of 
particular relevance to our ongoing research and analytical work.  The first 
volume was published in 2003 under the title Challenges of Security Sector 
Governance; the second one was published in 2004 under the title Reform 
and Reconstruction of the Security Sector; and the third volume in the series, 
published in 2005 was devoted to Security Governance in Post-Conflict 
Peacebuilding. 
The fourth edition of the series is dedicated to Private Actors and Se-
curity Governance. Security privatisation, from the perspective of both the 
top–down decision to outsource military- and security-related tasks to pri-
vate firms, and the bottom–up activities of armed non-state actors such as 
rebel opposition groups, insurgents, militias and warlord factions, challenge 
the state’s authority and monopoly of legitimate force. Common to this phe-
nomenon in all its dimensions is that it has significant implications for effec-
tive and democratically accountable security governance and is directly 
linked to opportunities for security sector reform (SSR) across the range of 
different reform contexts. This volume begins by attempting to situate secu-
rity privatisation within a broader framework that takes into account differ-
ent understandings of the role of the state in international relations, concepts 
such as globalisation, transnationalisation as well as the consequences of 11 
September 2001 (9/11). From a security governance perspective, different 
national cases are then assessed. Finally, different forms of regulation and 
control are considered with respect to the various faces of security privatisa-
tion. 
It would not have been possible to successfully complete this volume, 
particularly in light of the tight timescales involved, without the invaluable 
support of a number of people. In particular, we would like to thank Jonas 
Hagmann and Moncef Kartas for research and editing contributions, in par-
ticular in authoring the very rich Annex to this volume. Oliver Wates and 
Jason Powers respectively provided excellent copy- and technical editing 
assistance, and Tim Donais provided incisive comments and inputs on earlier 
drafts of the manuscript. Veit D. Hopf of LIT Verlag again guided us  
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Approaching the Privatisation of Security 
from a Security Governance Perspective 
Alan Bryden 
Introduction 
This volume considers the phenomenon of security privatisation from the 
perspective of both the top-down decision to outsource military- and secu-
rity-related tasks to private firms, and the bottom-up activities of armed non-
state actors such as rebel opposition groups, insurgents, militias and warlord 
factions that challenge the state’s authority. Both ‘bottom-up’ locally-
generated armed actors and ‘top-down’ private security and military compa-
nies (PSCs/PMCs), have significant implications for effective and democ-
ratically accountable security sector governance as both concern the dimin-
ished state monopoly of the use of legitimate military force. The themes and 
actors addressed in the various chapters provide a broad canvas reaching 
from village watch groups to companies listed on the world’s financial mar-
kets. This is deliberate. The intention has not been to focus on issues of in-
terest only to narrow expert communities but to widen the discussion by 
situating it within a broader security governance framework useful for pol-
icy-makers and practitioners involved in security privatisation but also re-
lated issues such as security sector reform (SSR). 
The SSR concept bridges security policy, peace and democracy pro-
motion and development assistance. This cross-sectoral character is signifi-
cant because of its integrating effect. By virtue of its emphasis on govern-
ance rather than government, it reaches out beyond the state to actors such as 
non-state civil society organisations and armed non-state actors. Given its 
holistic perspective, SSR integrates partial reforms of security sector actors 
such as the military, police or intelligence services with the requirements of 
democratic governance. It therefore spans a wide array of activities from 
political dialogue, policy and legal advice and training programmes to tech-
nical and financial assistance. SSR, particularly in post-conflict contexts, is 
therefore directly linked to the topic of security privatisation because it re-
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flects the fragmented monopoly of legitimate force. Fundamentally, it also 
provides a framework to link and sequence reform of the security sector in 
conjunction with related challenges such as disarmament, demobilisation and 
reintegration (DDR) or re-establishing the rule of law.1  
Arguably, all of the challenges described in this volume represent 
deficits in governance that need to be addressed at international, national and 
local levels. They certainly reflect the increasing trend for states to share the 
monopoly of the use of force – willingly or otherwise – with a range of non-
state actors. Security governance2 provides a useful optic to understand this 
fragmentation of political authority among public and private actors on mul-
tiple levels of interaction. The Stockholm International Peace Research Insti-
tute’s (SIPRI) latest Yearbook has noted that in 2005, 17 major armed con-
flicts took place in 16 locations and, for the second year running, all of them 
were intra-state conflicts, thus involving one or more armed non-state ac-
tors.3 Demonstrating the limitations of the Weberian notion of the state, non-
statutory actors have to be considered part of the de facto security sector.4 
This does not mean that these actors should be considered in unitary terms. 
Rather, it supposes that they are all significant in shaping security sector 
governance at the national level.  
The privatisation of security is closely linked to its internationalisa-
tion.5 The failure of the state in many parts of the world to provide security 
for its citizens underpins the intensification of international interventions 
since the end of the Cold War. As demonstrated by the first Human Security 
Report,6 such interventions, notably led by the United Nations, have resulted 
in a steady decline in genocides and international crises. Recurring themes in 
this volume include the importance of external actors appreciating context in 
harnessing and responding to the challenges of privatisation, the need for 
more ‘joined up’ and coherent approaches in the use of such actors, as well 
as sensitivity to considerations of local ownership. External actors operating 
in post-conflict environments require a secure environment in order to func-
tion and must also operate in a manner that optimises their effectiveness. The 
vital ingredient of legitimacy – for both international and national actors – 
can only be gained through operationalising principles of transparency, ac-
countability and participation which may run counter to the commercial 
principles that underpin the outsourcing of security provision.  
In this regard, there is an interesting contrast among contributors to 
this volume between those who highlight the distinct nature of the PMC/PSC 
phenomenon and those who link them to a much longer tradition of non-state 
actors providing security-related services for profit. This contrast is aptly 
illustrated by Ghebali (Chapter 11) in comparing the views of the first and 
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second UN Special Rapporteurs on Mercenaries who held markedly different 
views on this question. In his typology, although making a distinction be-
tween ‘traditional mercenaries’ and ‘modern private security or military 
companies’, Schneckener (Chapter 2) clusters mercenaries and PSC/PMCs 
on the basis that they all work for profit. Current and draft South African 
legislation regulating the provision of private security services goes further, 
drawing direct parallels between the role of PMCs and the deleterious effect 
of Western mercenaries on peace and security. Clearly, any such linkage – 
particularly with mercenarism – is anathema to the modern international 
private security industry. As Bailes (Chapter 3) points out, there is an impor-
tant difference between suppliers over-charging for the provision of services 
as with Custer Battles in Iraq (see Chapter 8) and the normative stakes at 
play in outsourcing intelligence-gathering or defence reform to a private 
company. 
These observations point to the fact that, depending on your view-
point, security privatisation is either very old or very young. Indeed, if the 
modern PMC/PSC industry can be traced back only some 20 years, both 
non-state actors providing security in the absence of adequate state provision 
and mercenarism have deep historical roots. On the other hand, the commer-
cialisation of security, which has arguably reached its zenith in Iraq, is 
closely linked to the phenomenon of globalisation. For Bailes, a shift in the 
centre of gravity in public-private relationships in the security field is just 
one of many aspects of globalisation. In terms of its security dimension there 
are evident links between globalisation, privatisation and the consequences 
of 11 September 2001 (9/11). As Schneckener points out, although the con-
cern of international actors for decades, ‘fragile statehood’ became secu-
ritised and globalised post-9/11 with the stark realisation that if local prob-
lems are ignored they may have global consequences. 
Many of the themes picked up in contributions to this volume can be 
found in the broader discourse on ways to promote democratic governance 
of the security sector through SSR. Challenges thrown up by security priva-
tisation echo the contested nature of the SSR concept by highlighting the 
lack of policy consensus or effective coordination among donor states and 
the concern by ‘recipients’ over imposing ‘Western’ approaches in the sensi-
tive area of national security. The lack of a gold standard among actors in-
volved in this field makes all the more important the need for practical and 
practicable lessons learned. Critically, security governance is a functional 
concept which through focusing on the modes and structures by which secu-
rity is provided, managed and overseen, points to ways to address both de-
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mocratic and security deficits. This volume hopes to make a contribution to 
the literature on privatisation by applying such a pragmatic approach. 
This introductory chapter begins by highlighting some of the key is-
sues drawn from an analysis of security privatisation within a broader policy 
context. It then considers different regional and national perspectives in or-
der to compare experience and identify potential lessons learned. Both the 
need for and efforts to date at regulation are then considered. Finally, this 
chapter considers a number of cross-cutting issues in relation to security 
privatisation and its links to the broader security governance agenda. 
The International Policy Context 
Conflict, its underlying causes and the ways in which both local and interna-
tional actors can address them are closely linked to the concept of fragile 
statehood, defined by Schneckener in terms of state structures and institu-
tions which have severe deficits in performing key tasks and functions for its 
citizens. Importantly, such states are not limited to failed or conflict-torn 
nations but include a much wider range of contexts characterised by deficits 
in governance, control and legitimacy. Distinguishing between ‘threat’ and 
‘risk’ he echoes the United Nations Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel 
on Threats, Challenges and Change which emphasised that fragile statehood 
is at the core of many international security challenges.7 The distinction is an 
important one because it conditions the nature of the response, in particular, 
whether such states are perceived as hostile or whether they are seen as hav-
ing certain deficits which need to be addressed in order to avoid the prolif-
eration of insecurity. 
In considering the role of the state in security governance many con-
tributors recognise that a central challenge is not just the state’s ability but its 
willingness to provide security on behalf of its citizens. Armed non-state 
actors (ANSAs) relate to both aspects of security provision. They may un-
dermine a state’s ability to provide security to its citizens but at the same 
time may exist in response to the state security sector’s inability to provide 
such security (or even to provoke insecurity through repression and vio-
lence). The typology of ANSAs provided by Schneckener highlights both 
these dimensions but also the interrelationship between state and non-state 
actors whether for political or self-interested reasons. This is a relationship 
characterised by uncertainty and change as demonstrated by his example of 
the ‘sobel’ (soldier and rebel) combining a role in the state security sector 
with engagement in criminal activities for profit. It is also necessarily fluid 
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since yesterday’s rebel is today’s warlord who may be tomorrow’s criminal 
or terrorist. In contrast to classical guerrilla or rebel movements, nearly all 
the actors covered in his typology8 place little emphasis on the international 
law distinction between combatants and non-combatants and thereby reflect 
the reality that civilian populations have become primary targets in contem-
porary conflicts. As discussed below, international actors may have an im-
portant impact on how individuals and groups transition between these cate-
gories. 
Wulf (Chapter 5) argues that international interventions are marked by 
two shortcomings: a lack of success in implementation and an absence of 
democratic legitimacy. While inherent democratic deficits provide a shaky 
basis to intervene to improve democratic governance, an increase in such 
interventions has led to overstretch in the military and security forces of 
intervening states – given the extent of post-Cold War demobilisation – but 
also the challenge of re-orienting capabilities away from the traditional role 
of protecting the nation state towards new and complex challenges such as 
peacekeeping, peace enforcement or post-conflict peacebuilding that typi-
cally combine both security and development dimensions. And as Bailes 
points out, if the most serious problems of security privatisation relate to the 
governance field, it is important to recognise that their roots are economic. 
Privatisation is a means for both Western and developing states to ease re-
source burdens and plug capability gaps. For both these reasons the market 
has opened up to private providers offering a range of services from general 
supply, logistic support, training, repair and maintenance of equipment, to 
intelligence-gathering and interrogation. Fundamentally, if the governance of 
national armed forces is difficult, and the ‘double democratic deficit’9 of the 
internationalised use of force further confuses this picture, then tasking pri-
vate companies can only further complicate this endeavour. 
In shining a light on challenges of privatisation and internationalisa-
tion, good government through developing state institutions and mechanisms 
for the democratic control of the security sector is essential. But given the 
deficits discussed above, such efforts will be insufficient without parallel 
emphasis on good governance at local, regional and international levels. 
Whatever the difficulties, acknowledged by the author, in implementing such 
a framework, Wulf’s vision of a multi-level public monopoly of force which 
reinforces the roles of the nation state and (primarily) the United Nations at 
the global level with increased emphasis on both the regional and local lev-
els aptly captures the complexities of contemporary security governance and 
stresses that meeting the challenges posed by top-down and bottom-up priva-
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tisation can only be achieved through addressing security and democratic 
deficits at international, state and sub-state levels. 
Another significant contemporary trend is that of transnationalisation. 
National-level security governance has to be understood as inextricably 
linked to regional and global levels. Attention to regulation at the national 
level is insufficient where the largest PSCs work through national subsidiar-
ies, so the impact may well be felt beyond national boundaries. Regulation at 
the state level is increasingly difficult in an environment shaped by non-
traditional, non-state multi- or transnational actors. In the case of insurgent 
movements, Schnabel (Chapter 4) emphasises that globalisation has pro-
vided a new impetus. The internet extends their reach to support bases for 
fundraising as well as the pursuit of weapons, making dual-use technologies 
and training more readily accessible. Groups operating through transnational 
networks and ties link war or post-war economies with global shadow 
economies as well as political agendas disseminated through diasporas, non-
governmental organisations (NGOs), third states and the media. As a conse-
quence, the multi-dimensional nature of insurgencies in a globalised world 
calls for multi-pronged responses by the international community. As one 
example, United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1373 and 137710 
were designed to address the financial support base of terrorist groups post-
9/11 by creating universally applicable norms and obligations for govern-
ment action to block terrorist funding. Although this initiative has had mea-
gre results in financial terms, Bailes notes that it has raised awareness of 
terrorism in the banking and business communities and forced familiarisa-
tion with traditional means of banking such as the ‘hawala’ system prevalent 
in Islamic societies. Indeed this example raises the question whether some of 
the heat generated in discussions on the roles played by PMCs/PSCs is down 
to ‘lost in translation’ misunderstandings among stakeholders with very dif-
ferent frames of reference to shape their understandings of security privatisa-
tion. 
Regional and National Perspectives 
Perspectives on security privatisation are provided in the very different con-
texts of Europe and the former Soviet space, the Middle East and South Af-
rica. A number of contributors point to the specificity of these cases and the 
consequent lack of lessons to be drawn that would be of use in other con-
texts. However, looking across the cases, a number of parallels do emerge 
linking security privatisation to the broader field of security governance. It is 
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therefore important to more clearly map privatisation in these different con-
texts in order to develop a wider picture that captures the role of the state as 
well as a range of sub-national and international actors in promoting secu-
rity, justice and development. Only from such a basis can entry points for 
reform be identified and programmes calibrated in a realistic manner. 
Failure to adequately reintegrate former combatants has been directly 
linked to increased criminality and a return to violence in post-conflict 
states.11 Extensive post-Cold War demobilisation of armed and security 
forces has played a central role in the growth of the private security industry 
at both national and international levels. In each of these cases, demobilisa-
tion provided qualified personnel with limited options beyond using skills 
already learned in the police, armed forces or intelligence services, so re-
maining in the security sector – whether legitimately or as ‘violence entre-
preneurs’ – was almost the only available option. The ongoing insurgency in 
Iraq continues to undermine efforts to achieve stability and reconstruction 
while in Africa the problem poses an acute security dilemma given the de-
stabilising impact of mercenaries moving from conflict to conflict. The con-
sequences of the downsizing and reform – more aptly described as ‘trans-
formation’ – of the South African security sector that formed a key part of its 
democratic transition still play out today.12 As Taljaard (Chapter 9) notes, 
the same resource pool of ex-South African Defence Force (SADF) person-
nel fuels both PMCs and mercenary activities, as evidenced in 2004 by the 
high-profile coup attempt in Equatorial Guinea.  
Gounev (Chapter 6) notes that in Bulgaria the decision taken in 1991 
to relinquish the state’s monopoly of force was a deliberate one aimed at 
meeting the employment needs of laid-off security personnel as well as the 
peculiar category of former state-sponsored athletes and their social net-
works that were to prove highly influential in the privatised Bulgarian secu-
rity sector. But weak state capacities in the area of the judiciary and law 
enforcement, a large grey economy and the downsizing of the police gener-
ated a vicious cycle of increased criminality and a deficit in the provision of 
security and its oversight by the state.  
In the post-Soviet cases discussed by Hiscock (Chapter 7), security 
privatisation was a consequence of the ‘big bang’ resulting from the Soviet 
Union’s collapse. Property was privatised and redistributed and in the ab-
sence of state provision the ‘krysha’ system of organisations and individuals 
protected clients as well as their business interests. Although downsizing is 
important to understanding this dynamic, it is significant that in many cases 
the Soviet-era security networks were not broken up but part-privatised, with 
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profit replacing repression as the underlying rationale. In Ukraine, the Minis-
try for Internal Affairs (MIA) plays a major role in privatisation through 
promoting the State Protection Service with the advantage that only it has 
the right to possess firearms or protect institutions such as banks, therefore 
establishing a quasi-monopoly on certain areas of the market. In Georgia a 
commercialised state body also has a strong presence but links to the MIA 
are less explicit, under pressure from the US, EU and OSCE who are sup-
porting police reform efforts in the country. 
In contrast, in the Middle East security remains by and large guarded 
jealously by the state. This is enshrined in legal frameworks as in Saudi Ara-
bia where local security guards must replace expatriate staff within a 90-day 
period. Iraq is therefore very much the exception. For Isenberg (Chapter 8), 
the extent of the PMC/PSC presence reflects a grave miscalculation of the 
extent of the post-‘active combat’ stability and reconstruction task and the 
impact of the insurgency on pursuing these goals. Contractor support on a 
massive scale has therefore been necessary in areas from logistics to protec-
tion and, to a lesser extent, training of Iraqi security forces. 
The issue of PSC effectiveness is particularly important in security-
related public sector contracts. According to Gounev, contracts relating to 
border guard duties or the protection of Bulgaria’s only nuclear power sta-
tion were awarded to PSCs on a cost-based calculation in comparison to 
using state security forces but also as a result of the political influence of 
stakeholders with an interest in the companies concerned. The combination 
of profit and interests pose broader questions over whether such actors have 
appropriate training and skills to deal with complex issues such as traffick-
ing, the particular security challenge of guarding highly sensitive fissile ma-
terials, or, as discussed below, in training armed and security forces in areas 
such as policing or counter-insurgency techniques. 
Challenges of Regulation 
Effective regulation of PMCs and PSCs requires an interlocking framework 
of national, regional and international control mechanisms.13 Where a level 
of consensus does exist is that existing laws at the international level are 
insufficient and national laws are lacking in many countries, creating a legal 
grey zone. Potential measures have been discussed at length in the relevant 
literature as well as in policy circles, to include amending the Geneva Con-
ventions, registration and licensing of companies as in the case of arms ex-
ports and regulation (including improved self-regulation) of the industry. 
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Efforts toward national regulation in Bulgaria are instructive in dem-
onstrating the difficulties of implementing such measures in practice. Ban-
ning illegal PSCs through prohibiting owners or employees with criminal 
records provoked a ‘rebranding’ of these organisations as insurance compa-
nies and also expanded the market since many saw the new legislation as an 
opportunity to register companies. An amended law was accompanied by 
enforcement measures and complemented by reform of the criminal justice 
system (four times as many individuals were prosecuted in Bulgaria during 
1999 as in 1993) under the pressure of meeting EU and NATO accession 
criteria. Tellingly, the most recent amendments to the legislation covering 
the private security industry were spurred from within the industry itself with 
the goal of cutting bureaucracy and clarifying market rules and regulations.  
Only the United States and South Africa have national legislation cov-
ering the provision of PMC/PSC services in 3rd countries. Taljaard distin-
guishes between these two regulatory frameworks on the basis that the South 
African Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act (RFMA) is under-
scored by the drive to promote an ‘ethical’ foreign policy. This position re-
flects the distrust of the post-Apartheid political authorities for an industry 
largely staffed by Apartheid-era security personnel and a consequent reluc-
tance to see security in private hands. The difficulty posed by this approach 
is set in stark relief by the paucity of licensing requests to the relevant au-
thorities when set against the numerous South African companies and indi-
viduals involved in such work in Iraq. The broad scope of the legislation and 
loopholes which include extremely high evidentiary requirements – resulting 
in unsatisfactory plea-bargains – and vulnerability to organisations shifting 
their territorial base of operations has impaired its effectiveness. New legis-
lation currently under review seeks to close these loopholes but according to 
Taljaard policy, legal and practical problems remain. 
In the case of peacekeeping and humanitarian interventions there is no 
consensus on the use of PSCs/PMCs in terms of their sustainability, effec-
tiveness or value for money. However, the increasing targeting of non-
combatants in recent conflicts has extended to increased intimidation or vio-
lence against relief and development agency (RDA) personnel which has 
heightened the interaction of such organisations with PSCs. In contrast to the 
commonly-held argument that much of the heat in the privatisation debate is 
taken up by the PSC/PMC phenomenon, Spearin (Chapter 12) points out that 
RDAs tend to have well-developed guidelines and protocols for interacting 
with militias, rebel forces, indigenous and foreign militaries but less famili-
arity with PSCs. 
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The lack of national legislation is striking given the profile of the in-
dustry, particularly so in Europe where a growing segment is based. Krah-
mann (Chapter 10) notes the complementary though neglected regulatory 
role of the European Union (EU) in harmonising export controls of military 
services and argues that such regional-level regulation should be encouraged 
and would be supported by both governments and the industry. The EU 
Code of Conduct on Arms Exports is notable in promoting transparency 
among member states and could be expanded to military and security ser-
vices while under the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) a com-
mon EU position – as exists on brokering – could require member states to 
implement national legislation on the export of military and security ser-
vices. These suggestions point to the overlapping nature of national and re-
gional regulation, suggesting a potential dynamic for harmonisation as has 
been witnessed in many other areas of EU competence. A forceful EU role 
in this field could also provide important emulation effects for other regional 
organisations. 
The Bulgarian and Georgian cases have demonstrated that accession 
pressures for aspirant members of the Euro-Atlantic clubs can have a posi-
tive impact on SSR, including on regulation of the private sector. Krahmann 
points out that many of the Central and Eastern European states have more 
extensive licensing requirements than older EU member states. These exam-
ples point to the ‘teeth’ inherent in accession processes which could certainly 
be made more explicit in the appropriate conditionalities with regard to regu-
lation of the private security sector. 
On regional and global levels, Ghebali describes the problems and 
loopholes inherent in three international legal frameworks addressing mer-
cenarism: the 1977 Amended Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions; the 
1977 Organisation of African Unity Libreville Convention for the Elimina-
tion of Mercenarism in Africa; and the 1989 United Nations Convention 
against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries. Chal-
lenges include the cumulative character of these agreements which make 
categorisation difficult; emphasis on ‘participation in hostilities’ which ex-
cludes a wide range of relevant actors; and a nationality requirement circum-
vented by individuals assuming local nationality to avoid being caught 
within the definition. The UN Working Group on Mercenaries, which re-
placed the function of the Special Rapporteur in April 2005 on the decision 
of the UN Commission on Human Rights, seeks to map the use of 
PMC/PSCs by UN bodies in order to ensure the appropriate application of 
international humanitarian law (IHL) and human rights standards. It has also 
Approaching the Privatisation of Security from  
a Security Governance Perspective 
13
encouraged the adoption of appropriate legislation and registration in export-
ing and user states. 
Private Actors and Security Governance 
Current debate in the policy discourse on SSR places particular emphasis on 
two interrelated issues: the need to promote local ownership as the centre-
piece of effective SSR and the importance of holistic interventions by exter-
nal actors in order to implement SSR in a joined-up manner across a range of 
different reform contexts. The European Commission’s Concept for Euro-
pean Community Support for Security Sector Reform underlines as a guiding 
principle the need for ‘nationally/regionally-owned reform processes de-
signed to strengthen good governance, democratic norms, the rule of law and 
the respect for human rights, in line with internationally agreed norms’.14 
The OECD’s Development Assistance Committee is currently developing an 
implementation framework for SSR (IF-SSR) which is intended to provide 
operational guidance for practitioners. The draft ‘Key Messages’ document 
for the IF SSR underlines that ‘reforms that are not shaped and driven by 
local actors are unlikely to be implemented properly and sustained’ and rec-
ognises a current weakness that ‘SSR is still discussed at the conceptual 
level in Headquarters and delivered and funded at the tactical level in the 
field’.15 Finally, although the UN has been engaged for many years in a wide 
range of SSR activities (if not necessarily labelled as such), there is increas-
ing interest within the UN system for a common, comprehensive and coordi-
nated UN approach to SSR, leading to greater clarity on roles and responsi-
bilities across the UN system.16  
Issues of local ownership and the importance of tailored external in-
terventions are relevant to both top-down and bottom-up privatisation. The 
following section therefore links security privatisation to these two broader 
SSR themes. In order to emphasise and link some of the key empirical find-
ings from this volume it focuses primarily on the different dimensions of 
top-down security privatisation.  
Local Ownership and Security Privatisation 
Regardless of the reform context, establishing sustainable national authori-
ties and supporting domestic constituencies is a pre-condition for stability 
and longer-term development. It is not for external actors to address the root 
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causes of grievance or conflict but they can assist national actors in develop-
ing solutions based on international norms and standards. For example, 
Schnabel observes that domestic authorities may be unsuitable agents in 
stopping insurgent violence, tending to overreact – which can strengthen the 
insurgency and its support – or to be too defensive in appeasing such actors 
– which can be similarly counter-productive. However, if international actors 
are to contribute meaningfully in addressing these issues then the importance 
of understanding context is essential. 
The problem of local ownership in SSR is a specific example of how a 
conceptually uncontested principle has proved highly difficult to implement 
in practice. A central problem remains in how to ensure that local actors 
behave any better than external providers in the light of dramatic governance 
and capacity deficits. These issues are highly sensitive and shaped by very 
specific local contexts: in Iraq, PMCs have, according to Isenberg, been pre-
ferred by Iraqis to locals as more trustworthy; the impetus behind South 
African regulation of the private security sector has been to prevent its na-
tionals from engaging in military- and security-related activities, particularly 
in other African countries even when this may relate to legitimate security 
and development activities; and Taljaard’s example of members of the South 
African Police Force’s Special Task Force resigning to pursue more lucra-
tive work in Iraq demonstrates how public/private distinctions become in-
creasingly blurred if you scratch under the surface. 
Deficits and contradictions that are magnified in weak states only rein-
force the need to enhance the role of local governance actors – including 
parliaments in their legislative and budgetary functions – to shape executive 
decisions. Even in areas where significant national regulation has been de-
veloped over a lengthy period the regulatory function is typically linked to 
the police or Ministry of the Interior rather than among actors such as par-
liament, civil society, local government institutions or the executive more 
broadly. This results in a lack of adequate checks and balances and a failure 
to shift from institutional readjustment to having a positive effect on human 
security. Participation by a broad range of stakeholders is therefore key to 
legitimate and sustainable reform processes. 
Legitimacy and accountability lie at the heart of addressing the de-
mocratic and security deficits discussed in this volume. Certainly the conse-
quences of police officers working for private gain as in Ukraine cannot be 
ascertained without budgetary transparency or adequate levels of democratic 
oversight.  Accountability of external actors to local authorities is therefore 
critical. Isenberg may be right that the Executive Outcomes/Sandline profile 
is out of date in terms of the roles played by the modern PMC/PSC industry. 
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But if this is the image held by local actors, the perception is significant. As 
Wilson (Chapter 13) emphasises, if external actors are to play a meaningful 
role then process is as important as substance. Even where sound interna-
tionally-recognised practices exist for regulation, legislation or oversight, the 
process of local analysis, consultation and debate is key to embedding re-
forms. 
Local ownership is also about taking into account local capacities for 
reform. The absence of effective Iraqi governance institutions is a compel-
ling, if conditional argument for private actors to operate without reference 
to local authorities. But a blanket assertion that companies would not work 
without immunity from local justice systems is both dubious and undermines 
the legitimacy of the work being carried out, regardless of its quality. In 
Georgia, where police reform is a central focus of SSR, limited capacity to 
pass legislation means that standards or new laws for the private sector do 
not feature highly on the priority list. Yet while for Bulgaria in the early 
1990s the private security industry was a key player and the need for regula-
tion evident, in Georgia and Ukraine police and military reform have a 
higher priority. Ultimately, given the limited capacities of weak states, se-
quencing of SSR activities must reflect the absorptive capacity of local ac-
tors and institutions. Regulation of private sector actors must be realistically 
prioritised alongside other reform needs. 
Privatisation, SSR and the Challenges of Intervention 
Although with long historical antecedents, private security actors’ involve-
ment in fields such as SSR is relatively new, as are many of the actors in-
volved. More generally, SSR remains contested in both theory and practice 
and much remains to be learned to inform future activities. The conflation of 
different private security providers described earlier in this chapter is signifi-
cant in that it sends a powerful message that for the recipient a sleek corpo-
rate profile and legitimate mandates from bi- and multilateral donors make 
little difference if such actors remain opaque and unaccountable and there-
fore undermine local political authorities. Indeed, Ghebali’s inference that 
the mandate of the second Special Rapporteur on Mercenaries was abruptly 
curtailed as a result of developing states’ displeasure at her proactive ap-
proach to the private security industry is testimony to this. Yet while ac-
knowledging the strong historical resonance of modern security providers, 
particularly in Africa, analytically it is not adequate to adopt such a position 
if these concerns are to be addressed. 
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Bailes makes a compelling normative argument that the globalising 
trends which underpin security privatisation make it increasingly illogical for 
defence and security to be treated apart for reasons of transparency and cor-
porate governance. Licensing of companies, services, corporate transpar-
ency, justiciability of offences, stricter contract terms, black lists, monitoring 
and enforcement of global rules and norms such as through the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) are all part of getting closer to a gold standard. The 
defence and security sectors have not historically faced significant share-
holder scrutiny. However, beyond self-regulation, there would be merit in 
looking further at this aspect of good governance, mirroring the corporate 
social responsibility movement. 
Measuring the performance – including the cost-effectiveness – of 
PMCs is not clear-cut nor should be generalisable since it will be dependent 
on the framing and implementation of individual contracts. But what cer-
tainly can be attributed to privatisation is that the benefits of direct interface, 
mutual learning and experience transfer are difficult to realise. This is sig-
nificant since a lack of transparency works against the industry because only 
the negative issues – such as accusations of overcharging – tend to be visi-
ble. Performance and ways in which to better understand success and failure 
provide the correct and pragmatic lens through which to judge all contribu-
tors to SSR. Drawing on experience in the economics field, Wilson identifies 
definability and observability as key criteria to achieving more measurable 
results. 
As an example of the former, Wilson cites the incongruity of Sierra 
Leone, often flagged as a success story for SSR when it remains second from 
bottom of the UN Human Development Index. It also displays many of the 
tensions between local ownership and external intervention as well as gains 
achieved through flexible approaches to overcoming such challenges.17 
Greater attention to definability does not mean tying performance indicators 
to long-term socio-economic trends influenced by a range of factors beyond 
the scope of SSR. It does however require a transition from outputs to out-
comes in order to avoid problems such as ‘workshop proliferation’. 
Contracting is a two-way street. Experience in Iraq clearly shows a 
gap both in Washington and in the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) 
with insufficient people adequately trained to design, implement and oversee 
contracts. Regulation of PMCs/PSCs in Iraq has evolved over time, with a 
US Department of Defense Directive as late as October 2005 clarifying the 
status and rights to bear arms of contractor personnel. Alongside this, Isen-
berg identifies a raft of US legislation to which contractors are accountable. 
Problems of accountability have also been highlighted in the vetting and 
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tracking of personnel, with this task left to the firms themselves. This dem-
onstrates the observability dilemma of donors at headquarters monitoring 
consultants in the field. More flexible contracting procedures that take into 
account the politicised, non-linear nature of SSR and build on good private 
sector practices are therefore essential. 
SSR requires new capabilities and more targeted learning from previ-
ous experience that cuts across public and private sectors. Wilson makes the 
important point that beyond PMCs/PSCs, the private sector in the shape of 
consultants as well as various research and policy organisations are already 
heavily involved in SSR policy research, training and consultancy services. 
PSCs can greatly improve their own profiles by embracing principles of 
transparency and accountability and demonstrating sensitivity to local con-
texts. Vinnell’s unsuccessful application of experience gained in training the 
well-paid, well-educated Saudi National Guard operating in a benign envi-
ronment to unpaid, unskilled armed forces recruits from Baghdad faced with 
high levels of violence (Chapter 8) would seem to provide a compelling 
counterfactual. National subsidiaries of international companies using pre-
dominantly local staff as in Sierra Leone and Iraq may be a way of encour-
aging knowledge transfer and capacity-building while time-limiting the ten-
ure of external experts although a blunt instrument at least prioritises knowl-
edge transfer. Maximising the use of local staff, including in management 
positions, has met with some success in fields such as mine action but re-
quires an explicit normative and resource commitment to move from token-
ism to building sustainable local capacity. 
In SSR there is a need for approaches that reflect and build on the 
strengths of a broad range of skills sets and private actors are already central 
to both policy-making and programming. Analysis of both top-down and 
bottom-up privatisation show that there is not a need for Western models but 
certainly an understanding of what different actors have to offer and the de-
velopment of ‘house styles’. Overall, what Wilson terms the ‘under-
developed SSR eco-system’ offers a range of opportunities if actors are pre-
pared to share knowledge, show flexibility and integrate efforts. 
Conclusion 
The contributions to this volume cover a range of disparate private actors 
who have in common that they play a significant if differentiated role in 
security governance. Collectively, an analysis of top-down and bottom-up 
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privatisation poses questions that merit a broader debate on the role of the 
state in the provision of security. It is also important to recognise the democ-
ratic and security deficits that underpin both the need for non-state security 
and in many cases its provision. Operationalising principles of democratic 
governance are central to addressing these deficits.  
History continues to weigh heavily on parts of the private security in-
dustry. It is important to look openly at the capacities on offer and gauge in a 
balanced fashion the trade-offs involved in different options. There is a great 
deal to be learned through drawing on a range of public and private sector 
competences in terms of good practice and cross-fertilisation of expertise. It 
is therefore essential to harness its dynamics in a positive way. However, 
such developments must be consistent with the normative imperative of the 
security governance approach. Performance gains through the use of private 
security actors will be more than outweighed by the costs to long term secu-
rity and development of not implementing the principles of transparency and 
accountability to democratically elected authorities. 
Security privatisation in all its guises is not going away. Effective re-
sponses to complex security and development challenges can only be 
achieved if there is adequate coordination within and between an array of 
actors on all levels of governance. It is therefore essential to better under-
stand these actors and their influence in order to inform policy and opera-
tional decisions in highly specific local contexts. There is a clear need for 
increased dialogue among stakeholders – governments, international organi-
sations, industry and civil society – to achieve common understandings that 
will improve effectiveness and address genuine concerns of democratic gov-
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Fragile Statehood, Armed Non-State 
Actors and Security Governance 
Ulrich Schneckener 
Introduction 
In the modern world, the state – at least in theory – has to fulfil a dual func-
tion with regard to political order: first, the state shall organise and guarantee 
public order domestically within a defined territory; second, all states to-
gether constitute the international system and, thereby, the global order. Inef-
fective, weak, failing or failed states – which can be subsumed under the 
rubric of fragile statehood – tend to undermine both functions and cause 
problems at the national, regional and global level. In particular, for experts 
on development issues, it is common knowledge that many post-colonial (or 
post-Soviet) states are unable to provide basic public functions and services 
vis-à-vis their citizens and are incapable of performing their duties and re-
sponsibilities as members of the international community. In other words, 
fragile statehood poses challenges not only for governance internally, but 
also for any form of regional or global governance. 
However, until the turn of the century the issue was largely perceived 
by Western governments as a local affair, left to development experts and 
agencies. Only in extreme cases of humanitarian intervention has the issue of 
fragile statehood become connected to the field of international security pol-
icy. Otherwise, the topic did not receive any systematic or strategic treatment 
in Western foreign affairs and security thinking. This, however, changed 
profoundly after the terrorist acts of September 11, 2001 (9/11). The debate 
has shifted – rightly or wrongly – to a more security-oriented approach. The 
message of 9/11 seems to be clear: if local problems are ignored, they have 
the potential to produce global risks.  
Therefore, both the US National Security Strategy (September 2002) 
and the EU Security Strategy (December 2003) call ‘failing and failed states’ 
a security threat, i.e. a direct or indirect threat to peace and security for the 
US and the EU.1 Both strategies, however, fail to acknowledge the analytical 
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difference between a concrete threat and a more general risk. Fragile states 
should not be understood as a threat per se, but as an enabling factor or a 
catalyst for potential threats and – almost more importantly – as an obstacle 
to solving key global security issues. In a more comprehensive and more 
accurate way, the report ‘A More Secure World’ of the High-Level Panel on 
UN Reform (December 2004), initiated by UN Secretary-General Kofi An-
nan, underscores that the issue of fragile statehood is at the core of most of 
today's relevant security problems. The Panel identified six ‘clusters of 
threat’: (1) economic, social and ecological threats; (2) interstate conflicts; 
(3) intrastate conflicts; (4) proliferation of nuclear, radiological, biological 
and chemical weapons; (5) terrorism; and (6) transnational organised crime.2 
In contrast to the US and EU security strategies, failing and failed states are 
not mentioned as a threat. However, the authors made clear that none of 
these problems could be solved unless the international community ad-
dressed the phenomenon of fragile statehood. In this respect, the issue cuts 
across various ‘old’ and ‘new’ security concerns. This point can easily be 
illustrated with a few examples: a meaningful fight against AIDS and epi-
demics or the implementation of effective disaster-prevention policies is 
hardly possible without the involvement of state institutions. Similarly, the 
fight against poverty and the fair distribution of resources require the frame-
work of a state; moreover, the containment of organised crime, the preven-
tion of the proliferation of nuclear material by non-state actors and the fight 
against transnational terrorist networks require, inter alia, state mechanisms 
of control and means of enforcement; and the reconciliation of regional con-
flicts and civil wars is directly tied to the creation of legitimate state struc-
tures. 
Against this background, this chapter argues that the lack of legitimate 
and effective security governance in many parts of the world makes it diffi-
cult to contain and prevent the spread of transnational security problems. In 
this sense, one key question seems to be whether and how far states are able 
and willing to provide security for their own citizens, to establish appropriate 
structures and institutions and to allocate the necessary resources. A major 
challenge for local security governance, however, is posed by activities of a 
variety of armed non-state actors which undermine the state’s monopoly of 
the use of force. In extreme cases they may even replace the state and its 
security apparatus, at least at a sub-national level. This poses a number of 
relevant questions: Who are armed non-state actors and how can they be 
categorised? How far do these actors profit from characteristics of fragile 
statehood? To what extent do they affect security governance? How can one 
differentiate among potential ‘security providers’? And, more generally, 
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what strategies can reduce their capacities as ‘spoilers’ in state-building and 
peacebuilding efforts? The chapter will address these questions by providing 
a framework of analysis and by highlighting some hypotheses which could 
inform further empirical research and case study work. 
A Typology of Armed Non-State Actors  
In order to analyse the relationship between fragile statehood and armed 
non-state actors and its consequences for security governance, we need a 
better understanding of these actors. Generally speaking, armed non-state 
actors are 1) willing and able to use violence for pursuing their objectives; 
and 2) not integrated into formalised state institutions such as regular armies, 
presidential guards, police or special forces. They may, however, be sup-
ported by state actors whether in an official or informal manner. There may 
also be state officials who are directly or indirectly involved in the activities 
of armed non-state actors – sometimes for political purposes, but often for 
personal interests (i.e. corruption, clientelism). The following typology aims 
at identifying the most important and most frequently encountered armed 
non-state actors as well as highlighting their specific characteristics.3  
Rebels or guerrilla fighters, sometimes also referred to as partisans or 
franc tireurs, seek the ‘liberation’ of a social class or a ‘nation’. They fight 
for the overthrow of a government, for the secession of a region or for the 
end of an occupational or colonial regime. In that sense, they pursue a politi-
cal – mostly social-revolutionary or ethno-nationalistic – agenda, and view 
themselves as ‘future armies’ of a liberated population.4 Hence they some-
times also wear uniforms and emblems in order to benefit from the protec-
tion of international law provisions for combatants. In their military opera-
tions they avoid direct confrontation with their opponents; therefore, guer-
rilla warfare typically begins in rural areas, mountainous regions or in re-
mote areas that are beyond the central government’s control.5 Some writers 
have propagated the concept of an urban guerrilla that is supposed to func-
tion as a vanguard for the rural guerrilla.6 According to the doctrine of guer-
rilla warfare, guerrilla fighters depend on the local population for logistic 
and moral support. In reality, however, the most significant support comes 
from foreign governments or various non-state actors that provide safe ha-
vens, weapons, equipment and know-how.  
Militias or paramilitaries are irregular combat units that usually act on 
behalf of, or are at least tolerated by, a given regime. Their task is to fight 
rebels, to threaten specific groups or to kill opposition leaders. These militias 
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are often created, funded, equipped and trained in anti-guerrilla tactics 
(counter-insurgency) by state authorities. On behalf of the state they may 
handle the dirty business of targeted kidnappings and killings, massacres or 
ethnic cleansing. Nevertheless they often evade government control and, in 
the course of a conflict, develop their own agenda. Self-proclaimed defend-
ers of an existing system such as ‘protection forces’ (Schutzbünde or Heim-
wehren) or vigilantes also fall into this category since they mostly protect the 
interests of groups that benefit from the status quo (for example land owners, 
former combatants, officers, dominant ethno-national groups).7  
Clan chiefs or big men are traditional, local authorities who head a 
particular tribe, clan, ethnic or religious community.8 They have usually 
attained their positions according to traditional rules, whether by virtue of 
their age and experience, ancestry or personal ability to lead the group. In 
this regard, they can be seen as legitimate representatives of their people. 
Most often, they control a certain territory which may range from a few pe-
ripheral villages or settlements to larger regions. While this control can be 
formalised as kingdoms or chiefdoms with a certain degree of autonomy, it 
may also be more informal since in many cases it either exists parallel to or 
cuts across administrative units of the state. Most chiefs or big men also 
command an armed force recruited from members of their tribe or clan. 
These forces are mainly set up for the purpose of self-defence, but also for 
deterring and fighting internal rivals.9  
Warlords are local potentates who control a particular territory during 
or after the end of a violent conflict. They secure their power through private 
armies and benefit from war or post-war economies by exploiting resources 
(such as precious metals, tropical timber, commodities or drug cultivation) 
and/or the local population (for instance, through looting or levying ‘taxes’). 
In doing so they frequently capitalise on transnational ties and links to global 
markets.10 Warlords are a typical product of long-standing civil wars. Some 
of them, however, manage to perpetuate their rule even after the end of com-
bat activities. Quite often they attempt to legalise the benefits they acquired 
during the war by running for public office.11  
Terrorists aim to spread panic and fear in societies in order to achieve 
political goals, be they based on left- or right-wing, on social-revolutionary, 
nationalistic or religious ideologies.12 They are organised in a clandestine 
way, most often in small groups and cells, sometimes also in larger transna-
tional networks (in particular Al-Qaida or Jemaah Islamyya). Most long-
standing terrorist groups have a hierarchical structure with a command level 
at the top. Militarily speaking they are rather weak actors who use terrorist 
attacks primarily as a mean for addressing the wider public or, in some in-
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stances, the international media in order to communicate their grievances 
and ideology. Typical tactical means include kidnapping, hostage-taking, 
sabotage, murder, suicide attacks, vehicle bombs and improvised explosive 
devices. Possible targets range from military sites and official government 
buildings to companies, airports, restaurants, shopping malls and means of 
public transport.13  
Criminals are members of Mafia-type structures, syndicates or gangs, 
as well as counterfeiters, smugglers or pirates. Their core activities may in-
clude robbery, fraud, blackmail, contract killing or illegal (mostly transbor-
der) trade (e.g. in weapons, drugs, commodities, children and women). Or-
ganised crime in particular seeks political influence in order to secure its 
profit interests, and uses means such as bribery, targeted intimidation or 
murder.14 
Mercenaries and private security companies are volunteers usually re-
cruited from third states who are remunerated for fighting in combat units or 
for conducting special tasks on their own. They can serve different masters, 
ranging from the army of a state to warlords who promise them rewards. 
Therefore, in civil wars mercenaries are frequently to be found fighting on 
all sides. Mercenarism has a long-standing tradition. Among its famous pre-
cursors are the Condottieri – contractors who led bands of mercenaries hired 
for protective purposes by Italian city-states or princes from the 15th century 
onwards. Other historic examples are mercenaries in the 30 Years War (1618 
to 1648) or during the period of decolonisation post-1945 (e.g. the activities 
of former German Wehrmacht officers in Congo (‘Kongo-Müller’). This 
category also includes professional ‘bounty hunters’ who hunt down wanted 
(war) criminals or terrorists either on behalf of a government or on their own 
account in return for financial rewards. While traditional mercenaries are 
banned under international law, modern private security or military compa-
nies usually act on a legalised and licensed basis. They have professionalised 
and commercialised the business of providing combatants, trainers or advis-
ers, or other forms of operational or logistical support, and are contracted by 
governments, companies or other non-state actors.15  
Marauders by contrast are demobilised or scattered former combat-
ants who engage in looting, pillaging, and terrorising defenceless civilians 
during or after the end of a violent conflict. They display a relatively low 
level of organisational cohesion and move from one place to another. A pe-
culiar version is the so-called sobel, a neologism combining the words sol-
dier and rebel. On the one hand, sobels are members of an under-funded 
army. However, after work they make private profit out of criminal and 
commercial activities (e.g. looting, robbery, the collection of protection 
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money, abductions, lynching). Marauders are therefore beneficiaries of a 
chaotic situation triggered by the central government’s loss of control over 
(parts of) its territory. In some cases, however, marauders may be deployed 
strategically by regular armed forces, paramilitaries or political movements 
as auxiliaries to handle the dirty business of ethnic cleansing, massacres of 
the civilian population or the persecution of political opponents. 
Most of these armed non-state actors share a common feature in that 
by using violent means they do not attach great importance to the distinction 
made by international law between combatants and non-combatants. If any-
thing, such a distinction may have played a role for classical rebel or guer-
rilla movements, who avoided using excessive violence against the civilian 
population, since the latter represented a source of – at least temporary – 
support for the insurgents. They primarily attacked members of the regular 
armed and security forces; however, they tended to view as 'combatants' all 
representatives of the state apparatus (e.g. politicians, policemen or judges) 
and thereby extended the notion of combatant far beyond the rather strict 
definition of international law. In contemporary conflicts, especially intra-
state ones, the distinction between combatants and non-combatants is in-
creasingly blurred. Far from receiving special protection the civilian popula-
tion has for a number of reasons become the primary target of various armed 
non-state actors pursuing political and economic gains. 
Another trend emerging since the 1990s has been the process of trans-
nationalisation; most groups and organisations increasingly operate via 
transnational networks and transnational ties, thereby gaining new room for 
manoeuvre. Transnationalisation not only facilitates the linking-up of war or 
post-war economies with cross-border smuggling routes and global ‘shadow’ 
markets; it moreover fosters the transmission of political agendas and ideo-
logical propaganda that are disseminated through international supporters 
(such as diasporas or exile communities, third states, NGOs) and interna-
tional media. The degree of such transnationalisation processes varies from 
one type to another: whereas rebels, warlords, mercenaries, criminals and 
numerous terrorist organisations make use of transnational relations, this is 
much less true for clan chiefs, big men, marauders and most militias. 
Despite their similarities, from an analytical point of view, four crite-
ria in particular bring the differences between these types into relief (see 
Table 1):  
 
1. Change versus status quo orientation: Some armed non-state actors 
seek a (radical) change of the status quo; they demand a different gov-
ernment, a different political system, the secession of a region, a new 
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world order, etc. By contrast, other groups – whether driven by their 
own interests or instigated by those in power whom they serve – aim 
at securing and consolidating the status quo. The former position ap-
plies to terrorists as well as rebels and guerrilla fighters, whereas the 
latter applies to warlords and criminals who generally seek to secure 
their achieved political and economic privileges. The same is often 
true for clan chiefs and big men, in particular when they are integrated 
into the political system by means of co-optive rule or neo-patrimonial 
structures. The prototypes of a status quo movement, however, are mi-
litias or paramilitary organisations, respectively, who are deployed to 
protect the rule of a regime or the dominance of particular groups. 
Mercenaries or marauders, by contrast, behave rather opportunisti-
cally; sometimes they may serve the interest of status quo forces, 
while at other times they may challenge them.  
2. Territorial versus non-territorial aspirations: Both guerrilla move-
ments and warlords, in principle, aim at the conquest and – if possible 
– the permanent control of territory. Mercenaries are usually em-
ployed for similar purposes. Clan chiefs are usually also connected to 
a particular territory or region. Terrorists, on the other hand, might 
have territorial ambitions (e.g. the creation of their own state); how-
ever, they are neither willing nor able to conquer territory and defend 
it by military means. The same applies to criminals and marauders if 
one neglects the control of town districts or villages. Militias include 
both variants. Some (especially large) militia organisations are capa-
ble of securing or reconquering territory from rebels, whereas other 
units are assigned special tasks apart from territorial control, such as 
the persecution of dissidents. 
3. Physical versus psychological violence: Rebels and guerrilla move-
ments pursue their goals by using physical violence. Their aim is to 
weaken their opponent’s military strength, defeat him or force him to 
surrender, and subsequently take his place. Terrorists, by contrast, of-
ten employ psychological techniques. In between these two extremes 
other armed non-state actors are to be found: clan chiefs or mercenar-
ies use primarily physical violence in order to defeat opponents, while 
for marauders and criminals the threat and use of violence is often 
merely a means of intimidation. Finally, militias and warlords are 
rather ambivalent with regard to the type of violence they use; de-
pending on the group itself and the general circumstances they make 
use of both forms of violence. 
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4. Greed versus grievance: Whereas guerrilla movements, militias, clan 
chiefs, big men and terrorist groups pursue – at least rhetorically – a 
socio-political agenda for which they need economic resources, the 
reverse usually holds true for warlords and criminals. They are pri-
marily interested in securing economic and commercial privileges. Po-
litical power and public offices as well as the use of violence serve the 
realisation of economic interests. In that sense warlords and criminals 
are not ‘apolitical’ actors; yet their motivation for joining the political 
struggle for power is different from that of other political actors. Simi-
larly, mercenaries and marauders pursue primarily economic gains.  
Table 2.1: Types of armed non-state actors 




















Big men  Status quo  Territorial Physical Political  
Warlords  Status quo Territorial Physical Psy-chological Economic 
Terrorists Change Non-territorial Psychological Political 
Criminals, 
Mafia, Gangs  Status quo Non-territorial Psychological Economic 
Mercenaries, 
PMCs/PSCs  Indifferent 
Ter-
ritorial Physical Economic 
Marauders, 
‘sobels’  Indifferent Non-territorial Psychological Economic 
Clearly, this characterisation is based on ideal-types. In reality numer-
ous grey zones exist, since groups sometimes undergo transformation in the 
course of a conflict. Rebels, big men or marauders, for instance, turn into 
warlords; militias or warlords may degenerate into ordinary criminals; 
criminals become involved in terrorist networks and vice versa; militias, 
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rebels or warlords increasingly employ terrorist methods, and so on. In many 
cases hybrid forms integrate features of different ideal types, such as the 
Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, the FARC in Colombia or Maoist rebels in Nepal. 
These organisations not only control significant territory but continue to 
launch terrorist attacks nationwide. They employ physical as well as psycho-
logical violence and pursue far-reaching economic interests. Nonetheless it 
does make sense to hold onto these distinctions, because they allow us to 
make statements regarding the extent to which particular groups or individu-
als correspond to these ideal-type categories. More importantly, in order to 
analyse the transformation of a particular group, criteria which distinguish 
one situation from another are necessary. This exercise not only has interna-
tional legal and sociological implications, but is also relevant for practical 
policy purposes since it may be helpful for developing hypotheses as to ac-
tors that are more or less likely to be integrated into state-building and 
peacebuilding efforts. 
Relating Fragile Statehood to Armed Non-State Actors 
Fragile statehood can be defined in terms of state structures and institutions 
which have severe deficits in performing key tasks and functions vis-à-vis 
their citizens. Fragile states are characterised by deficits in governance, con-
trol and legitimacy. This concept, however, covers a broad spectrum of 
states and is not limited to failed or collapsed states or to conflict-torn socie-
ties. The term statehood is used to avoid restricting the analysis to the gov-
ernment and its bureaucratic apparatus; it comprises instead a range of actors 
such as political parties and public institutions as well as different levels of 
governance (sub-national, local). Statehood, therefore, is a functional term 
which focuses on core state functions, on the political decision-making proc-
ess and on the implementation of decisions as well as on the political order 
in general. 
In order to operationalise the concept, it is helpful to distinguish at 
least three basic state functions: security, welfare and legitimacy/rule of 
law.16 First, ideally, the state has to provide physical security for its citizens 
– internally as well as externally. The state should be able to control its terri-
tory and borders, safeguard the security of its citizens vis-à-vis each other 
and defend against external security threats, ensure public access to natural 
resources and enforce tax administration. In short, the state has to ensure the 
monopoly of the use of force as well as the monopoly on raising taxes and 
revenues. Plausible indicators of state failure in this respect are: a lack of 
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effective control of the state’s territory as a whole; weak control of interna-
tional borders; non-existent or limited control over tax and tariff revenues as 
well as of natural resources; an increasing number of relevant armed non-
state actors; disintegration, fragmentation or commercialisation of the state’s 
security forces; a massive incidence of crime; and, the use of state security 
forces against the population of the state.  
Second, the state should provide basic goods and services as well as 
distributive mechanisms – both financed by a regular state budget. This wel-
fare function includes, inter alia, macro-economic governance, social poli-
cies, management of resources, education and healthcare, environmental 
protection policy as well as the establishment of physical infrastructure. 
Typical indicators of deficits are: the systematic exclusion of particular 
groups from access to economic resources; severe financial and economic 
crises; the unequal distribution of wealth; decreasing state revenues; low 
state expenditures; high rates of unemployment; a significant decline in hu-
man development; poor public infrastructure; degradation of the educational 
and/or the health system; and environmental degradation (e.g. shortage of 
water). 
Third, the state should enjoy legitimation by being organised in a way 
that ensures modes of political participation, legitimacy of decision-making 
processes, stability of political institutions, rule of law and effective and 
accountable public administration. Indicators of state failure in this area in-
clude: limited political freedom; increasing repression against opposition 
groups; election fraud; systematic exclusion of certain groups from decision-
making and political participation; increasing human rights violations; no 
independent court and legal system; ineffective public administration; and an 
increasing level of corruption and clientelism. 
The effective performance of all three functions can be seriously chal-
lenged by armed non-state actors when they systematically exploit the con-
trol and legitimacy deficits of the government and other state institutions. In 
particular, capable actors like rebels, militias, warlords or clan chiefs may 
even replace the state to some extent by providing a limited degree of secu-
rity and offering some kind of welfare to the local population, albeit often in 
an arbitrary and unreliable manner, which could further undermine the 
state’s legitimacy. 
Based on the capabilities of states to fulfil their core functions, various 
types or configurations of statehood can be differentiated. Each type has 
specific implications for the relationship between state and armed non-state 
actors as well as for the opportunity structures for armed non-state actors. 
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a. Weak statehood: The state’s institutions are still able to fulfil by and 
large the security function, but display grave deficiencies in fulfilling 
at least one of the two other functions. In other words, the government 
and its apparatus are not willing and/or able to deliver sufficient pub-
lic services and/or they suffer from severe legitimacy problems. This 
configuration can be studied in examples covering virtually all regions 
– see for example Macedonia and Albania in South Eastern Europe, 
most countries of Northern Africa, the Middle East and Central Asia 
as well as some states in Sub-Sahara Africa (e.g. Zimbabwe, Kenya, 
Zambia) and in Latin America (e.g. Venezuela, Bolivia, Peru). As 
these examples show, authoritarian or semi-authoritarian regimes of-
ten fall into that category. Despite appearing strong with regard to the 
monopoly of the use of force, they are in fact rather weak when it 
comes to provision of public services and their political and adminis-
trative systems, including the rule of law. Under these circumstances, 
armed non-state actors are usually not able to control a particular terri-
tory, or at least not for long periods. These states are thus not primar-
ily threatened by clan chiefs, rebels or warlords, but rather by smaller 
groups such as home-grown criminal and terrorist organisations. 
Moreover, in some cases militias or para-military groups set up by 
state authorities may play a role in oppressing regime critics or minor-
ity groups. On the whole, security governance is still very much 
shaped, dominated and financed by state institutions (security govern-
ance through government), however, frequently conducted in an inef-
fective way (e.g. because of widespread corruption) and characterised 
by human rights violations. 
b. Failing statehood: The state is no longer or has never been able to 
safeguard the security of its population. The monopoly of the use of 
force and the exclusive control over resources is either severely re-
stricted or entirely absent, while the state is nevertheless able to func-
tion in at least one of the other two areas. Examples include Algeria, 
Colombia, Sri Lanka, the Philippines, Indonesia, Nepal, Yemen, Paki-
stan or Georgia. These states do not completely control their territory, 
and they are mainly characterised by armed regional conflicts where 
violent non-state actors occupy and control certain regions. However, 
these states still deliver public services to the majority of the popula-
tion and/or still have some degree of political legitimacy. Sri Lanka 
serves as and example; despite the long-standing conflict in the north-
ern region, the state as such performs comparatively well, providing 
public services and running the political system. The examples show 
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that many states in the process of democratisation which are chal-
lenged by separatist forces fit in this category. Depending on the indi-
vidual case, security governance clearly involves a range of armed 
non-state actors; the government and its security apparatus is just one 
player among others (security governance beyond government). In 
particular, actors with territorial claims will figure rather prominently 
at the sub-national level, rebels, clan chiefs or big men may even be 
able to establish para-state structures. In addition, this type of state-
hood offers favourable opportunities for transnational criminal and 
terrorist networks which profit from the security gap and the state’s 
control deficits, especially regarding borders.  
c. Failed statehood (or collapsed statehood): None of the three state 
functions is effectively performed. Statehood as such has collapsed. 
There may still be a central government, but in lacking resources, ca-
pabilities and power, it has hardly any impact. Recent examples in-
clude war-torn countries such as Somalia, Afghanistan, the Democ-
ratic Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone and Liberia. In the past, An-
gola, Tajikistan and Lebanon also belonged in this category. In com-
parison to the other two types, this situation can be described as secu-
rity governance without government. Instead, the country in question 
is by and large dominated by relatively powerful armed non-state ac-
tors who rule not only regions and townships, but may also control the 
access to natural resources, trade and businesses as well as interna-
tional humanitarian aid. They act as de facto key ‘security providers’ 
based mainly on violence, suppression and intimidation, but some-
times also on popular support (e.g. in the cases of clan chiefs or re-
bels). Under these circumstances, the establishment of warlord re-
gimes is particularly significant. The same is true for the presence of 
mercenaries, criminals or marauders. In any case, the category failed 
states does not imply chaos or anarchy, but fragile and contested 
forms of political order established by a number of different non-state 
actors.  
 
The analysis of failures and their possible causes, however, does not 
give the full picture. Despite negative indicators, a number of fragile states 
prove to be surprisingly stable, even on a relative low level. In some cases, 
deficits in statehood and governance exist over decades without leading to a 
complete breakdown of state structures. In other words, in order to under-
stand fragile statehood, it is not just the question why things do not work, but 
also why some aspects of statehood are still in place that should be ad-
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dressed. Fragility always implies a certain degree of stability. These ‘stabi-
lising factors’ involve a range of social practices and political mechanisms, 
often developed by the ruling elites, including patronage and clientelism, 
neo-patrimonial structures, cooptation of certain groups, forms of power-
sharing and semi-authoritarianism, the mobilisation of traditional structures 
and informal practices of self-organisation (i.e. ethnic networks). Most of 
these mechanisms, however, do not lead to a sustainable statehood, but are 
part of the problem. The question is how can they be transformed or re-
moved in a way that does not increase tensions and instability. Moreover, in 
most cases, the elites and particular groups would have to give up some of 
their power and privileges in order to reform and transform statehood. This 
problem becomes even more difficult in dealing with armed actors. 
Dealing with Armed Non-State Actors 
Generally speaking, armed non-state actors can be seen as classical spoilers 
or trouble-makers for state-building and peacebuilding efforts, meaning the 
strengthening, reform or reconstruction of state structures and institutions. 
They have hardly any interest in consolidated statehood since this would 
inevitably challenge their position – a notable exception are private security 
companies who depend largely on governments’ contracts. Capable state 
structures would limit their room of manoeuvre and opportunities to pursue 
their political and/or economic agendas. Some of them, such as militias or 
rebels, would face disarmament and, eventually, dissolution. Others like 
warlords, guerrilla fighters or terrorists would be forced to transform them-
selves, i.e. to become political forces or to integrate into official state struc-
tures, while criminals, mercenaries or marauders would simply lose eco-
nomic profits. Therefore, they are more likely to challenge than to support 
any steps which would strengthen security governance through government, 
i.e. the (re-)establishment of the state’s monopoly of the use of force. This 
behaviour can be observed in almost every international intervention, rang-
ing from Bosnia and Kosovo to Haiti, Afghanistan and DR Congo, which 
aims at state-building. In these cases, the international community is con-
fronted with the following dilemma: on the one hand, state-building activi-
ties have to be implemented against the vested interests of these armed ac-
tors in order to achieve positive results in the long run. On the other hand, 
progress in the area of security is often only possible if at least the most 
powerful of these actors can be involved in a political process which would 
grant them political influence (e.g. posts in an interim government) and cer-
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tain economic and financial privileges which, in turn, could undermine the 
whole process of state-building. In other words, armed non-state actors are 
not only part of problem, but must sometimes also be part of the solution. In 
particular with regard to already established para-state structures by war-
lords, rebels, big men or militias, the question is whether it is possible to use 
these structures as temporary solutions and building blocs for reconstructing 
statehood, or whether this would simply increase the risk that they would be 
strengthened and legitimised so that the establishment of the state’s monop-
oly of the use of force becomes even less likely. In other words, those actors 
who have in theory the greatest potential for state-building and security gov-
ernance are also the ones who can mobilise the greatest spoiling power. 
Moreover, the international community runs the risk of sending the wrong 
message (‘violence pays’) by granting too much power or privilege to armed 
non-state actors who have already benefited from war and shadow econo-
mies. This may not only trigger increasing demands by these actors, but also 
seriously harm the credibility and legitimacy of external actors vis-à-vis the 
general public.  
Clearly, there are no satisfying answers to these questions. Consider-
ing past experience, context-specific, flexible arrangements in dealing with 
armed non-state actors will always be necessary. However, more broadly 
speaking, the international community has in principle a number of options 
for ‘spoiler management’. Depending on the type of actor and on the local 
situation, one or a mix of the following strategies might be appropriate:17 
a. Negotiating a political settlement: At the negotiation table, facilitators 
or mediators aim at persuading the armed actor in question to refrain 
from the use of force and to abandon maximalist positions. Usually, 
pros and cons of possible solutions have to be exchanged, incentives 
and disincentives have to be taken into account and a compromise ac-
ceptable for all sides has to be found. Often arguing and bargaining 
strategies (including cost-benefit analysis) are combined in order to 
achieve such a positive-sum-game outcome. This scenario applies 
mainly to groups with a clear political agenda and which are strongly 
tied to a defined constituency (e.g. tribe, clan, ethnic group, political 
party). The most likely cases, therefore, are clan chiefs, big men or 
classical rebel leaders; in some instances local terrorists or warlords 
may also be part of such a process, in particular when they seek to 
transform into more political figures. 
b. Socialisation: In the context of established institutional arrangements 
(e.g. electoral system, modes of power-sharing) and through political 
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practice spoilers are successively socialised into accepting certain 
norms and rules of the game. Armed non-state actors undergo proc-
esses of collective learning which may change their strategies and, 
eventually, their preferences and their character. This medium- to 
long-term strategy may work again primarily for those armed actors 
with political ambitions who have to address certain long-term expec-
tations of their followers. 
c. Bribery: Spoilers are induced to cooperate or silenced through the 
offering of material incentives, i.e. economic resources or well-paid 
posts. This strategy is politically and normatively questionable; how-
ever, in some cases it is indispensable for getting a peace- and state-
building process started in the first place (see e.g. Afghanistan). In 
particular, profit-driven actors such as warlords, criminals, mercenar-
ies or marauders have often been receptive to such a strategy.  
d. Amnesty: No less problematic from a normative point of view is grant-
ing amnesty for certain crimes and actions committed by non-state ac-
tors. This step, however, could work under certain circumstances as a 
precondition and an incentive to end violence. Generally, amnesty 
would be part of a larger political package and may not be applied to 
every crime or every group member. It might be especially attractive 
for groups who are aware of their weaknesses and for leaders who are 
willing to opt for a different political career. 
e. Containment and marginalisation: This strategy aims at systemati-
cally containing the political and ideological influence of armed non-
state actors. The idea is to isolate them from actual or potential fol-
lowers and their constituencies as well as to marginalise them. For that 
scenario, a broad consensus is needed among political elites and socie-
tal groups not to deal with these actors and not to react to their violent 
provocations, but to continue an agreed peacebuilding process. This 
approach is an option in the case of rather weak or already weakened 
actors such as smaller rebel groups, terrorists or marauders.  
f. Enforcing splits and internal rivalry: Another option aims at frag-
menting and splitting armed groups between more moderate forces 
and hardliners. This can be achieved by offering secret deals to some 
leading figures or by involving them in a political process which 
would encourage them to leave their group or to transform it into a po-
litical movement. The strategy, however, can result in the establish-
ment of radical fringe and splinter groups which may be even more 
extreme than the former unified group. This kind of fragmentation 
process can often be observed with rebel or terrorist groups. 
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g. Coercion: Finally, international actors may use coercive measures, 
including the use of force. Typical instruments are military or police 
operations aimed at fighting or arresting members of armed groups, 
the deployment of international troops in order to stabilise a post-war 
situation or the implementation of international sanctions (e.g. arms 
embargoes, no-fly zones, economic sanctions, freezing of foreign as-
sets, travel sanctions, war criminal tribunals) which could harm the in-
terests of at least some non-state actors, in particular para-militaries, 
rebel leaders, warlords and clan chiefs. 
 
As indicated, all these methods have their downsides. In particular, 
they imply that the international community has to be prepared to make am-
bivalent decisions, to risk backlashes and failures and to put up with norma-
tive dilemmas. Moreover, the international community must be willing to 
invest political capital, resources and time into efforts to co-opt, transform or 
weaken armed non-state actors. However, all three are difficult to sustain. 
First, the international community – and in particular the UN Security Coun-
cil – tends to focus primarily on cases of emergency and crisis which may 
have effects on regional and international security. If the situation has 
calmed, if a war has formally ended, high-level political attention will usu-
ally be absorbed by new crises despite the fact that state-building processes 
need long-term political support. Second, military, economic and personal 
resources are limited and demand exceeds supply. Moreover, the mobilisa-
tion of resources is directly linked to the question of political commitment. 
Third, external actors have the inherent problem that their mandates, budg-
ets, programmes or projects are limited in time and scope. Local actors know 
that and take advantage of this. In particular those powerful actors who do 
not have an interest in giving up their privileges will pursue all kinds of de-
laying and obstructive tactics because they know that time is on their side. 
In spite of the dilemmas, difficulties and obstacles outlined above, the 
alternative of staying out of war-torn societies and ignoring problems of 
fragile statehood is neither realistic nor desirable. Ultimately, disengagement 
means risking a dramatic worsening of the situation in fragile states, thereby 
making crises and the spread of armed non-state actors more likely. This 
would not only lead to additional humanitarian disasters, but create tangible 
security problems and governance failures – at the local, at the regional as 
well as at the global level. 
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Chapter 3 
Private Sector, Public Security 
Alyson JK Bailes 
Introduction 
What do these four headlines taken from one week’s issues of the Financial 
Times have in common? ‘The scramble for energy fuels a new era of power 
politics’ (6/1/2006),1 ‘Banks and insurers take stock as financial health flut-
ters [about corporate planning for bird ‘flu] (10/1/2006),2 ‘Businesses fail to 
assess AIDS effect’ (12/1/2006),3 and ‘America’s dilemma: as business re-
treats from its welfare role, who will take up the burden?’ (13/1/2006).4 They 
all help to illustrate the wide, and sometimes unexpected, variety of ways in 
which the private business sector has become linked with international, na-
tional and individual security and well-being in a globalised world exposed 
to multi-dimensional threats. 
Most fundamentally, since the collapse of communism across most of 
the globe and its far-reaching transformation in China, private economic 
activity has become the almost exclusive source of the wealth that pays for 
national and international measures in all the different spheres of modern 
security. The once clear boundaries of the ‘defence sector’ of industry are 
becoming wider and fuzzier as more and more scientific discoveries, tech-
nologies and products lend themselves to dual (military and civilian) or even 
to multiple uses. Commercial firms are getting into the supply of defence 
services and functions, not just goods, on a fast-growing scale in contexts 
ranging from the innocuous to the extremely controversial – as seen in Iraq. 
Beyond this, however, the modern tendency to define ‘security’ in new and 
increasingly many-faceted ways creates a whole range of new and some-
times very active interfaces between the relevant public- and private-sector 
players. At the same time, as the last news item cited above reflects, there 
are some counter-trends whereby enterprises (not just in countries emerging 
from communism) are trying to pass certain social-related burdens back to 
the state or demanding more state help in bearing them. The flurry of interest 
in late 2005 over an originally French idea of an EU fund to support workers 
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whose jobs were hit by developing-world competition is redolent of several 
paradoxes in the state of Western-style capitalism today. 
As a cumulative effect of these trends – and as often noted in more 
general analyses of globalisation – the balance of control in the public-
private relationship is shifting in the realm of security as well as in many 
other fields. There are rather few, if any, instances in which government 
nowadays can simply force business to do what it wants; and even the more 
obvious methods of indirect control – ranging from national and interna-
tional legal regulation through to ‘fixing’ the play of economic incentives – 
are becoming trickier to apply in an environment increasingly shaped by 
non-traditional, non-state, multinational or trans-national forces and actors. 
To encapsulate this trend as one of the ‘privatisation of security’ is 
tempting and acceptable as a kind of short-hand, but it does risk missing a 
number of nuances. Some of the security functions currently exercised by 
business have been delegated or contracted out on a case-by-case basis, 
without the full transfer of property and/or competence that occurs in indus-
trial ‘privatisation’. Other functions have always belonged to business, at 
least in modern industrialised societies, but are now (perhaps belatedly) rec-
ognised as having security overtones. To insist on these complexities is not 
to belittle the seriousness of the issues involved; defence and security are 
life-and-death matters with a heightened normative dimension, and even a 
minor and subtle shift in the pattern of governance may have grave conse-
quences for good or ill. But before embarking on any review of the topic it is 
important to realise what a very wide range of fields and individual cases it 
covers, and how complex the process of building adequate solutions is likely 
to prove. 
In the rest of this text, the more obvious areas of overlap between pub-
lic- and private-sector security roles – the business of defence itself, and 
business and conflict – will first be briefly reviewed. Next, some other areas 
of growing business influence and/or responsibility will be noted that belong 
within the wider or ‘newer’ parts of the 21st century security spectrum. The 
last two sections will turn back to the governance challenges posed by new 
forms of interdependence between the state, business and civil society, and 
to the question of how to deduce normative principles (‘values’) to govern 
the entire process. 
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The Permanent Interface Between Public and Private Sectors 
The most obvious security-related functions of the economy could probably 
be traced back to prehistoric times: the specialised production of weapons, 
and (slightly less directly) the production of surplus wealth that allows 
communities to maintain full-time soldiers not engaged in any other form of 
production. This latter pattern applies even in conscription-based systems 
because the civil purse both pays for the upkeep of the conscripts – and their 
repeated training – and has to be capable of meeting all other social needs 
without the conscripts’ own contribution. (The trade-off involved may look 
particularly positive to governments that are grappling with major youth 
unemployment.) Whatever the ultimate moral vires of these transactions, 
they are relatively familiar in human societies of all kinds and the secondary 
mechanisms for making them work within a modern nation-state are also 
obvious: conscription laws, contract terms for professional soldiers, the de-
fence section of the annual state budget, defence ministry procurement 
mechanisms, and the defence sector of industrial production which may be 
state- or privately owned or a mixture of both. In the 21st century world, 
three sets of trends are complicating and blurring this picture, and in the 
process spurring the search for new governance solutions. They will be 
sketched here relatively briefly because they are taken up in other parts of 
this volume. Beyond security concerns senso stricto, the impact of the pri-
vate sector on environment, demography and health is first considered. This 
is followed by the shifting and increasingly unclear boundary around what 
constitutes ‘the defence industry’ today; third is the shifting of the line be-
tween what that industry does and the traditional defence and security pre-
rogatives of the state; and finally, the impact of industrial and trade activity 
not (directly) linked to the defence sector upon the global phenomenon of 
armed conflict. 
Environment, Demography, Health 
The impact of private-sector activity on the natural and human environment 
– alongside its effect on the economic, political and cultural fortunes of 
states and societies – has been at the very heart of the debate over globalisa-
tion and anti-globalisation in recent years. The negative impact, direct and 
indirect, that companies can have in all these ways has been more than fully 
documented and a variety of governance measures has been mooted at all 
levels to restrain or at least regulate their activities. What seems worth bring-
ing out here is that while the defence of other human and environmental 
values will always demand some restraint on the play of the free market, 
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responsible governments and institutions must also rely on inputs from the 
private sector for solutions to the present challenges of climate change and 
environmental damage, exhaustion of resources, over- and under-population 
and uncontrolled migration, and both chronic and epidemic threats to the 
health of people, animals and crops. Obvious examples in the environmental 
area include the private-sector origins of technologies both for less environ-
mentally damaging activities and for clean-up work, and the role envisaged 
for the private market in ‘emissions trading’ under the Kyoto Protocol (or 
future analogous regimes).5 For purposes both of population control and 
public health, the main issue recently debated regarding the role of the pri-
vate sector has been the cost and availability of proprietary drugs (in which 
the means of contraception may be included). While voluntary initiatives 
have multiplied – like those involving former President Bill Clinton and IT 
billionaire Bill Gates in the USA – to transfer large quantities of key drugs to 
the poorest users at no, or lower, cost, it may sometimes be thought neces-
sary for governments nationally and internationally to intervene and to over-
ride or mitigate companies’ intellectual property in certain crucial medi-
cal/pharmaceutical products.6 Taking executive action to stockpile, share or 
transfer quantities of drugs of especial importance for epidemic control (like 
Tamiflu for influenza) does not prima facie interfere with normal principles 
of business governance, but it does raise the question of what incentives 
industry will be given to produce the necessary huge quantities of those par-
ticular products in the first place.7 This whole debate is a rapidly evolving 
one, but it seems to be leading towards initiatives for government–business 
practical dialogue and the use of market-based incentives rather than legisla-
tive or regulatory solutions. Where stronger international laws and enforce-
ment do seem to be required is to tackle the widespread and very damaging 
phenomenon of drug counterfeiting and denaturing, including the question-
able practice even by some larger companies of off-loading time-expired or 
otherwise sub-standard pharmaceuticals in the developing world.8 
What is the Defence Sector? 
Throughout most of the Cold War period, in both East and West, defence 
production (and production for space programmes) took place in enterprises 
separately dedicated to the purpose and often with complete, or a high de-
gree of, state ownership. Technological discoveries could be ‘spun off’ from 
this sector into civilian production, like the famous case of non-stick coat-
ings for metal goods originating from the US space programmes, but tech-
nology crossovers were not normally expected nor observed in the reverse 
direction. The defence industry was distinct in other respects too, such as a 
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high degree of security and limited transparency; an often near-governmental 
bureaucratic culture; and a limited degree of exposure to normal market 
competition which in turn was often associated with inflated pricing, cost 
over-runs and suspicions of corruption. Although this model of a ring-
fenced, state-owned industry remains widespread in non-European (and even 
to some extent in post-Soviet) regions, several forces have been combining 
to alter it in the developed West. 
Firstly, the nature of technological innovation today means that new 
breakthroughs are typically ‘multivalent’, i.e. they can be applied both in 
defence and in civilian industries and often in other spheres too, such as 
medicine and the arts. This means that governments who wish to keep a 
leading ‘edge’ and/or a semi-autonomous defence production base are more 
and more driven to invest in basic scientific and technical innovation, not 
just in the later stage of specifically ‘defence’ R+D.9 It also poses obvious 
questions about how to stop such powerful discoveries from getting into the 
wrong hands (i.e. of supposedly unreliable states or terrorists), and perhaps 
how to stop some particularly frightening and inhuman applications from 
being developed at all. One remedy now much discussed is to develop codes 
of conscience, of conduct and/or of practice for scientists and technicians, of 
a general kind and/or adapted to specific branches.10 State-level strategic 
export controls also remain as vital or more vital than they ever were, but 
need adaptation to a world in which (a) far more of the potentially dangerous 
items start off as private rather than state-produced property, (b) the range of 
potential producers is far wider as a result of technological advance in the 
developing world,11 and (c) the restraints have to bite on non-state as well as 
state ‘end-users’.12 
A second factor which amplifies these concerns is the renewed 21st 
century focus (after a perhaps over-complacent decade in the 1990s) on the 
dangers of ‘mass destruction techniques’ – currently seen as limited to the 
nuclear, chemical and bio-science areas but always liable to be expanded by 
new inventions – and on the perils of their expanded ownership (‘prolifera-
tion’). This creates a special and particularly acute case of the challenge of 
control already mentioned, inasmuch as the risk comes from possible aggres-
sive mis-applications of processes and materials that are overwhelmingly 
used for peaceful civilian purposes, and which it is not practical politics to 
‘minimise’ either in terms of the degree of their use or the spread of owner-
ship. Recent cases of concern regarding nuclear proliferation (Iran and North 
Korea) have stimulated discussion of possible – technical as well as political 
– ‘fire-walls’ that could be constructed between civilian nuclear power gen-
eration and the potential for weaponisation;13 but it is hard to see how any-
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thing of the kind could be imagined in the chemical and biological fields 
where even a vaccine – for instance – could be used as a weapon (by an ag-
gressor who was able to deploy the disease in question against opponents 
because his own operatives could be vaccinated for protection). 
Last but not least under this heading comes the impact on the private 
sector of the modern extended concept of national security and in particular, 
the greater salience of internal or ‘homeland’ security concerns since the 
events of 11 September 2001. This has highlighted that the survival of a 
nation and its citizens rests not only on their ability to produce or acquire 
military equipment, but also on the availability of everything needed for 
other modes of civil protection ranging from police batons and X-ray ma-
chines for customs to items with preventive (eavesdropping devices, cam-
eras), prophylactic (disease vaccines) or passive–defensive (gas-masks and 
bunkers) applications. Some of these types of equipment come from special-
ised producers analogous to the traditional defence industry, but many others 
from the pool of general-purpose private sector production. At the least this 
means that the ‘strategic’ elements and functions of national industry have to 
be defined in wider terms than before, but there are also interesting issues for 
security governance that are only in the early stages of being explored. 
Should the government take back central control of certain such commodi-
ties in some situations (e.g. the supply of vaccines against a pandemic), just 
as it expects to have the right to regulate – more or less strictly – the private 
possession of firearms? Should more of these types of products be made 
subject to export controls, not just for humanitarian purposes as the EU and 
others are striving now to tighten the control of objects that may be used for 
torture,14 but with considerations of national security in mind? Does the in-
creasing range and power of instruments being researched and used for non-
conflict security purposes – notably, ‘non-lethal’ techniques for crowd con-
trol – call for the extension of arms control approaches that have so far been 
confined to items with some ‘traditional’ military use?15 (It is noteworthy 
that under the Chemical Weapons Convention of 1993, certain substances 
that could be considered as chemical weapons if used in warfare are not spe-
cifically debarred from use in ‘crowd control´). 
Public–Private Sector Overlap in Defence Activity 
Before turning to the phenomenon of private sector activity in realms of 
defence and security formerly reserved for the state, it is worth noting that 
while the most problematic effects of this trend may arise in the governance 
field, its roots should be sought rather in the economic one. Advanced West-
ern governments, but also some of those facing the challenges of develop-
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ment, have been looking for ways of easing their resource burdens (and the 
very tough trade-off decisions that are linked with them) by drawing in pri-
vate capital for goals of public service through various forms of public–
private partnership (PPP). If this phenomenon has advanced – as it has par-
ticularly in the English-speaking world – as far as allowing private manage-
ment of prisons and of essential medical services, it should hardly be surpris-
ing that it has been experimented with also in the sphere of defence where 
resources are almost everywhere shrinking as the range of challenges every-
where is widening. First and foremost, it has penetrated the core of indus-
try’s traditional role which is the production of defence equipment. On the 
one hand, governments are seeking new ways to reduce cost over-runs (and 
incidentally to limit the scope for corruption) through a combination of 
‘smart procurement’ techniques and of efforts to escape from monop-
oly/monopsony16 situations, notably by exploring new non-native sources for 
procurement and by making use of or even promoting multinational consor-
tia. On the other hand, countries and groups of countries are exploring new 
ownership solutions such as the leasing of major equipment from industry 
both for ad hoc operations (sea and air transport) and for aspects of perma-
nent force management (e.g. the supply of trainer aircraft). Offset arrange-
ments for equipment transfers between states are also taking new forms often 
including counter-purchases of non-military, purely commercial products. 
Taking this set of trends together with the previously-discussed blurring of 
the boundary between military and other, strategically significant produc-
tion, one general normative conclusion might be that there is less justifica-
tion than there ever may have been for the defence industry to be treated as a 
case apart for purposes of transparency and the other basics of corporate 
governance.17 A different issue on which the verdict may not be so simple 
(and is not, properly, a question of security ethics) is to what extent it should 
still be granted exceptions protecting it from competition.18 
The Private Sector’s Evolving Role in Defence and Security 
None of the above points, however, has generated anything like as much 
concern and debate as the development of the private sector’s role in the 
active business of defence and security. The single largest issue here is one 
that can be seen as a direct outgrowth of the tradition of defence production, 
namely the provision by the industrial sector (both traditional military sup-
pliers, and others) of services as well as goods. Parts of this phenomenon are 
relatively uncontroversial, including the outsourcing of services that have a 
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clearly non-military nature; that are applied to the armed forces themselves 
(not directly to the ‘consumer’ of defence/security action); and that are sup-
plied in peacetime conditions and/or in the rear echelon of conflict. Typical 
examples are the supply of food, uniforms, fuel and other generic consum-
ables; laundry, medical cover, and vehicle maintenance, as well as the leas-
ing of transport assets already referred to. Problems may of course arise 
about the probity of such transactions, as US firms winning large contracts in 
Iraq have been accused of over-pricing and under-delivering, but the norms 
at stake are, again, not specifically security ones. The controversy starts 
when private companies and their employees provide services actively and 
directly in an environment of conflict or other acute security difficulty: pro-
viding armed guards for persons and premises under threat, working in mili-
tary prisons, carrying out intelligence or interrogation tasks, or actually 
fighting on behalf of a native or foreign government or as part of non-
governmental insurgencies. In the last few years there has also been a rapid 
expansion of private-sector engagement in post-conflict tasks including the 
restructuring and re-training of indigenous forces. The reasons for concern 
about these developments have been well documented elsewhere19 and are 
further explored in this volume, so it may just be noted here that the prob-
lems do not only arise when company operatives ‘go bad’ – fighting in a 
non-legitimate cause, failing to deliver on their contracts, failing to obey 
relevant national and internal security norms (including arms control and 
export control restrictions as well as humanitarian rules), and committing 
active abuses against life and property. Any use of a private intermediary 
blocks the way to the normal exercise of democratic controls (both in the 
‘providing’ and the ‘receiving’ state) that have been designed for state mili-
tary activity. It makes the application of domestic and international laws 
more difficult and sometimes impracticable. It loses all the benefits of direct 
interface, mutual learning and transfer of experience between one nation and 
another, which is especially a pity in the context of post-conflict reconstruc-
tion. 
For all this, observation of current trends – in particular, the growing 
demand for lengthy and complex international interventions combined with 
increasing strictures on the size of defence budgets and professional military 
forces – suggests that state delegation to private actors will become more, 
not less common in future among both developed and developing countries. 
This makes it an urgent matter to look at the scope for regulatory and execu-
tive solutions to curb the negative effects, which could include: measures by 
the nation where private military companies or private security companies 
(PMCs/PSCs) are located, e.g. licensing of companies, licensing of individ-
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ual ‘exports’ of services, corporate transparency requirements, establishing 
the justiciability of offences committed abroad; measures by the ‘consumers’ 
of such services, to include stricter contract terms and justiciability provi-
sions, standard-setting, monitoring, etc and the imposition of ‘black-lists’ for 
unsatisfactory performers; and efforts in international fora to clarify and then 
to enforce the application of relevant global rules and norms (including the 
jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court) to corporate actors and their 
employees. Beyond such damage-limitation measures, it may be argued that 
there is a certain group of functions which no responsible government should 
outsource or delegate, either to commercial or to other (e.g. foreign or col-
lective institutional) actors, because they are so intimately tied to the rights 
and responsibilities that go with the state’s supposed monopoly of force. 
Many would think of front-line combat as such an exception, but given the 
recently demonstrated scope for abuse, the point might well be extended to 
the interrogation and (a fortiori) the execution of prisoners. 
PSCs and PMCs are not, however, by any means the only corporate 
actors that have an influence on active processes of conflict causation and 
management. Other companies may do so from long range, by supplying or 
by buying that group of products that have come to be known as ‘conflict 
commodities’20 because they are particularly often used to fund the activities 
of non-government insurgents (but not only those). The private sector’s own 
initiative to control the flow of ‘conflict diamonds’ – the Kimberley proc-
ess21 – was born out of such concerns, combining with the consumer pres-
sures that were mobilised in response. Another even more prominent area for 
concern, NGO campaigns, and governmental and institutional efforts for 
control has been trade in small arms22, which wreak particular havoc in 
lower-intensity conflict situations. More generally, however, foreign compa-
nies that have establishments abroad may themselves become parts of con-
flict dynamics in the countries and the regions concerned. By following ethi-
cal and impartial business practices and appropriate corporate social respon-
sibility (CSR) programmes, they might be able to influence local social and 
economic developments in a way that reduces the risks of conflict in the first 
place. They are regularly invited and urged to come in and invest after con-
flicts, to help kick-start economic and social transformation, to limit the risk 
of long-term aid dependence and to tie the affected country back into the 
web of global economic intercourse. It is worth stressing these points before 
going on to note the more negative roles of companies that tend to attract 
more public (and certainly, NGO) attention – for example, their impact on 
the environment, their over-friendliness with abusive governments or with 
violent rebel leaders, the way they may help to finance such actors’ cam-
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paigns by dubious deals (particularly, raw material extraction concessions), 
or the excessive use of force by companies themselves or their hired guards 
against the local population.  
All such excesses ultimately reflect the darker side of the profit mo-
tive; but the more positive roles that governments, international organisa-
tions and even NGOs might wish companies to play will not be played either 
unless the profit motive can somehow be harnessed to promote them. This is 
by no means an argument for subsidising companies’ conflict-related activi-
ties, which would merely create ‘aid dependence’ in a new place. It does 
suggest, however, that much more dialogue is needed between governments, 
business and civil society on the conditions that would allow companies to 
operate across the widest possible range of territories while making fair prof-
its and behaving correctly in all aspects of their local interactions. The UN’s 
Global Compact network has recently complemented its efforts for responsi-
ble corporate behaviour in other fields by issuing an advice document on 
‘conflict-sensitive’ situations,23and the ICRC is also stepping up its activism 
in this context.24 These efforts might be most effective if they could be 
joined up with two other areas of investigation that business is pursuing for 
itself: the refinement of risk analysis and prediction techniques (especially in 
a geographical frame of reference), and the effort to bolster business conti-
nuity and survivability in emergencies, e.g. by better contingency planning, 
dispersal of key nodes and built-in redundancies. The first should help busi-
ness better to calculate, and the latter potentially to expand, its risk exposure 
at any given time without overstraining either its own resilience or the ca-
pacity of the global insurance system. 
The Wider Security Spectrum 
Incursions of business into what are traditionally thought of as ‘defence’ 
processes – conflict and the tools of conflict – are bound to attract more at-
tention and concern than the part that the private sector plays in various non-
military, or ‘new’, dimensions of security. This bias in analysis becomes 
harder to defend, however, in today’s conditions when the non-military risks 
and threats are more likely to cause mass loss of life in the world’s most 
developed countries (and also in those developing regions that are free of 
conflict) than any traditional military happening, and when business plays a 
larger, or even dominant, role in these other fields than it could ever do in 
traditional warfare. The field for examination here is almost infinite, but in 
this section a set of illustrations will be offered to show the scope of the is-
sue: 
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• business and the ‘asymmetric’ threats of terrorism and WMD prolif-
eration (and also crime); 
• business, infrastructure and vital supplies; 
• business, the environment, demography and health. 
Such large and diverse topics can of course, only be sketched here in a 
superficial way; not least because business’s role in them either has not been 
analysed in a ‘securitised’ way at all, or has been the subject of a number of 
unconnected lines of study. 
Security Governance and the ‘New Threats’ 
Business has always been exposed to violence from kidnappers, eco-
terrorists, violent anti-globalisation protesters and the like. It has lost lives 
and assets from many of the most sensational attacks by politically-
motivated terrorists in recent years, including the destruction of the Twin 
Towers on 9/11. It has also lost revenue from secondary impacts like the 
drop in travel, entertainment and consumer spending after such traumatic 
events, and from the rise in insurance premiums notably in the transport 
sector. Last but not least, business has been and remains affected by the eco-
nomic impact of new anti-terrorism measures adopted nationally (especially 
by the US) and internationally since 9/11: stricter visa rules (affecting ease 
of access for non-Western partners and customers and also the employment 
of foreign experts), travel and immigration delays for everyone, and new 
procedures for the protection and security inspection of ports, harbours, con-
tainers and other goods in transit by sea.25 The extra costs and delays that it 
was feared the latter would lead to have turned out to be not too damaging,26 
and many in the private sector have come round to see advantages for them-
selves in the consequently reduced risks of smuggling sabotage, and crime; 
but visa delays remain a target for recurring business complaints that have 
led the US Administration to offer at least cosmetic improvements in the 
new régimes. 
It would be as wrong, however, in this case as any other to see only 
the one side of business’s role and to deny that it can in some cases be part 
of the ‘new threats’ problem. There has been a particular focus since 9/11 on 
the risk of funding for terrorists being generated by and processed through 
business channels, as part of the wider phenomenon of money-laundering 
which was already a target for stronger international regulation.27 In many 
parts of the world terrorism is financed inter alia through criminal activity, 
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and/or corruption, that also has a clear business component (e.g. drug and 
cigarette smuggling). These concerns led to the early adoption of UN Secu-
rity Council Resolution 1373,28 creating universally applicable norms and 
obligations for government action to freeze suspected terrorist funds in pri-
vate quarters and to block any further such transfers. While the financial 
harvest of the concerted effort to implement UNSCR 1373 has been mea-
gre,29 it has had an undoubted impact in raising bankers’ and other busi-
nessmen’s awareness of the terrorist dimension, and facing them with new 
challenges in terms of checking their clients’ identity and gauging their in-
tentions, at least in the more developed regions of the world. Meanwhile, 
however, the difficulty of getting a grip by traditional legal means (including 
UNSCR 1373) on the informal ‘hawala’ banking system prevalent in many 
Islamic societies has highlighted the point that the business communities of 
all regions and societies would need to be mobilised for really comprehen-
sive and effective anti-terrorist coverage. 
It will be clear from what has already been said above that the same 
points can be made about business’s relevance to WMD control. Over time, 
the majority of technology leakages that have occurred from the first nu-
clear-capable states have involved private companies, albeit sometimes with 
a degree of government connivance. The still-ongoing exposure of the meth-
ods used by A.Q. Khan, the father of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons pro-
gramme, to share dangerous technology with other states – as well as infor-
mation provided by Libya after its renunciation of WMD programmes in 
December 2003 – has revealed a wide and tangled net of shady business 
connections summed up by the IAEA’s Director-General Mohamed El-
Baradei as a nuclear ‘Wal-Mart’.30 The multilateral export control groupings 
that exist to coordinate constraints on the transfer of various categories of 
WMD and dual-use goods and technologies31 have consequently been hard 
at work since 9/11 to update and expand their ‘control lists’ of dangerous 
items, to extend their membership (including to some former strategic adver-
saries who are willing to work against terrorism),32 and to improve enforce-
ment. Apart from the technical difficulties of making these rules bite on the 
various kinds of non-state actors, however, these groups are increasingly 
confronted with the challenges of both effectiveness and legitimacy arising 
from the fact that their membership is largely restricted to richer, Northern 
hemisphere countries. Some experts are beginning to wonder whether the 
only way to design effective technology transfer controls for a globalised 
economy – given also the increasing multilateralisation of research, and the 
rise of outsourcing – would be to make the controls equally universal, egali-
tarian and omnipresent, and to enlist the active cooperation of the whole 
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world’s business into the bargain.33 Arguably, an important precedent and 
experiment was offered by UN Security Council Resolution 1540,34 which 
called for equally global enforcement of a set of legal norms against unau-
thorised WMD possession and trafficking. 
The field of export control, at all events, provides a classic case of the 
proposition that where business is part of the problem it also needs to be part 
of the solution. Any nation will find it hard to apply statutory export controls 
unless, at the least, the great majority of businesses are aware of and comply 
with the licensing rules, since the ability of customs and border personnel to 
act as ‘back-stop’ for dangerous transfers is finite. Business’s help is also 
needed to keep the lists of existing and potentially dangerous goods and 
technologies up to date. A regular government–business dialogue (especially 
in the sectors of most concern) would seem to be common sense, but is sur-
prisingly far from a universal practice even in advanced Western states. It 
could and should also be pursued collectively at the level of export control 
groupings and of international organisations that intervene in the field (as the 
EU is increasingly doing on both conventional and WMD-related controls, 
while the OECD is active against money-laundering and corruption). Inter-
national outreach, sharing of best practice and technical assistance in the 
export control field – now practised in particular by the US and EU – need to 
be aimed not just at governments but also at the private sector (and indeed, at 
parliaments and non-governmental monitors) in the recipient states. While 
these examples are taken from the WMD dimension of ‘new threats’, several 
parallel arguments could be made about cooperation against terrorism.35 
Overall, it must be said that this field has been too much characterised since 
9/11 by the unilateral imposition of often hasty and imperfect governmental 
or institutional edicts, and that it remains a largely unsolved challenge for 
security governance to devise productive and systematic channels of consul-
tation, information exchange and collaboration in enforcement between the 
public and private sectors both nationally and internationally. 
Critical Infrastructure and Supplies 
Human life as well as welfare, in developed as well as developing countries, 
increasingly depends on the smooth operation of large-scale supply and sup-
port systems – electricity, food, water, transport, communications and others 
– that are well beyond individuals’ own control. In modern conditions the 
vast bulk of the related objects and capabilities are owned and run by the 
private sector, either because they always have been or because of the re-
cently accelerating wave of industrial privatisation. Moreover, the national 
character of provision in most of these fields has been heavily eroded by the 
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rise of large multi-national enterprises, the various pressures (e.g. in the 
EU’s Single Market) to dismantle national preferences in public procure-
ment, and more recently the growing practice of providing certain human 
inputs remotely (‘outsourcing’) from less developed countries. Increased 
human dependence plus concentration of supply creates a situation in which 
a single malfunction – caused by error, natural disaster, terrorism or conflict 
– can cause distress and even danger to life on a massive scale, not to speak 
of the economic losses. Concern about this set of problems has led to rapid 
development in the disciplines of ‘infrastructure security’ and ‘cyber-
security’, as well as the more traditional topic of ‘energy security’ (and the 
concerns about pipeline security and strategic sea-lanes, etc. associated with 
that). It has also stimulated a debate mainly within the private sector about 
the capacity of the present global insurance industry, which is definitely 
under strain after the natural and man-made disasters of the early 21st cen-
tury and has in some noteworthy cases (like air traffic insurance after 9/11) 
forced commercial re-insurers to go back to governments for support. 
In contrast to the previous set of issues discussed and for obvious rea-
sons, these areas of ‘functional security’ have been actively discussed be-
tween government and business, and most nations have managed to update 
and expand traditional consultation frameworks to deal with the increased 
scale and complexity of the challenge. The outstanding governance issues 
may be grouped under the headings of national authority and coordination, 
multilateral cooperation, and the case for global regulation. At national level, 
even where ownership of key utilities (including energy supply) is wholly in 
private hands, governments customarily have ‘emergency powers’ allowing 
them to take some degree of control and direction over privately-owned as-
sets or, where they have broken down, to replace them by state action. The 
challenge is that such arrangements made in peacetime and under a civil-law 
system tend to have different origins, durations and terms for different pri-
vate-sector providers, whereas a present-day emergency is almost certain to 
become ‘complex’ and cover many privately-managed sectors at once (a 
disease outbreak contaminating water, crippling food supply and requiring 
bans on transport as well as overloading the medical sector, for example). 
The practical solution usually adopted by governments is to set up a central 
executive organ of coordination with both planning and emergency response 
capacity, which can – inter alia – provide an efficient focal point for ‘plug-
ging in’ all necessary business contacts and inputs. For best results, govern-
ments that have not yet devised such structures should do so; they should 
carry out exercises to test among other things the robustness of public–
private coordination; and the private sector should continue its own efforts 
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for ‘critical infrastructure emergency planning’, aimed at identifying key 
nodes, maximising the various elements of organisational and physical pro-
tection, and endowing the system with as much redundancy and resilience as 
possible (notably through fall-back options). In an interconnected global 
system, the more developed states should do more to address the problems 
that countries of other regions – including those involved in outsourcing! – 
face in working with their own and foreign businesses to reach even a basic 
level of security and preparedness in these fields. 
The European Union is currently the scene of lively debates on the 
need for and shape of a collective policy on energy security, following the 
problems with temporary blockage of gas supplies from Russia in January 
2006.36 The EU’s single market also makes it well placed to address the case 
for a Europe-wide approach to various aspects of infrastructure security, 
although up to now these have mainly been discussed at sub-regional level 
(if at all) and concrete EU mechanisms for intervention are limited to emer-
gency response.37 As in any other field where security has de facto become a 
matter of transnational interdependence, such regional efforts in Europe or 
elsewhere are well worth encouraging so long as they do not overly distort 
competition or obstruct positive trans-regional cooperation. It is obviously 
important that they find the right way to engage private actors. Other points 
to look out for are the risk of focusing on political threats to supply lines 
while neglecting physical ones (or vice versa); the need to avoid ‘stove-
piping’ of arrangements for the different functional networks; and the deli-
cate balances involved in finding the right level for decision and control – 
neither pushing everything up to a multinational authority that may become 
rigid and overloaded, nor insisting on ‘self-help’ first in every case. When 
considering the option of fully global cooperation in functional security, the 
same issues apply mutatis mutandis but the idea of collective executive coor-
dination and response becomes almost impractical. The UN has no direct 
vires to intervene in private-sector activities, and recent international discus-
sions have shown that many states are inclined to resist the introduction of 
international-legal measures in fields such as Internet management.38 None-
theless, recent disasters with strong ‘functional’ impact in a number of coun-
tries (such as the December 2004 tsunami in the Indian Ocean region) have 
rightly spurred interest in this dimension of human security. The angles 
which could most realistically be explored at world level, either in the UN or 
the International Financial Institutions, would seem to be the definition of 
universal safety standards; the encouragement of networks39 for practical 
cooperation (and of inter-regional exchanges of aid and expertise); better 
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capacity for international response in emergencies; plus, of course, the avail-
ability of finance for infrastructure projects with a human security rationale. 
The Other Player: Civil Society 
In the analysis up to now, human society and the individuals that compose it 
have been cast in a somewhat passive role, as the ‘consumers’ of security – 
in all its dimensions – whose needs both government and business ought to 
serve. The reality is not, of course, so simple. In today’s globalised condi-
tions, the trends that create complex vulnerability for human populations 
have also brought certain new elements of (at least potential) empowerment 
for the individual. This point is most often made in connection with the 
alarming destructive power that single or small-group actors may wield 
when acting as terrorists or saboteurs; but there is a positive side to it as 
well. As many recent natural and terrorist-made emergencies have shown, 
individual reactions can greatly alter both the immediate impact of the event 
and its ‘manageability’ by swinging towards panic, exploitation and the 
blame game, or conversely towards responsibility, self-help, mutual help and 
charity. The question inevitably arises whether governments and interna-
tional institutions have reflected sufficiently on the possibilities of preparing, 
motivating and mobilising individuals to play the most positive of the roles 
available to them in any given contingency. In a Euro-Atlantic context this 
challenge might be defined as re-inventing Cold War concepts of ‘civil de-
fence’ in the new context of ‘civil emergency preparedness’. It is a tough 
task because the range of risks is so much wider now, but it should be made 
easier by rising popular standards of education and access to information, as 
well as by the fact that the range of coping skills now required is much more 
widely diffused at grass-roots level. (Contrast the first-aid skills needed after 
a hurricane with those needed after a military nuclear strike). 
Civil society also has a third role beside those of victim and of emer-
gency response: namely, the democratic control of both public and private 
sector security policies. How the people–government interface is and should 
be managed has been well documented in many fields of old and new secu-
rity.40 Less attention has been paid to the possibilities of popular influence 
over business in the security field as such. Consumer and share-holder 
power, mobilised usually by single-issue NGOs, has had an effect that gov-
ernments would have found it very hard to achieve in transforming business 
practices in contexts like ecological impact, child labour, and other aspects 
of human rights and social responsibility. Some NGOs have specialised in 
observing the big multinationals’ behaviour in conflict regions and their 
pressure has led (rightly or wrongly) to certain companies withdrawing from 
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certain locations.41 Up to now, however, popular pressure on other aspects of 
corporate security behaviour cannot be said to have been much explored as a 
motor of change, unless in the very general (and typically antagonistic) con-
text of anti-globalisation campaigns. One of the problems here is that the 
industry whose activities people are most likely to feel strongly about, i.e. 
the armaments and defence services sector, has little surface of exposure to 
either private consumer or share-holder pressure (and is likely to have its 
physical installations strongly protected as well). More thought needs to be 
devoted, by those who care about principles of answerability, to the general 
issue of the people–business interface; including the possible new openings 
for pressure where companies – as discussed above – are straddling the 
boundary between civil and military production in new ways. 
The Triangle of Security Governance 
It can be seen from the above that the challenge of achieving efficiency and 
propriety in the private sector’s response to security demands is actually a 
triangular one. Governments, businesses and civil society all interact and 
neither efficiency nor propriety can be assured unless all three are working 
on shared understandings and towards shared goals. The question may again 
be raised here – drawing together a number of strands from above – of what 
methods and structures of governance could be envisaged (at national and 
international level) to handle this challenge better than it has been handled 
up to now. Two extremes may at once be set aside: re-nationalisation and the 
free play of market forces. Governments might be tempted to try to retrieve 
direct control of private-sector resources in cases critical for security, and 
public opinion might press them to do so, but this cannot be a practical 
proposition except in a very small part of the new security spectrum42 – and 
experience gives no confidence that state control will always produce right 
answers either. At the other extreme, it is clear that allowing profit (and/or 
other shareholder demands) to guide all security-related business behaviour 
would often give bad results especially for the weakest governments and the 
poorest citizens. It could ultimately worsen the environment for business 
itself, in particular because of the built-in pressures to favour short-term over 
longer-term returns. 
What remains is a range of tools from ‘hard’ through ‘soft’ regulation, 
and from institutionalised to ad hoc consultation at least between govern-
ments and industries and preferably along all three sides of the triangle. It 
may at once be concluded that only some mixture of these approaches will 
work. There is an important and still partly unfulfilled role43 for formal, le-
gally-binding regulations to play, notably in fields where the state preroga-
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tive is best established and the life-and-death issues the sharpest: such as 
private defence services, the trade in deadly weapons and technologies, or 
bio-safety and bio-security. The method of regulation has its own pitfalls, 
however: its quality depends on adequate reflection, expertise and consulta-
tion (of business inter alia), and its equity and effectiveness both depend on 
its being adopted at the right level and under the right authority. For many of 
the areas discussed above, purely national regulatory solutions are clearly 
now sub-optimal and can do damage even beyond national boundaries (be-
cause of extra-territoriality or market interdependence) if they get the an-
swers wrong. It should be a general concern to ensure that security-
motivated measures cause the minimum possible disruption of free trade and 
freedom of movement and the minimum distortion of fair competition. Last 
but not least, as the UN’s special adviser on business and human rights has 
pointed out,44 it does not by any means follow that a given norm legally de-
fined for states can and should be translated into an identical obligation for 
business; indeed, to do so would blur the distinction most activists want to 
protect between the roles of government and the private sector. 
These arguments imply that some space must always be left for 
‘softer’ solutions including ‘self-regulation’ by industry and voluntary codes 
of conduct to be followed both at corporate and individual level. Many such 
codes have in fact been drawn up in sectoral contexts (conflict diamonds, 
extractive industries), by professional groups (scientists) or in regional set-
tings, but they have gaps and overlaps and in particular are inadequately 
known and applied in the developing world. Two possible approaches to 
remedy this would be for the UN to extend the normative framework of its 
Global Compact further into explicitly security-related areas (as in the case 
of conflict behaviour noted above); and/or for industry itself to develop a 
movement for ‘Corporate Security Responsibility’ (CSecR), modelled on 
that for ‘Corporate Social Responsibility’ (CSR) and aiming in a comparable 
way to combine and reconcile all the different dimensions of the issue.45 
(One great merit of a widely endorsed set of ‘security responsibility’criteria 
would be that they would allow insurance providers, credit providers, audi-
tors and experts assessing the health of companies before takeovers – among 
others – to cite such factors in their judgements, as often happens already, 
e.g. with existing CSR norms or conformity with the US Sarbanes-Oxley 
legislation; the market itself would then work for compliance through the 
penalties that would come to be associated with low ratings.) Last but not 
least, dialogue and consultation between all points of the ‘triangle’, on both 
general and specific security solutions, will always be a necessary and can 
never be a harmful part of the equation. What needs more creative thought 
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and energy is the question of where it is most urgent to build such mecha-
nisms for intersectoral policy-shaping (not forgetting international organisa-
tions), and – of course – what forms they ought to take. 
Conclusion 
In a thoughtful article in the Financial Times on 13 January 2006,46 Ian 
Davis, a top executive of McKinsey & Company, wrote: ‘The tenets of cur-
rent global business ideology – for example, shareholder value, free trade, 
intellectual property rights, profit repatriation – are not understood, let alone 
accepted, in many parts of the world’. He argued that this problem must be 
addressed as business, government and society grow more interdependent in 
a globalised environment: but not necessarily, that all the burden of adjust-
ment must be on the business side. As a matter of observation, governments 
throughout the world have been trying for years now to import business 
practices that they find conducive to performing their own duties towards the 
population better; a growing number of them are promoting ‘public–private 
partnership’ as the key to funding and delivering critical aspects of social 
provision; and an opinion poll taken in late 2005 by the World Economic 
Forum showed that respondents in 60 countries currently had a higher level 
of trust in business people (60 percent positive) than in politicians (40 per-
cent positive).47  
Most of the analysis in the present paper has been about ways that cor-
porate norms and behaviour need to be adjusted to public-sector (and public) 
requirements, normally moving further away from the simpler laws of 
‘value’ in the process. While it is reasonable to argue that in the life-and-
death business of security there can ultimately only be one set of values that 
guides all sectors, it would be counter-productive to assume that business 
can never internalise and defer to those values,48 and unfair to claim even 
that business has nothing to contribute to those values itself. It may suffice to 
mention the relevance of notions of comparative advantage and cost-
effectiveness to successful security provision; and to recall that business 
creates the wealth without which we neither have something to defend nor 
something to defend it with. Against the background of both traditional and 
modern, multi-dimensional, security challenges we may return to the old 
human adage that one should not kill the goose that lays the golden eggs: 
even in the name of saving it from avian ‘flu’. 
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Insurgencies, Security Governance and 
the International Community 
Albrecht Schnabel 
Introduction 
Armed non-state actors represent a critical challenge for security govern-
ance.1 They highlight the instability, insecurity and the unpredictable envi-
ronment characterised by violence and destruction typical of latent conflict 
situations.2 Insurgencies have long moved beyond the confines of state bor-
ders and make their power and influence felt internationally. The interna-
tionalisation of the insurgent – and in the recent past increasingly terrorist – 
threat makes security governance concerns crucial.3 National security gov-
ernance is inextricably linked with regional and global security governance. 
From this arises the responsibility of international actors to consider security 
governance at the national level as part and parcel of regional and interna-
tional security considerations. Effective security governance leaves the state 
in control of security – i.e. a legitimate, responsible and accountable state 
having the legal and legitimate responsibility for the monopoly of force. If 
the state is neither legal nor responsible nor legitimate, insurgencies may be 
the last resort of the population, as well as potential allies of the international 
community, in fighting illegitimate and oppressive governments. Such ar-
guments have been made, rightly or wrongly, in cases such as Kosovo, Af-
ghanistan and Iraq. 
Insurgent movements consist of both armed opposition groups and 
their support bases.4 The insurgents engage in guerrilla warfare (attacks 
against security forces) and terrorism (attacks against civilians). While some 
movements engage in local insurgencies, others engage in transnational op-
erations. Insurgency has been exacerbated by the resurgence of ethnicity and 
religiosity; enhanced movement of people across international borders; free 
flow of ideas and technologies; and the black and grey arms market. More-
over, globalisation has given a new impetus to insurgency. The forces of 
globalisation catalyse and empower existing and emerging insurgent move-
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ments. Instead of resisting globalisation, even the most puritanical insurgent 
groups exploit the forces and opportunities of globalisation to advance their 
political aims and objectives.5 For example, at the height of his campaign 
against the West, the Al Qaida leader Osama bin Laden wore a camouflage 
NATO jacket, carried a Soviet-manufactured AK-47, and used a satellite 
phone purchased in the USA.6 
Benefiting from this rapidly-changing environment, the phenomenon 
of insurgency transformed regionally and functionally. To avoid being 
traced, contemporary insurgents use pre-paid mobile phone cards to commu-
nicate; to reach difficult targets, they have used fuel-laden passenger aircraft 
in suicide attacks; and to attack from a distance, they prefer to use remote 
control detonation. The forces of globalisation have facilitated the rise, 
growth, mobility and acquisition of special weapons and dual technologies 
by insurgent groups. For instance, the Internet is widely used not only to 
reach out to existing and potential support bases, but also to shorten the 
planning and preparation phases of operations. Moreover, using inexpensive 
means of travel and widespread means of communication, insurgent groups 
have successfully and in unprecedented ways expanded and influenced their 
existing and potential support bases located within and far away from the 
theatres of conflict. 
Insurgencies in the post-Cold War period therefore differ markedly 
from the Cold War period in shape, size, structure and strategy. Contempo-
rary insurgent groups are multi-dimensional organisations. As they challenge 
state authority ideologically, financially, administratively, and electorally, 
government and societal responses must be multi-pronged. Therefore, for 
insurgencies to be managed, both governments and the international com-
munity should be prepared to use a variety of instruments. These range from 
informational, economic, political, military and diplomatic efforts under-
taken to influence the spawning, sustenance, escalation and de-escalation of 
insurgencies. 
It has recently become more difficult for governments to defeat insur-
gencies, as in a more globalised world, cooperation, arms supplies, training 
and fund-raising are not limited to an insurgency’s particular territory of 
operation. It is in this context that international efforts to manage insurgen-
cies are as important as ever and, possibly, may prove more effective than 
ever in stifling the threat and violence produced by insurgent activities. This 
chapter will first discuss the limitations of current approaches to insurgen-
cies. It will highlight the difficult task of understanding and judging the 
credibility and legitimacy of insurgencies – an important first step before 
deliberation over the need for external involvement to manage them. It then 
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considers phased and flexible response strategies (before, during and after 
violent insurgent conflicts), before summarising the challenges and opportu-
nities posed to governments and the international community in their at-
tempts to respond to insurgent movements and groups. The chapter con-
cludes with a number of recommendations for more effective and construc-
tive international involvement in the prevention and resolution of insurgent 
conflict. 
The Limits of Traditional Approaches to Defend Against Insurgencies 
Military force alone is severely limited in addressing insurgencies. As well 
as targeting the physical capabilities of non-state actors, it is critical to re-
duce their motivation. However, governments worldwide lack the tools to 
target non-state groups’ motivation to fight. As long as guerrillas and terror-
ists preserve their will to fight, insurgencies will persist. For instance, de-
spite having a highly skilled security service and military intelligence ser-
vice, Israel has failed to prevent periodic suicide attacks that kill and injure 
its citizens. Although target-hardening – such as the West Bank barrier – can 
reduce the threat temporarily, it cannot end the violence. Soft power com-
bined with hard power is essential to reduce the threat, while hard power 
alone will only strengthen the insurgents’ will to kill and die for their cause 
and increase the insurgents’ support base. 
Today, we face unprecedented challenges as well as fresh opportuni-
ties for cooperation. To effectively combat insurgencies, governmental, in-
tergovernmental and societal responses must be far-reaching and compre-
hensive. For counter-insurgency policies to be effective, they must reflect 
action against such groups at all stages. It is more cost-effective to invest in 
changing the conditions that spawn insurgency rather than spend billions of 
dollars on anti-insurgency (protective operations) and counter-insurgency 
(offensive operations) measures. With the sophistication of insurgent groups, 
target-hardening and other forms of protection will not reduce the threat. 
Instead of relying on the intelligence community and the police alone to 
combat insurgency, governments must develop a broad-based response. The 
range of actors essential to manage contemporary insurgency includes the 
military, customs, immigration, border protection, aviation security, port 
security, surface transportation security, coast guard, emergency services, 
educational institutions, religious schools, community organisations and 
private security professionals.  
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This is a matter primarily of national security governance. The role 
played by multilateral organisations is limited. Despite its potential, interna-
tional engagement should not be overstated – it can be short-lived and often 
dependent on strategic considerations, particularly if violence resumes. The 
main responsibility and opportunity to manage insurgencies, with or without 
external assistance, remains with states. Yet particularly in the face of global 
terrorist insurgent activity, international organisations are called upon to 
support, foster and legitimise joint state action to combat insurgent violence, 
but also to use their power of moral persuasion to promote respect for human 
rights and condemn their abuse – by both state and non-state actors. 
With the globalisation of insurgency, the nation-state alone cannot and 
should not manage an insurgency. Even powerful states are significantly 
dependent on their allies for assistance. With the dramatic decline in inter-
state conflicts and the increase in internal conflicts, the importance of the 
international community in managing insurgencies is increasing. As most 
insurgencies develop external dimensions, when and how should the interna-
tional community become involved in the management of insurgencies? 
Whose interests should the international community defend: the insur-
gency’s, the population’s, the state’s or the larger regional or global commu-
nity of states? 
Understanding and Judging Insurgencies 
Can an Insurgency be Justified? 
The formulation of effective response strategies requires a thorough under-
standing of the motivations and the perceived and recognised legitimacy of 
an insurgency’s violent struggle. Is there an entitlement to use force to ex-
press, for instance, a perceived right to national self-determination, a com-
mon motivating force for insurgent movements? Does such a right exist? It 
could certainly be argued that a right exists to overthrow an oppressive colo-
nial power, but not to break away from an existing state. This is the case 
especially when possibilities for enhanced autonomy and political self-
determination have not yet been fully explored. Amitai Etzioni argues that 
‘only when secessionist movements seek to break out of empires – and only 
when those empires refuse to democratise – does self-determination deserve 
our support. Otherwise, democratic government and community-building, 
not fragmentation, should be accorded the highest standing.’7 In this regard, 
for example, Kosovo Albanian leader Ibrahim Rugova’s non-violent struggle 
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against Serb oppression, and his numerous unsuccessful calls for external 
support, could be considered to have legitimised the KLA’s increasingly 
violent struggle for political autonomy. 
However, a struggle for secession without the exploitation of political 
channels to work out compromises, or the use of internal violence to further 
one’s own power position vis-à-vis other groups (outside the context of con-
tinuous oppression) does not justify violence. This includes wars for per-
sonal ambition, and resource wars (such as in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Cambo-
dia, or Biafra); warlords fighting for private interests to establish monopolies 
over the production and trade of specific commodities, such as diamonds or 
drugs (as in Sierra Leone or Angola); narco-terrorist warlords (in Colombia 
and South-east Asia); warlords disguising private interests as tribal or ethno-
territorial/ethno-political struggles (Bosnia, Chechnya, Abkhazia, Somalia). 
It includes secessions for nationalist goals to impose order along reli-
gious/ethnic lines (the Taliban); cases where an external actor instigates in-
surgency and violence (irredentism – such as in the case of the Bosnian 
Serbs in Republika Srpska and many African intergroup conflicts); and in 
the case of obvious terrorist activity, i.e. when insurgents conduct politically-
motivated violence that deliberately targets non-combatants. 
How should the moral justification for an insurgency be classified? A 
number of factors should be considered, such as its ambitions to serve col-
lective and locally-based interests of the population; its human rights record 
vis-à-vis the population; the support it enjoys among the population; the 
nature of its aims, goals and purpose; the government’s and state security 
system’s record of behaviour towards the population; the insurgency’s re-
cord of attempting to reason and negotiate with governing authorities, in-
cluding efforts made to engage legitimate international actors in political 
campaigns against state oppression and misgovernance. 
Is it Acceptable to Intervene? 
As hinted above, in order to decide how to approach the challenges and 
threats of emerging and active insurgencies, the international community 
needs to make difficult judgments. In order to help take both moral and pru-
dent decisions,8 it is essential to understand the justification for an insur-
gency as well as the justification for external involvement. The following 
questions are pertinent: 
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• What are the reasons, motivations, and objectives of an insurgency? 
• Should we differentiate among insurgencies? Are all violent insurgen-
cies unjustified and illegal, or not? 
• Are there moral justifications for insurgencies and the resort to vio-
lence in furthering their cause? 
• Are there moral justifications for the use of violence, even at the ex-
pense of civilian casualties? 
• Is the international community in some cases justified in using force 
to support the cause and military campaigns of insurgencies?  
At this point it is useful to draw some parallels with the dilemma that 
international actors face when challenged by the need (and possible respon-
sibility) to engage in humanitarian intervention. This presents a very similar 
challenge to intervention for the purpose of preventing and managing insur-
gencies, representing an assault on the sovereignty over internal affairs of a 
state, notwithstanding how morally justified the use of force and intervention 
by external parties may be in redressing gross violations of human rights. 
However, there are mitigating factors: first, one must consider the human 
rights (and human security) record of the government in power. Second, has 
the government attempted to address reasonable demands of minority 
groups, of political opposition, or of border communities? Third, has the 
government sought political and non-violent solutions to existing problems? 
Fourth, has the government tried to engage groups with legitimate griev-
ances in its attempts to avoid an escalation of violence? Finally, has the gov-
ernment provoked violence and/or counter-violence? 
International order, as much as domestic order, can only function if 
states and individuals follow the rules that govern their respective communi-
ties. Membership of the international community requires adherence to in-
ternational standards and rules. However, membership also comes with enti-
tlements and rights such as the right of the state to recognition and fair 
treatment by the international community and the right of the individual to 
be treated fairly and justly by his/her legitimate government. Poor and irre-
sponsible governance may trigger opposition and – sometimes violent – 
resistance. In these cases, international sympathy is with those taking up 
resistance, as demonstrated by widespread international support for ethnic 
independence and suppressed secessionist movements in the early 1990s. 
The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty’s 
(ICISS) report The Responsibility to Protect calls for the international com-
munity’s responsibility to oppose and to impose sanctions on irresponsible 
states.9 In cases where the international community will not respond – it is 
Insurgencies, Security Governance and the International Community 71
reasonable to assume that the majority of crises, now and in the future, will 
continue to remain unanswered – local resistance is often the only and last 
resort to oppose poor and irresponsible governments. 
However, while a moral case can be made for many insurgencies – 
particularly those that are fighting oppression and illegitimate (security) 
governance – the legality of insurgencies and international responses to them 
must nevertheless be questioned.10 Within a domestic context, and from the 
perspective of governments, insurgencies are usually illegal and have to 
expect forceful resistance from governing authorities. There may be moral 
justification for an insurgency. But the use of force can under all circum-
stances be justified only as a last resort to redress great injustice. Neverthe-
less, how do international organisations respond if they are a) reluctant to 
condemn the insurgency and assist the state to regain control and terminate 
the insurgency; b) in general opposed to international involvement in states' 
internal crises; while c) at the same time subscribing to an international 
moral/ethical code of a ‘responsibility to protect’ in cases of gross state irre-
sponsibility and human rights abuses? 
Limits and Opportunities for Effective Involvement 
What should be the role of international actors in the management of insur-
gencies? As already noted above, there are clear limits. Beyond a possible 
emerging threshold of gross human rights violations (ethnic cleansing or 
genocide),11 the international community possesses very limited authority in 
internal conflicts. The constraints of state sovereignty make it difficult for 
external actors to intervene without the government’s consent, irrespective 
of the legitimacy of the government in question. Few members of the inter-
national community would support military intervention in a dangerous in-
ternal conflict, unless their own security were threatened, for instance, as a 
result of conflict spillover, massive outflows of refugees, or threatened ac-
cess to key strategic resources. Political, geo-strategic or economic priorities 
condition the degree of outrage expressed about human insecurity suffered at 
the hands of dysfunctional security governance. Thus, willingness for out-
side involvement in internal wars is marked by overt selectivity, driven 
mostly by self-interest.12 Sub-regional and regional organisations are 
plagued by a lack of resources that make it difficult to intervene even if the 
necessary political resolve exists. Moreover, while there is usually little sup-
port during the crisis stage, there is a persistent lack of will and ability to 
address internal problems at an early stage of evolving crises and when gov-
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ernments are not yet locked into defensive counter-insurgency postures and 
are still more open to effective resolution. 
Despite these obstacles, there are nevertheless opportunities for effec-
tive involvement. These include humanitarian intervention in cases where 
internal wars, with or without insurgent fighting, produce high levels of ci-
vilian casualties and result in large-scale humanitarian crimes, cross-border 
security threats and transnational terrorist activity.13 International criminal 
tribunals to judge perpetrators of humanitarian crimes that have been com-
mitted at the hands of either a government and/or an insurgent group, have 
the potential of serving a deterrent role for would-be perpetrators and of 
assisting the post-conflict reconciliation processes. Diplomatic pressure 
(both formal and informal) could be applied to convince states to communi-
cate and negotiate with insurgents or to offer compromise solutions or ‘reha-
bilitation packages’, also in the interest of larger regional and international 
security. Diplomatic pressure could also be applied to convince states to 
meet legitimate and reasonable demands of opposition movements and civil 
society, and thus counter growing popular support for increasingly militant 
insurgent strategies. International organisations – such as the UN, through its 
Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC)14 – can offer assistance to states that 
justifiably fight exploitative insurgencies. The international community can 
also voice public condemnation and ‘shaming’ – including the imposition of 
international sanctions – of states that assist illegitimate insurgencies in third 
countries with money, training or territory. 
Politically Delicate Issues 
External actors must not worsen the situation on the ground as a result of 
their intervention. Ultimately they will – intentionally or unintentionally – 
become the partners and allies of one or the other side in a conflict. As a 
result, international actors will be perceived as enemies by the side that does 
not profit from their involvement, raising the stakes not only for troops and 
civilian actors on the ground, but – given the internationalisation of insur-
gencies – also in their home countries and for their representatives and inter-
ests abroad. 
There are significant operational difficulties in dealing with insurgen-
cies, including the challenge to negotiate with insurgent groups. Often there 
is no clear line of command, exacerbated by internal political struggles be-
tween different factions within insurgencies (often over more or less violent 
modalities of opposition, resistance and the use of force). 
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Fighting insurgent movements (if that is indeed required) is dangerous 
and causes casualties among the intervening actors. In most cases, local 
states and local actors will have to do the fighting. International actors might 
assist either one or all sides of the struggle with material and financial re-
sources, as well as by internationally isolating insurgents, warlords or irre-
sponsible governments and their leaders. Finally, exit and transition strate-
gies are important and highly delicate considerations for all parties con-
cerned – for insurgency leaders, governments and external actors. 
Response Strategies and the International Community 
With insurgencies increasingly assuming a multi-generational and transna-
tional character, the application of military force can have limited long-term 
and strategic success. Yet, as the face of insurgency changes, international 
organisations and government coalitions increasingly possess comparative 
advantages in dealing with insurgencies and insurgency networks compared 
to local and state actors. 
Local, National and International Actors 
At all stages of the management of insurgencies, local actors play the most 
crucial role, either with or without the assistance of external actors. Particu-
larly in cases where governments have been among the perpetrators of vio-
lence, (constructive) civil society actors must shoulder internal resistance to 
violence, advocacy of non-violent conflict and violence management, and 
post-violence reconstruction of the society (and the state). External actors 
must assure local ownership of external interventions and assistance. 
States play a key role in the management of insurgent movements. 
Their actions nurture, trigger, escalate, but also defuse insurgent movements. 
Their collaboration is required if external efforts at defusing insurgencies are 
to be successful. Governments are in a better position to prevent the radicali-
sation of insurgencies when the international community becomes involved 
at the initiation phase of an insurgency. 
External actors either support states in fighting ‘illegitimate’ insurgent 
movements, or they pressure states into negotiating and making peace with 
‘legitimate’ insurgencies. It is in the international community’s interest to 
bring insurgent wars to a conclusion, thus permitting societies to be rebuilt 
without territorial divisions and the creation of new splinter states. This may 
require the replacement of an existing government, and the inclusion of the 
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political leadership of the insurgency not only in peace negotiations and 
settlements, but also in the post-war political order and institutions. External 
actors include prominent individuals, groups (political and ethnic move-
ments, diaspora communities), states, groups of states, sub-regional and re-
gional organisations, and the UN. Given the global phenomenon of insur-
gencies, the UN’s response might be particularly important in forging inter-
national response systems to emerging and active insurgent movements.15 
External actors can be helpful in managing insurgent movements at pre-
conflict, conflict and post-conflict stages. Target states are those that are too 
weak to deal with insurgencies, except to engage in a protracted conflict. 
Often, domestic authorities are unsuitable agents in stopping the violence 
that accompanies insurgencies. Hard as well as soft state responses to insur-
gencies can be highly counterproductive. In the developing world, states 
tend to over-react, as a disproportionate response to insurgent activities tar-
gets the wide support base for a movement. Such action can strengthen the 
insurgency, while consolidating its popular support base. The Tamil mili-
tancy in Sri Lanka or the various insurgencies in India’s North-east are ex-
amples.16 On the other hand, a soft-line, defensive approach resembles a 
policy of appeasement, where the government protects potential targets, but 
avoids engaging insurgents in actual military warfare. Critics lament that 
such a policy – as being pursued by the Colombian government towards the 
Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) in particular – pre-
vents governments from forcing insurgents to the negotiating table.17 
There are more constructive and, ultimately, more successful ap-
proaches; A hard-line, yet proportional response drives a wedge between the 
insurgents and their support base. It isolates and fights active and core lead-
ers of the insurgency, while offering social and economic measures to pacify 
the support base (and to compete with social services previously provided by 
the insurgent movement). Sri Lanka is an example of such an approach.18 A 
‘soft–hard’ approach means harassing insurgents until they accept certain 
incentives such as power-sharing arrangements and until they prefer to con-
tinue their struggle on a political level, rather than on the battlefield. A 
common mistake in state responses is to target only the activists in the actual 
insurgent movement, rather than their support base, which is crucial if insur-
gencies are to be weakened to the degree that they can be defeated, or to the 
degree that they consider political negotiations. However, since 9/11, meas-
ures have been taken, nationally and internationally (UN Security Council 
Resolutions 1373 and 1377), to address the financial support base of, in par-
ticular, terrorist groups.  
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Timing 
What is the ideal timing of involvement? Ideally, of course, one can only 
speak of successful engagement of an insurgency if its escalatory response in 
anticipation and response to state action can be precipitated and influenced, 
preferably before the outbreak of violence and, should that fail (as it tends to 
be the case), during and after the violence. 
Pre-Conflict Phase 
At the pre-conflict stage, international actors should compel states to address 
legitimate demands from parts or all of society; particularly in cases where 
states fail to meet their responsibility of providing effective, accountable and 
just governance (including security governance).19 In many cases, social, 
economic or political oppression, marginalisation or deprivation feed insur-
gent movements. In these cases states carry at least partial blame for insur-
gencies that respond to such threats to the security and freedom of part or all 
of society. At the pre-conflict phase, the international community thus has to 
ensure that there is no feeding ground for insurgencies, and that societies are 
not compelled to look towards violence as the only recourse to address le-
gitimate demands for political, economic and social capital. The experience 
of the OSCE in making the internal affairs of its member states a key con-
cern of its approach to cooperative security, and in particular the work of the 
High Commissioner on National Minorities, could serve as a model for ef-
fective preventive work by international organisations.20 
States should provide peaceful channels for all groups in society to 
express both support and opposition to government policies and actions. 
Injustices and disputes can then be addressed peacefully – and morally ‘le-
gitimate’ insurgencies can be prevented. If such peaceful channels exist, 
international actors need to support non-violent movements and their lead-
ers, while denouncing and imposing sanctions on movements that use or 
intend to use violence to express their demands. 
Conflict Phase 
During the conflict phase, international actors need to serve as mediators 
between insurgencies, society and state authorities in stopping violence and 
war21 through convincing states to address injustice and inequalities that may 
have led to the formation of an insurgency and the outbreak of violence. 
They must integrate insurgencies and their political leaders in negotiations to 
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end violence. They should support ceasefires, the imposition of peacekeep-
ing forces and the support of political processes towards the cessation of 
war. They should facilitate and support political settlements that allow for an 
end to violence and the disbanding of insurgency movements. If the ‘legiti-
mate’ demands of insurgencies are met by the state, the political movement 
underpinning an insurgency should receive an opportunity to stand for future 
elections – particularly if they have made reasonable efforts towards seeking 
non-violent solutions to their demands. 
In the case of ‘illegitimate’ insurgencies, international actors should, 
as far as this is possible, aid governments to suppress such insurgencies, 
engage moderate insurgent leaders in negotiations and assist in cutting off 
financial, third-party and other support from such movements. States that are 
destabilised in such ways must count on the assistance of the international 
community in their defence against destructive forces from within. 
Post-Conflict Phase 
During the post-conflict phase, international actors must assist states to over-
come the human and material scars of conflict and violence. They must as-
sist in demobilisation of both insurgent and government forces, disarmament 
and the reintegration of former combatants into post-conflict society. Other-
wise, in the absence of alternative livelihood options, disillusioned armed 
ex-combatants are likely to regroup and spoil fragile peace and rebuilding 
processes. Moreover, the creation of viable and legitimate institutions that 
are able to reintegrate both government and non-government forces into a 
functioning and legitimate post-conflict security architecture will not only 
lower the potential for the resurgence of violence, but will also instill confi-
dence in the government’s ability to provide long-term security. 
In the post-conflict phase it is vitally important to remember the rea-
sons, values and goals that engendered insurgent movements, and the sup-
port – or lack thereof – they enjoyed from local populations. If insurgencies 
fought ruthless wars without regard for civilian casualties, for their own 
interests and ambitions, they should not be permitted to retain or gain control 
of the political and economic life of post-conflict societies. Those insurgen-
cies should be considered criminal organisations, and their leaders and sup-
porters should be treated as such. In the wake of the Bosnian war such an 
approach was taken vis-à-vis the Bosnian Serb forces. While they defended 
the Serb community against the Bosnian Croatian and Bosnian communities 
(heavily supported from Belgrade), their involvement in heinous cases of 
ethnic cleansing (such as the Srebrenica massacre of July 1995) discredited 
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them to the point that their political and military leaders as well as the wider 
Bosnian Serb population were subjected to much harsher treatment by the 
international community than the Muslim-Croat Federation following the 
Dayton Peace Treaty of December 1995.22 In addition, their military and 
political leaders, General Ratko Mladić, former Chief of Staff of the Bosnian 
Serb Army, and former Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić have been 
indicted for war crimes and genocide by the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the Former Yugoslavia in The Hague. They still remain at large. 
If an insurgency has been fought mainly to redress social, economic 
and political injustices within an oppressed society, after all political means 
for redress have been exhausted, there may be moral and political justifica-
tion for integrating, or even handing over political power to the (moderate) 
leaders of such insurgencies. In other words, the international community 
should be prepared to take sides and judge if an insurgency has the right and 
capacity to shape significantly the political landscape of the post-conflict 
society. 
In summary, the main approaches for external actors in addressing the 
challenges posed by insurgencies are early warning, preventive diplomacy, 
conflict management and resolution, and post-conflict reconstruction. Early 
warning requires thorough and honest attempts to understand the back-
ground, goals and operating procedures of an insurgency. Through preven-
tive diplomacy – both official and unofficial diplomacy with pre-insurgency 
movements and states – international actors may be able to mediate early 
resolutions to escalating crises.  
If preventive action fails and war breaks out, conflict management re-
quires further involvement to limit the escalation of violence, if at all possi-
ble at a low-intensity stage of the insurgency. If an insurgent war can be 
settled, with or without the involvement of external actors, the conflict’s 
resolution may require external assistance through mediation, facilitation, 
and arbitration. Exit strategies need to be offered to insurgencies’ leaders 
and fighters – but preferably not exit strategies that offer fame, wealth, po-
litical profile and power. And, finally, assistance has to be offered in post-
conflict reconstruction – assistance in the reintegration of combatants, sup-
port in building a new state, overcoming the culture of violence and intro-
ducing a culture of peace.23 
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Challenges of Insurgencies 
Insurgencies pose a number of serious challenges, yet also some opportuni-
ties to external actors committed to constructive involvement in internal 
conflicts. 
Difficulties 
Once an insurgency breaks out, violence is difficult to stop. Insurgencies are 
part of, or are the manifestation of, protracted social conflict that can sub-
side, flare up again, and move between times of low- and high-intensity vio-
lence. This makes it hard to design a long-term strategy to manage insurgen-
cies, just as it is difficult to manage protracted social conflict. Moreover, 
while an intervention in an internal conflict may be justified, legitimised and 
undertaken by external actors, this is only possible and feasible in the con-
text and at times of excessive violence.24 As violence subsides, so will the 
justification for external involvement. If violence resumes, chances are low 
that the international community will be willing to resume its previous level 
of involvement. 
Insurgents rally local populations around the need to use violence and 
counter-violence, convincing populations that non-violence is ineffective. 
Actions by international actors often support such assumptions. For instance, 
a number of secessionist groups that have pursued a non-violent path to-
wards reaching their political goals and towards securing the support of the 
international community, have failed miserably while once they have en-
gaged in violence to pursue their goals and make themselves heard, the in-
ternational community responded. The Kosovo Liberation Army’s (KLA) 
experience in Kosovo is a case in point. In the early 1990s, the KLA was 
considered a terrorist group. Since 1998, it has been considered as a move-
ment for freedom, autonomy and self-determination, and a partner in fight-
ing Serbia. During the Rambouillet talks in early 1999, the KLA was treated 
as a partner in peace negotiations. During the NATO bombing of the former 
Yugoslavia during the Kosovo war in 1999, significant cooperation was 
evident between the KLA and NATO. In the post-war period, the KLA 
emerged as a spoiler of post-conflict rebuilding activities; it created disorder 
in Kosovo and launched military operations in southern Serbia and in north-
ern Macedonia. The metamorphosis of the KLA (and the later demise of its 
political arm, the PDK, in the November 2001 provisional assembly elec-
tions) is an interesting example of the impact that external actors, in particu-
lar international organisations, can have on the ‘life cycle’ of an insur-
Insurgencies, Security Governance and the International Community 79
gency.25 Moreover, this illustrates the dilemma of preventive action by inter-
national actors. As long as there is little or no violence, there is no sense of 
urgency. The same applies to cases where there is no far-reaching threat to 
the international community. It is thus in the interest of insurgents – should 
they seek the assistance of the international community in advancing their 
goals – to raise the level of violence and appeal to the conscience (and hope 
for the support) of the international community. 
Insurgencies must secure the support of a significant part of the local 
population to ensure the long-term viability of their actions, as well as 
money, food and housing for their fighters. Without local support, few in-
surgencies can sustain their efforts and recruit new personnel. High levels of 
civilian casualties at the hands of government forces strengthen the local 
support for an insurgency’s cause. Government forces can generally be eas-
ily triggered into stepping up their violence (again, the KLA’s approach 
supports this observation). Thus, violence breeds counter-violence, which, as 
has been noted above, is necessary to draw international attention to the 
plight of ‘legitimate insurgencies’. 
Insurgencies that function as substitute states create dependencies that 
are not easily undone after the violence ends. Long-lasting insurgencies, 
particularly if geographically confined to a specific part of a country, can 
indeed develop quasi-state structures that, after the end of a conflict, can 
either be codified through the inclusion of the movement’s leaders in joint 
governing structures, or that need to be undone at the risk of even greater 
local destabilisation. This requires a thorough understanding of the insur-
gency’s internal dynamics, its ties to the local population, its ideology and 
post-war expectations. Otherwise post-war governments and external actors 
will not be able to find the most appropriate and – for the stability of the 
country – most beneficial approach towards integrating insurgencies’ rem-
nant political and social structures into the country’s post-war order.  
During especially long-standing insurgencies there is a creeping cul-
ture of violence that defines entire generations’ outlook on life and social 
behaviour. Violence becomes a normal means of political and social com-
munication with ‘the other’. To break this cycle of past and future violence, 
international organisations must become involved in social engineering ex-
ercises – targeted at ex-combatants as well as the civilian population – to 
help generations to overcome the traumas of war. This requires long-term 
commitment and investment. 
Insurgencies are often divided into various subgroups, with no direct 
line of command. It is difficult to pinpoint reliable negotiation partners who 
can guarantee that decisions are implemented on the ground. Compromise by 
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whoever claims leadership may not be supported by other influential mem-
bers of the insurgency, thus endangering the authority of particular represen-
tatives of a group to speak on behalf of the movement (such as was the case 
with former Palestinian President Yasser Arafat’s position in Palestine). If 
peace deals and agreed assistance operations by the international community 
are repeatedly threatened by this lack of clear lines of authority within insur-
gent movements, patience will run low and external actors are likely to with-
draw their support. 
In resource wars, such as during three decades of war between the 
União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) and gov-
ernment troops in Angola, there are few incentives for insurgents to end 
violence, relinquish their local authority or join post-war political struc-
tures.26 If they benefit from the continuation of war, they will threaten and 
endanger external actors on the ground. Peace will not be in their interest, 
and they are likely to sabotage efforts towards securing an end to violence. 
Thus, private interest insurgencies are frequent spoilers in peace-building 
processes. 
Opportunities 
On the other hand, insurgencies seem to offer society (and the international 
community) the opportunity to unseat criminal, unconstitutional, oppressive 
or unpopular regimes. Northern Alliance forces in Afghanistan have helped 
the American-led coalition to fight Taliban forces on the ground. In such 
instances, insurgencies can serve as allies of the international community. 
However, subsequently insurgencies do expect to partake in post-war gov-
ernance and need to be integrated carefully in post-war reconstruction and 
transition efforts. In the case of Northern Alliance forces this has been a 
counterproductive and futile effort: Sharing the monopoly of force with non-
state entities weakens central government structures and greatly weakens 
security governance, while Northern Alliance leaders’ unfulfilled expecta-
tions for a significant stake in the post-war dispensation of power and influ-
ence only led to frustration and, ultimately, refusal to recognise internation-
ally-supported post-war governance structures. 
If an insurgency fights for collective interests, the likelihood is great 
that it enjoys popular support and that it desires to end violence and re-
establish peace and order once its goals are met. Collective interest insur-
gencies are thus likely to support externally-initiated peace-building proc-
esses, particularly if they are invited to join and contribute to the process. 
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The United Nations, Insurgencies, and Terrorism Post-9/11 
As the only international organisation with global representation, the UN has 
a special responsibility and significant comparative advantages in managing 
incipient and active insurgencies. The response of the United Nations to 
insurgencies has seen partial successes as well as failures. To change the 
strategic environment and to make it harder for such groups to operate, the 
United Nations has played a significant role in developing 12 international 
conventions to counter terrorist activity.27 In regional conflicts, notably in 
Palestine and Kashmir, which are internationally disputed areas, the United 
Nations has so far failed to facilitate or enforce peace. In Bosnia, Kosovo, 
Afghanistan, Iraq or the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the United 
Nations has failed to take the lead in generating an international response 
robust and sustainable enough to capitalise on the UN’s expertise and legiti-
macy to stop violence and help build locally-trusted and internationally-
supported institutions of political and security governance. With or without 
the mandate and/or support and cooperation of the UN, others – such as 
NATO in Bosnia and Kosovo, the US and its ‘coalition of the willing’ in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, the EU in DRC, or the AU in Darfur/Sudan – have 
therefore stepped in to pursue those goals. 
Nevertheless, the UN’s normative and moral authority in guiding state 
action in conflict intervention as well as post-conflict peace- and nation-
building efforts should not be understated. As an example, the mandate of 
the United Nations Monitoring Group, which was originally established 
pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1363 (2001) and subsequently 
monitored the implementation of sanctions against Al Qaida, the Taliban and 
their associates, should be expanded to include other groups that practice 
terrorism.28 The Group has been effective and greater use should be made by 
the United Nations’ system of the Group’s accumulated know-how and insti-
tutional knowledge to persuade governments to act more rigorously against 
terrorist infrastructure and personnel. The key to the Group’s success has 
been its visits to many states, enabling them to see implementation on the 
ground at operational and technical levels. Consequently, the Group has 
been able to bring to the attention of the Security Council the shortcomings 
of states’ implementation of resolutions, highlight some of the successes and 
provide recommendations for improving the overall process of the Monitor-
ing Group. 
The United Nations should develop another list, similar to the current 
Consolidated List, concerning Al Qaida, the Taliban and their associates, to 
designate groups and their supporters that target civilians as terrorist groups, 
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and produce an annual report similar to the US government’s Patterns of 
Global Terrorism.29 Even if their cause is ‘legitimate’, groups that target 
civilians must be banned, proscribed and criminalised. Alternatively, the 
current Consolidated List could be expanded to include individuals and enti-
ties covering all terrorist groups against which sanctions should be imple-
mented. These could then be subject to monitoring by the Group. Here, 
shared intelligence might be an answer to the lack of consolidated informa-
tion that could inform such a joint endeavour.30 
Ultimately, however, it is the member states that must combat terror-
ism (coordinating, if possible, their activities through regional organisa-
tions31). This should happen under the aegis of the United Nations, which in 
turn has to provide the necessary encouragement – and legitimacy, if appro-
priate – to fulfill their obligations in regard to measures stipulated under 
Chapter VII resolutions. 
Conclusion 
A number of lessons drawn from experience to date should guide the inter-
national community’s involvement in insurgencies. First, the international 
community can contribute to the prevention of insurgencies by building con-
flict observatories, through which domestic, regional and international insti-
tutions can be warned before a societal conflict breaks out into insurgent 
violence, and to trigger diplomatic efforts to pressure governments into ad-
dressing the legitimate grievances and aspirations of marginalised people. 
From a security governance perspective, it is not the task of external actors 
(be they interested states or intergovernmental organisations) to address the 
root causes of grievances that lead to insurgencies. Yet it is their task and, as 
some would argue, their responsibility32 to assist national actors in develop-
ing and consolidating institutional solutions in areas of democratic control 
and oversight based on international norms and standards. Through this they 
can assist in addressing some of the grievances that have inspired and main-
tained support for insurgencies. 
Second, the international community can contribute to ending insur-
gencies through mediation, negotiation, and arbitration in cases of ‘legiti-
mate’ insurgencies; by assisting states in ousting ‘illegitimate’ insurgents, 
including through the provision of material and financial assistance; by iso-
lating such movements internationally; and by punishing those state and 
non-state parties who provide assistance to them. 
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Both international organisations (regional organisations and the UN) 
and government coalitions can engage insurgent groups. However, there is a 
specific role for the international community in the management of insur-
gencies; international organisations can play a role in engaging insurgent 
leaderships in peace negotiations. Striking compromise solutions among 
actors with often competing or conflicting interests is the bread and butter of 
inter-governmental organisations. Nevertheless, in the absence of the total 
defeat of either side and the accompanying human suffering of civilians, a 
compromise is the best each party can hope for. International organisations 
can help negotiate such a compromise and monitor its implementation. The 
UN in particular could learn much from the OSCE’s experience, in particular 
the High Commissioner on National Minorities’ low-key mediation activities 
with both governmental and non-governmental actors. 
However, there has to be immediate and visible improvement (beyond 
the cessation of violence) that accompanies settlements and peace-building 
efforts, and that effectively prevents the relapse into violence. In the absence 
of such improvements, insurgencies and counter-insurgencies will remobi-
lise and rekindle violent resistance. At this point the international community 
will in all likelihood withdraw its active engagement. Therefore the role of 
the international community in combating or engaging contemporary insur-
gencies is limited. Yet a thorough understanding of the roots, aspirations and 
extent of public support of insurgencies is likely to put the international 
community in a better position to judge insurgencies more accurately, en-
gage them more effectively and cooperate with governments to address in-
surgent and counter-insurgent violence, impressing upon them the need to 
address the root causes of insurgency. Building institutional structures of 
security governance that are legitimate, accountable and trusted by both the 
population and the international community is a key part of this endeavour. 
Notes
 
1  According to David Petrasak in ‘End and Means: Human Rights Approaches to Armed 
Groups,’ (Geneva: International Council on Human Rights Policy, 2000), armed non-state 
actors are ‘groups that are armed and use force to achieve their objectives and are not 
under state control’. Caroline Holmqvist includes the following groups in this category: 
rebel opposition groups (groups with a stated incompatibility with the government, 
generally concerning the control of government or the control of territory); local militias 
(ethnically-, clan- or otherwise -based); vigilantes; warlords; civil defence forces and 




that provide military and security services. See: Holmqvist, C., ‘Engaging Armed Non-
State Actors in Post-Conflict Settings,’ in Security Governance in Post-Conflict 
Peacebuilding, ed. Bryden, A. and Hänggi, H. (Münster: LIT Verlag, 2005) 45–46. 
2  See Holmqvist, op. cit.  45–68. 
3  See Tan, A. and Ramakrishna, K., New Terrorism: Anatomy, Trends, and Counter-
strategies (Singapore: Eastern University Press, 2003). See also Gunaratna, R. and  
Schnabel, A., ‘The Challenge of Contemporary Insurgencies,’ in Understanding and 
Managing Insurgent Movements, ed. Schnabel, A. and Gunaratna, R.,  (Singapore: 
Marshall Cavendish Academic, forthcoming in 2006). 
4  An often-referred to definition of insurgency describes it as ‘an armed rebellion against a 
constituted authority, by any irregular armed force that rises up against an enforced or 
established authority, government or administration. Those carrying out an insurgency are 
“insurgents.” Insurgents conduct sabotage and harassment. Insurgents usually are in 
opposition to a civil authority or government primarily in the hope of improving their 
condition.’ See < http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Insurgency>. 
5  This chapter is based on research conducted by the author and Rohan Gunaratna for their 
forthcoming book Understanding and Managing Insurgent Movements, op. cit. The 
author is grateful to Rohan Gunaratna for his feedback and contributions to various 
versions of this chapter, and he thanks Marshall Cavendish Academic for permission to 
base this chapter on parts of the introductory and concluding chapters in the afore-
mentioned book. 
6  See Gunaratna, R., Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror, (New York: Berkeley 
Books, 2002), 137. 
7  Etzioni, A., ’The Evils of Self-Determination,’ Foreign Policy, no. 89 (Winter 1992–93),  
35. 
8  Including decisions that may not be legal (such as NATO’s intervention in Kosovo in 
1999) and which are based on at least partially moral reasoning.  
9  Ibid. 
10  For an extensive discussion on the moral, normative, and legal justifications and 
ramifications of NATO’s intervention in Kosovo, see Schnabel A., and Thakur, R., ed.) 
Kosovo and the Challenge of Humanitarian Intervention: Selective Indignation, 
Collective Action, and International Citizenship, (Tokyo: United Nations University 
Press, 2000). See also Independent International Commission on Kosovo, The Kosovo 
Report: Conflict, International Response, Lessons Learned, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2000); and Tunstead Burchael, J., ‘Framing a Moral Response to Terrorism,’ in 
International Terrorism: Characteristics, Causes, Controls ed. Kegley, Jr, C. W., (New 
York: St. Martin’s Press, 1990), 213–218. 
11  Ibid. 
12  See Schnabel, A., ‘Humanitarian Affairs and State Foreign Policy: On State Interests and 
Self-Serving Humanitarian Commitment’, presented at the 46th Annual Convention of the 
International Studies Association, ‘Dynamics of World Politics: Capacity, Preferences & 
Leadership,’ Honolulu, USA, 1–5 March 2005. 
13  For an emerging discussion within the UN on Security Council-authorised preventive 
action, see the Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, a 
More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, New York: United Nations, 2004, Article 
125; and the Secretary-General’s response: United Nations Secretary-General. ‘In Larger 
 
Insurgencies, Security Governance and the International Community 85
 
Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All,’ UN Document 
A/59/2005, New York, United Nations, 2005.  
14  Established as a result of Resolution 1373 (2001)  
15  See also Holmqvist, op. cit. 56–57. 
16  See, for instance, Behera, A. D., ‘Conflict to Co-option? Experiences of Dealing with the 
Insurgencies in India’s Northeast,’ and Karthikeyan, D.R., ‘The Tamil Tigers of Sri 
Lanka,’ in Schnabel and Gunaratna, op. cit. 
17  See Bruneau, T. C., ‘The Military in Post-Conflict Societies: Lessons from Central 
America and Prospects for Colombia,’ in Security Sector Reform and Post-Conflict 
Peacebuilding, ed. Schnabel, A. and Ehrhart, H.-G., 233–242 (Tokyo: United Nations 
University Press, 2005). 
18  On the interdependence of civilian populations and insurgencies, see Chesterman, S., 
Civilians in War, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001). 
19  For a strong case of the international community’s responsibility to come to the rescue of 
battered populations, see ICISS, op. cit. 
20  See Wohlfeld, M., ‘The OSCE as a Primary Instrument of Conflict Prevention in Europe: 
Frameworks, Achievements, and Limitations of the OSCE’s Preventive Action,’ in 
Conflict Prevention: From Rhetoric to Reality: Organizations and Institutions, ed. 
Schnabel, A. and Carment, D., 167–205 (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2004).  
21  For a series of studies on this subject, see Ricigliano, R. (ed), ‘Choosing to Engage: 
Armed Groups and Peace Processes,’ ACCORD, no. 16 (2005). 
22  Strazisar, N., ‘Rethinking the Concept of Peacebuilding: Bosnia and the Lessons for 
Kosovo,’ in Southeast European Security: Threats, Responses, Challenges, ed. Schnabel, 
A., 213 (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2001). 
23  ICISS, op. cit. 
24  Ibid. 
25  See also Demjaha, A. and Peci, L., ‘Albanian Insurgency Groups in the Balkans,’ in 
Schnabel and Gunaratna, op. cit. 
26  On the dynamics of resource wars, see Collier, P. and Hoeffler, A., ‘Greed and Grievance 
in Civil War,’ Oxford Economic Papers, vol. 56, no. 4 (2004), 563–595. 
27  See <http://untreaty.un-org/English/Terrorism.asp>. 
28  The author thanks Rohan Gunaratna for the following comments on the UN Monitoring 
Group.  
29  Patterns of Global Terrorism, Washington, DC: United States Department of State 
(annual publication). 
30  See Chesterman, S., ‘Shared Secrets: Intelligence and Collective Security’, Lowy Institute 
Paper 10, (Double Bay: Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2006). 
31  For a list of regional conventions on terrorism, see <http://untreaty.un-
org/English/Terrorism.asp>. 








Weak countries lack the means to deal effectively with violent conflict. They 
are not capable of guaranteeing internal security and their instruments to 
execute the state monopoly of violence are inefficient or – in the case of 
failed states – incompetent or non-existent. The central argument of this 
chapter is that the failure or inadequacy of the state to ensure the state mo-
nopoly of legitimate force is a central problem of conflict-prone and post-
conflict societies. As a consequence, in order to open a path to peace in such 
societies it is essential to create or restore a monopoly of force that is not 
limited to the nation–state.1 
It is claimed, and supported by empirical data, that over the past dozen 
years, genocides and international crises have declined sharply; internal wars 
have been in steady decline as has the average number of people killed in 
conflict.2 This positive trend correlates to the internationally felt need to 
intervene in the sovereign domain of a state if its government cannot provide 
the most basic state functions or if it commits gross violations of human 
rights. Violent conflicts demand the attention of the international community 
since failure to address them is risky, both for the people of that country and 
for international peace and security. International interventions authorised by 
the United Nations have intensified since the end of the Cold War, increas-
ingly with the moral responsibility and humanitarian concern in mind to save 
lives and to prevent gross human rights abuses.3 Yet, the international com-
munity intervenes not only for altruistic humanitarian reasons; self-interested 
political and economic agendas are often hidden behind morally legitimised 
interventions. 
These international interventions suffer from two shortcomings: lack 
of success in implementation and an absence of democratic legitimacy. De-
spite many efforts of post-conflict programmes in all corners of the world, 
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including such diverse countries as Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, the 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Haiti, East Timor, Afghanistan, 
Mozambique, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia and Sierra Leone, 
the results are often unsatisfactory. Even when UN-mandated peacekeepers 
intervene on humanitarian grounds, this mandate suffers from a democratic 
deficit. To be accepted by the population of the country undergoing interven-
tion, such interventions must be legitimate. However, the decisions to inter-
vene, although according to international law and accepted norms, are taken 
by a highly politicised UN Security Council in which democratic rule, 
namely the will of the sovereign, is not represented. Stricter criteria are re-
quired to avoid the selectivity and arbitrariness of these decisions and to hold 
the decision-makers accountable. The fact that the executor of the global 
authority to apply force is not controlled by a legitimised body and operates 
instead according to the veto of the powerful permanent members of the 
Security Council de-legitimises its actions. This flaw in global governance is 
the specific bottleneck and barrier in creating a globally required and democ-
ratically legitimised monopoly of force. 
The experience of most internationally sponsored reconstruction pro-
grammes shows that long-term external engagement is required to establish 
or re-establish the monopoly of force. However, international programmes 
are often designed (but also fail) to bring quick results. This chapter ques-
tions whether the focus on building primarily state-centric structures is an 
adequate concept for all post-conflict societies and the only means to over-
come their problems.4 Instead, a monopoly of force which goes beyond the 
nation-state and also includes the local, regional and global levels is pro-
posed here. 
This proposition is grounded on an empirical–analytical observation 
and a normative–theoretical concept. The empirical–analytical observation 
recognises that more and more social forces operate across, below, and 
above the nation-state. Globalisation and localisation, integration and frag-
mentation have transformed the conditions for the monopoly of force of the 
nation–state. While ineffective state structures in authoritarian, transforming, 
war-torn or post-conflict states vary in form, three common characteristics 
and structural pitfalls are apparent which increase the risks of tensions and 
the outbreak of violent conflicts: 
• the security gap, which is the state’s inability to execute its most basic 
function and ensure security by exercising the monopoly of force;  
• the capacity gap, which is the state’s lack of capability to provide the 
most basic services such as health and education, as well as infrastruc-
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ture in key areas such as railways, ports, airports, waterways, mass 
transit, water and sanitation;  
• and, the legitimacy gap, which is the state’s missing authority to ad-
vance basic rights and freedoms, enforce laws and allow for citizens’ 
participation in the political process.5  
In practical terms it is evident from experience in the major peace-
building and reconstruction programmes that security, and with it the legiti-
mate monopoly of force, is a crucial prerequisite to progress.6 
The normative–theoretical concept is grounded in cosmopolitanism.7 
The cosmopolitan democratic agenda aims at establishing global governance 
that is based on democratic, elective, participatory principles and a pro-
gramme to overcome national sovereignty. At the core of this concept is a 
belief that the present patterns of global processes of regionalisation and 
localisation are undermining existing national forms of governance and that 
alternatives need to be found. Governance needs to be expanded across, be-
tween, beyond and below the nation–state level. The cosmopolitan concept 
is attractive since it envisions a step-by-step development and wants to make 
use of proven democratic mechanisms. Cosmopolitanism strives to transfer 
the democratic processes of the local and national level to the international 
level, so that international decisions are no longer grounded in the traditional 
pattern of political and economic power. The cosmopolitan concept envis-
ages a post-Westphalian global order, a system beyond the nation-state with 
overlapping authorities entitled to exercise the monopoly of force. 
Without in principle questioning the concept of the monopoly of force 
of the nation–state, new international norms have emerged which require the 
international community to intervene. It is therefore argued here that while 
the nation–state is still an important actor in exercising the monopoly of 
force, neither the UN at the global level, nor authorities at the regional, na-
tional or the local level are by themselves adequately equipped to perform an 
increased role in executing this monopoly. What is called for is conceptual 
rethinking and a capability reform, creating or buttressing a division of la-
bour at global, regional, national and local levels. 
A recent intervening factor, questioning the execution of the monop-
oly of force, is the privatisation of violence. This chapter will explore the 
ways in which the privatisation of violence is carried out and how the inter-
national community reacts to these challenges, and assess the impact on the 
monopoly of force. This is followed by an analysis of the dilemmas and 
challenges posed by privatisation from the perspective of security govern-
ance. It will then introduce the model of a multi-level public monopoly of 
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legitimate force and discuss the challenges, barriers and implications of cre-
ating such a public monopoly of force beyond traditional national borders. 
The chapter concludes by summarising these findings and by articulating 
several policy recommendations. 
Privatising and Internationalising Violence 
An analysis of contemporary wars and violent conflict reveals at least two 
new trends: First, the number of armed non-state actors engaged in these 
conflicts has decidedly increased. Armed non-state actors such as warlords, 
militias, rebels, para-military groups and gangs engage for political reasons 
or economic gain in these conflicts. At the same time, governments contract 
more and more private military companies to assist the regular armed forces 
in wars with the provision of technical or other services or even, in excep-
tional cases, for combat operations. Second, the international community has 
progressively tried to counter the outbreak and fighting of wars through con-
certed efforts, if necessary by military means. For more than three centuries, 
since the Peace of Westphalia, the monopoly of force was held in Europe by 
the nation–state, a state with a clearly defined territorial space. This concept 
of the monopoly of force, which served as a model beyond Europe is now 
fundamentally questioned for a variety of reasons, including the privatisation 
and internationalisation of violence. 
I distinguish between two types of privatisation of violence. Firstly, 
the bottom–up privatisation in which armed non-state actors spread violence, 
create insecurity and contribute to the failure of states. Many governments 
are no longer capable of guaranteeing law and order. Their police and mili-
tary forces are too weak, too corrupt or unwilling to exercise the rule of law 
and the state monopoly of force. This type of privatisation offers attractive 
economic gains for non-state actors. Warlords, for example, fight not primar-
ily for political or territorial control but to make an economic living through 
continued fighting. They are usually well connected into the world economy 
(or the shadow economy) by exporting resources like diamonds, tropical 
wood or drugs. From this income they pay their soldiers, serve their clientele 
and usually find it easy to buy weapons for their forces. 
A second type of top–down privatisation is based on the outsourcing 
of police and military functions, purposely undertaken by a number of gov-
ernments.8 Armed forces in many countries have demobilised millions of 
soldiers since the end of the Cold War. Yet today these forces are increas-
ingly burdened with various deployments in conflict and post-conflict situa-
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tions, such as in the Balkans, Africa, Afghanistan and Iraq. The burden on 
the armed forces leads to outsourcing military functions. The armed forces 
have consequently come to depend more and more on private military com-
panies for logistic support, training, the repair and maintenance of weapons 
systems and other military equipment, for the collection of intelligence in-
formation, for interrogation of prisoners of war, and for supplying mail, food 
and clean uniforms. Major corporations are active worldwide in pre-war 
preparation, in conflict, and in post-conflict reconstruction. At issue is that 
this development occurs largely outside the control of parliaments and only 
partially under the control of governments. 
Within the concept of internationalisation of armed conflicts I distin-
guish between two areas which are causally related. There is the general 
trend in recent years of political decisions to engage in international inter-
ventions, e.g. military missions of peacekeeping, peace enforcement, peace 
building or other types of international military or civil-military interven-
tions. As a result, armed forces are operating more and more jointly, as ‘Blue 
Helmets’ or within coalitions of the willing or military alliances, which has 
an effect on the organisation of the military. Such interventions necessitate 
structural changes within the armed forces. Militaries that were traditionally 
geared to the nation-state must now orient their structures internationally.  
These international interventions suffer from democratic deficits. 
Lacking legitimacy provides a shaky basis for introducing democratic struc-
tures through peacebuilding programmes and are not always desired or ac-
cepted by the people of countries subject to such interventions. Legitimacy is 
the key to stabilising a society and to building peace and creating the condi-
tions for development. However, all external interventions have to cope with 
the dilemma of a fundamental democratic deficit.9 Even when interventions 
and reconstruction programmes are authorised by the United Nations, the 
decision to intervene is not based on a democratic decision.  
Furthermore, decisions in foreign and security policy, despite notice-
able constitutional differences in many democracies, seem to be one of the 
least democratic policy areas, and the control and oversight rights of parlia-
ments are not very advanced. Rules and regulations do exist nationally in 
many countries, even though they are often insufficient to comply with de-
mocratic norms. However, decisions in most international organisations are 
not taken democratically and rules and regulations are rudimentary or non-
existent.10 Nationally organised armed forces are usually inadequate to pre-
vent or end conflicts in crisis regions. But considerations of prestige and 
pride, and national political and economic interest, are a barrier to establish-
ing a truly integrated international armed force. The democratic control of 
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internationalised armed forces is more complex than of national forces. 
Tasking private military firms complicates the democratic control even more 
or can make it impossible in certain situations. However, armed forces 
tasked with international interventions in the name of the defence of human 
rights, the promotion of democracy and the prevention or ending of war are 
only credible if they operate on the basis of effective democratic control.  
Privatising violence and international peace support missions are part 
of, and a reaction to, what have become known as the ‘new wars’.11 The two 
trends of privatisation and internationalisation are closely related. The two 
forms of privatisation, however, are different in principle, and partly contra-
dictory, since privatisation in violence markets is exercised bottom–up 
through non-state actors, while outsourcing is a government planned top–
down process. In many countries the state's inability to establish internal 
security or maintain domestic law and order creates the space in which or-
ganised crime and warlords can emerge to fill the security vacuum. As a 
consequence, people who can afford it seek to organise their own security 
without having to resort to under-funded, incompetent or corrupt state au-
thorities. Private security and protection of property has become a booming 
market in many urban centres. Some 2,000 private security companies cur-
rently operate in Kenya and large sections of the population rely on them. 
Similarly, it is estimated that security companies in Nigeria employ in excess 
of 100,000 people; these services have become a major part of the economy 
to protect residential and commercial areas and especially the oil industry.12 
Those who cannot afford such services either have to live with insecurity or 
might themselves resort to violence in their fight for survival. Zones of 
asymmetric security have emerged, or rather zones of insecurity for the poor 
and zones of relative security provided for people and their wealth by private 
companies.  
Privatisation of violence – a trend which reverses a centuries-old de-
velopment of disarming of citizens in the process of nation-building – un-
dermines and fundamentally challenges the legitimate monopoly of force. 
Furthermore, international interventions and the internationalisation of the 
armed forces have an effect on the monopoly of force as well, since deci-
sion-making on intervention and the use of force takes place at the interna-
tional level. Despite the fact that delegating the monopoly of legitimate force 
(at least partially) to the private and/or the international sector is pursued 
consciously, the notion of the monopoly of legitimate force itself, which 
rests first and foremost on the nation–state, is currently not being systemati-
cally re-conceptualised. 
Reconstructing the Public Monopoly of Legitimate Force 93
A variety of factors has led to outsourcing military tasks to private 
companies, including the reduction of armed forces, their limited capabilities 
to cope with ever more high-tech weapons, the intensified demand for inter-
ventions and emergency aid, the demands of the ‘war on terror’ and, last but 
not least, the dominant concept of the ‘lean state’.13 Given that both the 
trends to intensified international intervention and to privatisation of vio-
lence are here to stay, the question will need to be asked what the future of 
the state monopoly of force is going to be. 
Security Governance and Democratic Control of the Monopoly of Force 
The practice of outsourcing military functions is part of the effort to create 
more efficient armed forces. But this notion also has an inherent danger 
since a central function of the state, the monopoly of force, could be dam-
aged or endangered. 
At the global level the monopoly of force is completely lacking. A 
generally accepted, globally practiced monopoly of force does not exist and 
the weakness and impotence of the UN Security Council in the case of the 
2003 Iraq invasion is demoralising evidence of this fact. The UN Security 
Council already has a monopoly to authorise the use of force at the global 
level, although the UN was never given the necessary means – like the ca-
pacity to implement sanctions, a police force and armed forces – to exercise 
this authority. At the global level, a system of a legitimate monopoly of force 
is possible only, given the continued existence of states, within a system of 
collective security. This is already reality in embryonic form in as far as the 
Charter of the UN stipulates that all its members refrain in their international 
relations from the threat or use of force, except in cases of individual or col-
lective self-defence against external aggression. The prohibition to use force 
and the authority of the UN to use force, of course, do not constitute a mo-
nopoly of force at the global level. 
The deployment of private military companies complicates the situa-
tion further and is not without tension. Pursuing two at least partially com-
peting principal objectives creates friction. The public good ‘security’ and 
the private good ‘economic gain’ can be in competition with each other or 
even be contradictory. Therefore, privatising public goods has certain limita-
tions. Private military firms are specialised and offer professional services 
that are used in wars and violent conflicts. Yet, companies (like states) might 
be reluctant to engage in providing security or preventing war by military 
means if there exists too high a risk of losing the companies’ assets in such 
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conflicts. However, the opposite may also be the case and companies’ busi-
ness interests might function as conflict accelerators. The deployment of 
private companies has a profound impact on how the state monopoly of 
force is exercised and controlled. An important consideration must be that 
these companies are currently not accountable to parliament or the public – 
neither in the country that contracts them nor in the country where they op-
erate. While the government is held accountable by parliament, private com-
panies are responsible only to the shareholder and client. This is precisely 
the reason why some governments want to make use of private companies. 
For example in the United States, congressional restrictions on the use of the 
armed forces in operations like the anti-drug campaign in Colombia, have 
stimulated government decisions to circumvent such restrictions by contract-
ing private military companies. 
Hiring privately organised troops and companies which provide opera-
tional support can result in mutual dependencies between client and contrac-
tor, and even the danger that conflicts might be deliberately extended in the 
bilateral interest of such contracts. In such a situation it is not clear which 
state tasks can be implemented, who decides upon them, and how decisions 
are taken as to the way in which the monopoly of force (which, strictly 
speaking, is no longer a monopoly) is carried out. Contractors seem to create 
their own demand or at least have an influence on the demand for security 
services, when security is purchased commercially. 
The following figure summarises the arguments both for and against 
the privatisation of military tasks presented in research and the media and by 
the companies themselves. In all seven categories summarised in this table 
controversial opinions are raised and contradictory empirical evidence re-
garding the usefulness or the danger of contracting private military compa-
nies is available. The economic results of the private military sector are not 
entirely convincing. Within the military the deployment of private military 
firms is controversial while in peacekeeping and humanitarian interventions 
private military firms have had no real opportunity yet to demonstrate their 
claimed effectiveness. In international crises, their services are questioned 
regarding sustainability in ending conflict. Within the military, the question 
is raised if the superior technology employed by the private sector is really 
available when needed and governments have reason to worry that disrepu-
table private sector operators might compromise the contracting govern-
ments. There seems to be agreement that the existing laws at the interna-
tional level are insufficient to control these companies and since national 
laws are lacking in most countries, companies operate in a legal grey zone. 
Ways in which such regulation may be possible are, however, controversial. 
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Table 5.1: Arguments for and against deployment of private military 
companies 
Area Pro Contra 
Economics Companies work more cost- effec-
tively 
Evidence for their cost-effectiveness is 
rather weak  
Business practices of the companies are 
not very transparent 
Real cost of military missions is blurred 
through outsourcing 
Military Troops can concentrate on core 
missions 
Companies are more flexible and 
are quicker to deploy   
Synergies between companies and 
the armed forces are created 
Dependency of the military on firms 
Companies are unreliable on the battle-
field 
The just-in-time method is not suitable 
for war-fighting 





Quick reaction of companies in 
response to crises  
Quality of UN missions increases 
Protection of humanitarian actors  
Caution of deploying national 
troops  
Responsibility of the international 
community for protection is delegated  
Dubious firms are legitimised by the UN 
International 
crises 
Stabilisation of collapsing states 
Engaging the private sector in post-
conflict reconstruction 
Continuation of conflict in the interest of 
companies  
Companies might damage the foreign 
policy of their home country 
Distinction between civilians and mili-
tary disappears  
Companies act as proxies of their gov-
ernment  
Technology Better know-how of companies Technology is not available in critical 
situations  
Policy Governments can reduce the pres-
ence of their forces by hiring com-
panies  
No democratic control of companies 
States should have to guarantee security 
Complicated civil-military balance is 
disturbed 
Law Companies operate under govern-
ment licence 
Codes of conduct regulate business 
practices 
Lacking legal regulation of company 
deployment  
Hard to prosecute companies and em-
ployees for criminal acts or violations of 
human rights  
Geneva Convention (combatants/non-
combatants) is undermined 
Source: Wulf, H. Internationalizing and Privatizing War and Peace. (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2005) 63–64. 
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Given the fact that security governance at the global level exists only in ru-
dimentary form, that a global monopoly of force is lacking and that new, 
largely unregulated actors engage in international crisis situations, it is no 
surprise that international interventions, nation-building programmes and re-
creation of state institutions are faced with a number of serious problems. 
First: A fundamental issue is that the existence of central states is 
taken as given. Obviously, this is not necessarily the case and some conflicts 
have been exacerbated in the process of state-building. 
Second: The legitimacy to carry out interventions is weak. Recon-
struction programmes are not always desired or accepted by the people of 
the country experiencing international intervention. Neither are the decisions 
for an intervention democratically legitimised. 
Third: Intervention and reconstruction are usually implemented be-
cause of humanitarian concerns of the international community. At the same 
time, however, veiled behind these aims to prevent or end conflict, provide 
peace and enable development, there is also the ambition of some powerful 
members of the international community to exert political influence and 
advance their own economic interests.  
Fourth: Interventions and reconstruction programmes are often given 
unclear mandates and suffer from notorious coordination problems involving 
the external donors. Competition between them leads to failure and waste of 
scarce resources. 
Fifth: It is usually the case, almost by definition in situations where 
reconstruction is undertaken under international auspices, that the local 
structures are weak. The emphasis on the need for local ownership in the 
process of transformation of conflict is – conceptually – uncontested.14 But 
what happens when theory meets reality? Often, international donors, both 
governments and NGOs, violate this supposedly guiding principle of local 
ownership. 
 
Sixth: International donors often treat peace-threatening crises as 
short-term problems which have to be solved as soon as possible. While this 
is understandable considering the humanitarian consequences of inaction,  
experience in many post-conflict societies has proved that the conflicts have 
deep-rooted causes which do not disappear quickly. 
The fundamental nature of these difficulties leads to the conclusion 
that there are no easy solutions. Looking at the various experiences in peace-
keeping, conflict resolution, post-conflict reconstruction and state-building, a 
common feature in all of these cases is the lack of a legitimate monopoly of 
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force. It is assumed therefore, that the nation–state focus is too narrow to 
establish or re-establish such a monopoly. 
The Need for a Multi-level Public Monopoly of Force 
Globalisation and the Erosion of the Nation–State 
The concept of the state monopoly of force entails the elimination of private 
armies and the disarmament of other armed non-state actors who want to 
take the law into their own hands. However, this notion is challenged in 
many parts of the world, primarily by bottom–up privatisation, but it is ques-
tioned also by top–down privatisation. While the internationally accepted 
norm of a state guarantee for the public good of ‘security’ still exists, its 
implementation in reality is at present not possible.  
The state monopoly of force is also challenged by another develop-
ment. The idea of the undisputed national entity no longer exists as national 
boundaries have been increasingly broken down or lowered due to the gen-
eral trend of globalisation. Many actors today operate outside the boundaries 
dictated by the logic of territoriality. Economics, politics and culture are 
increasingly de-nationalised.15 Conceptually and in reality the state is being 
emptied of some of its functions. A logical consequence of the weakening of 
the nation–state is the need for multiple layers of authority over the monop-
oly of force. Such a new agenda breaks with conventional accounts of the 
monopoly of force concept in which the nation–state is conceived as the sole 
appropriate agent.  
The Westphalian ideal presupposes a world with sharply drawn bor-
ders demarcating distinct, territorial jurisdictions administered in relative 
isolation from other sovereign actors. This perfect model has never fully 
materialised. In today’s world cross-cutting and intersecting grids at the lo-
cal, state, regional, and global levels have emerged.16 As a result of increas-
ing interdependence and globalisation, the nation–state has lost or trans-
ferred part of its sovereignty to other entities: from the top (supra-national or 
multilateral organisations as well as private actors like companies and 
NGOs) and down to lower levels (such as local and district associations). 
However, at the same time, there was also a re-nationalisation process visi-
ble in many post-communist countries which had to restructure state institu-
tions and build domestic capacity, and in certain cases build state institutions 
from scratch. 
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At the global level, the dominant role of the nation–state is challenged 
both conceptually through global governance and institutionally through the 
ever-increasing number of multilateral regimes. Regionally, probably with 
the exception of the EU, there are only weak signs of state sovereignty func-
tions being delegated to regional bodies. The picture is different below the 
state level: in many regions of the world, local constituencies and traditional 
authorities within federalist structures are authorised to exercise public regu-
latory functions. There is a trend towards a multiplicity of authority among 
public institutions and more and more functional areas that were previously 
part of state functions are taken over by private citizens and private organisa-
tions. 
The Model of a Multi-level Monopoly of Force 
The reconstruction of the monopoly of force is not just about re-establishing 
a central state monopoly of force. A more holistic approach is necessary to 
establish rules and regulations for the use of force. It is proposed here that 
the concept of global governance and the establishment and enforcement of 
international norms require a public monopoly of force at all levels of gov-
ernance – at the local, national, regional and global levels. A segmented, but 
carefully crafted public monopoly of force with a clear division of labour 
should be based on at least the following four levels of authority: 
• the local level, with federalist structures or other traditional forms of 
shared authority, which offers proven forms of regulating violence 
with the inclusion of ‘zones of peace’ and ‘islands of civility’; 
• the national level, with credible and accountable institutions of organ-
ised force and good governance; 
• the regional or sub-regional level, with regional organisations en-
gaged in providing security and facilitating peace beyond the various 
national boundaries; and 
• the global level, through the United Nations, with accepted interna-
tional principles and agreed norms and with a legitimate authority to 
intervene for the protection of people. 
The intention of proposing such a model is to overcome the narrow 
Westphalian-type territorial fence, the national space. Given the globalised 
world, with porous or non-existent national borders, with failing or collapsed 
states and with asymmetric zones of insecurity, the future lies not necessarily 
in the re-establishment of a nation–state monopoly, but rather in a multi-
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level public monopoly of force. Such a multi-level legitimate public monop-
oly comes closer to the present reality of the international system since it 
addresses the different levels of political decision-making. 
Besides the daunting practical difficulties, such a system is faced with 
two conceptual problems: First, how shall the four different levels be legiti-
mised, given the acute deficit in democratic processes at all four levels? Sec-
ond, how must authority be apportioned at the different levels to avoid dis-
puted sovereignties, and how can cooperation and a division of labour be-
tween these segmented authorities function? 
A multi-level monopoly is, precisely speaking, an oligopoly since the 
powers of a monopoly need to be shared between authorities. Oligopolies are 
faced with the prospect of competition and conflict. When one authority 
encroaches on another, this necessarily means a loss of authority for one 
actor and gain for another. To create the suggested multi-level public mo-
nopoly of force as an efficient and functional instrument, and avoid a ruinous 
zero–sum game, a set of agreed rules is a precondition. Only if the system 
functions is there a chance to move from the present situation of the break-
down of the monopoly of force in many parts of the world to establishing a 
legitimate public monopoly of force. 
Cosmopolitanism could provide a normative framework. Cosmopol-
itanism emphasises diversity and multiculturalism; it is centred on the idea 
of collective human security and a wide spectrum of cross-cultural under-
standing to resolve conflict and sustain peace non-violently.17 The introduc-
tion of a multi-level public monopoly of force would imply creating a nor-
mative and institutional framework of world order in which authority is not 
simply imposed from the top.18 
Two crucial functional principles (graphically illustrated by the Table 
below) should provide the basis. First, the monopoly of force should be ex-
ercised according to the subsidiarity principle. In a bottom–up approach the 
lowest level should be the starting point and only when the local level is not 
capable or cannot be tasked with exercising the monopoly of force should 
the next level up be entrusted with this mission. This concept is, for exam-
ple, exercised in many federal states where a federal authority (or even local 
community) executes policing functions. The central state (the nation–state) 
will only become involved if the task goes beyond the local level or if the 
instruments of legitimised organised violence at that level prove to be in-
competent or inadequate. If the nation-state level is ill-equipped or incapable 
of exercising the monopoly of force, the regional organisation would be 
tasked, for example, with preventing trafficking in humans, drugs or weap-
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ons. This would leave the UN as the highest authority to ensure peace and 
security only as a last resort.  
The second principle is based on supremacy, on a hierarchy of author-
ity. Norm-setting takes place as a top–down process. International norms 
prevail over regional, regional over national and national over local levels. 
The UN has higher authority than regional organisations, the region is placed 
higher than the national level and the national level has prevalence over the 
local level. Given the realities of conflict-prone and war-torn societies, not 
all four levels will actually be functional, but the multi-level approach is 
designed precisely for such situations where one of the four levels is lacking 
or incompetent, namely, to compensate for the partial or prevent the com-
plete breakdown of the monopoly of force. 
Table 5.2: Establishing the multi-level monopoly of force 
Subsidiarity principle: 
bottom–up 









nopoly of force 
 Norm setting 
 
Conceptually, the division of labour along the lines of subsidiarity and 
the supremacy principles is clear. In practice, however, tensions over exer-
cising the authority are foreseeable. This model, however, suggests a method 
to include bottom–up concerns rather than pursue an ‘OECD-country-club’ 
approach which has experienced insurmountable difficulties in practice. The 
suggested model is of course not easy to implement. All of the four levels 
experience shortcomings. The local level in many societies is haunted by 
corruption, dominated by criminal networks and suffers from weak public 
institutions; a functioning civil society is often non-existent. The central state 
level, although usually still considered as the most important agent in exer-
cising the monopoly of force, is at present incapable in many countries. Re-
gional organisations are often too inept to perform their missions, not just 
because of a lack of capabilities but more so because of deep-rooted political 
differences amongst their members and the unwillingness of most states to 
devolve sovereignty functions to the regional body. Although they are rec-
ognised as potentially important actors in maintaining peace, conceptually 
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they are somewhat overlooked in the emphasis on the UN as the highest 
authority and the nation–state with its still important feature of state sover-
eignty.  
At the global level, the UN's activities are often heavily biased and 
contested. International norms are often selectively applied because the dou-
ble standards of members prevail. Conflict regions are not only assisted with 
crisis prevention programmes but all too often they are at the same time at 
the mercy of the dominant intervening powers.  
The suggested multi-level public monopoly of force would be difficult 
to implement, and pitfalls and shortcomings at each of the four levels could 
be enumerated. However, in many circumstances where security is lacking, a 
holistic approach would offer solutions to problems commonly encountered 
in currently prevailing approaches. The weakness at one level (for example 
at the national level) could be compensated for by the level below (at the 
local level) or above (the regional level). Compared to the present difficul-
ties in implementing international post-conflict programmes, this multi-level 
public monopoly of force promises to tackle the root causes of some of the 
difficulties of weak states. 
. 
Implementing the Multi-Level Public Monopoly of Force 
 
Establishing the suggested multi-level public monopoly of force requires an 
institutionalised division of power between the different levels.  
The local level – federalism and traditional conflict resolution mecha-
nism: The relationship between the local level and a central government can 
best be described as a federal system. Federalism is considered to be a seed-
bed of democracy, as it allows for more participation and accountability, 
stimulates civil society, adds channels of access for political participation, 
broadens sources of legitimacy, widens citizenship by institutionalising 
multi-ethnicity and provides for sub-national competition, thus stimulating 
local self-governance, innovation and efficiency. However, federalism can 
also preserve sub-national authoritarianism, promote rule along ethnic in-
stead of democratic lines, foster regional disparities, undermine the rule of 
law, and facilitate the rise of demagogues rather than encouraging democ-
racy.19 The closeness of local leaders to the local space and their knowledge 
of traditional conflict regulation are likely to promote realistic, bottom–up 
decisions. Their familiarity with the history and root causes of a conflict in 
their region facilitates their role in mediating between belligerent groups and 
allows the various stakeholders to participate in solving problems.20 Even 
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war-torn societies are also populated by citizens who form ‘zones of peace’ 
and ‘islands of civility’. 
The national level – institution-building: Notwithstanding the intensi-
fication of globalisation, the quest for global governance, international norm 
building and the growth of global civil society, the international political 
sphere remains decidedly state-centric – even though its importance is 
gradually diminishing. But, at the same time, many states are unable to fulfil 
their security and governance function effectively. To properly establish and 
control the agents of the state monopoly of force, a legitimised government 
with functioning state institutions is required. It is an extremely difficult task 
to democratise a society and build effective state institutions where democ-
racy has no tradition and where state institutions scarcely exist. 
The regional level – increasing responsibility and capacity: Regional 
organisations should have an immediate interest in promoting peace since 
civil wars normally affect neighbouring countries through spill-over and 
destabilisation. The experiences in Europe and Asia have facilitated the 
prospects for a more active and expanded responsibility of regional organisa-
tions. The United Nations has continued to emphasise since the 1990s the 
special importance of regional organisations in promoting and facilitating 
peace and stability within their respective regions.21  
In reality, however, most regional organisations have no convincing 
record of peace missions to justify such expectations. Given their present 
structure, institutions such as the African Union (AU), the Organisation of 
American States (OAS), the European Union (EU), the Association of 
SouthEast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Organisation for Security and Co-
operation in Europe (OSCE), Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) 
and others are not in a position to apply the monopoly of force effectively. 
Regional organisations suffer from four weaknesses which need to be over-
come in order to establish a functional multi-level monopoly of force: con-
tested sovereignty and a lack of delegating traditional nation–state authority 
to a regional body; overlapping responsibilities and competition among re-
gional organisations; fundamental political differences and lack of common 
values which lead to inaction; a lack of capacity to execute sanctions or to 
project force. 
The global level – norm setting and global governance: The function-
ing of the international system, and with it the multi-level monopoly of 
force, depends on the enhancement of international norms. The UN is a hy-
brid system of an intergovernmental organisation not operating according to 
democratic rules and at the same time acting as the conscience of the interna-
tional community and the highest authority on questions of war and peace. 
Reconstructing the Public Monopoly of Legitimate Force 103 
This inherent tension makes it an organisation in need of reform. However, 
despite these organisational and conceptual insufficiencies and despite the 
gap between theory and practice of international norms, there is no realistic 
alternative to the UN. 
The prohibition against the use of force, enshrined in the Charter of 
the UN, of course, is a different matter from a monopoly of force at the 
global level. In theory, UN members enjoy an inherent right to individual or 
collective self-defence under international law. As is well known, the prac-
tice of collective self-defence is different. It is not the provisions and obliga-
tions of international law but rather political opportunity and power politics 
that are the decisive criteria for intervention. Thus, the concept of a respon-
sible ‘international community’ is still far from being a reality. The lack of 
global governance is the specific bottleneck and barrier in creating the glob-
ally required and democratically legitimised monopoly of force. 
Conclusions 
Practical experience from recent peacekeeping missions and post-conflict 
reconstruction programmes have underlined that the failure or inadequacy of 
the state to ensure the monopoly of legitimate force is a central problem in 
societies haunted by violent conflict and wars. Both security and democratic 
deficits need to be addressed in order to find alternatives to the destabilising 
situation in many societies at present. Experience in recent years illustrates 
the pivotal role that the international community places on building strong 
state-centric structures at a time of globalisation when typical state functions 
are de-nationalised and the role of the nation–state diminishes. Interestingly, 
concepts of state-building and nation-building have re-emerged now, though 
the increase of global threats as well as intra-state violent conflicts and wars 
make concepts of national security appear outdated. 
A recently emerged and strengthened intervening factor of importance 
is the privatisation of violence. Armed non-state actors have contributed to 
insecurity and intensification of conflicts. At the same time the use of private 
military and security companies in wars and conflicts has increased dramati-
cally. The privatisation of violence is a trend of great concern since it ques-
tions the idea of security being a public good and transforms it into a com-
mercial and marketable product. Military resources are now offered on a 
contract basis in the global market. Experts for almost any military job wait 
to be called. Economic power can now be more quickly transformed into 
military power than in the past.  
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As a consequence of the weakening of the nation–state, a broader 
based monopoly of force is required to facilitate the stabilisation of societies. 
The governance tasks are too complex for single nation–states to handle, 
especially those states that are in crisis or have emerged from conflict.  
Three politico–legal areas of great importance for the future develop-
ment of peace and security and the regulation of force need to be considered: 
First: the regulation and the strict legal control of private military 
companies to overcome the legal grey zone in which they currently operate. 
The regulation of companies can be addressed at different levels, ranging 
from a reformed Geneva Convention, to registration and licensing of compa-
nies, as is done for example in arms export regulation, to international trans-
parency and verification methods.22 To ensure a public monopoly of force, 
steps need to be taken to improve regulation of the private security and mili-
tary companies at the international and global level. The established and 
endangered monopoly of force must be reformed in order not to leave the 
internationalisation and privatisation of war and peace to market forces or 
uncontrolled non-state actors.  
Second: overcoming the democratic deficit. At the national level par-
liaments can use their legislative function and budgetary powers as an im-
portant and effective instrument to strengthen their role in influencing or 
preventing executive decisions. While this is not uncommon with regard to 
the deployment of troops, contracts with military firms and the deployment 
of contract personnel is hardly on their agenda. However, the established, 
albeit often inadequate, control mechanisms at the national level are more 
complicated when international missions are involved. Although the UN 
organisation can operate out of humanitarian concerns and moral obligations 
and intervenes on the basis of international law and emerging norms, it suf-
fers from a democratic deficit and power politics which are due to its struc-
ture as an intergovernmental organisation.  
Third: overcoming the security deficit and reforming the state monop-
oly of force. Reconstructing the monopoly of force should not be geared 
primarily to creating or re-establishing efficient institutions at the level of the 
nation–state. This chapter proposes a carefully crafted division of labour in 
exercising the monopoly of force at the global (UN), regional (regional or-
ganisations), nation–state and local level. This proposal is made both be-
cause of practical experiences with a reduced nation–state function and an 
increased role of the UN as well as on the basis of conceptual considerations 
to establish democratically legitimised interventions. Probably the weakest 
factor in this multi-level approach is the regional level because of continued 
political disagreement over state sovereignty, overlapping responsibilities of 
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regional organisations, political differences within the regional organisations 
and a severe lack of capacities.  
One might dismiss the proposal of a multi-level monopoly of force as 
unrealistic and utopian. Yet the present fundamental assault on the West-
phalian nation–state system is so far-reaching that alternatives need to be 
considered. This has been recognised de facto by the creation of transitional 
administrations or UN protectorates, but conceptually, peacebuilding is still 
considered as a hopefully short-term transition to establishing a functioning 
nation–state. The proposed multi-level monopoly of force does not require 
more military force; on the contrary: if the suggested authorities at the vari-
ous levels are to provide security to the people who need it, less militarised 
conflict solutions seem desirable.  
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Bulgaria's Private Security Industry 
Philip Gounev 
Introduction 
This chapter examines the transformation of the private security industry in 
Bulgaria.1 The case of Bulgaria is of special interest for several reasons. 
First, it highlights a wide range of problems posed by the transformation of 
the private security industry between 1990–2006. These include corruption, 
organised crime, and a lack of capacity at the state level which has hampered 
oversight of the industry. Secondly, security privatisation has reached such 
profound proportions that about nine percent of all employed males in Bul-
garia are now engaged in a private security-related activity. Thirdly, for most 
of the 1990s the private security companies (PSCs), particularly those in-
volved in racketeering, were part of the public and political life to such an 
extent that numerous media reports and surveys provide valuable opportuni-
ties to examine the Bulgarian case. Therefore, the Bulgarian experience pro-
vides an important opportunity to identify ‘lessons learned’ that may be of 
benefit for other transition countries with active private security sectors. 
The central argument put forward in this chapter is that effective regu-
lation of the private security industry depends on a range of factors linked to 
security governance including issues of resources, organised crime, and cor-
ruption. Understanding the underlying factors that contributed to the estab-
lishment and transformation of the private security industry is important for 
several reasons. First, it demonstrates the limitations of ‘best practices’ mod-
elled on developed countries. Second, it suggests that looking at PSCs 
strictly from a security perspective might not be sufficient; also needed is an 
understanding of broader issues including the role of the judiciary, the in-
formal economy, criminality and the broader framework of government ca-
pacities. Finally, considering the factors that undermine PSC regulation sug-
gests that privatisation should be approached differently in countries in tran-
sition in comparison to developed countries. 
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This chapter lays out chronologically the development of the private 
security industry from 1990 to 2006, while highlighting its effect on state 
and human security. It analyses the challenges faced by Bulgaria and the 
factors that contributed to the transformation of the private security sector 
from the perspective of security governance. The chapter concludes with a 
number of policy recommendations drawn from this analysis. 
The Emergence of Privatised Security 
The recent history of PSCs in Bulgaria provides an experience quite different 
from many other countries not only in the EU but also in Eastern Europe. 
For much of the 1990s Bulgarian organised criminal groups, and the PSCs 
they controlled, were powerful enough to influence not only politics but the 
life of the average citizen. The names of the main PSCs were well known 
and became synonymous with crime, extortion, violence and fear. Fresh 
memories of these experiences have made Bulgarian society’s perceptions of 
PSCs quite different to that of many Europeans. 
During the early 1990s extensive lay-offs within the police and the 
military left tens of thousands of former security officers unemployed. The 
army was downsized from 150,000 in 1989 to 39,000 in 2001. The police 
force was also reduced as State Security (the former secret police) was dis-
banded and along with it close to 30,000 police and security officers were 
laid off. There were several possible career paths for laid-off law-
enforcement and military officers. Some used their connections to start busi-
nesses; many of those established private security companies. Others used 
their relations with the underworld to become involved in criminal activities. 
Three periods are discussed below in terms of the history of Bul-
garia’s PSCs. In the early 1990s, many professional athletes were left with-
out jobs. Secondary boarding schools, specialised in training of professional 
athletes, could not offer employment prospects to their graduates. These 
schools became the breeding ground for a new criminal class in Bulgaria, 
which includes many of the present-day underworld bosses as well as many 
of the country’s nouveaux riches. They facilitated the establishment of a 
social network of young, aggressive men with connections to security ser-
vices (as the two main sports clubs in the country were established under the 
auspices of the police and the army). Some started their careers in Central 
Europe, engaging in auto theft, currency fraud or pimping, while others re-
mained in Bulgaria, specialising in robbery, prostitution rings and protection 
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rackets targeting fledgling businesses. They also provided protection for 
street gangs against the police or rival criminal groups.2 
The Violent Period 
The first private security companies were founded in late 1991 after an in-
ternal decision to relinquish the state monopoly on force in order to meet the 
needs of unemployed professional athletes and laid-off security officers.3 At 
that time no legal provision regulated private security activities in any way.4 
On the one hand this change created the opportunity for laid-off military and 
law-enforcement officers to apply their skills in the private sector. Many of 
them took up this opportunity. Some of the largest present-day PSCs were 
started by such individuals in that period (1991–1994).5 On the other hand, 
criminal groups drawn from former wrestlers, boxers and martial arts experts 
grasped this opportunity to put a legal face on their activities.6 This second 
group of PSCs continued to be involved in racketeering, particularly of the 
retail and hospitality industries. Agricultural markets and tourist resorts 
around the country began to be controlled by different groups, with signifi-
cant effects on the national economy – bankrupting companies unwilling to 
give in to racketeering, distorting competition, fixing prices at high levels, 
and concentrating resources within preferred companies.  
These conditions differ from those in other countries in the region. 
Former Yugoslav countries, such as Macedonia or Serbia, maintained high 
numbers of military and police personnel for most of the 1990s due to the 
ongoing conflicts in the region. Organised criminal groups there engaged 
primarily in trafficking and smuggling activities. In Romania and Hungary, 
even though the military and police personnel were gradually reduced, the 
state maintained a strong hold on security for most of the 1990s, keeping 
crime under control and the criminal justice systems were much more effi-
cient than in Bulgaria.7 In addition, all of these countries lacked the social 
network of criminalised athletes that created the backbone of PSCs engaged 
in protection rackets. Closer to the Bulgarian example is the case of Russia, 
where rampant crime and the state’s inability to provide security to busi-
nesses created strong demand for private security provision.8 As in Bulgaria, 
the founders of many of the most prominent Russian criminal groups were 
former athletes with state boarding school backgrounds.9  
During this initial period there were at least four sources of demand 
for private security services in Bulgaria. First and foremost, the weak judi-
cial and law-enforcement systems led to a pervasive sense of impunity. The 
absence of effective enforcement presented new opportunities for organized 
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criminal groups to extort money and prey on small businesses. During that 
period the criminal justice system had practically come to a halt. In 1993, for 
instance, the courts convicted three times fewer individuals than in 198910 
while the crime rate more than doubled.11  
On the other hand, with transformation of the economy only slowly 
starting to take place, there were no adequate mechanisms for debt collection 
and almost all PSCs carried out this function through intimidation and vio-
lence. The scale of the grey economy during most of the 1990s approached 
40 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP).12 As Frye has argued in his 
research on Poland and Russia, businesses within the grey economy do not 
have access to official law enforcement mechanisms and therefore rely on 
private protection.13 In addition, the downsizing of the police force left un-
guarded many sites which still needed protection. These included large state-
owned enterprises, government and municipal buildings, hundreds of mili-
tary warehouses, sea and river ports. Finally, the increase in crime, particu-
larly racketeering, created further demand for private protection. 
The lack of government control and regulation of PSCs instilled an in-
creasing sense of insecurity among businesses and citizens. Intimidation 
tactics involved beatings, mutilations, bombings and murders (see Graph 
6.1), which reached record-high levels in 1994. PSCs owned by athletes 
racketeered entertainment establishments, retail establishments and restau-
rants, smaller offices, and hotels in sea-side resorts. PSCs founded by former 
security officers tended to insert themselves into a legitimate niche market 
created as a result of the reduced state-provided protection of large state-
owned enterprises, banks or infrastructure (ports, sports facilities, schools, 
etc.). 
Due to the staggering scale of racketeering and the impunity of those 
involved, very few people saw a reason to report such incidents to the police. 
Graph 6.1 shows that protection rackets peaked in 1993–1994, illustrated by 
the record high levels of bombings and murders in these years. At the same 
time registered racketeering cases numbered only a few hundred per year 
and less than a dozen individuals were sentenced, highlighting the large 
number of unreported racketeering incidents. 
It was at the height of this crisis that the government took the first 
steps towards regulating the PSCs, by adopting in March 1994 Ordinance 
№14 for the Issuance of Permits for Guarding of Sites and Private Individu-
als by Physical and Legal Persons.14 This ordinance mandated that a PSC 
could not be registered if one of the owners or its employees had criminal 
records, were under investigation, or had not paid taxes. The law left signifi-
cant discretion to local Area Police Departments (APDs) to decide on which 
Bulgaria’s Private Security Industry 113 
PSCs to register. Since practically all the owners of PSCs involved in racket-
eering had criminal records or were under investigation, the law was used to 
force the closure of such PSCs. 
Graph 6.1. Racketeering and Violence in Bulgaria 
 
Sources: Ministry of Interior; National Statistics Institute 
From Protection to Insurance Rackets 
The new law marked the beginning of the second period (1994–1998) in the 
history of Bulgarian PSCs. The closure of notorious companies such as VIS-
1 or Club 777 had an unexpected, negative effect that led to the widening of 
the influence of organised criminal groups. In response to losing their legal 
status the owners of the banned PSCs transformed their businesses into in-
surance companies. Thus, for example, the owners of VIS-1 registered an 
insurance company VIS-2 and Club 777 was transformed into Sila. Some 
former security officers, particularly from the Ministry of the Interior’s Anti-
terrorist Unit, already involved in criminal activities, saw this as a new op-
portunity to register companies. The re-branded PSCs continued their protec-
tion racketeering practices with the main difference being that they changed 
their legal face from the provision of security to provision of 'insurance'. 
However, the insurance rackets significantly widened the range of criminal 
opportunities with insurance forced not only on businesses but also on pri-
vate individuals’ motor vehicles and homes, or government and public insti-
tutions.15  
The two archrivals VIS-2 and SIC each had nationwide coverage. The 
presence of a sticker of one of the major insurers guaranteed that property 
would not be damaged or stolen. The sticker acted in effect as static protec-
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tion because any attempt to steal or break into insured property that had a 
VIS-2 or SIC sticker would cause a team of security guards from the insur-
ance company to be sent to recover the object or seek compensation for the 
inflicted damage. For instance, instead of receiving a payment from their 
insurance company, insured owners of vehicles that had been stolen were 
simply given a replacement – usually another stolen vehicle. During this 
period organised criminal groups became increasingly interested in circum-
venting the international embargo against the former Yugoslavia and in de-
veloping illegal markets (consumer goods and drugs smuggling, prostitution 
rings, etc.). In addition, the economic crisis of 1996–1997 made racketeering 
even less profitable, and interest gradually started to shift away from this 
activity.  
In 1997 the new government of Ivan Kostov made a political decision 
to challenge the violent insurance companies. In April 1997 Interior Minister 
Bogomil Bonev met with the heads of all the top organised crime-affiliated 
insurance companies and informed them that they would have to discontinue 
their racketeering and extortion practices.16 In July 1998 amendments in the 
Law on Insurance17 marked the beginning of a new period. The new provi-
sions specifically banned: (1) insurance companies from performing private 
security activities (Art.4); (2) PSCs managing or owning insurance compa-
nies, whether fully or in part (Art 9.9); (3) actuaries or insurance agencies 
from being owned, managed, or linked to PSCs (Art.13.3, Art.43.3, Art.43.5, 
43v); (4) insurance companies from conducting any activities through legal 
or private persons that provide private security (Art.31.6); and (5) most im-
portantly, the law banned with immediate effect any insurance companies 
that had carried out private security activities. Added to this was a require-
ment for insurance companies to re-register as part of the new requirements 
with a minimum capital that most criminal insurance companies did not 
have. In practice these amendments brought about, if not the closure, at least 
a significant transformation of PSCs turned insurance companies.18 
Attempts at Regulation 
The closure of the insurance companies involved in racketeering marked the 
beginning of a new period of increasing regulation of PSCs in Bulgaria. In 
February 1999 a short-lived Ordinance №39 and the June 2000 Ordinance 
79 on the Conditions and Order for Carrying out Private Security Activities 
developed further the PSC legislation. The new legislation was accompanied 
by stringent enforcement measures. In August 2001 police throughout the 
country carried out inspection visits on 847 PSCs, 2338 sites with armed 
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guards and 1079 sites with unarmed guards, reporting that ‘dozens of viola-
tions’ had been identified and given administrative sanctions and 69 had 
been issued warnings.19 The regulation of private security activities should 
be seen in broader perspective, however, as a number of other regulations 
and laws were being developed simultaneously relating to the use of firearms 
or transportation of precious cargo.20 
Despite this flurry of legislative and law-enforcement activity, racket-
eering continued to be relatively widespread. A crime victimisation survey 
of businesses in Sofia, conducted in 2000 for the United Nations Interre-
gional Institute on Crime and Justice, provides a snapshot of the use of pro-
tection rackets.21 The survey findings indicate that 11.4 percent of businesses 
stated that protection rackets were either common or very common in their 
line of business. When asked if they had been racketeered, 7.7 percent of 
businesses responded positively. For 78.9 percent of them, this had happened 
less than five times during 1999 but for the rest it was almost a monthly ex-
perience. The respondents pointed to ‘organised crime groups’ (79 percent) 
and rival businesses (21 percent) as the main perpetrators. The United Na-
tions Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) study (see 
Graph 6.2) shows that at that time the phenomenon of protection rackets was 
still much more widespread in Bulgaria than most East European countries 
that had not been part of the former Soviet Union. 
The great majority of racketeering, however, remained unreported. 
Only 7.9 percent of businesses in Sofia responded that they had reported all 
instances of racketeering to the police during 1999. The main reason for the 
lack of reporting was fear of reprisals (63 percent). Two other reasons men-
tioned were that the police were not interested (40 percent) and were 
unlikely to be able to help (23 percent). It is probable that at the height of the 
racketeering boom (1993–1995) an even greater share of the crimes re-
mained unreported. Under pressure to meet requirements for Bulgarian 
membership of the EU and NATO, by 1999 the criminal justice system was 
more functional and the courts convicted four times more individuals than 
they did in 1993 (from 6,935 to 29,391). 
The most significant step towards regulation of the PSCs was the ac-
ceptance in 2004 of the Law on Private Guarding Activities.22 The official 
rationale of the law was that it meant to bring Bulgarian legislation regulat-
ing PSCs up to the standard of the best European practice, particularly that 
of the Scandinavian countries.23 The law strengthened the definitions of pri-
vate security activities and introduced an obligation for all PSC employees to 
attend a six-day training programme. The new law mandated that the private 
security activity licence did not have a time limit (unlike the previous three-
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year limitation) and that all PSCs had to register under the law. From a busi-
ness standpoint this latter development was positive as it reduced signifi-
cantly the bureaucratic process. The removal of limits on licences also had a 
positive effect by allowing the police to focus on monitoring or controlling 
PSCs rather than administrative issues related to the renewal of licences. 
Added to this were explicit limitations on the use of automatic weapons by 
PSC personnel. 
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Security Governance and the Private Security Business in Bulgaria 
The factors driving the transformation of PSC regulation in Bulgaria have 
changed over the years, ranging from the state’s own desire to exert some 
level of control over the means of force, to external (NATO or EU) pressures 
to deal with organised crime. The initiative behind the most recent regula-
tory effort (the Law on Private Guarding Activity) could to a large extent be 
attributed to the PSC industry itself, which recognised the need for a well-
regulated relationship with the police, clear rules in the security services 
market, and as little bureaucratic muddle as possible. NATO and the EU 
have played no particular role in shaping the present regulatory framework 
or practices but were instrumental in intensifying the political will to crack 
down on organised crime-related PSCs in the late 1990s. Civil society or-
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ganisations and communities have not taken a particular interest in this issue, 
which is reflected in the present Law on Private Guarding Activity, where 
there are no provisions or institutional platforms that allow for civilian con-
trol or complaints mechanisms. 
The present Law on Private Guarding Activities leaves oversight of 
the private security industry entirely to the police and the Ministry of the 
Interior, from granting and revocation of licenses, to control over the use of 
firearms and administrative sanctioning of irregularities. No provisions are 
made for oversight by local government, the National Parliament or other 
government authorities. The judiciary only becomes involved in resolving 
disputes between the PSCs and the police or other plaintiffs. A trade union 
of private security guards was only established in September 200525 and has 
yet to have any effect. In addition, five different associations of PSCs sprung 
up involving the majority of PSCs.26 These first steps towards self-regulation 
included the establishment of a common code of ethics, and working to-
wards improving the public image and trust in PSCs. However, despite the 
establishment of common standards, there is no oversight or monitoring 
mechanism that allows such associations to adequately enforce their ethics 
codes. 
Oversight Capacity 
Being the only institution responsible for overseeing the private security 
industry, the interior ministry faces a number of challenges. The government 
has allocated few additional resources to overseeing the private security in-
dustry. The licensing work was simply added to the tasks of local police 
departments without adding staff specifically involved with licensing and 
oversight. Control is carried out mostly on an ad hoc basis and an indication 
of the lack of proper resource management is the incomplete knowledge of 
the Ministry of the Interior of the size of the private security industry; the 
ministry has officially stated on various occasions that there are around 
130,000 guards working in private security companies in Bulgaria.27 A 2005 
survey of businesses revealed, however, that in fact there were only around 
54,000 security guards working for PSCs, while the rest (around 70,000) 
were employed in in-house security teams. Data presented by the National 
Statistical Institute (NSI) also indicate that security companies at the end of 
2004 employed some 42,733 personnel. One possible explanation for the 
discrepancy between the NSI and the survey figures is that a significant 
number of PSC guards work without contract and are paid ‘under the ta-
ble’.28 In addition, since most PSCs employ guards who are equipped with 
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their own personal firearms, the MoI does not have a clear picture of the 
number of firearms possessed by PSCs and in-house security teams. 
Two recent incidents further highlight existing difficulties in control-
ling the large private security sector in Bulgaria. On 23 November 2005, the 
citizens of the village of Gabra (near Sofia) staged a protest against the deci-
sion of the Sofia municipality to use an abandoned local mine for depositing 
the city's garbage. The protesters clashed with about 50 private security 
guards that the mine owner had hired from a number of different PSCs. Ten 
protesters were injured. The police detained 34 guards and found that none 
of them had the right to guard the mine and that 13 of them had criminal 
records. During the police investigation all guards declared that they hap-
pened to be walking around the mine and had not been hired.29 And in the 
end no PSC was sanctioned. This case illustrates the readiness of some PSC 
guards to break the law as well as the problems with the current Law on Pri-
vate Guarding Activity that allows individuals with criminal records to be-
come guards.30 
In another case, the private guards of a wealthy land-owner who had 
illegally taken over public forest lands attacked two forest rangers, beating 
and robbing them of their arms and ammunition. Three hundred local inhabi-
tants signed a letter to the MoI and the Ministry of Forestry and Agriculture 
protesting against lawlessness and the inability of police to control the secu-
rity guards, who regularly abused the local population and patrolled the re-
gion on horses with automatic weapons, wearing bullet-proof vests and 
masks.31 
Crime and PSCs 
A more detailed illustration of the lingering challenges in overseeing the 
private security industry is presented in an analysis of PSC involvement in 
racketeering or illegal dispute settlement. During the past six years such 
influence has subsided. In the 2005 business crime victims survey, only 1.3 
percent of the respondents indicated that they had been asked for protection 
money during 2005 – a significant reduction from the 2000 level of 7.3 per-
cent.32 Overall, however, 8.8 percent of the companies had been victims of a 
range of threats and extortion (protection money being only one aspect of it). 
Generally, small companies with fewer than 10 employees were up to five 
times more likely to fall victim to such crimes than companies with over 100 
employees. In only 7 percent of cases though were PSCs directly blamed as 
the perpetrators of such threats and extortion. In the other cases, local organ-
ised crime groups (33 percent) and competition (26 percent) were named as 
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the main culprits. Nevertheless, the data suggests that some PSCs remain 
involved in criminal activities. The levels of reporting threats and racketeer-
ing to the police were still low – 70 percent were not reported – but 22 per-
cent had reported such crime, which is a clear increase from the earlier fig-
ure of 7.9 percent. However, this is significantly lower than other types of 
crimes that generally have reporting rates of over 50 percent. 
In 2005 the key reasons for not reporting incidents to the police were 
the perception that the police cannot do anything about it (31 percent), and 
that this is a problem that has nothing to do with the police (31 percent). One 
key difference with the 2000 survey's reasons for not reporting is the issue of 
reprisals; while in 2005 only 21 percent mentioned this as a reason for not 
reporting, in 2000 63.3 percent mentioned it as a reason. This indicates 
changing patterns of action by the perpetrators and decreased levels of vio-
lence by PSCs. This supports the more general observation that organised 
crime in Bulgaria has gone through a period of a high level of violence in the 
early 1990s towards reduced levels of violence and, as discussed in the fol-
lowing section, its substitution by corruption as a tool to achieve its goals.33 
Corruption and Conflicts of Interest 
A major gap in the present legislation is the lack of sufficient checks and 
balances to ensure adequate measures against corruption. This encompasses 
a broad range of issues concerning both public administration and the private 
sector.34 There are various ways in which corruption has affected the over-
sight of PSC services. Some of the problems stem from the close relations 
between the police and the former military or police-turned-PSC-owners. 
Other issues are more systemic and are related to the more general problem 
of corruption in Bulgaria.  
The most widespread aspect of corruption relates to the issue of public 
procurement contracts. In 2003, 54 percent of all companies (not only PSCs) 
in Bulgaria admitted to having paid bribes to obtain a public procurement 
contract. In 2005 the share fell to 35 percent.35 There is no reason to believe 
that private security companies were in any way an exception to such prac-
tices. Such levels of corruption, though, take on an entirely different mean-
ing when concerning public procurement contracts for provision of security 
services to military sites, the Kozlodui nuclear power plant, international sea 
or river ports (i.e. international border crossings). It is probably the issue that 
most directly questions the limits of security privatisation particularly in 
countries with high levels of corruption. During the past decade, security for 
hundreds of military sites, most major international ports (such as Varna, 
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Russe and Burgas), power plants and other key infrastructure sites has been 
contracted out to PSCs.36 These had formerly been guarded by police or 
military forces.  
 
At the highest level, corruption could be described in terms of conflict 
of interest or influence-peddling by politicians who own PSCs. The present 
legislation fails to impose adequate measures against such practices. There 
are three models of corrupt practices. One involves using political influence 
to ensure that the regulation over certain PSCs is more or less strict, depend-
ing on the politician's business interests. The second, which is more widely 
applied, is to gain public procurement contracts through influence over other 
government agencies, possibly through kickbacks. The third is trading in 
influence where a given company could be forced to (or even would will-
ingly) give a contract to the politician’s PSC, and as a result expect certain 
favours in return.  
Given that the majority of the private security companies in Bulgaria 
are either staffed or run by former police officers, assigning the oversight of 
PSCs solely to the police leaves significant room for informal relations be-
tween PSCs and their regulators. It is well known that some influential poli-
ticians or their families still own PSCs. For example, allegations of undue 
influence have been made against both the well-known Scorpio PSC regard-
ing contracts to guard the National Customs Agency37 and against Ipon con-
cerning the contract to guard municipal property in Sofia.38 Both companies 
have ties to prominent politicians. In another case the PSC Khan Krum, 
owned by an off-shore company and linked to a former Member of Parlia-
ment and member of the ruling coalition party Movement for Rights and 
Freedoms, was awarded a contract to guard the Kozlodui Nuclear Power 
Plant (the only one in the country).39  
Certainly, the above cases do not suggest any easy answers and it 
could be argued that private security companies are one means of circum-
venting widespread corruption within the police and the military. This may 
be true but salaries in most PSCs are lower than those offered by the police 
or the military, with evident consequences in terms of incentives to corrup-
tion. Also, unlike the police or military (where there are internal affairs de-
partments), PSCs do not have instruments and resources to fight internal 
corruption. Further to that, the difficulties described in terms of oversight 
and control of PSCs suggest that much remains to be done to further develop 
the current regulatory framework and strengthen the oversight capacity of 
the government. Such initiatives should take into account the underlying 
factors that drive the demand for private security. This is important, because 
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while certain demand-driven factors are perfectly legitimate (for instance 
increased security around a private defence production facility), others (like 
collection of debts) are the result of existing legislative gaps or inefficient 
work of law enforcement agencies. 
The Demand for Security Services 
Despite the challenges described above there remains a significant demand 
for private security services. There are various factors that fuel such demand. 
The 2005 CSD/Vitosha Research survey indicated that perceptions about 
crime were by far the leading factor, but the grey economy, experiences of 
crime, and racketeering were also factors. 
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Fear of Crime 
The fear of crime is by far the leading factor that has driven the demand for 
private security services. During the 1990s, such fears were fuelled by the 
PSCs themselves, as many of them were involved in the criminal activities 
described above. In recent years, though, these fears have been maintained 
by growing media attention on criminality.40 During the 2001–2005 period, 
overall crime significantly declined in Bulgaria. The reasons for this de-
crease are complex, including demographic factors (rapidly declining popu-
lation, particularly young males), decreasing unemployment, rising incomes, 
and an increase in the prisoner population. The crime prevention effect of 
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private security companies is not clear. Analysis indicates that companies 
using the services of PSCs have a lesser chance of being victims of burglary. 
However, the likelihood that they would become victims of theft from out-
siders or employees or become victims of threats and extortion is not af-
fected and they remain vulnerable to such crimes. 41 
Economic Factors 
A number of economic factors drive the demand for PSC services. First, it 
has been argued that the informal economy in itself attracts PSCs because 
contracts in the grey sector cannot be enforced through the legal system and 
official law enforcement channels, therefore opening a market niche for pri-
vate enforcers.42 The shrinking of Bulgaria’s informal economy over the past 
few years43 has probably contributed to the reduced negative influence of 
PSCs.  
Another source of demand for PSCs’ services has been created by the 
inefficiency of Bulgaria’s court system, which provides a slow and unreli-
able system of debt collection. In 2005 the courts had blocked 375,000 debt 
claims worth 917 million euros. At the same time debt among companies 
and individuals has mounted to 3.5 billion Euro.44 A judge passes an average 
of six collection verdicts per month, which means that most debt claims will 
remain stuck in court for years. Even slower is the actual enforcement of 
verdicts, which usually takes years.45 Therefore a demand has been created 
for debt collection services, some of which are provided by legitimate debt 
collection agencies, but often there are ‘special units’ within PSCs which 
also provide such services using threats and intimidation to collect debts.46 
The introduction of private collection judges, due to start work during 2006, 
is expected to gradually help make official debt collection more enforceable.  
Finally, hiring a private guard makes sound business sense to many 
companies because this is still a relatively inexpensive service and certainly 
cheaper than hiring military and law enforcement personnel. Furthermore, it 
seems that hiring private security guards has become to many something of 
an ‘industry standard’, particularly for retail or wholesale enterprises since 
instead of quality of service or price serving as the main criteria to hire a 
PSC, business owners remain cautious, pointing to reputation and trust as the 
two key criteria in selecting a PSC. 
Although financially attractive, private security guards are often not 
properly trained and managed to provide quality services. A recent incident, 
in which the Bulgarian Football Union tried to save money and paid a PSC 
SOT 161, instead of the police, to guard a football match proved disastrous. 
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The company failed to control a fight between hundreds of hooligans, and 
the police were called in to intervene.47 Specific skills are moreover needed 
when guarding key infrastructure or military sites. For instance, the question 
whether PSCs are fit to guard complex border sites such as international sea 
ports is a valid one. There are no specific conditions or skills required from 
PSCs bidding for such contracts, even though guards are likely to be exposed 
to challenges related to smuggling of drugs, arms, or human beings. 
There are at least two reasons why PSCs are less efficient at providing 
certain specialised services. One is insufficient training and skills; police 
have more extensive and continuous training in comparison to the three-day 
general course required for security guards. Secondly, PSC guards have nei-
ther the authority nor the deterrent effect of the police; they do not have suf-
ficient powers to detain trespassers or to use force. And attacks on PSC 
guards are not sanctioned any differently than attacks on regular citizens, 
unlike attacks against the police. 
Conclusion and Recommendations 
Per capita, Bulgaria is near the top of the European list measuring the ratio 
of private security guards to police officers. Thus, for each Bulgarian police 
officer there are two guards employed by private security companies and 
about three more private guards in in-house security teams.48 This fact high-
lights the need for even greater resources and measures to ensure adequate 
control over PSCs. 
Implementing the regulations to divert PSCs from racketeering in se-
curity provision has been a long process that has depended on political will, 
the capacity to enforce new legislation, economic development, the appear-
ance of more profitable criminal opportunities and the influx of a critical 
mass of former police and military officers with a better work ethic and pro-
fessional standards. However, despite the positive developments that led to 
the decriminalisation of significant parts of the private security industry, a 
new set of challenges has emerged in recent years connected by a lack of 
oversight capacity, corruption and lingering crime-related problems. 
The transformation of the private security industry is a process that 
involves a broad range of legislative and administrative reforms and meas-
ures related to firearms regulations, corruption, crime, judicial and law en-
forcement capacity, and more broadly to the business environment. 
Countries in transition in Eastern Europe or the former Soviet Union, 
where former police and military personnel (due to downsizing of the secu-
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rity apparatus) constitute the backbone of the private security industry, pose 
their own challenges. Adopting best practices in PSC regulation from West-
ern Europe is a first step. While adopting a sound law is relatively easy, fail-
ure to adapt it to the local context can render it inadequate when facing the 
realities of countries where corruption and organised crime have undue in-
fluence. The following recommendations, drawing on the Bulgarian experi-
ence, could certainly be taken into account when drawing up legislation and 
establishing PSC control mechanisms in other countries in transition. 
• Provision of adequate resources for oversight is key. One possible 
approach would be to allocate funding for licensing, levy fines, or 
even introduce additional fees that could support the oversight body. 
Another solution could be to broaden the range of institutions that 
oversee the PSC industry, thus splitting the cost across several agen-
cies, possibly even mandating the establishment of an industry-funded 
independent monitoring body. 
• Providing additional bodies with functions in oversight of PSCs. 
Although the police are certainly best fit to control and monitor PSCs, 
local government could be allotted a role. There are two important 
dimensions of the oversight – licensing and monitoring. One possible 
way would be to establish an inter-agency licensing mechanism, so 
as to avoid undue influence over the licensing process by former po-
lice officers. Another would be to concentrate the licensing process 
within regional centres, instead of keeping responsibility with the lo-
cal police stations or municipalities. This would reduce the likelihood 
of inappropriate relations. Monitoring could also be improved by es-
tablishing multi-agency monitoring teams. Thus not only the police, 
but also labour conditions inspectorates, civil defence agencies, fire 
departments, or an industry body could be involved in such teams, in 
order to provide more objective and balanced assessment. 
• Stricter regulation of in-house security. Given that in-house security 
guards outnumber PSC guards, there is no reason to have lesser regu-
lation of this sector. In fact it has been argued that they are de facto 
PSCs registered simply as companies with only one department – in-
house security.49 Therefore, in-house security teams should be put on 
an equal standing with regard to training, responsibilities, and registra-
tion requirements. 
• Stricter rules for individuals with criminal records. Criminal inci-
dents involving PSC staff have highlighted the danger to the public 
from guards with criminal records. At least two steps could be taken 
Bulgaria’s Private Security Industry 125 
to provide safeguards. First, security guards with criminal records 
should be barred from working in a PSC if they re-offend. In the case 
of Bulgaria this should include any violent crime as well as ‘hooligan-
ism’, which usually captures all small-scale violent and threatening 
behaviour. A second approach would be to set up higher criminal li-
ability of PSC guards, i.e. that criminal offences committed by secu-
rity guards should result in harsher penalties (higher fines or longer 
sentences) than would be given to ordinary citizens.    
• Widening opportunities for citizens to seek legal remedy. In light 
of the public threat that some PSCs have posed and given the fact that 
PSC management remains well-connected to law enforcement struc-
tures, alternative sanctions and remedies outside the police should be 
made available. One potential ally is the ombudsman institution, while 
local government bodies could also be allotted a more significant role. 
• Increasing PSC liability for actions of their personnel. At present 
there is a whole raft of practices aimed at reducing company liability 
at the expense of individual guards. These range from having no offi-
cial contractual relationship between guard and company to obliging 
guards to obtain personal firearms permits and use their own weapons 
in the course of their daily work, to not bearing responsibility for 
semi-legal guarding or debt-collection activities that guards unoffi-
cially carry out on behalf of their employer. Increased liability would 
force the company to more strictly control the actions of its personnel 
and to limit their involvement in illegal practices. 
• Higher standards for companies guarding critical infrastructure. 
Existing regulations do not require a higher level of training, special 
skills, or higher liability for companies providing security services for 
key security infrastructure, such as ports, military facilities or nuclear 
power plants. If such requirements are fulfilled, the cost of private se-
curity is likely to surpass the cost of hiring law enforcement person-
nel. Thus, from a financial or security point of view it makes little 
sense to employ PSCs under present conditions. 
• Measures against conflicts of interest. Although some of the above 
recommendations aim to diminish corruption, there should be some 
direct legislative provision as well. The absence of rules and regula-
tions against conflict of interests of government officials or their fami-
lies that own PSCs has created conditions for corrupt practices and 
trading in influence. Legislation could include provisions barring 
owners or individuals related to PSCs from holding public office. 
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Despite the impressive transformation through which Bulgaria’s pri-
vate security industry has gone since 1990, the need for further reforms, in 
terms of creating the conditions for more effective, well-managed and de-
mocratically-governed security provision, remains clear. The case of Bul-
garia highlights some of the difficulties that future European Union initia-
tives to establish common standards for PSC regulation might encounter. 
Countries in East-Central Europe, like Poland, Bulgaria or Hungary, where 
corruption is higher and the PSC sector larger than in most West European 
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This paper considers the private security industry in post-Soviet countries 
from a security sector governance perspective. It focuses particularly on 
Georgia and Ukraine, two countries in which significant reforms of the secu-
rity sector are under way, yet where democratic control of the private secu-
rity industry has rarely been discussed. It also looks more widely at the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) region, where similar dynamics 
could be witnessed, at least in the early post-Soviet years. 
This study does not claim to be a comprehensive review of private se-
curity provision in Georgia, Ukraine or the CIS overall. Rather, it aims to 
give the reader a broad impression of the salient issues in the region, with the 
hope that this may encourage further discussion on the topic within the re-
gion itself, since this has not been systematically focused on either by aca-
demics, policy-makers or broader civil society. It also hopes to make a con-
tribution to the academic and policy dialogue about the privatisation of secu-
rity internationally, since there are some significant differences between 
private security industries in the CIS and their Western counterparts. 
The main thesis of this paper is that whilst in many ways the post-
Soviet region has witnessed the same processes whereby the maintenance of 
security is no longer the sole preserve of the state and there are now a multi-
tude of private security actors, both the factors underlying this transition and 
the overall situation with regard to ‘police-style security services’ display 
notable variations from the Western model.1 Most discourse about the priva-
tisation of security rests on a ‘Western’ perception of the division between 
the public and the private, and assumes that economic liberalisation is fol-
lowing the same course everywhere. Both these assumptions are question-
able with regard to the former Soviet Union, and analysing the ‘privatisa-
tion’ of security thus risks overlooking some key factors. For this reason, it 
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is proposed that a wider assessment of the ‘commercialisation’ of security 
may provide a better analytical framework for understanding the transition 
period, and allow a wider perspective of security sector governance issues 
affecting private security provision. 
The paper begins by sketching the main factors driving the rapid ex-
pansion of the domestic private security industry in the immediate post-
Soviet period, marking out several stages in their development, particularly 
in Russia, the largest and most influential CIS state. It then considers the 
private security industries in Georgia and Ukraine in more detail, demon-
strating that despite common roots, significant differences already exist be-
tween CIS countries. The paper then discusses the main issues concerning 
security sector governance in these countries, and concludes by suggesting 
some of the practical and policy implications of this analysis and outlining 
areas for much-needed further research.2 
The Development of the Private Security Industry in the CIS 
Given their common Soviet roots, the early history of the private security 
industries in CIS countries probably does not differ much from state to state. 
Over time, however, they have developed in different ways – both in terms 
of their overall political, economic and security directions, and more specifi-
cally with regard to their private security industries. This section touches 
particularly on Russia, as the largest state in the CIS and often the leader in 
various trends. The following sections, on Ukraine and Georgia, provide 
counterpoints demonstrating some of these variations. 
Stage 1: Uncontrolled Privatisation 
The privatisation of security in the post-Soviet world did not creep up on 
analysts and policymakers as it did in the West – rather, it occurred as a sud-
den explosion. The proliferation of private security companies (PSCs) in the 
early 1990s came as an unintended consequence of the collapse of the Soviet 
Union and the badly planned ‘liberal’ reforms that followed. A swift privati-
sation and redistribution of property took place without first having equipped 
state institutions (which were essentially new, even when formed on the 
basis of their Soviet predecessors) with the mechanisms to ensure the correct 
functioning of the market or to maintain security in a democratic state.3 The 
result was a kind of ‘wild’ capitalism where large swathes of the economy 
were effectively criminalised, with primordial methods often being em-
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ployed to gain and maintain control of resources. Crime did not only affect 
businessmen: there was an upsurge in various forms of petty crime, such as 
burglary, robbery and street violence. In some areas, particularly the South 
Caucasus, conflicts ignited, causing even greater insecurity. 
In the absence of a legitimate and effective national system for pro-
tecting property, resolving conflicts and enforcing decisions, there was a 
sudden increase in demand for some sort of externally-provided security. 
Writing about Russia, Vadim Volkov notes that since ‘the speed of liberali-
zation was greater than that of institution-building, the emerging markets 
spontaneously developed alternative mechanisms of protection and enforce-
ment.’ The most significant was the role that quickly came to be known as 
the ‘krysha’ (roof).4  
At its simplest, the krysha may have resembled little more than a pro-
tection racket, but it was usually considerably more advanced. Volkov de-
fines it as ‘an enforcement partner, criminal or legal, and signifying a com-
plex of services provided…to its clients in order to protect them physically 
and minimize their business risks.’ He notes that this relationship goes well 
beyond physical protection, including, most importantly, ‘the ability to en-
gage in informal negotiations with other enterprises and their enforcement 
partners in case of a breach of contract or failure to return the debt.’5 Though 
the more successful kryshy usually resolved such matters peacefully, regular 
reports in the 1990s of vicious gun battles and businessmen being assassi-
nated indicate that such negotiations often turned violent. 
The gap which the private security industry sought to fill was thus lar-
ger than just police-type services such as static surveillance or close protec-
tion, and this, as Volkov rightly notes, distinguishes the industry from its 
counterparts in most of the rest of the world.6 Yet it should be noted that the 
private security industry was not alone, or even the main actor in filling this 
vacuum; this role could equally be played by overtly criminal groups or cor-
rupt state officials. 
This is an important point both theoretically and practically. From a 
theoretical point of view, the distinction between the private and the public 
in Western dialogue on private security actors implicitly rests on the follow-
ing assumptions: 
• The state implements the law in an impartial manner; 
• The state has the capacity to fulfil its responsibilities, however it de-
fines them; 
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• State officials act in the interests of the state rather than for their own 
gain; and these interests, in a democratic state, are to a great extent 
identical to the public interest;  
• Private and corporate actors are driven by personal/company gain in a 
way that state actors are not. 
Unfortunately, these assumptions were not true in post-Soviet states 
blighted by weak institutions and corruption (nor are they true in most de-
veloping and post-authoritarian states). The former meant that the state mo-
nopoly over violence disappeared almost overnight; the latter ensured that it 
was not only individuals in the private sector who saw the opportunity to 
charge money for providing security. The result was that security soon be-
came a commodity like any other, almost regardless of who was offering it. 
Stage 2: Capturing Market Share 
Though they were never the only actor, PSCs were nonetheless able to capture an 
important share of the private security market in several post-Soviet states. They 
achieved this partly because there was a ready supply of staff, partly because there 
was plenty of room for expansion in the market, and partly because of their format 
and status. 
The private security industry could expand rapidly because there were plenty 
of experienced personnel available for employment. In most post-Soviet states, in-
dependence was followed almost immediately by downsizing and/or reform of the 
security sector, including the police, the armed forces and the intelligence services. 
For many newly-unemployed security professionals, working for or running a PSC 
was an obvious way to continue to be paid for one’s skills. Given low levels of pay 
and high dissatisfaction across much of the state security sector, many employees 
were attracted by the alternative employment opportunities that PSCs offered. 
It is worth briefly highlighting the background of these employees. The KGB 
and the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA) existed not so much to protect the Soviet 
people as to protect the Soviet state from everything – including its own citizens. 
These agencies did not escape the wave of commercialisation of security; on the 
contrary, their skills, experience and contacts left them extremely well-placed to 
benefit. Yet it would be naïve to expect that only those that moved into the private 
security industry were motivated by profit; rather, a web existed stretching across 
both state and private structures that was mutually beneficial. It may be argued that 
despite many fractures, the Soviet-era security networks were never convincingly 
broken up – they were merely part-privatised and re-directed from repression to-
wards making a profit.7 
 
The Commercialisation of Post-Soviet Private Security 133 
The early development of a legislative framework for regulating PSCs should 
be seen in this light. Volkov argues that though the 1992 ‘Law On Private Protection 
and Detective Activity in the Russian Federation’ did reduce crime, it was intended 
more as a way of offering alternative employment to those leaving the state sector.8 
Nonetheless, it allowed the state to gain at least some control over the already ad-
vanced privatisation of security. Indirectly, it acknowledged that the state had lost 
the monopoly of violence and that enforcement was increasingly carried out by 
kryshy – but even if some of their work was of dubious legality, PSCs were still 
preferable to purely criminal groups, since they were easier to monitor and sanction. 
Of course, their legal status also made them preferable for both employees and cli-
ents. This fact was not lost on criminal groups either, who saw the advantages of 
using PSCs to give a legitimate framework to their activities, including (in Russia) 
the ownership of weapons.9  
Over time, therefore, PSCs captured a fair proportion of the market for po-
lice- and krysha-style security provision, since they provided a legal shell for a range 
of activities that the state was in no position either to provide itself or prevent, turn-
ing a blind eye to much that was not strictly ‘above board’. As privatisation and the 
redistribution of wealth continued apace, there was an increased demand for protec-
tion and plenty of people willing to pay for it. 
Stage 3: Stabilisation and Consolidation 
Gradually, most former Soviet countries reached a point of natural stabilisa-
tion (though this happened earlier in some countries than in others). In eco-
nomic terms, this meant that a new elite had largely been formed which now 
wished to consolidate its position. The state began to take more control, 
though with different aims, since its interests had to a considerable degree 
become the interests of this elite (part of which had always remained within 
state structures). 
For the private security industry, this meant two things. Firstly, the 
state gained greater capacity to regulate its work, since the (re)consolidated 
elite saw the potential for using the machinery of state to strengthen its own 
position and root out its rivals. Slowly, the grey area of semi-legal activities 
for which a PSC was valued became smaller, and overtly criminal elements 
were further squeezed out of the protection market. Yet it should not auto-
matically be assumed that re-establishment of state control over security 
provision (whether directly, or through better regulation of the industry) is 
the same as the establishment of the rule of law. The latter assumes that the 
entire justice sector functions effectively and impartially. If this were so, it 
could be expected that there would no longer be a need for the wider ‘en-
forcement partnership’ role of the krysha, and PSCs would revert to more 
traditional forms of ‘police-style security’ functions. However, judicial sys-
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tems in much of the CIS are still considered to be corrupt, open both to brib-
ery and to pressure from the executive. In this case, strengthening state con-
trol may offer opportunities for those within the state to profit from the 
commercialisation of security without necessarily reducing this commer-
cialisation per se: on one level, some officials benefit from close contact 
with PSCs, possibly reducing incentives to implement policies aimed at im-
proving security for everyone; at a higher level, the fact that security can be 
offered or removed means it can be used for political or economic leverage. 
Hence improved control over the private security sector does not necessarily 
lead to better democratic governance. 
As noted above, these three stages are most clearly defined in Russia, yet are 
visible in some form in many other CIS states. Nonetheless, after 15 years of inde-
pendence it is no surprise that significant variations exist in terms of how security 
has become commercialised, the scope and strength of the industry, and the state’s 
capacity and interest in managing security provision. Two case studies, in Ukraine 
and Georgia, explore these differences in more detail. 
Ukraine: Not Private, Not Profit-Making, Not Free to All 
Background to the Privatisation of Security 
Ukraine has many social and political similarities with Russia, and as the 
second most populated Soviet successor state, it is not surprising that it faced 
many of the same challenges. Ukraine was struck just as hard by the crimi-
nalisation of the economy, had even greater problems establishing function-
ing state institutions, and suffered huge corruption. As a result, Ukraine also 
saw a rapid increase in demand for externally-provided security, also saw the 
concept of the krysha spread through business circles, and also seemed ini-
tially unable either to provide security itself or to manage its provision by 
others. The criminal groups that blossomed in the early post-Soviet period 
were not just analogous to their Russian counterparts – they often cooperated 
or even combined. 
Essentially, therefore, the rapid commercialisation of security in 
Ukraine did not differ much from the first stage mapped out above. The two 
main differences in Ukraine relate to how the government responded to these 
security challenges, and to the wider issue of security sector reform. Firstly, 
the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA) quickly moved to ensure it played a 
major role in the provision of ‘private’ security through the establishment 
and promotion of the State Protection Service (see below). Secondly, 
Ukraine pursued a more westward-looking course, with ambitions of NATO 
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membership and a declared interest in the principles of democratic security 
sector governance (even if this did not always appear to translate into practi-
cal changes). This process accelerated following the ‘Orange Revolution’ 
and the election of Viktor Yushchenko in December 2004, with a more de-
fined emphasis on assimilating European norms of governance in all areas. 
This case study considers whether this alternative political direction has had 
any impact on management of the private security industry. 
Size and Scope of the Private Security Sector 
According to MIA figures for May 2006, there are 3,018 enterprises licensed 
to undertake protection work, employing 33,000 people. Approximately two-
thirds of these licenses involve the protection of state or private property, 
while the other third concern personal protection. In 2005 alone, nearly 
1,600 such licenses were granted.10 Though most PSCs’ work is limited 
largely to property protection (installation of alarm systems, physical guard-
ing, rapid response, accompanying of freight transport) and/or close protec-
tion, some also offer background checks on potential business partners,11 and 
there have been cases of PSCs carrying out raids on disputed properties.12 
This in effect forms part of the ‘enforcement partnership’ role described 
above.  
The private security industry, although significant in itself, is dwarfed 
by its governmental counterpart, the State Protection Service (derzhavna 
sluzhba okhorony – DSO), a department accountable to the Ministry of In-
ternal Affairs. The DSO includes 218 sub-divisions, 170 cash transportation 
services and 35 special ‘Titan’ sub-divisions, and employs more than 51,000 
people.13 It offers the same range of services as the private security industry, 
as well as others that non-state actors cannot perform, such as armed protec-
tion of banks and cash transportation. Indeed, it regularly reminds potential 
clients that it is the only protection service with the right to possess fire-
arms.14 Furthermore, it also runs training centres, and is responsible for vari-
ous tasks relating to the regulation of the industry, raising important govern-
ance issues (see below). All these services cost money; approximate charges 
can be found on the DSO’s website. Should such an agency be left out of an 
analysis of the commercialisation of security? To answer this question, it 
must be classified in some way. 
The DSO appears to be a strange hybrid, part government agency and 
part entrepreneurial activity. According to the cabinet decision that estab-
lished it,15 the department’s activities are financed by the payment of its ser-
vices on a contractual basis. However, its operations are not intended for 
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profit and any money made in the course of its activities should be re-
channelled into improving its resources and its workers’ welfare (though it is 
unclear how this is done in practice). In theory, therefore, it is neither private 
in the sense that it is a non-governmental actor nor that it is motivated by 
profit. Yet since it is providing and charging for the same services as the 
private security industry, it is clearly in direct competition with it. In fact, it 
does not seem that different from state-run enterprises in other sectors and in 
other countries: a behemoth which dominates the market with state support. 
The complaint that the DSO has an unfair monopoly as the only pro-
vider of armed protection has been loudly made by the Ukrainian Federation 
of Non-State Security Services (UFNSSS – an industry association bringing 
together about 140 private security companies) and the Association of 
Ukrainian Banks (AUB). In particular, the AUB complains that since its 
banks are forced to turn to the DSO for armed protection, the DSO charges 
the banks excessively for its services.16 Though the AUB and UFNSSS bring 
legal and moral arguments into their conflict with the DSO, it is probably 
fair to say that their main concerns are economic. However, the current state 
of affairs also raises significant concerns from a security governance per-
spective. 
Governance of the Private Security Sector 
There are questions about both the quality of governance currently exercised 
over the ‘commercialised security sector’ (i.e. PSCs and the DSO taken to-
gether), and about the whole structure by which it is governed. 
Starting with the quality of governance, PSCs do not always appear to 
live up to best practice. Most obviously, there appears to be fruitful ground 
for illegitimate cooperation between PSCs and state security institutions, 
since most PSC staff have previously worked for the state. This is cemented 
further by a requirement in the licensing conditions that PSC chiefs must 
either have a higher legal education, have three years middle or senior level 
experience within the MIA or SBU (sluzhba bezpeky Ukrayiny – the Ukrain-
ian Security Service), or have served at least five years in parts of the Armed 
Forces.17 Other concerns include occasional accusations of political misuse 
of PSCs (such as those made by representatives of Nasha Ukraina during the 
2004 presidential elections)18 and illegal raids perpetrated by PSCs on pri-
vate property.19  
The government acknowledges that problems exist within the private 
security sector, and in March 2006 the Ministry of Internal Affairs was or-
dered to review the licenses of all non-governmental protection companies 
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by the end of the year.20 However, it claims to have had much success al-
ready in reducing unlicensed activity and abuses by the private security in-
dustry.21 
Obvious doubts arise, however, about the legitimacy of the MIA hav-
ing responsibility for regulating the private security industry when its own 
DSO is in direct competition with the industry, especially if the DSO itself is 
involved in the licensing and review process. The fear is that the MIA/DSO 
could use its regulatory powers to further squeeze its private competitors out 
of the market. 
The regulatory structure also raises concerns. Non-governmental pro-
tection companies are regulated primarily by the law ‘On Licensing of Cer-
tain Types of Economic Activity’22 and the aforementioned 2004 licensing 
conditions, while the DSO is largely governed by the same legislation as the 
rest of the MIA. It is widely agreed that there is a need for a proper law to 
regulate the industry. A draft law ‘On Protection Activities’ was proposed 
both in 2002 and in 2005, but has not yet passed. The UFNSS agrees with 
the need for such a law, but complains that in its current form, the draft law 
is aimed at further strengthening the DSO’s position rather than creating a 
fair or well-governed system.23 Some credence to these claims was given by 
the comments on the draft law presented by the parliament’s main analytical 
department, which recommended that the law should not be passed until 
significant changes had been made.24 
The DSO argues that its staff have had more training and are more 
professional than those of PSCs (though this is hard to measure), and also 
implies that by merging protection and policing functions (it claims to have 
prevented more than 65,000 crimes and detained more than 72,000 criminals 
in nine months of 2005)25 it can serve private and public interests simultane-
ously. Yet the DSO’s status raises many questions. Firstly, should police 
officers, who should be serving the public interest, be involved in money-
generating activities for private employers? Secondly, is there not potential 
for conflicts of interest between the needs of those using the DSO’s services 
and those of the state and the public? What happens in such cases? Thirdly, 
although the rules governing the DSO’s work say that it is a non-profit-
making body, unless there is total budgetary transparency and accountability, 
can the public be sure that the DSO is not involved in profit-making activi-
ties? Lastly, is it possible to argue that since an overall improvement in pub-
lic security might limit the demand for some of the DSO’s activities, this 
may weaken the resolve of some MIA officials to focus their activities on 
improving security for all? 
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The protection sector faces a double governance challenge: not only 
does the regulation of the private industry by the MIA create an apparent 
conflict of interests; it is also unclear whom the DSO itself is accountable to. 
It is presumably governed by the same oversight mechanisms as the rest of 
the MIA. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to analyse these mechanisms 
in full, but it should be noted that despite increased talk of ‘security sector 
reform’ in Ukraine over recent years, the lion’s share of attention has gone to 
the military. As Leonid Polyakov noted in January 2005, this has meant that 
‘the military attempts to adhere to democratic norms as officially declared, 
but the intelligence and law-enforcement agencies have not yet retreated 
from excessive secretiveness nor the inherited Soviet traditions of low trans-
parency of their activities neither to society nor to even the Verkhovna Rada 
(the parliament)’.26 Indeed, despite many statements of good intent, it is still 
hard to pinpoint concrete reforms that would lead to a more democratic or 
accountable police service – and little has changed under the ‘Orange’ gov-
ernment, which has appeared divided on many issues and lacks the political 
strength to break through the web of bureaucracy and personal interests that 
characterises the MIA. This is a major disappointment for much of Ukrain-
ian society, which repeatedly rates the police as one of the least trusted or-
ganisations. It is also a failure on the part of both the Ukrainian government 
and its Western interlocutors: with an eye to eventual NATO membership, 
‘security sector reform’ has still been largely associated with the military, 
even though NATO regularly claims that military reform is only part of the 
equation. 
This discussion of police reform may seem a little far from the topic 
of private security actors. Yet since private security issues form part of a 
wider debate about the whole security sector which is still not taking place, it 
may be optimistic to imagine that much attention will be given to govern-
ance of private security actors except by those who are directly involved. 
This carries the risk that the industry will be regulated in the interests of the 
industry itself, rather than those of the public or state. Whether this will 
change depends in part on whether the new government formed after parlia-
mentary elections in March 2006 will be more able or willing to address the 
issue. It also depends, however, on whether the Western institutions which 
Ukraine aspires to join indicate that improved governance of the protection 
industry should be part of Euro-Atlantic integration.  
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Georgia: Who Gains from Regulating the Industry?27 
Background to the Privatisation of Security 
The general collapse in economic, social and political fortunes that accom-
panied the collapse of the USSR hit Georgia harder than most. Previously a 
reasonably prosperous and peaceful republic (by Soviet standards), by 1993 
it had suffered a small civil war and two separatist conflicts in Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia. By the time the ceasefire agreements were signed, Georgia 
had lost control over significant sections of its internationally recognised 
territory, its economy had been ruined, and the state’s ability to govern dras-
tically weakened. The process of creating effective institutions (including a 
security sector) out of the rubble of the Soviet Union, which was challenging 
enough already, was thus made even harder. 
Although Eduard Shevardnadze’s government initially brought some 
kind of order and economic stability in the mid-1990s, by the end of the 
decade a sense of decay had set in. Corruption was extremely widespread, 
and the police were no exception, ranging from simple bribe-taking by rank-
and-file officers through to semi-legal business activities and overtly crimi-
nal acts such as extortion and smuggling, which were often thought to be 
coordinated at a senior level.28 Poor equipment and training meant that even 
non-corrupt officers lacked the capacity to police effectively. Levels of pub-
lic trust in the state’s ability to maintain security were thus rather low. 
This created strong incentives to turn to private companies for protec-
tion, and a fair number of PSCs appeared to fill this gap; if PSCs were never 
quite as prevalent in Georgia as they were in Russia or Ukraine, this was 
probably because the economy was so weak that there were fewer businesses 
or rich individuals who could afford such services. As elsewhere, PSCs were 
generally set up by former security sector employees; it is likely that in the 
early years they were also joined by members of various disbanded paramili-
tary groups. 
In November 2003, Shevardnadze was ousted following several weeks 
of protests known as the ‘Rose Revolution’ and replaced by a reformist gov-
ernment led by new president Mikheil Saakashvili. This government was 
younger and more Westernised than its Ukrainian counterpart, and the break 
with the old system much cleaner. Hence police reform was made one of the 
government’s top priorities, and major changes soon followed. Employing 
fewer people but paying them well was seen as a key precondition to reduc-
ing corruption. The first stage was thus the disbandment of the unpopular 
traffic police, the dismissal of over 15,000 employees, and significant pay 
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increases for those that remained. By the summer of 2005, therefore, the size 
of the Ministry of Internal Affairs had been reduced from well over 30,000–
40,000 employees (depending on how this was calculated; the previous gov-
ernment had no clear figures for the number of MIA employees) to under 
17,000 employees, of which about 14,500 were serving police officers.29 
Beyond reducing numbers, the government set several key priorities 
for the reform of the police. There were three key goals. The first was to 
civilianise the MIA. Previously, virtually all employees of the MIA had been 
policemen, regardless of their function within the ministry, and there was no 
clear separation between the ministry as a management body and the police 
as an operational body. Furthermore, the ministry contained nearly 10,000 
Internal Troops, which were essentially a militarised body; and the rest of 
the police force was also organised along military lines, with military ranks 
and management methods. The reforms therefore intended to separate the 
management and operational functions within the ministry, and to create a 
truly civilian police force. A major step in this direction was the transfer of 
the Internal Troops to the Ministry of Defence (MOD) in November 2004. 
The second goal was to professionalise the police, through compre-
hensive restructuring and (re-) training. Many changes have been made to 
the organisational structure to bring the MIA closer to European norms, and 
major efforts have been made at the Police Academy to overhaul the system 
for training new recruits and regularly re-training older staff. The most high-
profile change so far has been the launch of a new ‘Patrol Police’ in summer 
2004, parading modern cars and equipment and a considerably more polite 
manner in dealing with citizens. Public approval ratings for the new Patrol 
Police have stayed extremely high, and the government is now undertaking 
further ambitious reforms, supported by the US, the OSCE, and the EU, to 
introduce a community-based policing model and reform the remaining po-
lice departments into a fully operational Criminal Police.30 
The third goal was simply to ensure that the MIA and the police had a 
suitable level of equipment and financing to ensure that they continued to 
function in a sustainable fashion. In the short term, this has required major 
international support for infrastructure and equipment. In the longer term, 
however, the Georgian government intends to become self-sufficient through 
improving the size of the MIA’s budget and the efficiency with which it is 
spent, which also requires major reforms to the whole management culture; 
here again, international assistance is currently being provided. 
Despite this definite sense of positive momentum, however, it remains 
too early to say that there has been a major improvement in public security; 
embedding these changes will take several years, and the Georgian public 
The Commercialisation of Post-Soviet Private Security 141 
has come to be cynical about promised reforms until they can really see the 
effects of them. This means that for the near future, the demand for private 
security is likely to remain high for those that can afford it. 
Size and Scope of the Private Security Sector 
As in Ukraine, there are questions about how to define the ‘private’ or ‘commercial-
ised’ security sector, since there is also a state body that provides protection services 
on a commercial basis, the Police Protection Department (PPD). However, the situa-
tion is made even more confusing by the lack of a clear structure for either PSCs or 
the government body.  
Starting with the private security industry, it is difficult to give figures for the 
number of PSCs operating in Georgia, since there are no specific legal provisions for 
their activity. This means that no particular statistics are kept, and it can be difficult 
to decide whether a specific company qualifies as a PSC or not. However, it is esti-
mated that there are about 250 to 300 PSCs in existence, though fewer than 10 of 
these are major players.31 It is also thought that many companies are dormant, acting 
as a potential safety net for protecting the interests of their founders, mostly former 
members of various security sector institutions.32 PSCs in Georgia predominantly 
focus on guarding property (physical guards and alarm systems). Close protection 
does not appear to be common, possibly because PSC staff cannot legally carry 
weapons, though some companies do offer such services.33 
According to industry representatives, the market is undergoing a period of 
rapid change, with many new companies set up in the last few years, though most 
have quickly gone out of business.34 This is most likely linked to the downsizing in 
the police and other institutions, which has left a lot of security professionals look-
ing for work. Given the alleged links between the industry and various key officials 
and parliamentarians, the change in government may also have contributed to the 
shake-up, with some companies going out of favour and others gaining it. 
Within the Georgian government there is a Special State Protection 
Service, subordinate to the President, which is responsible for the protection 
of senior officials and some important buildings (and also takes some com-
mercial contracts). However, the key competitor for PSCs is the PPD within 
the MIA, which in some ways is run along similar principles to the DSO in 
Ukraine, since it provides protection services to other government agencies 
and to private companies and individuals on a contractual basis. It is esti-
mated to have about 10,000 employees, making it a very significant actor on 
the private security market. 
Unlike the DSO, however, it does not seem to be considered a 
‘proper’ part of the MIA. They have no police powers, wear separate uni-
forms, and have separate identification.35 As a result, figures listed for the 
number of MIA and police employees usually leave out the PPD. Both the 
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history and future of this department are unclear; Darchiashvili suggests that 
in the past, essentially private actors were registered as police officers within 
the PPD as it gave them more legal rights, which may have provided finan-
cial opportunities for those in charge of registration.36 The future is poten-
tially more promising, from a governance perspective, since there have been 
strong recommendations from international police advisers that the PPD has 
no role within a European police force.37 The MIA has promised to remove 
this department, possibly by privatisation; however, some advisers are cyni-
cal as to the likelihood of the ministry doing away with a body that currently 
provides a useful revenue stream.38 
Governance of the Private Security Sector 
It is difficult to speak of governance of the private security sector in a situa-
tion where very few rules exist to regulate its behaviour. There is no specific 
legislation on private security companies, so they are licensed under the gen-
eral ‘Law on Entrepreneurs’.39 There is therefore virtually no way of ensur-
ing that any particular standards are maintained within the industry. Huge 
grey areas exist in which the industry operates to the best of its ability.  
Despite the obvious deficiencies in the current system, insiders remain 
pessimistic about the prospects of passing suitable legislation in the near 
future. This is because it is believed that various parliamentarians and senior 
officials have close links to the private security industry and are opposed to 
introducing legislation that might damage their interests or restrict their free-
dom of movement.40 Furthermore, given the limited capacity of the Georgian 
state to pass and implement appropriate legislation in any field, it may well 
be perceived that the private security industry is not currently important 
enough to expend the government’s energy on. 
The situation with the PPD is equally murky, since although it is offi-
cially part of the MIA, in practice it is unclear how much even the MIA itself 
considers this department to be part of the Ministry, nor is it clear under 
what legal framework it is currently operating (unlike the Special State Pro-
tection Service, for which there is a separate law). This has been acknowl-
edged by the MIA, at least, largely as a result of the deep international en-
gagement on police reform, yet no concrete changes have yet taken place.  
Thus although Georgia’s approach to security sector reform has been 
broader in scope than in Ukraine, governance of the private security sector 
has still remained largely off the map. The huge international support for 
police reform has led certain advisers to touch on PSCs during their analyses 
of the current situation, yet this has not been backed up by a genuine focus 
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on the issue of private security. Again, unless there are European or ‘Euro-
Atlantic’ standards that Georgia is encouraged to uphold in order to move 
closer to NATO and the EU, developments in the PSC market are likely to 
depend more on economic or political factors than concerns about the best 
form of democratic governance. 
Post-Soviet Security Privatisation in Context 
This chapter has questioned some of the implicit assumptions behind the 
Western dialogue on the privatisation of security: that there is a clear distinc-
tion between the public and the private; that state officials act in the interests 
of the state and the public good, and only private companies are motivated 
by profit; and that processes of economic liberalisation are essentially simi-
lar everywhere. On the contrary, it is argued that through corruption and lack 
of capacity, there are frequent occurrences of state officials putting private 
gain before duty, thus blurring the separation of public and private, and that 
although the states of the former Soviet Union certainly underwent economic 
liberalisation in the early 1990s, this was a much more extreme and chaotic 
experience than in the West, resulting in unintentional ‘shock therapy’ for 
the private security market without allowing the time or resources to build a 
new regulatory framework. It is thus suggested that an analysis of the ‘priva-
tisation’ of security fails to capture the complexity of these changes, and that 
considering events in terms of the ‘commercialisation’ of security allows a 
better understanding of what has happened.  
This paper has raised numerous concerns about the quality of private 
security governance in the CIS region, with particular regard to Georgia and 
Ukraine (though these are meant only as case studies rather than to ‘single 
out’ these states). These include insufficient or controversial legislation, 
areas where the industry does not appear to be operating according to best 
practice, or beyond its mandate (the krysha role), potential clashes of interest 
between various ‘commercial’ security actors, and unclear lines of transpar-
ency and accountability. 
The paper has also noted considerable differences between CIS 
states in the way in which the private security industry has developed, along 
two main variables: the level of state involvement in ‘commercialised’ pro-
tection and the scope and depth of legislation. There may be numerous rea-
sons for this, many of which do not relate to the private security industry in 
particular, such as the level of consolidation of elites and overall state capac-
ity to pass and implement legislation. Nonetheless, the level of control over 
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the industry in different CIS countries may not be as great as first appears, 
since legislation is no guarantee of democratic control in states where the 
rule of law is still shaky, and the potential remains for elites to (mis)use 
PSCs for their own ends. It may well be that it is more a question of whether 
such control is formal or informal; further comparative study of this question 
would be extremely interesting but methodologically challenging.  
However, perhaps the greatest concern is that private security govern-
ance does not appear to be regarded as an important issue. If there are few 
mechanisms for either parliament or the public to exercise democratic con-
trol over the sector, this is due in large part to a lingering Soviet attitude that 
the security sector as a whole is a matter for the state alone. Despite the ob-
vious risks of allowing unregulated private security actors to operate and the 
enormous social impact of the commercialisation of security, there is still 
little understanding that the public has the right to control such matters, let 
alone of how to do this; furthermore, given the massive decline in living 
standards associated with the end of the Soviet Union, most people are still 
more concerned with making ends meet than with demanding democratic 
governance. Unfortunately, this means that even where private security in-
dustries are regulated, this tends to be in the interests of the industry or pow-
erful figures, rather than democracy and public security. 
It is likely that state control over the private security industry will 
grow over the next few years; in some countries, such as Ukraine, the state 
never really lost control. This is certainly necessary to some degree, and 
should be expected in a region where governments still have a natural ten-
dency towards intervention and control in many spheres. Yet government 
control is not necessarily the same as democratic governance, especially 
where the rule of law is perceived as incomplete. In that sense, it is optimis-
tic to expect that governance over the private security industry will be much 
better than in the security sector as a whole. 
Currently, however, governance of the private security industry has 
not been part of the dialogue on SSR in the region. There is comparatively 
little research on security sector governance in the region, and even in coun-
tries which have declared their intention to reform towards European struc-
tures, understanding that the scope and purpose of SSR stretches far beyond 
military reform or democratic control of the armed forces is largely lacking. 
This must be addressed at both policy-making level, for example by includ-
ing discussions in NATO or EU Action Plans (where appropriate), and at the 
analytical level, by incorporating private security into future studies of secu-
rity sector governance. 
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A related point is that most CIS governments lack both the capacity 
and the political will to prioritise private security governance, but interna-
tional pressure could help to push this issue up the agenda: even states that 
have no interest in EU or NATO membership are sensitive to accusations 
that they are failing international or European standards. Thus although the 
‘Western model’ of the privatisation process may not be relevant to the CIS 
context, ‘Western’ standards of regulation and democratic control of the 
industry could play a major role in improving governance – if such standards 
and best practice were clearly codified and it was therefore possible to en-
courage CIS states to adhere to them. Without this external impetus, govern-
ance of private security industries in CIS states is likely to improve even 
more slowly than overall security sector governance, unless major internal 
changes dictate otherwise. 
Conclusion 
This paper does not claim to be comprehensive, but merely to present a 
broad overview of some of the relevant issues and open them up for discus-
sion. This cursory analysis suggests that the situation in Ukraine requires 
further study. From a practical and policy point of view, major questions 
remain unanswered about whether the current situation is appropriate to en-
sure democratic governance of the sector; from a theoretical perspective, 
studying the development and set-up of the ‘commercialised’ security sector 
in more detail may offer insights into wider questions about the privatisation 
and commercialisation of security since the late 1980s. Comparative analysis 
looking at why different countries in the CIS have developed in different 
directions may also contribute something to the academic debate. 
In order to do this, and to provide reliable baseline information to pol-
icy-makers and academics, there is a need for comprehensive national sur-
veys using appropriate methodology.41 Currently, very little academic or 
policy research is available with which to make truly informed judgements 
about the state of the private and commercialised security industries in the 
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Chapter 8 




There has been no systematic attempt to date to collect data on and analyse 
security privatisation in the Middle East. Furthermore, the types of private 
actors in the region, ranging from ethnic- or religion-based militias to guer-
rilla groups to corporate security firms are so different as to defy coverage in 
a single paper. This paper will therefore focus on private military companies 
and private security companies in the Middle East, focusing in particular on 
the case of Iraq. 
Private military and security firms, that for the sake of convenience 
only are here referred to broadly as private military companies (PMCs), are 
extremely difficult to generalise about. As an industry, or at least, business 
sector, PMCs have been around for less than 20 years. And while they have 
attracted growing attention from analysts, scholars, governments and the 
general public in the past decade, there is still no agreement on how to de-
fine, let alone categorise them. Furthermore, the privatisation of security, at 
least in the sense the term has come to mean in the West – the outsourcing of 
former inherently governmental functions to the private sector, particularly 
those associated with regular military forces – is not something that has 
taken root in the region. With the exception of various guerrilla groups in 
Lebanon or Palestine most states still zealously guard their monopoly on the 
legitimate instruments of violence. Consequently, they have not privatised 
combat support or combat service support functions in the same way as the 
United States or Britain.  
Current legal frameworks are hostile to foreign PMCs working in the 
region. It is a misconception that PMCs have open entry into the Middle 
East. By and large, countries in the Middle East do not want Western for-
eigners carrying weapons and even if a PMC could land a contract it is most 
likely that it would be forced out once the required knowledge had been 
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imparted. For example, in Saudi Arabia in July 2005 the Council of Minis-
ters passed a new law that bans employment of non-Saudis as security 
guards at private companies and organisations. Saudis must replace non-
Saudis within 90 days after the law comes into effect.1 The only other coun-
tries where PMCs are operating, albeit not directly for national stakeholders, 
include Kuwait and Jordan. But both are related to Iraq insofar as they are 
being used as part of the supply lines for forces operating in Iraq. In addi-
tion, facilities in Jordan are used to train Iraqi forces by such PMCs as Mili-
tary Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI) and DynCorp Interna-
tional. 
Generally in the Middle East, if security is defined in the Weberian 
sense of who has a monopoly on the instruments of violence, and assuming 
there has been no lapse into civil war – as was the case with Lebanon in the 
1970s and 1980s – that role is still generally held by the state. Nevertheless, 
some societies are tribal in nature, and while various ethnic or ideological 
groups can amass considerable security and military forces on their own 
(Hezbollah in Lebanon), these may uneasily co-exist with government forces 
or may be entirely independent of the government (both the Kurds in north-
ern Iraq and the group SICIRI, representing the Shiites, while Saddam Hus-
sein was still in power). More recently, the rise to political power through 
elections in the Palestinian Authority of the armed group Hamas will un-
doubtedly have a significant impact on the provisioning of security, although 
it is too soon to say what it will ultimately be. 
Yet, given the recent announcement at an international conference in 
Amman, Jordan, by Cofer Black, vice-chairman of Blackwater USA, a major 
US PMC, that Blackwater stands ready to help keep or restore the peace 
anywhere it is needed, it is not difficult to envision PMCs bidding for con-
tracts in the region in the future.2 In fact, PMCs have in recent years com-
peted for contracts in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait but have usually ended up on 
the losing side, due to fairly restrictive laws against foreign-owned compa-
nies. 
Much of the public image of PMCs is based on perceptions that are 
woefully out of date, such as the activities of now defunct groups like Ex-
ecutive Outcomes and Sandline.3 Specifically, many people still think that 
companies undertake direct offensive combat operations such as Executive 
Outcomes did in Angola and Sierra Leone, which is simply not the case. Or 
that the various PMCs operating in Iraq constitute a cohesive army, second 
only in size to the American forces there. 
In fact, the private security sector in Iraq is very diverse. Yes, there 
are thousands of Westerners carrying arms but there are also more host na-
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tionals – Iraqis – and third-country nationals, who are doing the same. Some 
are more low-key than others when it comes to the use of force but, in gen-
eral, these PMC personnel are more disciplined and experienced than their 
active duty counterparts. And their functions, as detailed below, vary, de-
pending on the terms of their contract. While the common theme for a secu-
rity contractor is providing security and protection it can take many different 
forms, ranging from static security for buildings and infrastructure to secu-
rity details for officials and reconstruction workers.  
The role and impact of private actors in both providing security and 
reform of the security sector varies significantly according to the context. 
Obviously in the case of Iraq the provision of personal security, primarily for 
people doing reconstruction work, but also for infrastructure, has been the 
top priority, especially given the dangers caused by the insurgency. But as 
time goes by and the new Iraqi government seeks to establish, consolidate, 
and expand its powers, personal protection will assume less of a role, as Iraqi 
military and paramilitary forces assume security functions and as the recon-
struction effort draws to a close. Then the emphasis will be on training and 
professionalisation of those forces, something the United States did not be-
come serious about until 2005. While the US military has taken back some 
of the responsibility for training Iraqi military forces that it originally out-
sourced out of dissatisfaction with the way it was being done, other PMCs – 
notably DynCorp, which has the contract for training Iraqi police – will con-
tinue to play a prominent role in reforming that aspect of the Iraqi security 
sector. 
This paper will briefly examine the role of PMCs in security provision 
and security sector reform in the Middle East. It then assesses their impor-
tance and influence in Iraq, describes their impact on the country and tries to 
discern whether their role has any wider regional impact. Areas for further 
research and policy lessons that should be learned from activities to date are 
proposed. 
Private Actors, Security Provision and the Reform of the Security Sec-
tor in Iraq 
Iraq has raised the level of international attention on the role of PMCs to 
new heights.4 Reliance on PMCs increased greatly after the initial major 
combat operations phase. This was mainly due to two factors. First, the US 
political leadership grossly underestimated the number of troops that would 
be required for stability and security operations. As a result, companies such 
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as Halliburton were needed just to meet the military logistics requirements of 
sustaining US and other coalition forces. 
Second, as part of the US plan to bring democracy to the Middle East, 
Iraq was to be remade into a new country. This required a massive recon-
struction project to overcome the effects of over two decades of war, against 
Iran and subsequently the United States, as well as the consequences of the 
sanctions regime. But the US administration did not anticipate the emer-
gence and growth of the insurgency. Since US forces were not available to 
protect those doing reconstruction work, such firms had no choice but to turn 
to private security contractors in order to protect their employees. Put an-
other way, while PMCs provide valuable services in Iraq, monumentally poor 
planning created the need for them; these are not exactly the sort of market 
conditions the industry can or should count on in the future. 
Initially, PMCs were involved in the retraining of Iraqi security forces 
but due to problems and the increasing challenges posed by the insurgency 
this task has been taken back by American military forces. Over time, there-
fore, PMCs have provided three main categories of services in Iraq:  
 
• personal security details for senior civilian officials;  
• non-military site security (buildings and infrastructure); and  
• non-military convoy security.  
 
Rather than working directly for the US government or the Coalition 
Provisional Authority (CPA), most PMCs are subcontracted to provide pro-
tection for prime contractor employees, or are hired by other entities such as 
Iraqi companies or private foreign companies seeking business opportunities 
in Iraq. This obviously makes PMC accountability difficult. A Congressional 
Research Service report from 2004 noted: 
 
Details of the CPA contracts and related subcontracts are not public in-
formation. This has led to questions concerning the cost-effectiveness of 
the contracts as well as of any obligations of the contractors under the 
contracts regarding the use of force. According to the CPA, ‘subcon-
tracted PSCs and their parent companies generally do not make available 
details concerning the prices of their contracts, salaries, or numbers of 
employees,’ because ‘such information is proprietary and may have pri-
vacy implications...’. Some analysts suspect that at least a few of the con-
tracts may detail ‘rules of engagement’ under which contracted personnel 
are permitted to use their weapons as a means of protecting the personnel 
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and other assets of the companies performing reconstruction work, as 
there currently is no legal framework governing the use of private weap-
ons in Iraq.5 
 
In fact, companies did and do provide significant detail to government 
contracting officers. However, the Bush administration has been particularly 
reluctant to share that information with Congress. Moreover, the CPA gave 
an enormous amount of personal data of PMC employees – such as names, 
addresses, and contact information – to the Iraqi government, which, argua-
bly, was a violation of the 1974 Privacy Act.6 CPA Memorandum 17 re-
quired companies to provide detailed information as a condition of receiving 
a licence to operate. 
The lack of security in post-war Iraq created an enormous demand for 
PMC services. At least 10 to 15 cents of every dollar spent on reconstruction 
is for security, according to the Inspector-General for the CPA.7 More recent 
reports indicate the cost of security is much higher, approaching 50 percent.8 
Certainly, PMCs have not lacked for business. In February 2006 the 
British government disclosed it had spent more than £100 million on private 
security companies in Iraq since the 2003 invasion. Some PMCs have done 
very well financially.9 A joint investigation by Corporate Watch, an inde-
pendent watchdog, and The Independent newspaper found that British busi-
nesses had profited by at least £1.1 billion since coalition forces toppled 
Saddam Hussein. In early February the British press reported that Aegis 
Defence Services had seen turnover rise more than 100-fold in three years 
thanks to its security contracts in Iraq. According to its Chief Executive Of-
ficer, Tim Spicer, turnover in 2005 was £62 million, of which three-quarters 
came from work in Iraq. In 2003, the firm’s first full year of operation, turn-
over was £554,000.10  
Given that US military forces are reluctant to take on any new mis-
sions while trying both to turn responsibilities over to Iraqi military and se-
curity forces and reduce their own presence, it is likely that any additional 
attempts to proceed with reconstruction will provide PMCs additional busi-
ness opportunities.11 Some believe that Iraqis prefer foreigners for critical 
security tasks, as international staff are harder to bribe or threaten (via vul-
nerable family members).12 However, using foreigners risks strengthening 
distrust of Iraqi government institutions such as the police and security ser-
vices. And ultimately, only a capable, autonomous government can provide 
the fundamental security that is so desperately needed in Iraq. 
From a PMC perspective most activities have been of a tactical, not a 
strategic nature. That is, their day-to-day activities are not serving to trans-
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form the overall political, military and social environments in which they 
operate. The one possible exception in Iraq where PMCs could help effect a 
strategic change would be in the training programmes for Iraqi military and 
security forces. The creation of competent, professional, and trusted forces 
will be essential for the formation of a central government that is in turn 
necessary if there is to be a future state of Iraq. 
In that regard, DynCorp International was prominent for its hiring of 
former US police officers to train police recruits in Iraq.
 
Training was also 
conducted by Vinnell Corp. or one of its subcontractors.13 Unfortunately, 
there is at least some reason to doubt how effective PMCs have been.14 For 
example, Vinnell, owned by Northrop-Grumman, is technically in charge of 
training the new Iraqi Army, having long done the same in Saudi Arabia. 
Vinnell won a one-year contract to train nine battalions of 1,000 men each 
for the new Iraqi army, with an option to train all 27 battalions if it per-
formed well. But Vinnell was viewed as having performed badly and had 
subcontracted some of that work to other American PMCs. The CPA conse-
quently decided to use the Jordanian military to train Iraqi officers and other 
PMCs to train Iraqi non-commissioned officers (NCOs).  
For several reasons the number of police officers and soldiers trained 
was far below expectations. Some problems were beyond the contractors' 
control. For one thing, the US administration in Baghdad balked at paying 
the recruits more than about $70 a month, a minimum wage even in Iraq. It 
has been argued that Vinnell erred in that it based its techniques on its 25-
year experience in training the Saudi Arabian National Guard – a relatively 
well-paid, well-educated fighting force that bore little resemblance to the 
unskilled recruits fresh off the streets of Baghdad. US military officials 
complained that the contractors had put too much emphasis on classroom 
studies of strategy and tactics and not enough on basic combat skills. An-
other problem centred around objections from Iraqi officials who asked why 
Iraq should pay US contractors to train police when France and Germany 
were reportedly offering such services for free. And they said it was a waste 
of money to hire contractors to build a training facility in Jordan when there 
were plenty of facilities in Iraq. A more important problem was that Iraq's 
security situation became so precarious that personnel in outlying areas were 
afraid to hazard a trip to Baghdad or Jordan for training. One year after the 
first training contracts were issued, the Iraqi army had only 6,700 troops and 
fewer than half of them had received training. The first real sign of trouble 
came in December 2003, when more than half of Vinnell’s first battalion 
deserted. Some of the remaining soldiers had not mastered such basic skills 
as marching in formation or responding correctly to radio calls.15 
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In Iraq, PMCs can be divided into two types: those with guns and 
those without. Simply put, the difference is between a security contractor 
and a logistics contractor. Inevitably, a security contractor has used weapons 
for a living – either law enforcement, more usually the military, or a combi-
nation of both. Some contractors employ non-Iraqi Westerners from the US, 
Britain and other Western countries; third country nationals from Chile, Ne-
pal, Fiji, South Africa, etc.); and Iraqi nationals. For example, Erinys, a Brit-
ish company, had hired over 14,000 Iraqis to guard the country’s petroleum 
infrastructure. 
There are also domestic PSCs. Some of these have made the news for 
operating in a heavy-handed manner and routinely disregarding Iraqi gov-
ernment forces, including soldiers. Government leaders who do not trust 
Iraqi government forces use them. 
Logistics contractors include employees of the big companies such as 
Halliburton and its Kellogg, Brown & Root subsidiary. These are the people 
driving supply trucks, setting up and staffing US military bases, running the 
mess halls, and laundry services, and doing all the usual logistics that a regu-
lar military force requires. While this is an immense operation, it has virtu-
ally nothing to do with security or security sector reform in Iraq. It is simply 
the most recent iteration of the military sub-contracting phenomenon. 
It is often said that such firms are more cost-effective and efficient 
than the public sector but the simple truth is that nobody knows for sure.16 
There is no empirical data to confirm such assertions and there has been 
enough evidence of cost overruns, inflated invoices, and fraud and abuse to 
be somewhat sceptical. Whether or not a PMC is cost-effective will depend 
heavily on how the contract between the client and PMC is structured and 
what incentives it contains.17 
PSCs have not been immune from the corruption more commonly 
linked with their PMC brethren.18 An auditing board sponsored by the 
United Nations recommended that the United States repay as much as $208 
million to the Iraqi government for contracting work in 2003 and 2004 as-
signed to Kellogg, Brown & Root, the Halliburton subsidiary. The work was 
paid for with Iraqi oil proceeds, but the board said it was either carried out at 
inflated prices or done poorly. 19 As of the December 28 meeting of the In-
ternational Advisory and Monitoring Board (IAMB) for Iraq there had been 
no recommendation to repay the money.20 However, the overall cost of the 
KBR work was subsequently reduced by $9 million.21 
The prosecution of Custer Battles is a case in point, pitting two whis-
tle-blowers against two former Army officers whose company, Custer Bat-
tles LLC, won multimillion-dollar contracts in the aftermath of the fall of 
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Saddam Hussein in 2003. The trial in February 2006 was notable for being 
the first civil fraud case against a US contractor accused of war profiteering 
in Iraq; specifically bilking the US government out of $50 million. The case 
generated extensive media coverage because of the seriousness of the fraud 
charges and because it became the first test of whether the federal False 
Claims Act applies to the conduct of contractors working in Iraq. Court fil-
ings in the Custer Battles case detailed how CPA officials in Baghdad were 
ill-equipped to write, much less oversee, the processing of millions of dollars 
in contracts. The federal jury found Custer Battles guilty and ordered it to 
pay more than $10 million in damages and fines. It found that Custer Battles 
committed fraud in 37 instances in connection with a $9 million contract to 
help distribute new currency in Iraq. It was found guilty of defrauding the 
CPA of millions of dollars. The company denied the charges and said it 
would appeal.22 
The Consequences of Iraq 
Iraq has become the poster child for the private military and security sector. 
Certainly, the role of such firms has inspired a torrent of popular and aca-
demic writing on the subject.23 Moreover, most people nowadays will at 
least recognise firms like Halliburton, Blackwater, DynCorp, ArmorGroup, 
Triple Canopy, et cetera, something that would not have been the case just 
three years ago. 
The impact of private military and security contractors in Iraq has 
been mixed.24 Their impact varies according to who is viewing their activi-
ties, i.e. US military, civilians doing reconstruction work, other US govern-
ment agencies, the Iraqi government, or Iraqi civilians. Since we still do not 
have a full accounting of the actions of all contractors operating in Iraq, it 
remains impossible to assess where the balance lies between positive and 
negative assessments. 
Overall, the PMC sector has transformed itself into a more mature in-
dustry with fewer firms employing many hundreds, if not thousands of con-
tractors around the world, and receiving multi-hundred million-, if not bil-
lion-, -dollar contracts. They are also increasingly well-connected politically, 
hiring former government officials to their staff or boards of directors to help 
bid for contracts. These developments are a sign of the emergence of the 
PMC sector as a significant industry, insofar as all industries seek to influ-
ence government for their own advantage. This evolution of the PMC indus-
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try is also a worrisome development, in that it puts these firms squarely in 
the midst of the favour-trading game in order to influence contract awards. 
Governance Challenges in Perspective 
With the advantage of hindsight it is clear that there has been friction be-
tween clients and contractors on numerous occasions in this field, notably 
over coordination. According to a US Government Accountability Office 
report: 
 
While the US military and private security providers have developed a 
cooperative working relationship, actions should be taken to improve its 
effectiveness. The relationship between the military and private security 
providers is one of coordination, not control. Prior to October 2004 coor-
dination was informal, based on personal contacts, and was inconsistent. 
In October 2004 a Reconstruction Operations Center was opened to share 
intelligence and coordinate military–contractor interactions. While mili-
tary and security providers agreed that coordination has improved, two 
problems remain. First, private security providers continue to report inci-
dents between themselves and the military when approaching military 
convoys and checkpoints. Second, military units deploying to Iraq are not 
fully aware of the parties operating on the complex battle space in Iraq 
and what responsibility they have to those parties.25 
 
Although there is no publicly available data, anecdotes and common 
sense suggest that the use of lethal force by regular military personnel, 
through accidents and errors, is far greater than that by PSC employees. US 
military rules of engagement favour ‘force protection’ over any obligation to 
protect innocent life.26 There are far more shootings of innocent civilians by 
soldiers manning checkpoints than all the known killings of civilians by PSC 
personnel. However, examples of controversial incidents involving private 
security staff include the following: 
 
• The Los Angeles Times reported in December 2005 that private secu-
rity contractors had been involved in scores of shootings in Iraq, but 
none had been prosecuted despite findings in at least one fatal case 
that the men had not followed proper procedures. Instead, security 
contractors suspected of reckless behaviour were sent home, some-
times with the knowledge of US officials, raising questions about ac-
countability and stirring fierce resentment among Iraqis. 
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• In March 2006, Kays Juma, an Australian resident and a professor at 
the University of Baghdad, was shot dead in Baghdad when private 
security guards mistakenly fired on his vehicle.27 
• An alleged ‘trophy’ video appeared to show security guards in Bagh-
dad randomly shooting Iraqi civilians. The video, which first appeared 
on a website that has been linked unofficially to Aegis Defence Ser-
vices, contained four separate clips in which security guards open fire 
with automatic rifles at civilian cars. While there has been much hue 
and cry over the shootings it is far from clear that the guards did any-
thing wrong. The results of an investigation by the US military, re-
leased 10 June 2006, determined that no one involved would be 
charged with a crime. 28 
 
There have also been problems between contractors and regular mili-
tary forces. For example, one major PMC in Iraq, Triple Canopy, has had 
several friendly-fire incidents in Iraq where military personnel shot at 
them.29 One of the better-known complaints occurred in May 2005 when a 
group of armed American private security guards from Zapata Engineering 
were taken into custody on suspicion of shooting at a Marine guard tower. 
Although subsequently released, the contractors feel that they were unfairly 
arrested and, once in the military prisons, some say they were subjected to 
humiliating treatment and were abused. The marines say the contractors 
were treated professionally. Recently it was announced that the contractors 
had been cleared of all charges.30 
While there have been incidents involving friction between contrac-
tors and regular military in Iraq the overall trend has been downward. Con-
tractors clearly recognise that they are subordinate to regular military forces 
and when so directed must obey the orders of the commanders under whose 
jurisdiction they fall. To the extent there are still incidents it is likely a result 
of new troops being rotated into the theatre who are unfamiliar with working 
with contractors, along with some resentment, fuelled by often misleading 
reports in the media, of the higher salaries of contractor personnel. 
PMC Regulation 
Concerns over accountability and regulation of PMCs have long been a sta-
ple in academic discussion of the industry.31 However the widespread use of 
PMCs in Iraq brought increased publicity to and discussion of the issue.32 
One problem in regulating PMCs is their somewhat ambiguous legal status 
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in regard to existing international treaties relevant to conflict and war. There 
is a lack of clarity over the exact relationship between governments and 
PMCs. Such ambiguity leaves companies open to arbitrary treatment by 
combatants or other countries if they stray over borders.33 PMC personnel 
are combatants under the Geneva Conventions if they bear arms and are 
clearly working on behalf of one side in a conflict; yet they could also be 
treated as non-combatants if they do not wear recognisable uniforms or are 
not under military command. 
A significant development, though not well covered in the press, was 
the issuance by the Pentagon on October 3, 2005 of DoD Instruction 3020.41 
‘Contractor Personnel Authorized to Accompany the U.S. Armed Forces’, 
issued pursuant to a provision in the FY 2005 Defense Authorization Act. 
The 33-page document clarifies the legal status of civilians hired to support 
those forces in a contingency. The new instruction also explains when con-
tractors can carry weapons in areas where US troops operate – for example 
in Iraq, where armed contractors have been operating for more than two 
years without clear regulatory guidance. The regulation ties together nearly 
60 Pentagon directives and Joint Staff doctrinal statements that relate to the 
role of contractors on the battlefield. 
From the viewpoint of the PMC industry the new regulation is impor-
tant because it establishes criteria for civilian contractors to carry weapons, 
which are to be used only in self-defence. It also sets forth detailed proce-
dures for arming contingency contractor personnel for security services. 
However, the key question now is how it will be implemented. Reportedly, a 
number of Defence Federal Acquisition Regulations are being modified to 
reflect the guidance in the new instruction. But it may be too difficult to 
retroactively implement all of the rules and regulations spelled out in the 
policy to cover the contracts in effect in Iraq.  
Aside from international legal controls, private security firms are also 
accountable to the War Crimes Act of 1996, Victims of Trafficking and Vio-
lence Protection Act of 2000, Anti-Torture Statute, Defense Trade Controls 
Act, Arms Export Control Act, Gun Control Act, Export Administration 
Regulations, International Traffic in Arms Regulations, Defense Base Act, 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, and the General Orders of the Central Com-
mand, Multi-National Corps – Iraq and Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF). 
However, the problem has not been a lack of relevant laws, but of 
means. Regulations existed but were not implemented because the relevant 
administration existed mainly on paper. Public discussion on immunity 
granted to foreign contractors has overlooked the fact that, without being 
granted immunity from the jurisdiction of Iraqi courts, security contractors 
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simply were not going to work in Iraq due to the likelihood of arbitrary legal 
treatment of their employees. In addition, without immunity, insurers were 
threatening to increase their premiums significantly. Furthermore, because 
there is no status of forces agreement in place it has never been clear in what 
venue legal proceedings against a contractor might take place. Such uncer-
tainty was another reason for granting contractors immunity. 
The impact of all the above is ambiguous. Theoretically, even with the 
immunity granted by CPA Memorandum 17, contractors could still be 
prosecuted under various legal authorities, especially the Military Extraterri-
torial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA). But, until recently, federal prosecutors were 
not that interested in using the Act and local prosecutors in the states where 
PMCs are headquartered, and for whom MEJA holds greater relevance, 
normally do not have sufficient resources to use it. 
Despite these rules and regulations, it is unlikely that the activities of 
PMCs in Iraq, numerous as they are, offer many permanent lessons for the 
industry as a whole. From an industry perspective, nobody believes that they 
are going to see another Iraq. The United States could not intervene in an-
other country on the same scale as Operation Iraqi Freedom, even if it 
wanted to. The industry recognises that whatever contracts they get in the 
future are going to be in countries and situations that will be quite different 
from those in Iraq. 
There have been numerous problems with accountability of private 
contractors of all kinds in Iraq. Consider these excerpts from a study released 
in February 2006 by the Special Inspector-General for Iraq Reconstruction: 
 
• The US government also experienced shortcomings in accounting for 
personnel deployed to Iraq – especially civilians and contractors. 
There was, and still is, a lack of effective control procedures at many 
entry and exit points for Iraq, and there is no inter-agency personnel 
tracking system. Official and contract personnel often arrived and de-
parted with no systematic tracking of their whereabouts or activities, 
or in some cases, with no knowledge of their presence in country. 
Shortly before its dissolution in June 2004, CPA was still unable to 
account for 10 percent of its staff in Iraq.  
• Mechanisms to track contractors supporting CPA have been left 
largely to the contractors’ individual firms and have not been en-
forced.34 
 
The most important factor in the risk-management trade is choosing 
and training the right people. While PMCs generally subject employees to 
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vetting35 and have codes of conduct for their staff, there is no uniform check 
of these actors by government agencies. In the United States, contractors to 
the government are theoretically liable to prosecution but as yet this has 
never happened. Disciplining contractor personnel is seen as the contractor’s 
responsibility. 
The CPA set some initial minimum standards in Iraq for regulating 
PMCs and subsequently the Iraqi Ministries of the Interior and Trade 
adopted new mandatory guidelines to vet and register PMCs. However, 
while the Iraqi government is, in a de jure sense, in charge especially since 
the end of the CPA and handover of sovereignty back to the Iraqi govern-
ment, it is a sovereignty that is still largely theoretical, given the challenges 
posed by the insurgency and its lack of resources. Thus, from the viewpoint 
of the PMC sector, doing business with the relevant Iraqi ministries is ex-
tremely difficult.36 Currently, there is nobody in the Iraqi Interior Ministry 
who can issue a Weapons Authorisation Card. This means security contrac-
tors are using a variety of IDs, making their own, or using none at all. When 
there exists a variety of identification documents there is no credibility, un-
dermining the point of regulation. 
One question worth pondering is the potential for PMCs to create an 
insecure environment by training Iraqi forces without the guarantee that they 
will have sustainable employment in the future. Beyond the training of 
members of the Iraqi security forces, PMCs are training men and equipping 
them with a set of military skills. These men are often earning two to three 
times more than the average Iraqi. But what happens after Western forces 
and reconstruction workers leave and those Iraqis no longer have a job? Are 
we training the next insurgency force? While firms such as DynCorp include 
democratic policing and respect for rule of law in their training of Iraqi po-
lice, other firms probably train Iraqis for future subsidiaries they hope to 
establish. While Iraqi authorities may recognise such issues, it is unlikely 
they can do much about them. The truth for them, and for PMCs, is that 
knowledge is fungible. Once you teach a set of skills there is nothing you 
can do to prevent it from being used. 
Conclusion  
In conclusion, let us consider some specific questions. First, how effective 
has been the use of PMCs/PSCS instead of national staff to train Iraqi mili-
tary and police? With respect to the military the answer seems to be ‘not 
very’. Providing personal security for reconstruction work was a far bigger 
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task. Also, training was primarily a task that the US military and other coali-
tion forces reserved to themselves, even though, in the case of the United 
States, it initially did not spend much time and effort on it.37 Although the 
United States initially contracted with PMCs to do some training of Iraqi 
military forces they subsequently took back responsibility as the growth of 
the insurgency increased the importance of this task. 
PMCs have been more significant in regard to police training. In Feb-
ruary 2004, Dyncorp, then a unit of Computer Sciences Corporation, won a 
State Department contract for civilian police services worth about $1.7 bil-
lion over five years. That contract was one of three awarded under the State 
Department’s $6 billion Civilian Police Program. By most accounts Dyncorp 
contractors have performed competently, and many have been killed in the 
course of their work. What problems there have been with the programme 
are mainly due to the US government not providing funding on time. There 
is little evidence to date that use of PMCs for training Iraqi police and secu-
rity forces has had any adverse effects. While this author has not seen any of 
the training materials used by PMC personnel, press reports indicate that 
such key principles as the rule of law, the importance of human rights, and 
the subordination of the military and security forces to civilian leadership are 
taught.  
Second, a key principle of democratic security sector governance is 
that of local ownership as a pre-condition for sustainable reform and recon-
struction of the security sector. What can be said about the roles of 
PMC/PSCs in Iraq from the point of view of accountability and transparency 
and the consequent implications for nascent Iraqi governance institutions?  
This was probably the least successful aspect of PMC/PSC operations 
in Iraq. This is because most accountability and transparency issues were 
between the companies and the US government and not the Iraqi govern-
ment. After all, when PMC/PSCs first started operating in Iraq the Iraqi gov-
ernment was mostly theoretical. Companies were only being supervised by 
the CPA, which took fairly little interest in their activities. More importantly, 
US government agencies and regulators were far too often too few in num-
ber, inadequately trained, overburdened in terms of contracts to be moni-
tored, and kept on the job for too short a period to gain the experience they 
needed to adequately monitor contract performance. 
Finally, there are anecdotal reports that many Iraqis prefer the use of 
foreign PMC/PSC personnel as honest brokers, or at least as being less sus-
ceptible to corruption or pressure than fellow Iraqis. Given the viciousness 
and brutality of the ongoing insurgency, it is understandable that outsiders 
might seem more reliable. But this situation is unlikely to last. A prerequisite 
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for a stable security sector is public confidence in fellow citizens staffing 
positions in the security sector, i.e. those who carry out their professional 
duties as members of the police, military, border police and other paramili-
tary forces. 
Iraq has served to highlight and publicise the existence and role of 
private security actors in a way that would have been unimaginable if the 
war had not occurred. Tactical lessons to be learned include how to coordi-
nate with each other and regular military forces, standardising operational 
procedures, gathering and analysing intelligence, improving vetting proce-
dures for hiring personnel, and, at least for the United States, improving 
some of its laws to provide better oversight and accountability of PMCs. 
Some suggest that a strategic lesson to be learned from Iraq is the 
need to improve oversight and accountability of PMCs working in the field. 
However, while PMC and government performance in those areas can al-
ways be improved, their efforts in Iraq – undoubtedly the harshest environ-
ment PMCs have faced thus far – showed that we have plenty of means to 
ensure both oversight and accountability. The problem is not one of means, 
but of political will. After all, governments set the standards by which PMCs 
must abide. 
 Strategically, we have not learned any new strategic insights from the 
experience of PMCs in Iraq. While it may be new to the general public, all 
the relevant issues, including coordination with regular military forces, com-
pliance with domestic and international laws, preventing human rights 
abuses and corruption in the contracting process, had already been exten-
sively discussed previously and, if not solved, at least recognised as an issue 
meriting special effort and attention in the future. 
 Calls for increased regulation of the industry are met by industry re-
plies that while it is not against regulation there are already numerous laws 
and regulations on the books. But the truth is that many of those laws and 
regulations are either about setting standards or providing legal authority to 
prosecute someone if they break the law. What is really needed is a mecha-
nism that provides transparency and oversight while a PMC operation is 
ongoing, not after the fact. 
To the extent that PMCs will seek to work as part of future operations 
conducted by regular military forces it is necessary to know what has gone 
right and wrong. There are enough examples of friction between the two in 
Iraq to suggest that there are still problems of control and coordination, as 
evidenced by the number of friendly-fire incidents that need to be worked 
out. Thus, an exhaustive lessons-learned report needs to be compiled, based 
on access to records from all the PMCs operating in Iraq. In addition, access 
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to records from all government agencies that interacted with PMCs would 
also be needed. 
A final major policy lesson that Iraq offers is that while improved na-
tional legislation by the states that PMCs are headquartered in is necessary, it 
is insufficient since a PMC could always relocate to another state if it feels 
burdened by a state’s laws.38 Thus, considerably more work needs to be done 
on harmonising international legal standards relevant to PMC activities, 
either by revising existing law or by creating new ones, or by creating a 
common international standard for PMC registration and licensing. 
Notes
 
1  Abdul Ghafour, P.K., ‘Foreign Security Guards to Be Phased Out,’ Arab News, 12 July 
2005. 
2  Sizemore, S., ‘Blackwater USA Says It Can Supply Forces For Conflicts,’ Virginian-
Pilot, 30 March 2006. 
3  For detail on the past activities of Executive Outcomes, see the recently published book 
Venter, A.J., War Dog: Fighting Other People’s Wars, (Casemate, 2006). 
4  This section is taken from Isenberg, D., ‘A government in search of cover: PMC in Iraq,’ 
paper prepared for the conference ‘Market Forces: Regulating Private Military 
Companies,’ 23–24 March 2006, Institute for International Law and Justice, New York 
University School of Law. 
5  Elsea, J. and Serafino, N. M., ‘Private Security Contractors in Iraq: Background, Legal 
Status and Other Issues,’ Congressional Research Service, RL 32419, 28 May 2004, 
http://www.opencrs.com/rpts/RL32419_20040528.pdf. 
6  Author's telephone conversation on 11 July 2006 with a man who used to be in 
management for a major private security contractor that still operates in Iraq.  
7  Borenstein, S., ‘Insurance, security prove costly for contractors in Iraq,’ Knight 
Ridder/Tribune News Service, 1 April 2004. 
8  Scarborough, R., ‘Iraqi Construction Funds Go To Security,’ Washington Times, 9 
February 2006, 1. 
9  See Eagar, C., ‘A Game of Risk,’ The Evening Standard, London, 31 March 2006 and  
Guthrie, J., ‘Tim Spicer finds security in the world's war zones,’ Financial Times, 7 April 
2006, London Edition 1, 21. 
10  Boles, T., ‘Dog of War Builds £62m business on Iraq,’ Sunday Times, 5 February 2006.  
11  Graham, G. and Kessler, G., ‘Iraq Security For US Teams Uncertain: Use of 
Reconstruction Coordinators Has Been Approved,’ Washington Post, 3 March 2006, 11. 
See also Burton, F., ‘Iraq: Leaving the Green Zone,’ Stratfor, 6 April 2006, 
http://www.stratfor.com/products/premium/read_article.php?id=264424&selected=Stratfo
r+Weekly.  
12  ‘The Swiss Guard of Baghdad,’ Strategy Page, 3 March 2006, 
http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htinf/articles/20060303.aspx 
 
Challenges of Security Privatisation in Iraq 165 
 
 Military Professional Resources Inc., Science Applications International Corp., Eagle 
Group International Inc., Omega Training Group and Worldwide Language Resources 
Inc. 
14  Eunjung Cha, A., ‘Recruits Abandon Iraqi Army: Troubled Training Hurts Key 
Component of Bush Security Plan,’ Washington Post, 13 December 2003, A1. 
15  Isenberg, D., ‘A Fistful of Contractors: The Case for a Pragmatic Assessment of Private 
Military Companies in Iraq,’ British American Security Information Council, September 
2004, 37–38, http://basicint.org/pubs/Research/2004PMC.pdf. 
16  See Fredland, E.J., ‘Outsourcing Military Force: A Transactions Cost Perspective on the 
Role of Military Companies,’ Defence & Peace Economics, vol. 15, no. 3 (June 2004), 
205–219. 
17  See Adler, M., ‘Sometimes, Government Is The Answer,’ Los Angeles Times, 4 March 
2006. 
18  Roche Jr., W. F., ‘Documents Describe US Auditors' Battles With Halliburton,’ Los 
Angeles Times, 29 March 2006; Witte, G., ‘Documents Trace KBR Billing Problems,’ 
Washington Post, 29 March 2006, 7; and ‘Billions Wasted In Iraq?,’ CBS News, 12 February 
2006  http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/02/09/60minutes/main1302378.shtml. 
19  Glanz, J., ‘US Should Repay Millions to Iraq, a UN Audit Finds,’ New York Times, 5 
November 2005. 
20  IAMB Press Conference, United Nations, 28 December 2005, 
http://www.iamb.info/trans/tr122805.htm. The IAMB’s mandate was due to expire on 31 
December 2005 but was extended by the UN Security Council to the end of 2006. 
21  IAMB press release, 30 January 2006, http://www.iamb.info/pr/pr013006.htm. 
22  See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Custer_Battles; and Babcock, C. R., ‘Contractor Accused 
Of Profiteering,’ Washington Post, 16 February 2006, D2.  
23  See, for just a few examples, Geddes, J., Highway to Hell, (London: Century, 2006); 
Minow, M., ‘Outsourcing Power: How Privatizing Military Efforts Challenges 
Accountability, Professionalism, and Democracy,’ Boston Law College Review, 
(September 2005); Bina, M. W., ‘Private Military Contractor Liability and Accountability 
After Abu Ghraib,’ The John Marshall Law Review, (Summer 2005); Schmitt, M. N., 
‘War, International Law, and Sovereignty: Reevaluating the Rules of the Game in a New 
Century: Humanitarian Law and Direct participation in Hostilities by Private Contractors 
or Civilian Employees,’ Chicago Journal of International Law, (Winter 2005). 
24  For detail on this, see the author’s previous paper, ‘The Good, the Bad, and the Unknown: 
PMC in Iraq,’ http://basicint.org/pubs/2006PMC.htm. This paper was written and 
presented at the ‘Guns 'n gates: The role of private security actors in armed violence’ Cost 
Action 25 Working Group 3 roundtable, held in Bonn, Germany, 9–10 February 2006. 
25  GAO. ‘Rebuilding Iraq: Actions Needed to Improve use of Private Security Providers,’ 
US Government Accountability Office, GAO—05-737, July 2005, 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05737.pdf. 
26  Bacevich, A. J., ‘What's an Iraqi Life Worth?,’ Washington Post, 9 July 2006, B1. 
27  Butterly, N. and Riches, S., ‘Aussie dies in bungled Baghdad security mix-up,’ Hobart 
Mercury, 30 March 2006, 4. 
28  Finer, J., ‘Contractors Cleared In Videotaped Attacks: Army Fails to Find 'Probable 
Cause' In Machine-Gunning of Cars in Iraq,’ Washington Post, 11 June 2006, 18. 
29  Phinney, D., ‘Marines Jail Contractors in Iraq: Tension and Confusion Grow Amid the 




Contractors In Iraq,’ Los Angeles Times, 8 June 2005; ‘Marines 'beat US workers' in Iraq: 
Contractors say they were treated like insurgents,’ The Guardian, 9 June 2005, 15; Witte, 
G., ‘Contractors Deny They Shot At Marines, Allege Mistreatment,’ Washington Post, 10 
June 2005, 18; Sonner, S., ‘Nevadan says Marines abused him while jailed in Iraq 3 days,’ 
Associated Press, 10 June 2005; Behn, S., ‘Security guards sent back to US,’ Washington 
Times, 10 June 2005; Miller, T. C., ‘Contractors Say Marines Behaved Abusively,’ Los 
Angeles Times, 11 June 2005, 1; Blomfield, A., ‘Shootings May Lead To Security Guard 
Curb,’ London Daily Telegraph, 11 June 2005, 1; Regan, T., ‘US troops, security 
contractors increasingly at odds in Iraq,’ Christian Science Monitor, 13 June 2005; and 
‘Troops and Contractors Come into Conflict in Iraq,’ NPR Radio, Morning Edition 7:10 
AM, 13 June 2005. 
30  Confehr, C., ‘Blanchard cleared of wrongdoing,’ Shelbyville Times-Gazette, 28 March 
2006, http://www.t-g.com/story/1145493.html. 
31  See, for example, Jackson, P., ‘War Is Much Too Serious a Thing to be Left to Military 
Men: Private Military Companies, Combat and Regulation,’ Civil Wars, vol. 5, no. 4, 
(Winter 2002), 30–55. 
32  See Elsea, and Serafino, op. cit.; Some illustrative articles from law journals are Desai, D. 
R., ‘Have Your Cake and Eat It Too: A Proposal for a Layered Approach to Regulating 
Private Military Companies,’ University of San Francisco of Law Review, vol. 39, 
(Summer 2005) 825; Coleman, J. R., ‘Constraining Modern Mercenarism,’ Hastings Law 
Journal, vol. 55 (June 2004) 1493; Bina, M. W., ‘Private Military Contractor Liability 
and Accountability After Abu Ghraib,’ The John Marshall Law Review, vol. 38, (Summer 
2005) 1237; Minow, op. cit.; and Dickinson, L. A., ‘Government For Hire: Privatizing 
Foreign Affairs and The Problem of Accountability Under International Law,’ William & 
Mary Law Review, vol. 47, (October 2005) 135. 
33  For detail see, Maj. Milliard, T. S., ‘Overcoming Post-Colonial Myopia: A Call to 
Recognize and Regulate Private Military Companies,’ Military Law Review, vol. 176, 
(June 2003), 19–76; and Singer, P., ‘War, Profits, and the Vacuum of Law: Privatized 
Military Firms and International Law,’ Columbia Journal of International Law, vol. 42, 
no. 2 (Spring 2004) pp. 523–550, 
 http://www.brookings.edu/views/articles/fellows/singer20040122.pdf. 
34  ‘Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Human Capital Management,’ Special Inspector-General 
for Iraq Reconstruction, January 2006, http://www.sigir.mil. 
35  Glanz, J., ‘Modern Mercenaries on the Iraqi Frontier,’ New York Times, 4 April 2004. 
36  Schwartz, M., ‘A Government with No Military and No Territory: Iraq's Sovereignty 
Vacuum (Part 1),’ TomDispatch.com, 9 March 2006,  
 http://www.tomdispatch.com/index.mhtml?pid=66969. 
37  Cordesman, A., ‘Iraqi Force Development: A Current Status Report, July 2005 February 
2006,’ Center for Strategic and International Studies, 15 February 2006, 
http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/060215_iraqforceupdate.pdf. 
38  Detail on this will be in the future book based on the papers presented at the conference 
‘Market Forces: Regulating Private Military Companies,’ Institute for International Law 
and Justice, New York University School of Law, 23-24 March 2006. 
 
Chapter 9 
Implementing South Africa’s Regulation 
of Foreign Military Assistance Act 
Raenette Taljaard 
This Chapter seeks to analyse the South African state’s attempts to regulate 
the activities of private military and security companies through the imple-
mentation of the Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act (RFMA), 
enacted by the new democratically-elected South African government in 
1997. This country-specific case study is done against the broader backdrop 
of significant gaps and ambiguity concerning private security firms in public 
international law, and a clear failure of the field of civil-military relations to 
adequately grapple with and respond to the profound conceptual, legal, po-
litical, practical and moral dilemmas inherent in the emergence and increase 
of private security actors. The study also offers an interesting reference point 
in debates on the possible regulation of PSCs and/or PMCs, since the RFMA 
constitutes one of the most direct legislative attempts in the world, outside of 
the United States, to regulate the activities of private actors involved in the 
deployment and use of force. 
This case study comprises five core focus areas. First, it examines 
what has been said in some of the leading academic literature on the South 
African case. Second, it contextualises the challenges posed by the sheer 
scale of the South African PSC and PMC market. It examines the emergence 
of the industries in the broader context of the South African negotiated tran-
sition and the Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration and Rehabilita-
tion (DDRR) debates that informed that transition with a specific focus on 
the former apartheid state security forces. Third, a brief synopsis of the Act 
and its existing provisions is provided. Fourth, the implementation of the Act 
in a series of recent high-profile cases involving South African PSCs and 
PMCs is considered. The various legal challenges that were encountered in 
the attempted prosecution of these cases are examined, including the use of 
plea bargaining to secure convictions; the hurdle of evidence in securing 
clear-cut prosecutions; the different principles at stake in pursuing RFMA-
related prosecutions; and the question of effective sanctions imposed by the 
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courts thus far. Lastly, recent efforts by the South African government to 
close the gaps in the RFMA, as evidenced in the myriad of plea-bargains that 
have emerged and the tabling of the draft Prohibition of Mercenary Activi-
ties and Prohibition and Regulation of Certain Activities in an Area of 
Armed Conflict Bill1 is briefly discussed, highlighting some of the severe 
difficulties inherent in the new draft legislation. 
This study concludes by addressing the broader question posed to the 
international community as a whole – whether it is possible for the ‘state’ in 
its residual Westphalian and Weberian shape to continue to exert ‘control’ 
over an increasingly complex and diffuse security sector in an era of multi-
national PSCs and PMCs, and whether it is possible to re-establish some 
form of democratic control in view of the reality of private sector presence in 
the security sector globally and locally. There can be no doubt that this de-
bate has to take place with clear normative parameters and not only with a 
positivist analysis of the status quo. It is equally clear that such a debate can 
only lead to progress if states realise the limits to their self-interest in a 
world where PSCs and PMCs currently fall largely outside defined norms of 
international law bar a broad interpretation of the law of state responsibility. 
Regulation at the level of the law of state responsibility in the absence of 
new clear-cut norms on the role of PSCs and PMCs in international peace 
and security will remain an inadequate response to the challenges posed by 
these actors to conventional notions of civil–military relations and security 
governance. 
South Africa’s Regulatory System 
Avant highlights different trade-offs that states make in their choice and 
design of frameworks to regulate PSC and/or PMC activity and emphasises 
that in the United Kingdom, the United States and South Africa, the relevant 
policy-makers were well aware of the trade-offs they were making in select-
ing and designing their regulatory responses to the emergence of private 
companies as security sector players.2 
Whilst there are clear similarities between the US and South African 
cases in their decision to implement a licensing regime – albeit with very 
different levels of efficacy – differences in the design of the licensing sys-
tems and their practical operation have led to very different consequences in 
the two countries. South Africa has opted to favour the integrity of its for-
eign policy principles over the US approach that uses PSCs extensively in a 
way that could be termed ‘foreign policy by proxy’. This assessment has 
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largely been borne out by the lack of licensing requests received by the Na-
tional Conventional Arms Control Committee (NCACC) – the licensing 
authority for all arms exports including foreign military assistance – since 
the enactment of the RFMA and the wilful flouting of its requirements by 
key commercial security sector players. It is most obviously demonstrated by 
the large numbers of South African citizens working on contract for security 
firms in Iraq. Thus in contrast to the US approach, South Africa's efforts to 
sideline the market for force have not only led it to forego new policy tools, 
but have also reduced its ability to control the violent actions of its citizens 
abroad. 
The sheer magnitude of the numbers of South Africans working for 
PMCs in Iraq in violation of the Act has marked a particularly important 
turning point for policy in South Africa. The NCACC issued a clear state-
ment declaring Iraq a ‘conflict area’, triggering the application of the Act. In 
addition, and largely in response to the challenges emanating from Iraq, the 
draft bill on the Prohibition of Mercenary Activities and Prohibition and 
Regulation of Certain Activities in an Area of Armed Conflict has been ta-
bled in the South African Parliament. These events are of particular impor-
tance and will alter the regulatory landscape in South Africa with reference 
to PSCs and/or PMCs. 
The most important analytical questions, however, are whether the 
new regulatory system that is to be created will continue to de-legitimise 
PMCs and PSCs as is inherent in the RFMA’s legislative foundation, and 
what the respective benefits and costs of such a new regulatory framework 
will be. Whilst some analysts felt that the correct trade-offs were made in 
respect of the RFMA, evidence of its implementation may suggest other-
wise. One argument suggests that the South African government lost an op-
portunity to co-opt the PSCs and allow them to legitimise their operations, as 
opposed to the strategy that was adopted which has resulted in more covert 
actions on the part of firms engaged in unregulated activities outside of 
South African borders.3 In addition, it remains to be seen whether the current 
draft bill will make the correct trade-offs in maintaining the integrity of 
South African foreign policy while dealing adequately with the challenge 
posed to security sector governance by the emergence of the private sector as 
a key player. 
In analysing the reasons for the regulatory strategy of de-legitimising 
PSCs opted for by the new South African government in the early 1990s, a 
few influencing factors should be borne in mind. The South African PSCs of 
the early 1990s were generally staffed with apartheid-era personnel, result-
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ing in a particularly hostile relationship with the new government. Further-
more, the new government was concerned with establishing effective control 
over a state security sector that it still regarded with mistrust, and in aiming 
to reconstruct the new ‘state’, did not wish to see security as the first state 
function in private hands. The new government wished to ‘leash the dogs of 
war’ as part of a new ethical foreign policy and human security doctrine, and 
in order to establish effective control over the new South African state’s 
foreign policy agenda. In practical terms, the state was not going to be a 
client for PSC services on a large scale given the political transition dynam-
ics involved. PSCs therefore started looking to the private sector and foreign 
markets for potential clients. In this regard the PSC sector that subsequently 
emerged within South Africa itself – servicing primarily the private sector 
and individuals – has become very sizeable and significant, whilst countless 
foreign ‘opportunities’ have arisen for PSCs and PMCs, notably in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. 
In comparing the US and South African licensing regimes, Ortiz iden-
tifies a crucial similarity in the two-step process the Act establishes.4 First, it 
requires any person wishing to offer foreign military assistance to approach 
the NCACC for authorisation and, second, it requires subsequent scrutiny 
and approval of every agreement reached after initial authorisation has been 
granted. The regulation issued pursuant to the RFMA enactment specified 
the procedures to be followed to comply with the requirements of the Act. 
Ortiz emphasises the fact that the South African government’s efforts at 
regulation occurred in part in response to international pressure over the 
activities of key firms such as Executive Outcomes, but also emanated from 
the concern of the South African government about the activities of its citi-
zens in African conflicts. This concern sets it apart from the focus of the US 
regulatory system. 
Holmqvist effectively captures the two-fold purpose of the Act: to 
ban mercenary activity outright and, secondly, to regulate the provision of 
military services abroad, and argues cogently that the South African gov-
ernment’s frustration with the implementation of the Act will see it poten-
tially banning exports of private security services to war zones.5 This is 
clearly the direction inherent in the draft Prohibition of Mercenary Activities 
and Prohibition and Regulation of Certain Activities in an Area of Armed 
Conflict Bill, and is a direct response to the death of South African citizens 
on contract to US PSCs in Iraq and an attempt to enforce not only the 
NCACC statement with reference to Iraq, but to ensure no South African 
security worker ever conducts security work in contexts where the line be-
tween security contract work and combat situations could blur.  
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Singer identifies three key problematic areas of this regulatory frame-
work.6 First, the provisions effectively result in official sanctioning by re-
quiring the government to approve each contract. Second, the wide remit of 
the definition of foreign military and security services is identified as a key 
weakness of the legislative framework, rendering it nearly irrelevant. Third, 
the contract sanctioning power vests in the NCACC (an executive organ of 
government responsible broadly to the Ministers of Defence and Foreign 
Affairs) thereby granting the executive branch of government considerable 
discretionary powers and effectively subverting parliamentary oversight. 
Apart from the specific flaws Singer highlights, he draws attention to the far 
more serious problem that afflicts all national-level regulation – the ease 
with which it can be subverted by moving the base of operations of the PMC 
or PSC to other jurisdictions. An important first step in strengthening the 
South African national regulatory framework would be to amend the RFMA 
to focus the definition of its scope (when it is triggered) on the nature of the 
assistance offered (i.e. whether the service is military in content or not) 
rather than focusing on the destination of the service (i.e. whether or not it 
constitutes a conflict zone). It is interesting to note that the draft Prohibition 
of Mercenary Activities and Prohibition and Regulation of Certain Activities 
in an Area of Armed Conflict Bill does the exact opposite  – it strengthens 
the emphasis on whether an area is a conflict area to be designated as such 
by the executive branch of government, whilst it increases the scope of the 
definition of services to be near all-encompassing along the lines outlined by 
Holmqvist – the delegitimisation of/ban on the export of security services. 
Confronting the Past in the Present: DDRR and South Africa’s 
transition 
The South African democratic transition was marked by a clear and distinct 
phase of military downsizing that coincided with the end of the Cold War. 
Despite a largely effective DDRR (Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegra-
tion and Rehabilitation) effort, it soon became clear that, on the one hand, 
former military personnel who had taken voluntary severance packages 
wished to supplement their income in the private sector and, on the other 
hand, that some DDRR efforts, specifically the efforts to deal with the noto-
rious former 32 Battalion (a specialised unit of the former SADF) would 
remain largely unresolved following the Unit’s disbandment in 1992.7 These 
former combatants subsequently became key members of PMCs and the 
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desolate mining town (Pomfret) where former 32 Battalion members were 
left with their families became a key recruiting ground for PSCs and PMCs.   
There can be little doubt that aspects of the transitional DDRR efforts 
in South Africa continue to play out today in the efforts of the South African 
government to curtail mercenary and PMC/PSC activity regionally and glob-
ally. It seems as if there is a constant uphill struggle for the current ANC 
government to ensure that all South African citizens do not actively under-
mine the foreign policy goals of the South African state. Indeed many of the 
South African citizens currently in Iraq have former South African Defence 
Force (SADF) links whilst many of the alleged mercenaries recruited for the 
Equatorial Guinea/Zimbabwe mission, discussed below, were former 32 
Battalion members from Pomfret. After the wrangling around the alleged 
mercenaries in Zimbabwe and Equatorial Guinea, the South African gov-
ernment has taken certain steps to attempt to disperse the residents of Pom-
fret, invoking the nearby asbestos mine as a key reason for the purported 
move.  
The actions by the South African government were a direct response 
to the world’s first primarily military service provider firm – Executive Out-
comes (EO). EO was as close an example as possible of a modern era private 
army with a client base that included private mining companies as well as 
the governments of Sierra Leone, Rwanda, Angola and the Central African 
Republic.8 
After the RFMA was enacted and EO was formally disbanded (despite 
receiving a license in 1998) South African PSCs became smaller and more 
specialised with very few offering actual combat services and most offering 
non-combat services due to the clear mercenary ban in the new RFMA. 
However, many new firms can merely be regarded as sophisticated EO off-
shoots involving ex-employees of the former state security sector apparatus 
in new private sector incarnations. 
The Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act – Key Features 
South Africa’s new Constitution clearly crafted the backdrop to the adoption 
of the RFMA. Section 198(b) of the Constitution states: 
The resolve to live in peace and harmony precludes any South African 
citizen from participating in an armed conflict, nationally or internation-
ally, except as provided for in terms of the Constitution or national legis-
lation. 
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The enactment of the RFMA gave clear content to the Constitutional 
commitment. In essence, the Act addresses mercenarism, PMC/PSCs and 
aspects of conventional arms control. Whilst it bans mercenary activity out-
right, defined as ‘direct participation in armed conflict for private gain’, the 
RFMA regulates rather than bans the provision of foreign military assis-
tance. The Act stipulates that no person within South Africa or elsewhere 
may recruit, use or train persons for, or finance or engage in mercenary ac-
tivity. 
The Act contains a licensing mechanism which is presided over by the 
NCACC. Decisions of the NCACC are subject to the Promotion of Adminis-
trative Justice Act and based on principles of international law including 
human rights law. The application of the Act is triggered by the existence of 
an armed conflict – a factor many analysts believe is its Achilles heel – and 
requires that the recipient of the assistance must be a party to such conflict.  
Whilst it may be the most direct effort to regulate PSC and PMC ac-
tivity thus far, it has been fraught with many difficulties. Avant identifies at 
least three potential fault-lines in the RFMA that have resulted in difficult 
enforcement.9 First, the definitions contained in the Act are both too vague 
and cast too broad a definitional net trying to regulate activities that cannot 
be regarded as ‘military’, resulting in considerable regulatory uncertainty 
and arbitrariness. Second, the legislation excludes ‘humanitarian or civilian 
activities aimed at relieving the plight of civilians in an area of armed con-
flict’. This is the ‘loophole’ some PSCs utilise to claim that their activities in 
Iraq are completely legal despite a NCACC statement to the contrary issued 
in January 2004. Third, there is a level of distrust in the PSC community as 
to the fair execution of the Act that hampers its effectiveness and, arguably, 
creates disincentives to applying for a licence. 
Whatever the shortcomings of the legislation, it has certainly served to 
highlight the conceptual and practical difficulties inherent in aiming to regu-
late the emergence of the private sector as a player in this field. In addition, 
the new draft legislation before the South African Parliament has aimed to 
go much further than plugging any ‘loopholes’ in the RFMA and is grap-
pling with the thin line between PSC activity in conflict zones and ‘tip-of-
the-spear’-style PMC activity, if not modern-day mercenarism. Whether this 
will be a workable proposition will only be judged once the legislature con-
cludes its ongoing deliberations on the draft law. 
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Contemporary Challenges to Regulation:  the Ivory Coast, Equatorial 
Guinea/Zimbabwe, Iraq and DRC  
In recent months the South African government has come under increasing 
pressure to demonstrate the efficacy of the RFMA through some key prose-
cutions. Events in the Ivory Coast, Equatorial Guinea/Zimbabwe and the 
involvement of between 5,000 and 10,000 South Africans in Iraq has added 
to the pressure to demonstrate the effective functioning of the Act as a deter-
rent, against mounting evidence to the contrary.  
Public statements by the president, the various government ministers 
and the Chair of the NCACC have publicly sought to reinforce the clear 
message that transgressions of the provisions of the Act are regarded in a 
very serious light and will be prosecuted. The reality that has emerged has 
been slightly different. Most prosecutions have occurred via plea bargains 
thereby not subjecting the law in its current form to a specific robust test by 
the Courts – despite some cases proceeding to the South African Constitu-
tional Court. Core questions about the efficacy of the Act can legitimately be 
asked when the NCACC receives a paltry amount of licensing or authorisa-
tion applications whilst more and more South African PMCs, and PSCs 
emerge and increasing numbers of South Africans start working on contract 
for US or other private military and security companies around the world. 
One of the biggest areas of controversy engendered by the new draft 
legislation has been the unprecedented extraterritorial jurisdiction it aims to 
accord the South African authorities – a matter deeply troubling to many 
international agencies that have made submissions on the drafts. 
The South African government has reiterated the fact that Iraq is re-
garded as a conflict zone, thereby triggering the application of the RFMA 
and therefore requiring PSCs and/or PMCs to obtain specific authorisation to 
commence any contract work in Iraq. Between 2003 and 2004 the NCACC 
only received two applications for authorisation, which it subsequently 
turned down. The NCACC referred two cases to the National Prosecuting 
Authority (NPA) but the NPA highlighted severe evidence problems in ob-
taining clear-cut prosecutions and convictions. 
The three recent cases that have led to prosecutions, or where prosecu-
tions are in process – Ivory Coast, Equatorial Guinea/Zimbabwe and Iraq – 
deserve more detailed analysis as they all highlight the challenges faced in 
implementing the RFMA. These challenges range from evidential burdens 
(including intelligence-gathering in foreign locations), to the prospect of 
difficult prosecutions tied to evidential burdens and hence the prospect for 
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repeated plea bargain agreements, to minimal sentences that do not serve as 
effective deterrents. 
Ivory Coast 
The first man to be convicted in South Africa for contravening the RFMA 
was Francois Richard Rouget, a former French soldier. During the delibera-
tions of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Rouget was linked to the 
murder of Dulcie September, an ANC representative to France, in the mid-
1980s.10 Rouget, a naturalised South African citizen, tried to recruit merce-
naries in South Africa to fight in the Ivory Coast civil war and was convicted 
in late 2003 in the Pretoria regional court after pleading guilty to recruiting 
persons for military assistance to the Ivory Coast government in October 
2002. The assistance entailed logistical support and equipment, with the 
group contracted as training pilots or infantrymen. Rouget was fined 100,000 
Rand (approximately $14,000) for contravening the RFMA but later ap-
pealed his sentence and claimed the fine was too harsh. In 2005, two years 
after his conviction and sentencing, Pretoria High Court acting Judge Kobus 
van Rooyen reduced the fine to 75,000 Rand.11 
Though conceding the serious nature of mercenary activity, the judge 
stated that Rouget’s guilty plea and full disclosure of his involvement should 
count in his favour. The Court held that mercenary activity is an embarrass-
ment to the country and should be discouraged. Although the offence was a 
serious one, the court considered the fine imposed on the appellant too harsh. 
It set out the appropriate sentencing approach to be adopted by courts, and 
found that the trial court in this case had failed to follow the said guide-
lines.12 It does not appear that the reduced fine served as an effective deter-
rent to future prohibited activities, as Rouget was subsequently alleged to be 
active in Iraq.  
On 3 February 2004, South Africa’s elite Scorpions unit (a specialised 
investigative agency) arrested Carl Alberts, a decorated former defence force 
pilot, for alleged mercenary activities in the Ivory Coast.13 Mr Alberts took 
part in Operation Askari in Namibia and Angola and was decorated for his 
leading two Alouette gunships in an attack on Cuvelai during South Africa’s 
border wars.14 Alberts was sentenced to two years in jail or a 20,000 Rand 
($3,000) fine in the Swellendam Magistrate’s Court.15 The sentence was 
suspended and Alberts was released after paying 10,000 Rand. The guilty 
plea and fine formed part of a plea bargain agreement between Alberts and 
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the NPA.16 In addition Alberts had to surrender 20,000 Rand to the South 
African Asset Forfeiture Unit as part of the proceeds of criminal activity. 
The Makings of a ‘Coup’: Equatorial Guinea, Zimbabwe and the Alleged 
Mercenaries  
The alleged Equatorial Guinea coup attempt started unfolding in March 2004 
in the midst of South Africa’s third democratic election campaign. In subse-
quent months this made the rounds through different chambers of South 
Africa’s legal machinery and ended up in the Constitutional Court, setting 
numerous precedents in South African constitutional law though still not 
fully testing the strength of the RFMA. 
The South African government appears to have taken a keen interest 
in the unfolding events for at least two clear reasons. First, they posed a 
challenge to the country’s efforts to ban mercenary activity outright in the 
RFMA in pursuance of its growing peacekeeping obligations on the African 
continent. Second, the involvement of many former 32 Battalion members 
was of additional concern in a context where these veterans had never satis-
factorily been enmeshed in the overall DDRR efforts of the transition.  
On 7 March 2004 about 70 people mainly of South African national-
ity, although including a British Old Etonian and former SAS officer Simon 
Mann, were arrested at Harare International Airport where they had alleg-
edly stopped to collect weapons.17 The Zimbabwe authorities alleged that 
they were ‘mercenaries’ en route to overthrow the government of Equatorial 
Guinea with the assistance of the British, Spanish and US secret services. 
Those arrested denied the charge and claimed they were on their way 
to the DRC where they had been contracted to guard a mine, and that they 
stopped at Harare airport to collect weapons which had been legally pur-
chased for that purpose. They were tried in Harare in July 2004, charged 
with breaching the country’s firearms and security legislation, as well as 
immigration and aviation laws. Two men were acquitted while 67 were con-
victed of immigration offences. In addition, the two pilots were also con-
victed of aviation offences. They were all sentenced to prison terms ranging 
from 12 to 18 months. Simon Mann was convicted of trying to purchase 
weapons and sentenced to seven years in prison. However, on appeal their 
sentences were reduced by four months in March 2005. Mann’s sentence 
was cut to four years’ imprisonment whilst the Boeing used in the operation 
was confiscated by the Zimbabwean government. 
During the course of the proceedings in Zimbabwe, the spectre of a 
possible rapid extradition to Equatorial Guinea loomed large. Given the pos-
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sibility that a court in Equatorial Guinea would avail itself of the death pen-
alty for the alleged offences the accused sought urgent relief from the South 
African Constitutional Court. In order for an extradition to be valid, in re-
spect of requirements of dual criminality, there were two hurdles: first, the 
accused would have to admit to contravening South Africa’s RFMA; and 
second, Zimbabwean law lacked similar legislation and therefore similar 
offences. 
Of specific interest from an RFMA perspective is the specific matter 
of the plaintiffs’ request for the court to compel the South African govern-
ment to seek their extradition. The men had already admitted in their court 
papers to offences that could potentially trigger prosecution under the 
RFMA. The NPA did indeed open an investigation into the possibility of 
charging the applicants under the RFMA. However, as the Constitutional 
Court pointed out, a request for extradition would require a clear prima facie 
case containing basic evidence – evidence that was not clearly in the hands 
of the NPA despite the investigative docket being open.18 
Makhosini Nkosi, the NPA spokesperson in South Africa, is on record 
as stating that most of the men to be charged under the RFMA probably had 
little to do with the planning of the alleged botched coup and were mere foot 
soldiers. Nkosi stated clearly that the Scorpions were really interested in the 
people who had planned and organised the alleged coup, including Simon 
Mann, but that there were clear jurisdictional barriers in pursuing such 
prosecutions. This is clearly problematic if the offences of which they are 
suspected under the provisions of the Act are not regarded as crimes in the 
countries in which they reside. In the case of the UK in particular, where 
there is no RFMA equivalent, the sharing of this information beyond the 
channels of normal diplomacy may not have much effect. In addition, and in 
the same interview, Nkosi is quoted as stating that the alleged mercenaries 
who would be charged next in connection with the alleged botched coup 
attempt would also be allowed a plea bargain provided they met the re-
quirements. Yet another prosecution based on a plea bargain under the 
RFMA. 
Of these 67 men at least 20 were former 32 Battalion members, and 
two of the men, Louwrens Horn and Hermanus Carelse were involved in 
another PSC that had lucrative contracts in Iraq – also in clear contravention 
of the RFMA. After returning to South Africa, having served their sentences 
in Zimbabwe, some of the men were charged with violating the South Afri-
can RFMA. On 16 January 2006, the trial of nine men accused of involve-
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ment in a planned coup d’état in Equatorial Guinea was postponed until July 
2006 in the Pretoria Regional Court.  
It is important to note that thus far these prisoners have never been 
convicted of taking part in any coup plot. With the exception of Carelse and 
Horn, who were fined 75,000 Rand each subject to a plea bargain agreement 
which saw them co-operate with further investigations, there have thus far 
been no further convictions under the RFMA with respect to the former de-
tainees. Rather, these men were convicted for various transgressions of Zim-
babwean aviation, immigration and weapons acquisition laws. 
Equatorial Guinea – the 15 Black Beach Prisoners 
On 8 March 2004, 15 foreign nationals were arrested in Malabo and Bata,  
suspected of plotting a coup attempt. Eight of them were South Africans.  
Nick du Toit, the alleged ringleader and director of Triple Option Trading, 
was immediately arrested and taken to Black Beach prison. The subsequent 
detention and trial were condemned by Amnesty International as core human 
rights had been breached.19 Allegations were also made to Amnesty Interna-
tional by detainees who were acquitted that, despite not having jurisdiction 
in Equatorial Guinea, South African National Prosecuting Authority officials 
were taking statements to probe possible breaches of the RFMA. According 
to the acquitted detainees, both the NPA and the Zimbabwean Security 
forces were particularly interested in the military careers of the detainees and 
especially their experiences in 32 Battalion. 
The trial20 of 19 people charged with crimes against the Head of State 
and the form of government began on 23 August 2004 and concluded on 26 
November 2004 – a few hours after the appearance of Sir Mark Thatcher in 
South African courts on charges of breaching the RFMA, allegedly for the 
same mission. The prosecutor explicitly asked for the death penalty for Nick 
du Toit and Severo Moto Nsa and for sentences ranging from 26 to 102 
years for other defendants. In the end three Equatorial Guineans and three 
South Africans were acquitted – significantly the acquitted South Africans 
had not been members of 32 Battalion – and those found guilty received 
sentences ranging from 16 months to 65 years in prison. 
The Conviction of Sir Mark Thatcher 
By far the most prominent prosecution under the provisions of the RFMA in 
South Africa has been that of Sir Mark Thatcher – son of former British 
Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher – for his alleged involvement in the al-
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leged coup attempt in Equatorial Guinea. According to reports, Thatcher 
invested in a company run by Simon Mann called Logo Logistics, via a 
South African company, Triple A Aviation, which was operated as Air Am-
bulance Africa by Crause Steyl.21 
Steyl was approached by the NPA to turn state witness in return for 
immunity from prosecution under the RFMA. Thatcher was arrested on 25 
August 2004 and in a hearing on the same day bail was set at £167,000. At 
this point of the prosecution there was a clear stale-mate: in the one corner 
was Thatcher, desperate to avoid a prison sentence, while in the other South 
Africa’s NPA with a case that was far from watertight and a clear concern 
about the damage a high-profile failure to secure a conviction could inflict 
on the credibility of the RFMA. Thatcher subsequently admitted to a lesser 
charge, conceding that his actions may have recklessly but unwittingly con-
tributed to the financing of the coup plot, and received a four-year suspended 
sentence and a three million Rand ($415,000) fine in accordance with a plea 
bargain agreement. In addition Thatcher was requested to continue assisting 
the NPA in its ongoing probe and, after a subsequent unsuccessful appeal, 
was forced to answer questions from Equatorial Guinean prosecutors. 
South Africans were furious at Thatcher’s light sentence, believing it 
was a clear example of an undeserved plea bargain. Some commentators 
correctly argued that South Africa’s jurisprudence is the poorer for the 
Thatcher case not testing the mettle of the RFMA but merely resulting in the 
Court upholding a plea bargain agreement. This was yet another such plea 
bargain agreement under the RFMA following similar agreements between 
the State and Rouget and Alberts as well as the State and Horn and Carelse. 
South African Citizens and the War on Iraq – PSC and PMC Boom 
There can be no doubt that many South Africans – both former state security 
sector operatives and current members of the armed forces, South African 
Police Service (SAPS) elite Special Task Force and dog handlers – are cur-
rently working in Iraq illegally under the RFMA and various military and 
public service codes. 
Two companies, Meteoric Tactical Solutions and Grand Lake Trading 
46 (Pty) Ltd, submitted applications to work in Iraq under the RFMA provi-
sions whilst a third, Erinys, did not apply. Thus far, more than 20 South Af-
rican contractor employees have been killed in Iraq working for, amongst 
others Dyncorp, Blackwater and Erinys International. According to one risk 
analyst, there could be between 1,500 and 2,500 South Africans currently 
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working in Iraq with the possible ratio of South Africans in the PMC and 
PSC ranks in Iraq potentially being as high as one in eight, based on a 
PMC/PSC ‘force’ of 20,000 estimated to be in Iraq.22 
It took South Africa’s NCACC one year following the American inva-
sion to rule that Iraq was to be regarded as a conflict area and therefore ‘off 
limits’ unless operating licenses were granted. The granting of licensing for 
any activities – whether foreign military assistance or security work – in Iraq 
seemed relatively remote given the South African government’s staunch 
foreign policy opposition to the US-led intervention. Those who stepped into 
the profitable Iraqi occupation can credibly claim that there was some ambi-
guity due to the NCACC’s slow response in issuing a clear ban on activities 
in post-war insurgency-plagued Iraq. However, once the NCACC formally 
declared Iraq a conflict area for RFMA purposes, the legal position of PSC 
contract workers was in clear transgression of the RFMA, a position vocifer-
ously stated by the South African Minister of Defence Mosiuoa Lekota. 
It is clear that most companies in Iraq were acting in breach of the 
RFMA. Even though some companies were only involved in commercial 
security work, like protecting buildings and private individuals, these activi-
ties could be problematic in terms of the Act. A popular loophole that exists 
is for companies to register themselves as demining companies, a move 
which exempts many from the law as their efforts are seen as humanitarian. 
In the same vein, the broad discretion allowed for ‘humanitarian assistance’ 
opens up a very clear loophole in the law and may be the reason for the ban 
on support for humanitarian assistance in the new draft Bill. 
But it is not only former security operatives who are active in Iraq. 
Members of the police Special Task Force are resigning to pursue more lu-
crative security work in Iraq in close protection services, generating similar 
staff retention problems as are faced by the UK and US armed forces. 
Omega and the DRC  
In May 2006, 32 security service agents employed by a private firm regis-
tered in South Africa as the PSC Omega Risk Solutions were detained in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) as alleged mercenaries suspected of 
‘destabilising government institutions’ – a euphemism for a coup attempt. 
Of these 32 men, 19 were South African citizens, 16 were working for 
Omega Security Solutions on contract with the DRC’s National Transport 
office, training security personnel, and three were working for a mining 
company (Mirabulis) as interpreters. (Omega Security Solutions is an off-
shoot of Omega Risk Solutions). Omega Risk Solutions did not have 
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NCACC approval in terms of the procedural requirements of the RFMA to 
offer services in the DRC – a country that technically could still qualify as a 
‘conflict area’ under South African legislation pending the outcome of de-
mocratic elections and the ongoing peacekeeping mandate of MONUC. Ac-
cording to a statement issued by Omega, it adhered to all procedural re-
quirements though this has been denied by the South African government. 
Given that Omega Security Solutions was apparently duly registered in the 
DRC, this may prove to highlight the ineffectual nature of the RFMA’s ex-
tra-territorial application in a context where other countries do not necessar-
ily have similar provisions in their national legislation. The firm was assist-
ing with the upgrading of port security, according to its staff, but also had a 
potentially more controversial contract with a US security company (AQMI 
Strategy Corp) for close protection and related services to a Congolese poli-
tician, Oscar Kashala. 
The detainees were released and deported within days by the interim 
DRC government, which continued to state that the detained men were 
‘mercenaries’ and asked prosecuting authorities in their countries of origin to 
charge them. Omega contradicted these statements, highlighting the clear 
registration of the company as a DRC-based company and the training con-
tracts for security personnel it had with the interim DRC government. It re-
mains to be seen whether the DRC detainees that have been deported will be 
charged under the RFMA. 
The New Draft Legislation 
The South African case studies under the RFMA serve to highlight key chal-
lenges inherent in regulation. First, the lack of clarity in respect of defini-
tions in terms of mercenaries, PMCs and PSCs is vividly highlighted. Sec-
ond, the cases demonstrate the tremendous hurdle in obtaining adequate 
evidence to secure convictions through prosecutions, resulting in decisions 
by prosecuting authorities to opt for plea bargains instead. Given the nature 
of operations that are often conducted abroad, the evidential burden can be 
near insurmountable. Third, the definition of a ‘conflict area’ is open to con-
siderable discretion, and possible alignment, arguably, with foreign policy 
positions as is clear in the case of Iraq. Whilst this makes for interesting 
foreign policy, it generates considerable legal uncertainty due to the tremen-
dous administrative discretion present in procedures and the lack of clear 
criteria for determining licensing approval requests. Lastly, all the cases in 
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question have highlighted the challenge of extraterritorial ‘offences’ or 
‘breaches’ being committed and the inability of regulation to be binding 
beyond national boundaries. In addition, the Zimbabwe-Equatorial Guinea 
case has highlighted, through the South African Constitutional Court ruling, 
the importance of dual criminality for extradition requests to be successful 
with regard to RFMA-related offences. This points to the importance of in-
terlocking regulation at the national, regional and international levels if any 
regulation is to be workable. 
Whilst the new draft legislation before Parliament seeks to address 
many of these challenges, it may fail entirely due to confused objectives, 
possible overreach and contradictions that could cause immense legal uncer-
tainty if implemented in its current form. 
In his State of the Nation Address in 2005, President Thabo Mbeki 
clearly signalled the government’s intention to tighten the provisions of the 
RFMA:  
In the coming year, we shall continue with all these and other pro-
grammes, to…review the Foreign Military Assistance Act in order to dis-
courage, for their own good and the good of the country, those who seek 
to profit from conflict and human suffering such as in Iraq.23 
In confronting the clear areas of difficulty that have emerged in the 
implementation of the RFMA, the South African government tabled the draft 
Prohibition of Mercenary Activities and Prohibition and Regulation of Cer-
tain Activities in an Area of Armed Conflict Bill in Parliament in October 
2005. The Bill is a clear legislative response to the perceived failure of the 
RFMA to act as an effective deterrent to practices the government regards as 
undesirable and potentially undermining its foreign policy goals. 
The explanatory memorandum of the Bill highlights that it has been 
designed to address ‘some deficiencies’ in the RFMA under which the gov-
ernment has only been able to secure a few prosecutions and where the con-
victions were in nearly all instances the result of plea bargain agreements 
between the accused and the NPA. The explanatory memorandum deals 
explicitly with concerns about events in Equatorial Guinea and the fact that 
private military and security companies have been recruiting South Africans 
to offer these services in areas of armed conflict such as Iraq. The Bill is a 
clear attempt to tighten the provisions of the RFMA vis-à-vis private security 
companies and aims to close certain ‘loopholes’ that were used to broaden 
the scope of the operation of these firms in controversial conflict areas under 
the banner of ‘humanitarian assistance’. The Bill in its current draft form is 
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beset by a number of difficulties which the Minister of Defence has re-
quested the Joint Standing Committee on Defence to address in upcoming 
public hearings. 
Despite the good intentions behind the Bill, it has the potential to 
make the regulatory framework in South Africa more unworkable and ar-
guably even less effective than in its current form. From comments made by 
the Minister of Defence after the tabling of the draft Bill, it seems clear that 
the government is well aware of the complexities inherent in the new draft 
and of the difficulties it faces in ensuring that the RFMA has a successor that 
is a stronger regulatory instrument. 
In recent public hearings on the new draft law in May and June 2006, 
the Portfolio Committee on Defence heard a number of concerns from inde-
pendent security sector analysts, academics, the South African Special 
Forces League, some key PSCs and various international actors.24 Most 
commentators have criticised the draft legislation for hindering South Afri-
cans from doing legitimate humanitarian and private security work abroad 
and for contravening certain key clauses of the South African Constitution’s 
Bill of Rights, as well as being inconsistent with international law in respect 
of the unprecedented extraterritorial jurisdiction the Bill aims to vest in the 
South African authorities. The near banning of humanitarian assistance 
without proper authorisation – which would be time-consuming and subject 
to considerable administrative discretion – came in for stinging criticism 
despite the concerns of the South African government that it was exactly this 
‘loophole’ many South Africans working in Iraq used to create a veneer of 
legitimacy for their activities while lacking NCACC approval. The blanket 
exemption for entities involved in struggles for national liberation caused 
considerable distress. The BAPSC stated that the Bill’s requirements were 
akin to a forced global licensing of private security services and humanitar-
ian aid organisations in areas of armed conflict. Though this may be an ide-
alised goal for advocates of increased regulation, it is ill-conceived to try to 
reach this aim by means of a single national statute instead of working at the 
international level to craft a global regulatory regime. 
Despite conceding the clear difficulties in the implementation of the 
RFMA to date,25 key departments of the South African government such as 
the South African Police Service and the Department of Defence emphasised 
that the country had an obligation to oversee and regulate the thousands of 
military-qualified citizens selling their skills abroad. However, even if the 
considerable legal and conceptual hurdles in passing a sound new legislative 
instrument are overcome, it remains to be seen whether the South African 
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government will be able to provide adequate evidence (effectively intelli-
gence given the nature of the evidence that would need to be obtained), will 
devote adequate resources to investigations, and will attach clear priority to 
enforcing the new legislation in a more pro-active manner than has been the 
case with the RFMA to ensure that any new law becomes a more effective 
deterrent. 
Conclusion 
There are at least four salient issues that emerge from the South African 
case: 
First, there are still some transition aspects of the DDRR process that 
remain unresolved. With reference to 32 Battalion and their enclave in Pom-
fret in particular, the South African government is now increasingly con-
fronted by this legacy in its ongoing efforts to promote an ethical foreign 
policy. 
Second, the question posed by Avant proves to be crucial: has the 
South African government’s ‘trade-off’ in its choice of regulatory instrument 
(the RFMA) paid off or has it simply sent operators ‘underground’, limiting 
the effective option for control? In the light of few licensing applications, a 
paucity of information and evidence to pursue prosecutions, and the frequent 
resort to the plea-bargain route for convictions, there appears to be a compel-
ling argument for the latter argument. However, it is unlikely that the South 
African government will opt to legitimise the notion of private actors in the 
military or security field given its commitment to an integrity-based foreign 
policy process – a choice it appears unlikely to reverse in favour of the US 
model of regulation. 
Third, it is an inescapable conclusion that the RFMA has been diffi-
cult to implement in practice in terms of sourcing information and intelli-
gence and gathering adequate evidence to ensure convictions. Given that 
most convictions were achieved through plea bargains, a true litmus test of 
the RFMA through the courts has not occurred and was neatly side-stepped 
by the Thatcher plea-bargain in particular. In addition, it does not appear as 
if the Act has acted as an effective deterrent when considering the case stud-
ies described above and the paltry fines that have been imposed in cases 
where convictions have been forthcoming. 
Fourth, though the South African government is rightly concerned 
about the ultimate credibility of the regulatory system in South Africa, recent 
amendments proposed in the draft Prohibition of Mercenary Activities and 
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Prohibition and Regulation of Certain Activities in an Area of Armed Con-
flict Bill are unlikely to result in a more coherent and stronger regulatory 
framework without considerable debate and amendment of proposals. 
It is clear that any national regulatory response will have to recognise 
the transnational nature of the industry it seeks to regulate. It logically fol-
lows that any national legislative efforts, however well-intentioned, will 
never be adequate without a concerted and considered response by the inter-
national community to the increasing role of the private sector in war and 
peace. A key challenge for analysts, policy- and law-makers is to determine 
the measures that will be required to adequately address the emergence of 
the private sector as a key player in the security sector and to craft an inter-
national regulatory framework capable of responding credibly to this chal-
lenge globally.  
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Regulating Military and Security Services 
in the European Union 
Elke Krahmann 
Introduction 
In recent years, there has been a growing disillusionment with the lack of 
national and international regulation of private military and security services. 
While the expansion of the industry after the end of the Cold War has led to 
an increasing number of incidents – such as private soldiers accused of 
shooting at civilians on the streets of Baghdad,1 torturing prisoners in Abu 
Ghraib,2 trying to overthrow the government of Equatorial Guinea,3 training 
the Croatian army which committed human rights atrocities in the Krajina,4 
and circumventing the arms embargo against Sierra Leone5 – only the United 
States and South Africa currently have separate laws concerning the export 
of private military and security services. Moreover, regional and interna-
tional efforts such as the United Nations and African Union conventions on 
mercenaries have proven ineffective. 
This chapter seeks to show that the extent to which private military 
and security services are currently controlled by national and international 
regulation, and the options for strengthening existing legislation have been 
very much underestimated. In particular, in Europe there has been an expan-
sion of national and international regulation since the mid-1990s which also 
controls some aspects of the provision and export of private military and 
security services. The emergence of European controls is particularly impor-
tant because a growing section of the private military and security industry is 
not only based in Europe, but also employed by European governments in 
international interventions. Moreover, through the development of best prac-
tices and through the active promotion of European standards such as the 
European Union (EU) Code of Conduct within international organisations 
and allied nations, the EU is contributing to improving the global govern-
ance of the private military and security industry. 
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This chapter is divided into four parts. The first part seeks to explain 
why the role of the EU in the regulation of private military and security ser-
vices has so far been neglected. The second part investigates the growing 
range of EU policies which seek to control the provision and export of mili-
tary and security services. The third part examines how these have comple-
mented and influenced national regulations among the member states. The 
fourth part identifies existing loopholes in the current legislation and what 
steps could be taken to address these. The chapter concludes by arguing that 
the approach of regional harmonisation and strengthening of military service 
export controls embraced by the EU is likely to be supported by both gov-
ernments and industry.  
Security Governance: The EU and the Regulation of PSCs 
One reason for the lack of attention paid to the EU with regard to the regula-
tion of private military and security services has been the state-centric mod-
els with which many authors have approached the issue. Proceeding from 
Weber’s imperative that the state should hold the monopoly on the legitimate 
use of force, the key question has been how the state can retain or regain 
control over the use of force by private military and security companies. An 
international regime on the control of private military force is generally be-
lieved to be highly unlikely in the light of the failures of both the 1989 
United Nations International Convention Against the Recruitment, Use, Fi-
nancing and Training of Mercenaries and the Organisation of African Unity 
(OAU) Convention for the Elimination of Mercenaries in Africa.6 However, 
in conflict regions or failing states, where private military contractors have 
increasingly been employed, state control is often weak and sometimes non-
existent. 
What the prevailing perspective underestimates is the positive role 
that exporting states in Europe and North America and their regional organi-
sations can play in setting new standards for the regulation of private mili-
tary and security services. Although it is correct that private security and 
military companies can evade stricter national and regional controls by mov-
ing abroad, experience with armaments companies shows that the standards 
and export regulations of exporting nations can significantly influence and 
improve the global level of governance of the defence sector. Moreover, 
since many defence export countries and regions are developed and democ-
ratic, they are much more capable of enforcing controls and standards than 
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the underdeveloped or failing states which tend to import military and secu-
rity services. 
A security governance approach helps to illustrate the range of actors 
who might be involved in regulating the sector. It suggests that centralised 
governmental control over the provision of security has been replaced by 
more fragmented modes of governance in which state and non-state actors, 
including private companies but also regional organisations such as the EU, 
NATO and the OSCE play a growing role.7 The differentiation of govern-
ance can be observed in seven dimensions: geography, function, resources, 
interests, norms, decision-making and policy implementation. In each of 
these dimensions, exclusive governmental control is increasingly replaced by 
a multitude of actors, policies and regulations. In geographical terms, gov-
ernmental legal authority over citizens and companies competes or overlaps 
with that of regional regimes and private regulations. In functional terms, 
many regional security organisations have expanded their remit from de-
fence and deterrence to conflict prevention and non-proliferation. Moreover, 
there can be a spillover effect from some dimensions to the others which can 
contribute to the transformation from centralised modes of government to 
fragmented ones.8 For instance, the fragmentation of resources and security 
expertise among state, private and international organisations has facilitated 
the inclusion of these actors in the security policy decision-making and pol-
icy implementation process. 
The exponential growth in private security and military services can 
be understood as part of this shift from centralised ‘government’ to frag-
mented ‘governance’.9 It is on the one hand a result of the differentiation of 
resources and expertise between the armed forces and private military and 
security companies, and on the other hand it is a factor which contributes to 
the further involvement of private companies in security policy-making and 
implementation.  
However, the security governance approach also suggests the possibil-
ity of controlling private security contractors beyond the state. In particular, 
it argues that the state is not the sole actor capable or even responsible for 
the regulation of private military and security companies. In addition, there 
is scope for the self-regulation of private security firms and for a growing 
role of regional organisations in regulating the private use of force. Most 
importantly, the security governance approach argues that contemporary 
governance can proceed through sets of overlapping standards and regula-
tions at multiple levels including the company, industry, state, region or 
globe which can be mutually reinforcing and frequently create their own 
dynamics contributing to tighter regulations.  
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Diverse standards, codes of practices and legislation can be observed 
across these levels. They include registering and licensing of companies 
providing private security and military services as well as the provision and 
export of these services themselves. The relevant companies include special-
ised military service firms, domestic private security and guarding compa-
nies, risk consultancies and armaments corporations; the services can range 
from combat, personal security and military training to security consulting, 
technical support for the operation and maintenance of military equipment, 
procurement, trafficking and brokering of military equipment, explosive 
ordnance disposal, logistical support for military operations and bases, intel-
ligence collection and analysis, including the interrogation of military pris-
oners.10  
Given the variety of companies and services that can be subsumed un-
der the private military and security service sector, different regulations, 
laws and standards apply to separate sections of the industry. In Europe, 
such laws and standards include national registration of companies, public 
and private training standards set by governments and industry associations, 
but also a growing number of national and regional EU-wide regulations on 
the export of specific military and security services. 
Just as the differences between the mode of governance in different 
dimensions can lead to pressures for further transformation, the divergences 
and interactions between distinct regulatory approaches and standards in 
Europe have led to demands for greater harmonisation. However, rather than 
limiting standards to the lowest common denominator, as has been the case 
in some environmental regulations,11 controls over the private military and 
security sector have been tightened and expanded. 
The EU has been a key actor in this development because it has been 
at the centre of various overlapping sets of regulations – both in functional 
and geographical terms. Functionally, the EU’s authority ranges from the 
regulation of the private security industry as part of the internal market to the 
potential control of the export of private military and military support ser-
vices under its Common Foreign and Security Policy. Geographically, the 
EU influences the regulatory policies of its member states, but is also in-
volved in representing its members at the United Nations and promoting 
common EU standards, such as the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports, 
worldwide.  
However, while a system of multilevel governance in which overlap-
ping national and regional regulations strengthen each other appears to have 
major advantages, there are also some disadvantages. The disadvantages 
include the complexity and inconsistency of the emerging controls which 
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currently leave a number of legislative loopholes and which put a heavy 
administrative burden on regulators and private security providers. The fol-
lowing sections examine how these controls have evolved over the past dec-
ade before proceeding to discuss the potential for further improvements. 
European Union Regulations and Policies 
The European Union has played a critical role in promoting national and 
regional regulations on the provision of military and security services in its 
member states and their export to third countries.12 Existing regulations in-
clude the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports and a range of Common 
Foreign and Security Policies, either in conjunction with the Code or sepa-
rately, which have created requirements for national laws or imposed limita-
tions on the export of military services such as technical assistance related to 
weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and to embargoed destinations, the 
brokering of arms, and the export of small arms and light weapons. In addi-
tion, the EU Court of Justice has formally established EU competence over 
the regulation of domestic security services under the first pillar.13 The fol-
lowing sections examine each policy in detail before turning to national leg-
islation in the member states. 
Code of Conduct on Arms Exports 
The EU Code of Conduct on Armaments Exports emerged in June 1998 out 
of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, but through its institutionalisa-
tion has taken an independent role in the promotion of stricter export con-
trols for military equipment and services.14 The Code of Conduct was origi-
nally drawn up to set common standards for conventional arms transfers and 
to facilitate the exchange of information about arms exports among member 
states. The Code of Conduct further called for the circulation among the 
member states of confidential annual reports on their arms exports and the 
implementation of the Code, as well as for the production of a consolidated 
yearly report by the EU. The first report was published in November 1999.15 
It was four pages long and observed the initial efforts to establish institu-
tional channels of communication on arms transfers among the member 
states. Since then the details contained in each report and the scope of the 
Code have increased every year.16 While the fifth report of 2003 was 42 
pages long and included lists of arms export volumes by destinations and 
exporting member states,17 the seventh report of 2005 contained no less than 
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288 pages specifying national exports by country, destination, type of 
equipment and value.18  
Since all member states are required to produce annual national re-
ports as the basis for the consolidated EU report, most members have de-
cided to make their national data on armaments exports public. Today all but 
two of the 25 member states, Cyprus and Greece, publish their national re-
ports online.19 
The impact of the Code of Conduct has not only been to increase 
transparency concerning armaments exports from the EU, the Conventional 
Arms Exports Working Group (COARM) has played an important role in 
identifying additional areas which require regulation and in strengthening 
existing export controls. With regard to private military and security ser-
vices, COARM has specifically contributed to EU regulation on the broker-
ing of arms. COARM first identified the issue of brokering as a problem in 
the annual report on the implementation of the Code in 2000. By 2001, 
member states had agreed on a set of guidelines for controlling brokering as 
the basis for national legislation.20 The result was the Council Common Posi-
tion on the control of arms brokering, passed in June 2003, which has made 
binding the national regulation of brokering among the member states.21 
Armaments Brokering 
The provision for the national regulation of armaments brokering are set out 
in Council Common Position 2003/468/CFSP of June 2003.22 The Common 
Position formally requires member states to implement these guidelines in 
the form of national legislation. The stated objective of the Common Posi-
tion 2003/468/CFSP is ‘to control arms brokering in order to avoid circum-
vention of UN, EU or OSCE embargoes on arms exports, as well as of the 
Criteria set out in the EU Code of Arms Exports’. The Common Position 
mandates that ‘member states will take all necessary measures to control 
brokering activities taking place within their territory’, but it also encourages 
member states ‘to consider controlling brokering activities outside their terri-
tory carried out by brokers of their nationality resident or established in their 
territory’.23  
Technical Assistance Related to WMDs and Embargoed Destinations 
Whereas Common Position 2003/468/CFSP emerged from deliberations 
within the context of the EU Code of Conduct, other defence export control 
issues are discussed under the general provisions of the EU's Common For-
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eign and Security Policy. Specifically, the Council agreed on the need to 
control technical assistance related to weapons of mass destruction. 
The resulting EU Council Joint Action 2000/401 of 22 June 2000 has 
committed member states to the control of technical assistance related to 
certain military end-uses or destinations among the member states.24 The 
proposed regulations concern technical assistance related to items ‘which are 
or may be intended for use in connection with weapons of mass destruction 
or missiles for delivery of such weapons’.25 Technical assistance as defined 
by the EU Joint Action covers nearly the entire spectrum of private military 
and security services, albeit only with regard to WMDs, including ‘technical 
support related to repairs, development, manufacture, assembly, testing, 
maintenance or any other technical service, and may take forms such as in-
struction, training, transmission of working knowledge or skills or consulting 
services’. 
The Joint Action also ‘encourages’ member states to ‘consider the ap-
plication of such controls also in cases where the technical assistance relates 
to military end-uses other than those referred to in Article 2 … and is pro-
vided in countries of destination subject to an arms embargo’. In sum, the 
Council suggests national legislation regarding the export of private military 
services related to chemical, biological or nuclear weapons as well as to any 
country subject to international arms sanctions. 
EU Embargoes on Technical Services 
While Joint Action 2000/401/CFSP suggests that EU member states should 
contemplate a national regulation of the export of technical assistance to 
embargoed destinations, the EU has also directly mandated the licensing or 
prohibition of technical service exports to certain countries in compliance 
with United Nations sanctions. 
Following increasing awareness of the dangers of exporting military 
assistance and services to conflict regions by the United Nations and the 
inclusion of such services in UN sanctions since the mid-1990s, the EU 
Council has imposed collective EU regulations on technical assistance to a 
number of destinations.26 In May 2006, nine individuals, groups and coun-
tries were subject to such export restrictions – the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Myanmar/Burma, Somalia, Sudan, Osama bin 
Laden/Al-Qaida/Taliban, Uzbekistan and Zimbabwe.27 Previously, similar 
embargoes had been imposed on Afghanistan,28 Ethiopia and Eritrea,29 
Libya,30 Nigeria31 and the former Yugoslavia.32 Importantly for the regula-
tion of PSCs, the EU's definition of ‘technical services’ in most of these 
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embargoes subsumes all types of military, security and military support ser-
vices. The definition is also considerably broader than those embraced in 
many of the national export legislations that emerged from Joint Action 
2000/401/CFSP.  
Small Arms and Light Weapons 
In addition, the EU has adopted common policies regarding the transfer of 
small arms and light weapons, which can be facilitated by the operations of 
PSCs in developing countries.33 In 1998, the Council adopted Joint Action 
1999/34/CFSP on the EU contribution to combating the destabilising accu-
mulation and spread of small arms and light weapons.34 Amongst others, the 
Joint Action envisaged that the EU should enhance efforts to build a consen-
sus in international organisations such as the United Nations and the OSCE 
for restrictive arms export criteria as provided in the EU Code of Conduct. 
Moreover, the Joint Action proposes that member states ‘shall seek to in-
crease the effectiveness of their national actions in the field of small arms’.35  
In 2002, it was replaced by Joint Action 2002/589/CFSP which also 
included the export of ammunition for small arms and light weapons and 
expanded the list of measures sought to counter the spread of small arms.36 
In direct application of the Joint Actions, the Council passed two Decisions 
which offered the government of Cambodia assistance in the development of 
appropriate legislation for the possession, use and sale of small arms and 
ammunition and for general disarmament measures.37 Other projects directed 
at the finding, collection and destruction of small arms were agreed on with 




Finally, the EU is beginning to exert its influence over the regulation of pri-
vate security services among the member states. Specifically, the European 
Court of Justice has established the competence of the EU Commission in 
several rulings according to which private security counts as an ‘economic 
sector’ and as such falls under the first pillar of regulation of the internal 
market.40 However, the movement towards common European regulations 
on private policing has so far been rather slow. A Spanish initiative concern-
ing the establishment of a network of contact points of national authorities 
responsible for private security was rejected by the European Parliament for 
formal reasons.41 Nevertheless, the committee of the European Parliament in 
charge of the issue was in favour of harmonising member states’ regulations 
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of the private security sector and the Council adopted on 13 June 2002 a 
recommendation regarding cooperation between the competent national au-
thorities of member states responsible for the private security sector.42 Fur-
ther pressure for common European regulations is exerted by the Confedera-
tion of European Security Services (CoESS) and the trade union federation 
Uni-Europa which signed on 18 July 2003 a Code of Conduct for the private 
security sector. The sectoral social partners believe ‘that the rules governing 
their sector need to be harmonised across the EU’.43 
National Controls 
The impact of EU policies on national legislation regarding private military 
and security services in the member states has been significant. Current na-
tional regulation applies to six types of military and security services in par-
ticular: technical assistance related to WMDs and embargoed countries, bro-
kering, technical services related to controlled goods, military training and 
domestic security services. The first three sets of regulations are a direct 
consequence of the EU policies outlined above. The last three are the result 
of national policy priorities and export control traditions, specifically among 
the new member states in Central and Eastern Europe which used to have 
strict export controls and were recently required to develop new laws due to 
accession.44 Since a detailed examination of the legislation in all 25 member 
states is beyond the scope of this chapter, the following sections discuss the 
scope and variance of regulation in each of the six areas. 
Technical Assistance Related to WMDs and Embargoed Destinations 
Since Joint Actions are legally binding for EU member states, Joint Action 
2000/401/CFSP on the export of technical assistance related to WMDs has to 
be implemented in the form of national legislation by the member states. As 
of 2006, a majority of members have done so. They include Austria, the 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Lat-
via, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden 
and the United Kingdom. However, slow legislative processes have delayed 
new legislation on technical assistance as well as embargoed destinations in 
a considerable number of countries. In particular, Belgium, Cyprus, France, 
Ireland, Luxemburg and Malta have not yet or not fully implemented spe-
cific legislation controlling the export of technical assistance related to all 
WMDs and missiles for their delivery.45 
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While Joint Action 2000/401/CFSP requires member states to regulate 
the export of technical assistance related to WMDs and delivery missiles, the 
form of regulation is left to the individual member states. Accordingly, na-
tional legislation within the EU varies considerably. Five countries, namely 
Austria, Denmark, Germany, Sweden and the United Kingdom, have prohib-
ited the export of related technological assistance, whereas other member 
states request that exporters apply for a licence. 
The variation is even greater with regard to technical assistance for 
embargoed destinations because Joint Action 2000/401/CFSP encourages, 
but does not demand, national legislation on the issue. Whereas Austria and 
Hungary prohibit the export of certain types of technical assistance to all 
countries under an arms embargo, others such as the Czech Republic, Esto-
nia, Germany, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, Slovakia 
and Spain require export licences. Finally, Denmark, Sweden and the United 
Kingdom, have decided not to nationally regulate the export of technical 
assistance to countries subject to international sanctions, perhaps because 
prohibitions to export technical services are today already included in most 
United Nations and EU arms embargoes with which member states have to 
comply. 
Brokering 
Three years after Joint Action 2000/401/CFSP, Common Position 
2003/468/CFSP on the brokering of arms has been implemented more 
widely among the member states, although not more consistently.46 National 
licensing requirements exist in 19 EU countries with the exceptions of Cy-
prus, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg and Portugal. However, the scope of 
the controls differs considerably among the member states. Some countries 
such as Austria and Denmark regulate brokering activities only when con-
ducted from within their national territories; other countries such as Finland, 
Hungary and Slovakia control brokering also if citizens, permanent residents 
or registered businesses engage in brokering activities abroad. Some national 
laws are very complex and detailed; others are very general leaving much 
open to interpretation. In addition, several countries, including Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, the Netherlands, Slovenia and Spain, have set up 
national registers for armaments brokers in which individuals or businesses 
planning to engage in future brokering activities have to be registered prior 
to applying for a licence, whereas most states require only individual export 
licences. 
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Technical Services Related to Controlled Goods 
As a consequence of historically strict export controls and the necessity to 
revise national export legislation in compliance with EU accession in 2004, 
most Central and Eastern European countries have more extensive licensing 
requirements than the older EU member states. In particular the accession 
process has encouraged the new members to draft legislation which subjects 
the export of all types of military equipment and related services to licens-
ing. The Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slo-
venia and Slovakia thus have comprehensive regulations which typically 
include the services provided in connection with controlled military equip-
ment, such as development, design, production, adjustment, repair, mainte-
nance and use, under the same licensing laws. 
How strict national criteria are for granting a licence is, as in all the 
cases above, a separate question. In principle, the EU Code of Conduct lists 
seven criteria which member states have agreed to take into account when 
granting arms export licences:  
 
1. Respect of human rights in the country of final destination; 
2. The internal situation of the country of final destination; 
3. Preservation of regional peace, security and stability; 
4. The national security of the Member States and of territories whose 
external relations are the responsibility of a Member State, as well as 
that of friendly and allied countries; 
5. The buyer country's behaviour with regard to the international com-
munity, in particular its attitude to terrorism, the nature of its alliances 
and respect for international law; 
6. The existence of a risk that the equipment will be diverted within the 
buyer country or re-exported under undesirable conditions; 
7. The compatibility of the arms exports with the technical and economic 
capacity of the recipient country. 
Military Training 
Due to the explicit linkage of services to controlled military equipment in 
EU Joint Action 2000/401/CFSP, few member states regulate the export of 
military training beyond that in the use of military technology. Thus, the 
Czech Republic, Hungary and Italy demand licences for the export of all 
training related to the ‘use’ or ‘handling’ of military equipment; and Estonia 
and Poland regulate the export of training and consulting services related to 
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military goods, including ‘technical support related to the development, 
manufacture, assembly, testing, repairs, transport or maintenance of military 
goods, or any other relevant service’.47 Only Sweden has a separate stipula-
tion on the licensing of all ‘training with a military purpose’.48 
Private Policing 
Whereas the preceding sections have focused on the export of certain types 
of military and security services, a large body of national legislation applies 
to the provision of security services within the territory of the member states. 
Although these regulations do not apply to the transfer of private security 
services overseas, it can be argued that companies which have to meet cer-
tain standards nationally will to some degree export them when operating 
abroad. An overview of national legislation on private security services 
among the 25 EU member states has been produced by CoESS.49 It shows 
that from the 1990s nearly all European countries have stepped up their con-
trol of domestic private security and policing services. 
The prime mechanisms regulating private security and military ser-
vices in the EU member states are the national registration and licensing of 
security companies and their personnel.50 The conditions for a licence, which 
on average needs to be renewed every five years, vary among the member 
states. However, all member states require a clear criminal record among 
management and personnel. Additional conditions include sufficient liability 
insurance, identification cards with name and photo, and approved uniforms 
which are not easily confused with those of the police or armed forces.51  
About 60 percent of the EU member states mandate specific training 
of private security personnel and the passing of an examination.52 Training 
can range from basic instruction of between 32 (France) and 300 hours (Po-
land) to complementary and follow-up training, including for the protection 
of persons, the transport of valuables and the use of firearms. With the ex-
ception of Denmark, France, the Netherlands and the UK, most member 
states allow for the carrying of firearms by security personnel with a special 
permit. Nevertheless, many states limit and request registration of the type 
and number of weapons concerned, and most mandate that after-hours stor-
age has to be in special facilities.53 
General Level of Controls  
Although the extent to which EU member states are controlling the provision 
or export of private military and security services is larger than commonly 
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recognised, few countries go beyond the requirements currently set by the 
EU Code of Conduct and the Common Policies and Joint Actions outlined in 
the first part of this chapter. As summarised in Table 10.1, the main Euro-
pean arms-exporting states, such as the UK, France, Germany and Italy, do 
not have the most extensive controls. In fact, the largest exporter of military 
and security services, the UK, is one of the member states with the least 
restrictive export regulations. Although the UK has implemented all new EU 
regulations, it has only done so to the required minimum. Other large de-
fence exporters, such as France and Italy, are still in the process of imple-
menting the new EU export control policies with regard to technical assis-
tance or brokering in national laws. 
Among the medium-sized arms exporters, Sweden stands out as the 
member state with the strictest controls, followed by the Netherlands; 
whereas the regulations of Austria and Spain are merely average. The states 
with the most restrictive armaments and military service export regulations 
can be found among the new members, including Poland, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Estonia, Slovakia, Slovenia and the Czech Republic. Ironically, 
these countries have been more likely to be importers than exporters of pri-
vate military and security services.54 
Loopholes and Options for Future Regulation 
The preceding analysis has illustrated the range of regulative measures 
which control the domestic provision and international export of private 
military and security services in Europe. Although some organisations such 
as Amnesty International find reason to criticise the implementation of exist-
ing armaments export legislation in Europe,55 it demonstrates that the mem-
ber states of the EU are recognising the importance of regulating not only the 
export of military equipment, but also of related services. In addition, the 
central place of the EU within the evolving security governance structures in 
Europe and pressures for the harmonisation of various standards and legisla-
tions have contributed to the strengthening of controls. Since the new regula-
tions on the control of technical assistance and brokering have only recently 
come into force and only in some member states, it is too early to attempt an 
assessment of the effectiveness of these controls and their implementation. 
Instead, this section will discuss the remaining gaps in the current legislation 
and how the EU might address them. 
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Austria56 prohibited or licensed 
prohibited or 
licensed licensed — — 
Belgium57 — prohibited or licensed licensed — — 
Cyprus58 — — — — — 
Czech Repub-
lic59 licensed licensed licensed licensed — 
Denmark60 prohibited — licensed — — 
Estonia61 licensed licensed licensed licensed licensed 
Finland62 prohibited — licensed — — 
France63 C-weapons prohibited — licensed — — 
Germany64 prohibited licensed licensed — — 
Greece65 ? ? — ? ? 
Hungary66 licensed prohibited licensed licensed licensed 
Ireland67 — — — — — 
Italy68 licensed licensed — — licensed 
Latvia69 licensed licensed licensed licensed — 
Lithuania70 licensed licensed licensed licensed — 
Luxemburg71 — — — — — 
Malta72 — — licensed — — 
Netherlands licensed licensed licensed licensed — 
Poland73 licensed licensed licensed licensed licensed 
Portugal74 ? ? — ? ? 
Slovakia75 licensed licensed licensed licensed — 
Slovenia76 licensed licensed licensed licensed — 
Spain77 licensed licensed licensed — — 
Sweden78 prohibited — licensed — licensed 
United King-
dom79 prohibited — licensed — — 
Gaps in Current Legislation 
As has been argued in the second part of this chapter, the private military 
and security industry includes a broad variety of providers and services. 
They range from armaments corporations to security guards; and from com-
bat and armed site protection to risk consulting and military training. The 
preceding sections have shown that only a limited section of these providers 
and services are subject to specific legislation. As a result, control over the 
provision and export of private military and security services in the EU has 
two major gaps. 
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The first gap in the current controls concerns the application of na-
tional licensing and training standards to companies and individuals who are 
registered in one of the member states, but who are providing their services 
in other member states or outside the EU. With regard to the former, the EU 
Court of Justice has ruled that, in the absence of common EU regulations, 
member states have to recognise the national standards of other EU countries 
even if these are lower than their national licensing requirements. Since the 
majority of security companies rely on local and national expertise and repu-
tation for their success, the danger of companies circumventing tight controls 
by moving to those member states with the least controls is limited. Al-
though there is an increasing transnationalisation of larger companies, most 
work through national subsidiaries, which operate under national laws. For 
instance, the world’s second largest private security company, G4S which 
was formed in 2004 by a merger between Group 4 Falck and Securicor, op-
erates globally through a network of subsidiaries registered in over 100 
countries. 
Nevertheless, there has been increasing pressure for a harmonisation 
of national legislation under the authority of the EU, including from security 
industry associations such as CoESS. The industry contends that the current 
differences not only give companies registered in member states with low 
standards a competitive advantage, they also make it difficult for security 
firms to supply transnational security services such as transport security for 
the integrated market of the EU. 
With regard to the operation of security companies outside the EU, 
there has so far been no attempt to enforce national licensing and training 
standards. Although Finland, Hungary and Slovakia have set a precedent for 
the extraneous application of national regulations in the case of arms broker-
ing, most EU member states are reluctant to take responsibility for the for-
eign operations of national companies or citizens. The main argument 
against such legislation is that states do not have the resources to monitor 
compliance with national standards abroad. 
A second gap regards the export of military and security services that 
are not directly linked to military equipment. Unfortunately, these services 
make up a major proportion of the private military and security sector. They 
include armed combat, personnel and site protection, transport security, stra-
tegic and tactical military training, risk analysis, intelligence gathering and 
contingency planning. Even the prohibitions of technical military assistance 
and services to embargoed destinations under the EU’s Common Foreign 
and Security Policy rarely subsume these services. Nevertheless, experience 
in the Balkans, Afghanistan and Africa has demonstrated that the provision 
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of strategic and tactical assistance can be as decisive for the outcome of a 
conflict as the export of missiles and tanks. Although embargoed destina-
tions are obviously the main areas of concern with regard to the supply of 
non-technical military assistance, the long-term impact of military training in 
particular should be taken into account when permitting their export to non-
democratic regimes. 
Policy Options 
Several policies suggest themselves to address these gaps and simplify the 
regulation of the private security industry within the EU. With regard to the 
national registration and licensing of companies and individuals, consider-
able progress towards the harmonisation of national laws within the EU has 
been made by the ruling of the EU Court of Justice that security services are 
part of the common internal market. As a consequence, the Commission has 
technical authority over the sector under the first pillar. While the EU Coun-
cil decided to exclude private security services from the Commission’s pro-
posed draft directive on services in the internal market which is likely to 
come into force in 2006, it tasked the Commission with presenting a separate 
proposal for the harmonisation of regulations concerning private security 
services within a year after the implementation of the directive.80  
The most effective solution would be a proposal for common basic 
standards for the registration and licensing of private security providers, 
including vetting, training, safekeeping of weapons and licence renewal. 
Common EU standards could help to raise the level of regulation and lessen 
the administrative burden on both companies and member states. Moreover, 
common regulations would facilitate the spread of EU best practice among 
acceding and aspirant members. 
Concerning the export of military and security services not related to 
military equipment, a number of complementary policies could be envis-
aged. Most effective would be an agreement within the EU Council on a 
CFSP (Common Foreign and Security Policy) Common Position comparable 
to that on brokering activities, which requires member states to implement 
national legislation controlling the export of military and security services. 
Such legislation should apply to all third countries and require the licensing 
of all service exports by the national authorities. Member states would de-
cide what types of services should be controlled and what requirements 
should be made for an export license.  
Alternatively, or to complement the above, the EU Council could ex-
tend the application of the export control criteria endorsed in the EU Code of 
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Conduct on Arms Exports to military and security services. Although the 
Code is less binding than an EU Common Position, it might serve as a first 
step towards the introduction of export controls on military and security 
services. Given the success of the Code’s COARM working group in bring-
ing about legislation on arms brokering, an extension of the Code would 
facilitate broader awareness and discussion of the problems posed by un-
regulated service exports among the EU member states.  
In addition, COARM might want to consider a common list of mili-
tary and security services similar to the EU common list of military equip-
ment established under the EU Code of Conduct to encourage the harmoni-
sation of the military and security service export legislation among the 
member states.81 The list would need to be reviewed regularly to take into 
account new developments in the sector and to establish best practice. In the 
case of further legislation, the EU Code of Conduct could also be used to 
facilitate the exchange of information regarding military and security service 
license denials through the same network that has been set up for notification 
on arms exports among the member states. 
Finally, the EU’s common regulations on the export of dual-use 
equipment, i.e. goods with civilian and military applications, could be ex-
tended to cover technical assistance related to these services. A 2005 study 
on the possible amendment of Council Regulation 1334/2000 on export con-
trol of dual-use items and technologies initiated by the EU Commission has 
already investigated different options for controlling the illicit brokering of 
dual-use items to comply with UN Resolution 1540.82  
Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter has been to illustrate the current extent and future 
possibilities for strengthening the national and international regulation of 
private military and security services in the EU and, thus, worldwide. It has 
demonstrated that private security companies are not only subject to exten-
sive standards and regulations within the member states, but that the EU is 
also controlling the export of an increasing range of military and security 
services ranging from technical assistance to support for military activities in 
embargoed destinations. 
What are the consequences of this analysis for the debate over the 
regulation of private military and security services? Most contemporary ef-
forts to control the growing private military sector have aimed towards new, 
preferably global, regimes on mercenaries and private military and security 
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firms. However, in order to function, these regimes not only need the support 
of a sufficient number of signatories, they also require a strong normative 
commitment in the absence of global monitoring mechanisms or effective 
sanctions. As a consequence, progress on a global regime for private military 
services has been limited. 
This chapter suggests that there might be a faster and more effective 
way to improve the regulation of private military and security services. It has 
demonstrated that overlapping national and regional regulations, while not 
perfect, can create a dynamic by which a centrally-placed actor such as the 
EU can exert pressure for harmonisation in favour of more comprehensive 
control mechanisms. This approach appeals to governments because com-
mon controls are more cost-efficient and easier to implement than national 
regulations by simplifying overlapping legislations. However, it is also sup-
ported by the industry because regional regulations eliminate competitive 
disadvantages. 
It might be argued that the example of the EU is not directly transfer-
able to other regional organisations because few have the central decision-
making capacity and authority of the EU. Neverthless, several arguments 
suggest that the evolution of military and security service regulations in 
Europe might still serve as a model. First, the EU Code of Conduct, Com-
mon Position 2003/468/CFSP and Joint Action 2000/401/CFSP were de-
cided intergovernmentally and on the basis of a consensus among the mem-
ber states. High levels of integration are thus not a precondition for common 
regulations. Second, the initial level and scope of EU export controls were 
limited. Rather than trying to achieve a maximum level of control immedi-
ately, member states agreed on a general framework in the form of the Code 
of Conduct which institutionalised cooperation and consultation on the issue 
of armaments export controls. While the original Code was only politically 
binding and very general in its stipulations, it was this institutional network 
which has created a permanent forum for the discussion, and implementa-
tion, of more extensive regulations. Finally, the EU, through enlargement 
and as an international actor in organisations such as the United Nations, 
seeks to increase the number of states which subscribe to the Code and re-
lated regulations. A small number of states who can agree on common regu-
lations for their growing national and international private military service 
industry might thus serve as a core for future regional or pan-regional con-
trols. In conclusion, the EU not only suggests how other regions might be 
able to improve the regulation of private military and security services, it 
also plays an active part in the expansion and export of its controls. 
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The United Nations and the Dilemma of 
Outsourcing Peacekeeping Operations 
Victor-Yves Ghebali 
In the context of globalisation, a process which has been accelerated by the 
revolution in information technologies and the shift from bipolarity to multi-
polarity, the UN reached out to private actors for obvious reasons: the tri-
umph of market ideology coupled with a growing scepticism (essentially 
from major Western powers) vis-à-vis the UN's overall capacity to deliver, 
and more generally the UN's failure to achieve a quantum leap from multi-
lateralism to globalisation.1 Thus, the continuous decline in official devel-
opment aid and the dramatic progress of economic globalisation convinced it 
that the state-centred approach to socio-economic development was leading 
to a dead end: hence the launching, by Secretary-General Kofi Annan, in 
July 2000, of the Global Compact Initiative.2 The UN also concluded that 
international peace and security were now endangered mainly by intra-state 
conflicts, that state collapse represented a regional and global security threat 
(with the paradox that extreme weakness could be as dangerous as excessive 
military capabilities), that armed non-state actors were now able (through 
terrorism or organised crime) to put at risk the security and good governance 
of nation-states, and that the victims of post-Cold War conflicts were pre-
dominantly civilian populations. Consequently, the UN realised that the con-
cept of collective security could no more be limited to the protection of 
states, but must include human security concerns so as to encompass devel-
opment and human rights.  
In parallel, voices emanating from some major Western governments, 
academia and the private sector itself made the case for outsourcing private 
security and/or military companies (PSC/PMC) to UN peacekeeping opera-
tions.3 Actually, PSC/PMC have been used within the UN system at large for 
the provision of logistical and support services, as well as security and polic-
ing functions. However, as noted in the Green Paper issued by the British 
House of Commons in 2002, if the services that private companies are pro-
viding to the UN (and also to NATO and the European Union) are relatively 
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uncontroversial, ‘more problematic is the notion that private military forces 
might be used for politically sensitive and high-profile areas of UN opera-
tions, such as peacekeeping and peace enforcement.’4 This paper analyses 
the shifting position of the UN towards mercenarism, the problem in the 
context of which the central debate on PSC/PMCs is taking place, and then 
focuses on the two major associated hurdles: the legal definition of the con-
cept of ‘mercenary’ and the advantages versus the inconveniences of a pos-
sible partial ‘privatisation’ of UN peacekeeping operations. 
The Shifting UN Position Towards Mercenarism – From the Special 
Rapporteur to the Working Group on Mercenaries 
As decolonisation unfolded in the 1960s, the UN General Assembly, the 
Security Council, ECOSOC and the Commission on Human Rights adopted 
repeated resolutions condemning the activities of mercenaries combating (at 
the behest of former colonial powers or domestic opposition groups) national 
liberation movements or groups aimed at destabilising newly-independent 
states. Given the persistence of the phenomenon, the General Assembly de-
cided in 1979 to undertake the framing of a binding international text against 
the recruitment, use, financing and training of mercenaries5 – which came to 
fruition only in 1989. Meanwhile, in 1987 the Commission on Human Rights 
appointed a Special Rapporteur to address the issue of the ‘use of mercenar-
ies as a means of violating human rights and impeding the exercise of the 
right to self-determination of peoples.’6 
The Special Rapporteur (Enrique Bernales Ballesteros, from Peru) be-
gan his work by addressing mercenary activities against the exercise of the 
right to self-determination of peoples carried out by individuals or more or 
less informal groups. Soon afterwards, he realised that mercenary action was 
not restricted to situations of armed conflict, but could also be closely linked 
to organised crime – through illicit trafficking of human beings, weapons, 
diamonds and drugs serving, fuelling and prolonging armed conflicts – and 
international terrorism.7 As a consequence, mercenaries were consistently 
labelled criminals, offering multiple services in multiple roles. At first fo-
cused on Africa, the continent the most affected by mercenary activities, the 
Special Rapporteur progressively extended his investigations to Central 
America (Guatemala, Salvador, Nicaragua), the Caribbean (anti-Cuban mer-
cenary activities), South Pacific (Papua New Guinea), former Yugoslavia, as 
well as to a number of former Soviet Republics (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Geor-
gia, Moldova, Tajikistan).8 
The United Nations and the Dilemma of  
Outsourcing Peacekeeping Operations 
215 
The Special Rapporteur's task was certainly not easy: his annual re-
ports were criticised ‘for focusing overly on theoretical and legal questions’ 
and, at the end of the day, little attention was paid to them.9 Over time, the 
Special Rapporteur realised that the problem of mercenarism was changing 
and acquiring aggravating characteristics: initially concerning certain ‘dogs 
of war’ driven by ideology and in search of thrill and financial gain, it now 
involved corporate firms (PSCs and PMCs) offering services to recognised 
governments with close links to major Western governments. He directly 
addressed the issue of PSC/PMCs from 1997, in relation to the activities of 
Executive Outcomes in Africa, as well the operations conducted by other 
companies (Sandline International, Military Professional Resources Inc., 
Keeni Mine Services, British DefenceSystems, Air Scan…) throughout the 
world.10  
From the outset, Ballesteros regretfully noted that PSC/PMCs were of-
fering ‘a kind of alternative security model for countries with internal con-
flicts that are practically unmanageable for the Governments concerned.’11 
Consequently, those companies were taking upon themselves responsibilities 
and functions hitherto exclusively reserved to states.12 The Special Rappor-
teur considered that this ‘new operational model’ was leading to situations 
where the state was being supplanted by private actors in what constituted its 
basic raison d'être.13 From there, he went on to argue that ‘no Government is 
authorised to exercise the attributes of authority against the sovereignty of 
the State itself, because responsibility for internal order and security in a 
sovereign country is an obligation which may not be renounced or trans-
ferred …’.14 He added that the state cannot divest itself of its basic obliga-
tions in this area because it ‘would no longer have any obligation to defend 
peace and life and would be replaced in military matters by private compa-
nies that by definition are concerned with their own interests…’.15 Further-
more, he considered that if states were prepared to give up an intrinsic ele-
ment of their sovereignty, this should be clearly expressed and consented to 
by the population.16 Finally, he signalled that such a development would 
affect the nature, structure and functions of the state, while at the same time 
changing the nature of international relations themselves.17 For the Special 
Rapporteur, such a development was not only unwelcome as matter of prin-
ciple, but also for two basic practical reasons. 
First, while PSC/PMCs established corporate structures and signed 
contracts with internationally recognised governments, the result was in-
variably a ‘formally tolerated mercenary intervention’.18 Given their very 
composition, PSC/PMCs are ‘mercenary companies which work with mer-
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cenaries and carry out mercenary activities.’19 In any case, ‘the selling of 
security operations’ results in allowing ‘intervention in internal affairs by 
paramilitary forces with a mercenary component.’20 Second, ‘the privatisa-
tion of war’ has significant consequences for such important issues as the 
self-determination of peoples, state sovereignty and national and interna-
tional guarantees of the observance of human rights.21 Handing over such 
type of authority to a private entity not only amounted to ‘agreeing to a limi-
tation of State sovereignty’, but could also result in impairing the basic hu-
man rights of the population.22 Proceeding from those premises, the Special 
Rapporteur did not suggest prohibiting the existence of PSC/PMCs but the 
establishment of clear and precise limits for their activities by means of 
regulation. Considering that PSC/PMCs must act within certain bounds, he 
argued that ‘the appropriate course of action is to devise regulations clearly 
establishing the areas in which private companies may legally operate’, that 
is to say clearly fixing ‘what the State can legitimately transfer to the private 
sector in terms of military security and what should remain in State hands 
because it is inherent to the State's very existence.’23 In this connection, the 
most important point was to prohibit PSC/PMCs from recruiting, hiring, 
financing or using mercenaries to fight in armed conflicts. In other words, to 
avoid the formation of private armies.24 
In his final Report to the Commission on Human Rights (2003), the 
Special Rapporteur arrived at four main conclusions. First, despite all efforts 
by the UN and regional organisations to combat mercenary activities, such 
activities had not disappeared; they continued to occur in many parts of the 
world in multiple forms and represented a danger to peace and security in 
weak countries, especially in Africa and small island states.25 Second, 
whether acting individually or not, the mercenary still performed as a viola-
tor of human rights.26 Third, one of the major obstacles to the fulfilment of 
the Special Rapporteur's mandate was the absence of a clear definition of a 
what precisely a ‘mercenary’ was: hence the need for updating the 1989 UN 
Convention on mercenaries.27 Fourth, the Special Rapporteur recommended 
that ‘private companies offering military assistance, consultancy and security 
services on the international market should be at least regulated and placed 
under international supervision’ and that ‘the crimes and offences committed 
by employees of such companies must not go unpunished as is usually the 
case.’28 
In July 2004, the Commission on Human Rights decided to extend the 
mandate of the Special Rapporteur for a period of three years and appointed 
to the position to Shaista Shameem (Fiji). In her two successive reports (ad-
dressed to the Commission on Human Rights and the General Assembly in 
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2004-2005), the new Special Rapporteur adopted a pragmatic approach 
sharply contrasting with her predecessor's longstanding positions.29 Stressing 
the need for ‘a paradigm shift’ with respect to the mandate, she advocated ‘a 
fundamental rethinking of the issue of mercenarism and its relation to the 
promotion and protection of human rights’ as well as ‘a fundamental recon-
sideration of (…) the responsibility of States and the United Nations with 
respect to the activities of actors currently legally defined as mercenaries.’30 
Hence the need for a debate on the role of the State with respect to the use of 
force ‘so as to reach a common understanding on the respective duties and 
responsibilities of the different State and non-State actors in the current con-
text, and their respective obligations for the promotion and protection of 
human rights’, the core issue being to identify ‘who is entitled to legitimacy 
in the use of force in the current political and security climate.’31 Such a 
debate, she concluded, could conceivably lead to ‘a fundamental revamping 
or the total revocation of the UN 1989 Convention on mercenaries’ and also 
yield ‘a useful outcome for the United Nations itself with respect to effective 
maintenance of its peacekeeping and peacebuilding mandates.’32 
In line with this ‘paradigm shift’, Shaista Shameem cautioned against 
confusing mercenaries with other actors supplying security services in trou-
bled world spots: ‘while there may be occasions when the activities of mer-
cenaries merge with activities of these other actors, it is important to avoid 
making assumptions’, including not overstating the link between mercenar-
ism and terrorist activity.33 Thus, as regards PMC/PSCs, she considered that 
in the absence of a satisfactory definition of mercenaries and corresponding 
legislation, a pragmatic approach should be promoted in the interim: encour-
aging company self-regulation rather than regulation imposed by external 
bodies, to promote a sense of ownership and sustainability in the implemen-
tation of agreed measures.34 She noted that such companies were under con-
tract with governments, NGOs and, ‘increasingly, the United Nations’, to 
provide security, logistical support and training in conflict and post-conflict 
contexts, for example, in Iraq and Afghanistan,35 and that there was inade-
quate justification for their criminalisation under the UN Convention.36 Ac-
cordingly, consideration should be given to identifying PMC/PSCs primarily 
as private sector actors to which should be extended ‘the corresponding prin-
ciples and consultations, including the United Nations Global Compact, the 
draft Norms on the responsibilities of transnational corporations and other 
business enterprises with regard to human rights and voluntary principles on 
security and human rights.’37 The new Special Rapporteur then went on to 
suggest ‘to explore whether licensing and regulation of genuine private secu-
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rity companies, such as through strong national legislation or an international 
registration mechanism, could serve to identify clear lines of accountability 
for bona fide companies and thereby distinguish other organisations engag-
ing in mercenary activity to the detriment of human rights and the rights of 
peoples to self-determination.’38  
During her brief mandate (2004-2005), the second Special Rapporteur 
took the initiative to contact a number of PMC/PSCs – Beni Tal, Erinys Af-
rica, Northbridge Services Group, ArmorGroup International, Blackwater, 
Military Professional Resources Incorporated, as well as a US-based indus-
try association, the International Peace Operations Association (IPOA) – to 
explore the possibility of a code of conduct consonant with international 
human rights law and standards.39 IPOA informed her that it had already 
developed in 2000, in coordination with several NGOs, a code of conduct for 
its corporate members operating in conflict or post-conflict environments, 
and that human rights were the key concern in the original draft of the text – 
which was subsequently improved by contributions from legal experts, aca-
demics and human rights specialists.40 More significantly, Shaista Shameem 
held a meeting in London (June 2005), convened at her suggestion, with 
representatives of a number of ‘members of the peace and security industry’ 
which ended with a joint statement.41 The text affirmed that ‘Peace and Se-
curity Companies within this industry fully support all appropriate interna-
tional human rights instruments, norms and principles, and seek to engage 
the UN, NGOs and humanitarian organisations to see how we can best con-
tinue to support these norms.’ Consequently, it requested that in light of the 
fact that those corporations were ‘frequently employed by UN member 
States and the UN own entities, we strongly recommend that the UN re-
examine the relevance of the term mercenary’ because ‘this derogatory term 
is completely unacceptable and is too often used to describe fully legal and 
legitimate companies engaged in vital support operations for humanitarian 
peace and stability operations.’ The communiqué also stressed that ‘the in-
dustry is keen to engage with UN mechanisms and is willing to examine a 
wide variety of options to ensure that the private sector continues to be an 
increasing and positive presence in peace and stability operations’ before 
announcing the convening of ‘a future industry conference to develop a uni-
fied international code of conduct related to private sector operations in con-
flict/post conflict environments’.42 
In sum, in the second Special Rapporteur's view, PMC/PSCs could 
help compensate the deficiencies of the UN when the latter is confronted 
with widespread violations of human rights and genocide, it being under-
stood that such an option ‘need not be at the expense of the contributions to 
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peacekeeping or peacebuilding missions by member States, but in addition to 
them [and] provided there is a properly registered vetting mechanism and 
guidelines for private companies put in place in advance.’43 Shaista 
Shameem's positions displeased many Third World governments: while that 
remains undocumented, it can hardly be doubted. The Commission on Hu-
man Rights abruptly decided, in April 2005, to end the mandate of the Spe-
cial Rapporteur and to replace it overnight by a Working Group made up of 
five regional independent experts for a period of three years.44 The Commis-
sion tasked the Working Group to continue the work previously done by the 
two successive Special Rapporteurs, taking into account the proposal for a 
new legal definition of a mercenary drafted by Enrique Bernales Ballesteros 
before his departure.45 Since then, the Working Group has been concentrat-
ing on two issues: the role of the state as the primary holder of the monopoly 
of the use of force, and agreements between governments which led to im-
munity from accountability for human rights violations by PMC/PSCs and 
their employees. At the same time, it adopted a text outlining its methods of 
work, including the establishment of a monitoring and complaints mecha-
nism to address complaints regarding mercenaries’ activities. It also decided 
to elaborate concrete proposals and advisory opinions on possible new stan-
dards, general guidelines or basic principles, to examine (as a special cate-
gory) situations where children are involved in mercenary-related activities, 
to make use of an ‘urgent action’ procedure in case of need and, finally, to 
establish a network of academics to further support the gathering of informa-
tion on and study of different regional experiences. 
As of the time of writing (July 2006) this chapter, the Working Group 
had submitted two reports.46 Noting that some UN departments, funds, pro-
grammes and organisations, were reportedly utilising the services of 
PSC/PMCs, the Working Group expressed the intention of seeking further 
information on the nature and scope of this practice and the criteria used for 
selecting these companies, with a view to ensuring the appropriate applica-
tion of international human rights standards and international humanitarian 
law.47 In the meantime, it tabled four suggestions. First, the Working Group 
recommended the application of the normative provisions of the draft Norms 
on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business 
Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights (2003) to PSC/PMCs providing 
military and security services in more than one country or as a cluster of 
economic entities operating in two or more countries, with particular care to 
be given to the right to security of persons, the rights of workers and respect 
for national sovereignty, territorial integrity and human rights.48 Second, it 
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considered that states from which PSC/PMCs exported military assistance, 
consultancy and security services should adopt appropriate legislation and 
regulatory mechanisms to control and monitor their activities, including a 
system of registering and licensing which would authorise these companies 
to operate and to be sanctioned when the norms were not respected.49 Third, 
it called upon governments making use of PSC/PMCs’ services to establish 
registering and licensing regulatory mechanisms for ensuring that human 
rights were respected at domestic level.50 Fourth, the Working Group en-
dorsed Shaista Shameem's suggestion as to the convening of a high-level 
round-table on the role of the state as primary holder of the monopoly on the 
use of force.51 
The Legal Hurdle: The Definition of a Mercenary 
Throughout his lengthy tenure (1987-2003), the first Special Rapporteur 
realised that the failure to curb mercenary activities effectively was due 
above all to the loopholes and shortcomings of the legal definition of a mer-
cenary contained in the three international instruments in force, namely Ad-
ditional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions (1977), the OAU Libre-
ville Convention for the Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa (1977) and 
the UN International Convention against the recruitment, use, financing and 
training of mercenaries (1989).52 
Article 47 of Additional Protocol I considers the issue of mercenaries 
in the strict framework of international humanitarian law: it denies the mer-
cenary the rights of a combatant or of a prisoner of war without referring to 
state obligations towards mercenarism.53 From this limited scope, it defines 
the mercenary through a set of six cumulative elements, qualifying him as 
any person who a) is specially recruited (locally or abroad) in order to fight 
in an armed conflict; b) does, in fact, take a direct part in the hostilities; c) is 
motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the desire for private 
gain and is actually promised, by or on behalf of a party to the conflict, ma-
terial compensation substantially in excess of that promised or paid to com-
batants of similar ranks and functions in the armed forces of that party; d) is 
neither a national of a party to the conflict nor a resident of territory con-
trolled by a party to the conflict; is not a member of the armed forces of a 
party to the conflict; and who has not been sent by a state non-party to the 
conflict on official duty as a member of its armed forces. 
The UN Convention repeats the definitions of Article 47, but differs 
by specifying that a mercenary is any person who also participates in a con-
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certed act of violence aimed at overthrowing a government or undermining 
the constitutional order or the territorial integrity of a state – a provision 
covering internal conflicts. In addition, it creates international obligations in 
relation to offences committed not only by a mercenary (Article 1), but also 
by any person who recruits, uses, finances or trains mercenaries (Article 2) 
and any person who is the accomplice of a person who commits or attempts 
to commit any of the offences set forth in Convention (Article 4 b). State 
parties are bound to make the offences punishable by appropriate penalties 
(Article 5 § 3) and to cooperate, directly or through the UN Secretary-
General, in preventing and prosecuting the abovementioned offences (Arti-
cles 7, 8, 10 and 14). Notably, the UN Convention also provides for fair trial 
guarantees for captured mercenaries (Article 10 §§ 3-4 and Article 11).54 
As for the OAU Convention, it is a regional instrument prohibiting 
both mercenary activities and mercenarism as a crime against peace and 
security in Africa, whether committed by an individual, a group, an associa-
tion, a State or a State representative (Article 1 §§ 2 and 3). It replicates the 
substance and letter of Article 47 of Protocol I. Although establishing obli-
gations comparable to those of the UN Convention (articles 6 to 11), the text 
differs from the latter in that states may be accused of breaches of the Con-
vention ‘before any competent OAU or international organisation tribunal or 
body’ (Article 5 § 2). Furthermore, by explicitly referring to ‘any person, 
natural or juridical, who commits the crime of mercenarism’ (art 10 2 c), it 
covers the responsibility of private companies. 
The definition contained in all texts present obvious shortcomings 
which have been outlined by the initial Special Rapporteur.55 First, the ele-
ments of the three definitions being cumulative (they have to be all met si-
multaneously), makes it difficult to categorise someone as a mercenary. Sec-
ond, the requirement that the mercenary takes a direct part in the hostilities 
excludes military advisers or counsellors and, more fundamentally, does not 
consider that mercenaries can engage in illicit trafficking, organised crime 
and terrorism. Third, besides being difficult to prove, the condition related to 
excessive material compensation does not take into account conscripts and 
foreign nationals driven by sincere convictions of humanitarian, ideological, 
political or religious nature. Fourth, the nationality requirement overlooks 
the situation where a mercenary acquires the citizenship of the country in 
which he fights in order to avoid being categorised as such.56 Fifth, it is not 
uncommon that mercenaries integrate into the armed forces of the side on 
whose behalf they are acting. All loopholes are further aggravated by the fact 
that the legislation of most states does not criminalise mercenary activities, 
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basically because weak states affected by internecine conflicts are willing to 
hire PSC/PMCs and powerful ones may use them as undercover tools of 
foreign policy. At the end of his mandate, after 16 years of reporting, the 
first Special Rapporteur suggested a new legal definition, presenting the 
following improvements: 57 
a. A mercenary is any person who is specially recruited not only in order 
to participate in an armed conflict, but also in other crimes such as 
‘destabilisation of legitimate governments, terrorism, trafficking in 
persons, drugs and arms and any other illicit trafficking, sabotage, se-
lective assassination, transnational organised crime, forcible control of 
valuable natural resources and unlawful possession of nuclear or bac-
teriological materials.’  
b. The nationality criterion should be taken into account when the mer-
cenary acquires the citizenship or the nationality of the country in 
which he fights or when he ‘is hired to commit the crime in his coun-
try of nationality and uses his status as national to conceal the fact that 
he is being used as a mercenary by the State or organisation that hires 
him.’ 
c. A mercenary is any person who does not form part of police forces as 
well as the regular armed forces at whose side the person fights. 
d. A mercenary is any person who is specially recruited for the purpose 
of participating in a concerted act of violence aimed at overthrowing a 
government or otherwise undermining the constitutional, legal, eco-
nomic or financial order or the valuable natural resources of a State, 
undermining the territorial integrity and basic territorial infrastruc-
ture of a State; committing an attack against the life, integrity or secu-
rity of persons or committing terrorist acts and denying self-
determination or maintaining racist regimes or foreign occupation. 
The reference to the ‘valuable natural resources of a State’ refers indi-
rectly to those PSC/PMCs whose activities have been rewarded by 
mineral or oil concessions. 
e. ‘Where a person is convicted of an offence under rticle 1 of the Con-
vention, any dominant motive of the perpetrator should be taken into 
account when sentencing the offender.’ 
When taking over as Special Rapporteur, Shaista Shameem noted that, 
given the futile number of ratifications to the UN Convention, its parameters 
should be reconsidered.58 She also pointed out that a new legal definition of 
a mercenary would be useless, all available or proposed definitions being 
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unworkable for practical purposes.59 In her opinion, a fresh definition might 
be arrived at ‘only after a policy decision has been reached on the fundamen-
tal question of whether States wish to continue to be solely responsible for 
the use of force, for declaring war and for sanctioning the use of force within 
certain internationally acceptable rules of engagement.’60 In this connection, 
‘the first question to be determined, therefore, is what is to be considered as 
outside the law and criminalised, and what is to be considered acceptable 
within the new geopolitical environment and the deregulation of State mili-
tary activity.’ Only then can the question of the definition of a mercenary, in 
the Special Rapporteur’s view, respond to the realities facing the interna-
tional community today. ‘A new legal definition can then be drafted with 
ease and is likely to be more acceptable to Member States, which have pro-
vided such contradictory replies to the notes verbales on this issue.’61 
In sum, the absence of an all-encompassing and unambiguous defini-
tion is not without consequences. Given its non-enforceability and the ab-
sence of a monitoring mechanism, it allows mercenaries to act with impu-
nity. At the same time, it does not permit PMC/PSCs to avoid being accused 
of performing mercenary-type activities, with no distinction whatsoever 
made between ‘reputable and disreputable private sector operators.’62 
The Political Hurdle: The Externalisation of UN Peacekeeping 
Operations 
In conjunction with the crisis that affected UN peacekeeping operations in 
the mid-1990s (due to the disastrous mismanagement of conflicts in Bosnia, 
Rwanda and Somalia) and following the apparent successes of Executive 
Outcomes in Angola and Sierra Leone, the idea of outsourcing UN conflict 
and post-conflict management functions to private actors gained ground. In 
June 1998, Kofi Annan declared that during the Rwanda tragedy of 1994, 
when he was Head of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and when 
the UN needed skilled soldiers to separate fighters from refugees in the 
Rwandan refugee camps in Goma, he ‘considered the possibility of engaging 
a private firm’, but did not do so because he felt the world was not ‘ready to 
privatise peace.’63 Nevertheless, PSC/PMCs were gradually called upon to 
provide logistical and support services as well as fulfil security and policing 
functions (including mine action) in UN peacekeeping operations. For in-
stance, beside delivering logistical services to ECOMOG, International 
Charter and Defense Systems provided local guards to UNAVEM in An-
Victor-Yves Ghebali 224
gola.64 Pacific Architects & Engineers also provided logistics to UNAMSIL 
in Sierra Leone;65 in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, it refurbished 
airfields and managed air traffic control for MONUC. Furthermore, the UN's 
humanitarian branches relied on PSC/PMCs to ensure the protection of their 
personnel and premises.66 By contrast, and apart from the coordination of 
Sandline International with ECOMOG, so far PSC/PMCs have not been 
engaged in military support for peacekeeping operations.67 Whether emanat-
ing from governments, the security business industry itself or academics, the 
case for the use of private contractors revolves around two main twinned 
arguments: the deficiencies inherent in UN peacekeeping operations and  the 
capacities of PSC/PMCs to provide a viable alternative in this regard.68 
Notoriously, UN peacekeeping operations are, more often than not, 
conducted by ill-trained, poorly-armed and badly-coordinated volunteers 
representing different cultures, operating with heterogeneous equipment and 
minimal funding and, to make things worse, lacking strong motivation. This 
means that the UN lacks the capacity for undertaking large-scale military 
enforcement actions and that a number of conflicts could not be effectively 
addressed by means of standard peacekeeping operations. No wonder, then, 
that UN peacekeeping is in constant crisis. Although the UN is unfairly and 
routinely scapegoated for that, the root of the crisis stems from the reluc-
tance of Western and other major governments to become enmeshed in con-
flicts that do not directly affect their vital interests. Be that as it may, 
PSC/PMCs affirm that they can offer a viable alternative to the major pow-
ers’ lack of commitment and UN constraints; they are able to deploy much 
more rapidly (in terms of days and not of months), make use of highly-
skilled troops with a firm chain of command, use compatible equipment and 
perform  assigned objectives with much better efficiency than the UN and, 
moreover, at much cheaper cost. Executive Outcomes claimed that it could 
have been able to prevent the Rwandan genocide.69 Today, as the Darfur 
tragedy (which has caused the deaths of 180,000 people and two million 
refugees in three years) is still raging, the private sector has expressed will-
ingness to intervene should they be officially asked. The main thrust of the 
PSC/PMCs’ argument is that, in certain circumstances, the international 
community’s choice lies between abdication or outsourcing, all the more 
since some conflicts can only be resolved by enforcement measures. 
Admittedly, the contribution of PSC/PMCs could take three main 
complementary forms: intervention prior to the deployment of a UN peace-
keeping operation in order to secure the zones in which the latter will operate 
(this is what the US-led UNITAF coalition of the willing was expected to do 
in Somalia but did not); back-up of an already deployed UN operation aimed 
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at pacifying certain highly troubled zones (a role akin to that the European 
Union's Operation Artemis performed in support of MONUC in the Democ-
ratic Republic of Congo); or monitoring the continuing implementation of 
peacebuilding arrangements after the withdrawal of a UN operation for the 
sake of deterring any possible upsetting of those arrangements. 
No consensus yet exists (or is emerging) to use ‘guns for hire’ for two 
basic reasons. First, a number of governments consider that, as a modern 
form of mercenarism, PSC/PMCs represent illegitimate non-state actors 
supplanting the basic functions traditionally reserved for the state. Their 
perception is compounded by two additional political factors. On the one 
hand, given the close relations they entertain with their domestic military 
establishments, PSC/PMCs are used by major Western states as tools for a 
covert parallel or proxy foreign policy. On the other hand, companies are 
often closely associated with mining and natural resource industries. In any 
event, UN peacekeeping operations are a source of income for poor states 
which can only ‘dispute the expenditure of UN funds on private military 
companies rather than on the current practice, which helps to support their 
national armed forces.’70 Second, the possible use of contracted peacekeep-
ers raises fundamental problems of accountability, especially in weak states 
where law enforcement devices are lacking. Reportedly, PSC/PMC person-
nel have often violated fundamental human rights and international humani-
tarian law.71 The trouble is that, contrary to regular armed forces, PSC/PMCs 
operate outside criminal justice standards, without real national or interna-
tional oversight, which means that even in case of egregious misconduct (as 
for the abuses committed in Iraq's Abu Ghraib prison) they are seldom 
prosecuted and even less punished. It has been suggested that a regulatory 
framework at both domestic and international level could help to alleviate 
the accountability problem.72 Arguably, the best way to make private com-
panies accountable is through domestic legislation. However, besides their 
heterogeneity, PSC/PMCs conduct their activities in foreign countries (out-
side the purview of domestic law) and can move from one jurisdiction to 
another.73 More significantly, whether strong or weak, the most interested 
states are reluctant to constrain their liberty to hire private military contrac-
tors. Undoubtedly, without adequate regulation at domestic level, interna-
tional regulation (through the setting up under UN auspices of a regulatory 
body to register and monitor the activities of PSC/PMCs, complemented by 
a Code of Conduct) would simply be ineffective. 
Victor-Yves Ghebali 226
Conclusion 
As PSC/PMCs have become a standard feature in the post-Cold War security 
landscape, the UN can clearly not avoid closer interaction with them. How-
ever, there are two insuperable obstacles to this. The first is that one cannot 
reasonably expect the UN to outsource part of its peacekeeping operations in 
the absence of both adequate domestic and international legislation regulat-
ing the activities of PSC/PMCs, depriving them of the infamous label of 
mercenarism and recognising their legitimacy. As to the second, the out-
sourcing of peacekeeping on a regular or irregular basis would entail abdica-
tion of the ‘Weberian’ privilege which, under Article 42 of the Charter, at-
tributes to the Security Council the monopoly of the legitimate use of force 
for the maintenance of international peace and security. When states decide 
to externalise part of their military prerogatives for clear reasons (using 
proxies to pursue foreign policy objectives in the case of strong countries 
and exercising the right of self-defence, consistent with Article 51 of the UN 
Charter, for weak ones), this might be debatable but remains perfectly under-
standable. By contrast, the reneging by the UN – the repository of interna-
tional legitimacy – on the cornerstone provisions of its own Charter is a 
qualitatively different thing. As acknowledged by a prominent figure of the 
security business industry (Doug Brooks, President of the International 
Peace Operations Association), the UN remains against all odds the natural 
solution to international peace and security problems because it has got 
‘some surprising capabilities and expertise to help with humanitarian ser-
vices, peace making and state building’ and remains the most qualified in-
ternational organisation in the world capable of organising humanitarian 
relief on a massive scale.74  
It would be wrong to assume that the choice for the UN is between 
outsourcing or indifference to protracted conflicts. Ideally speaking, there 
are two rational solutions. The first one is the appropriate beefing up of the 
UN’s peacekeeping capabilities. Indeed, all arguments advanced in favour of 
private contractors, miss a crucial point: the UN could be an effective secu-
rity organisation should its member states take the step of endowing it with a 
standing rapid deployment force – a prospect which at present is unpalatable 
to most if not all of the Security Council's permanent members.75 The second 
solution is systematic large-scale bilateral and multilateral assistance efforts 
to improve the good governance of the weak states’ legitimate security sec-
tor. 
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Assessing the Relationship Between 
Humanitarian Actors and Private Security 
Companies 
Christopher Spearin 
Since the end of the Cold War, interest regarding the interaction between 
Relief and Development Agencies (RDAs) and international private security 
companies (PSCs) has risen in waves as determined by humanitarian crises.1  
In the mid-1990s, the first wave followed the genocide in Central Africa. In 
response to this disaster, the non-governmental organisation (NGO) CARE 
Canada issued the Mean Times report that openly suggested the need for 
further interaction between RDAs and PSCs.2 Later, in the wake of hostili-
ties in Sierra Leone instigated by the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) at 
the start of the new century, further attention was given to the option of 
PSCs maintaining the humanitarian space. In the present day, three specific 
conflict milieux have again raised interest pertaining to PSCs: Afghanistan, 
Iraq and Sudan. 
Though RDA/PSC interaction is increasing, this reliance is conten-
tious and has remained so despite the differences in the waves of interest 
(location, actors, etc.).3 Many RDAs eschew PSCs for strategic, operational 
and ethical reasons.4 Indeed, choosing to rely upon a PSC, a body that for 
some is nothing more than a group of mercenaries in the most pejorative 
sense, is a difficult and trade-off-laden decision for RDAs. 
In order to inform a nuanced perspective on a complex issue, this 
chapter examines RDA/PSC interaction by considering the operational im-
plications, legitimacy concerns, and culture divides that it poses. To do this, 
the chapter first looks at the threats RDA personnel face and suggests the 
reasons for these threats. It then outlines the relevant PSC services for RDAs 
and indicates examples of RDA/PSC interaction. The chapter asserts that 
many of the concerns about RDAs using PSCs have changed, so that the 
debates should no longer be perceived exactly as they were in the first wave 
of interaction. 
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Recognition and understanding of these contextual factors and their 
changing dynamics are important so that RDAs can make informed determi-
nations about contractually engaging PSCs. The chapter concludes with a 
number of policy recommendations drawn from this analysis. 
Relief and Development Agencies Under Threat 
Since the early 1990s, RDAs, regardless of their mandate, organisational 
culture and operational ethos, have faced intimidation and violence in a vari-
ety of conflict-plagued regions.5 One study concludes that ‘malicious acts’ 
claimed the lives of 218 UN civilian personnel from 1992 to 2004.6 Simi-
larly, a Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health report finds that 
over a 14 year period ending in 1998, ‘intentional death’ was the leading 
cause of death for personnel in 32 RDAs. The study ‘The Year of Living 
Dangerously’ establishes that more humanitarian workers died in 2003 than 
in any other year, while the 2005 No Relief study, perhaps the largest vic-
timisation survey of RDA personnel ever conducted, calculates that 20 per-
cent of RDA respondents were subject to ‘security incidents’ such as assault, 
robbery, intimidation, and sexual violence.7 Equally troubling is the observa-
tion that security incidents are likely to be under-reported by RDAs.8  
Why has this violence occurred? At times, RDA personnel were sim-
ply caught in the crossfire. On other occasions, armed actors purposely at-
tacked RDA operations, even if they were conducted in an independent, 
neutral and impartial manner, as dictated by the humanitarian ethic, because 
of the political effect they were having on the ground. Similarly, RDAs were 
attacked because of the economic value of the goods they provided. What is 
more, in many countries, the line is often blurred between military and 
criminal activity; stolen funds and provisions can both facilitate military 
operations and line pockets. In this vein, the No Relief study finds that ‘crime 
appears to be the biggest contributor to insecurity’.9 
While the existence of these catalytic factors has been ongoing, other 
factors, noted since the terrorist events of 11 September 2001, have brought 
into question the integrity of the humanitarian ethic. First, it is increasingly 
plain that the diversity of RDAs and the desire many of them have for inde-
pendent status means that there is a lack of coherence in terms of how the 
RDA community presents itself to those in conflict zones, combatant and 
noncombatant alike. As a result, indiscretions and controversial policies by 
one RDA risk painting the entire in-theatre RDA presence with the same 
brush. Though this does not justify attacks upon those with protected non-
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combatant status, it does threaten to spread violence and intimidation due to 
a lack of differentiation. Additionally, though many RDAs assert that they 
observe the humanitarian ethic, they often provide more than emergency 
relief. Human rights advocacy, development, reconstruction and rehabilita-
tion might also be part of their overall agendas; they are multi-mandate 
agencies with activities that have political, economic and social repercus-
sions. Though RDA activities may be normatively positive, they may never-
theless invoke hostility because they change how ‘humanitarians’ are per-
ceived.10 
Second, in the era of the ‘Global War on Terror’, one characterised by 
asymmetric warfare, insurgency and terrorist activity, RDAs may be tar-
geted. From one standpoint, this may be because traditional state-sanctioned 
humanitarian norms and understandings are rejected by religious extremists 
or other non-state actors in conflict zones intent on accruing tactical or stra-
tegic advantage. The fact that groups in Islamic countries have labelled RDA 
personnel ‘the enemy’ or that Mullah Omar stated in October 2003 that 
Western humanitarian organisations were the ‘worst enemies of Islam’ rein-
force this line of thought.11 
But from another standpoint, armed actors in conflict zones may have 
certain cause for upset because, though many RDAs may be uncomfortable 
with this, RDAs are increasingly viewed by states, particularly the US, as 
part of an overall ‘peace consolidation strategy’.12 In this light, RDAs, re-
gardless of their desire for independence, are thought to be but one of the 
instruments that states can employ to promote stability, security, and recon-
struction. This is a difficult predicament for many RDAs, especially humani-
tarian NGOs. Troubling, therefore, are the words of one US military officer, 
speaking with respect to Afghanistan, that further obscure the distinctions 
between relief, development and military action: ‘The war will be won by 
humanitarian workers and not soldiers because they, the humanitarian work-
ers, address the root causes of the conflict’. Similarly, in October 2001, then 
US Secretary of State Colin Powell referred to NGOs as ‘force multipliers’ 
that were part of the ‘combat team’.13 For Kjell Bjork and Richard Jones, the 
implications are clear: ‘[T]he blurring of boundaries between civilian and 
military distinctions means that to some attackers their motivation for attack 
is based on their perception that all foreigners are in some way or another 
working for the consolidation and expansion’ of foreign political and mili-
tary objectives.  RDAs, therefore, become proxy or soft targets.14 
The cumulative result is the hampering of RDA activism which in turn 
means that fewer communities in need benefit from relief and development 
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assistance. The Afghanistan NGO Safety Office (ANSO), for instance, finds 
that because of security concerns in Afghanistan in 2004–2005, 44 percent 
of respondents curtailed their programming and an additional 35 percent 
operated in fewer areas than initially planned.15 As for specific examples in 
2004, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) closed its operations in Afghanistan, 
CARE and World Vision suspended their work in Iraq, and Save the Chil-
dren removed its personnel from Sudan. Overall, for the authors of the No 
Relief study, ‘an unprecedented number of NGOs are pulling out of countries 
in the absence of adequate security guarantees’.16 
PSC Roles 
Just as the reasons why RDA personnel are threatened are complex, so too 
are the methods employed to bolster security. Generally, RDAs select their 
approach to security on the basis of three options: acceptance, protection and 
deterrence. The UN’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assis-
tance (OCHA) describes the acceptance approach as ‘based on the premise 
that local communities and power structures will allow and even support 
humanitarian activities if these activities are well understood. The accep-
tance approach requires that those in a position to undermine humanitarian 
work must see it to be consistent and believe it to be independent’.17 Security 
for RDA personnel is facilitated through social relationships, solidarity with 
local populations, and the development of trust. For many, the alternatives of 
relying upon protective procedures and armed actors sends the wrong signal; 
it affects the image of humanitarianism, hinders the solidarity relief and de-
velopment providers are meant to have with affected communities, and con-
tributes to a ‘war culture’.18 Thus, the protection approach, with its emphasis 
on ‘hardening’ of targets through training, potentially self-isolating security 
procedures, and security equipment is to be eschewed. This is doubly so for 
the deterrence approach manifest in a counter-threat stance that involves 
armed personnel. 
However, in light of the increased violence RDAs face, one can ques-
tion the continued, or at least the perceived, universal utility of the accep-
tance approach. Indeed, a 2004 study made by the European Commission’s 
Directorate-General for Humanitarian Aid (ECHO) finds several problematic 
features with this approach. For instance, the acceptance model makes it less 
likely some RDAs will challenge the status quo with respect to human rights 
conditions in theatre. The acceptance model still leaves RDAs vulnerable to 
crime. RDAs often assume the inherent goodness of their work and do not 
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feel the need to constantly negotiate their continued presence. Finally, in 
environments in which RDAs are linked, rightly or wrongly, to foreign po-
litical agendas, the acceptance model becomes moot because of the difficul-
ties in illustrating uniqueness and independence, either between RDAs and 
intervening states or within the RDA community itself.19 
As a result, the No Relief study finds that due to security risks, RDA 
strategies often move away from the acceptance pole and towards the protec-
tion and deterrence end of the security continuum. The study also finds that 
32 percent of respondents have relied upon armed guards, an increase from 
the 17 percent found in an initial 2002–2003 assessment.20 This signals a 
move towards the end of the security spectrum where PSCs become more 
relevant. 
The considerable range of potential PSC services for RDAs includes 
the following: threat and context assessments, security audits, policy devel-
opment for risk control and evacuation, security training, and the provision 
of security management and guards.21 For the latter service, this can cover 
both compounds and RDA convoys. In recent years, several RDA clients 
have taken advantage of these services, including CARE, CARITAS, ECHO, 
IRC, Save the Children, the UN Development Programme, the UN High 
Commission on Refugees, the UN Office for Project Services, the UN Chil-
dren’s Fund, the UN World Food Programme, and Worldvision. As for ser-
vice providers, Peter Singer determines that about 25 percent of firms that he 
describes as ‘high-end’ have had RDA clients.22 A list of PSCs that have 
worked with RDAs includes ArmorGroup, Control Risks Group, Global 
Risk Strategies, Erinys, Hart Security, Kroll, Lifeguard, MPRI, Olive, 
RONCO, Southern Cross, and Triple Canopy. 
Challenges and Dilemmas for RDAs 
Despite the description above, it is clear that many RDAs have yet to con-
tract PSCs; there has been no bandwagoning towards the PSC alternative 
amongst RDAs. Put differently, if one extrapolates from the No Relief study, 
more than two-thirds of RDA personnel did not rely upon armed guards 
(which would include PSC personnel). Obviously, this number is partially 
dictated by the level of danger present in the particular operating environ-
ment; PSC assistance may not be warranted. But it is also determined by 
RDA worries – strategic, operational and ethical – regarding reliance upon 
armed actors in their work. (One can also argue that those RDAs that do rely 
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upon PSCs may not be entirely comfortable in doing so.) While many RDAs 
have developed protocols and guidelines regarding their interaction with 
armed actors such as militias, rebel forces, indigenous militaries and foreign 
forces, in order to manage and mitigate these worries, this has not occurred 
to the same degree with respect to PSCs. But with RDA/PSC interaction on 
at least a slow rise, this study now turns to analysing factors RDAs should 
consider in their interactions with PSCs. Indeed, shifts on the geopolitical 
landscape since the start of the new century require RDAs to be savvy of the 
place PSCs now hold in global security governance. 
Operational Implications 
The seeming advantage of RDA/PSC interaction is the separation of RDAs 
from those armed actors that have political and/or criminal stakes in the op-
erating environment. Reliance upon local warlords and militias for protec-
tion still often continues the theft and graft; the relationship is nothing more 
than a protection racket.23 Such reliance also potentially implicates RDAs 
with extreme violence or human rights violations attributed to their hired 
protection, leads to the indirect financing of factions in conflict, and further 
militarises the citizenry.24 As for reliance upon intervening military forces, 
this also further links RDAs to the varying political agendas they represent. 
Additionally, because these forces usually operate under the principle of ‘last 
in, first out’, RDA timetables and requirements may not always be heeded. 
The PSC alternative, however, does not necessarily negate these con-
cerns. Like all industries, the PSC industry wishes to keep costs low and 
profits high. As such, it is economical to rely upon local expertise rather than 
solely upon personnel with experience garnered from security sectors in the 
developed world. For instance, in Sierra Leone in the late 1990s, the PSC 
Lifeguard had managerial staff from South Africa, the United Kingdom, and 
the US, but the bulk of its employees were Sierra Leonean. Depending on 
the contract, the ratio was anywhere from 3 to 15 local employees to every 
foreign national. While the PSC may be foreign in origin, it does often have 
very indigenous attributes. 
Another related cost reduction and profit-seeking measure may also 
cause armed actors on the ground, rightly or wrongly, to make linkages be-
tween RDAs and the agendas of others: the desire for multiple clients and 
the resultant economies of scale. This is borne out by International Alert in 
its 2001 assessment that ‘some apparently bonafide private security compa-
nies...may provide services of a more military nature to other clients whilst 
at the same time working for aid agencies’.25 For instance, the PSC Southern 
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Cross, in addition to its RDA clients in Sierra Leone, held a contract with the 
government in Freetown for fisheries protection. Again, in the case of Life-
guard, it did become involved in firefights with the RUF while guarding 
diamond mines. Though this situation did not produce any known repercus-
sions, Lifeguard at the time was providing assistance to the UN and other 
RDAs.26 
More recently, thousands of Iraqis work as private security employees 
in Iraq, often for foreign-based firms or those with joint Iraqi–foreign man-
agement. Their clients are not isolated from the broader conflict dynamics. 
One accusation made by the Iraqi National Accord in 2003 was that Erinys, 
hired to protect oil pipelines and infrastructure, recruited its employees 
largely from the ranks of the Iraqi Free Forces linked to Ahmad Chalabi’s 
Iraqi National Congress. Erinys’ officials, for their part, offered a spirited 
defence of their hiring policies and procedures.27 Nevertheless, challenges 
such as these reveal how PSCs, wittingly or not, may become caught in 
strong intrastate rivalries that may spill over onto the larger client base, 
RDAs included. Indeed, Yves Sandoz, the former Director of International 
Law and Communication of the International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC), appropriately suggests that RDA caution is required before interact-
ing with PSCs: ‘[I]t might be delicate to have a contractual relation with a 
company which is actively engaged on the side of a party to a conflict’.28 
The Iraqi case, along with other post-11 September 2001 examples, 
highlights added dimensions to the delicate issues RDAs face. As already 
mentioned, RDAs are increasingly seen as part of larger intervention efforts 
with definite political rationales. RDAs will probably not enjoy a greater 
sense of independence through relying upon PSCs because these firms too 
are part of these larger endeavours; they are likely to have contracts with 
numerous clients including states, corporations and international organisa-
tions. In Iraq alone, of the billions of dollars allotted for reconstruction pro-
jects, approximately one-third of all costs will go towards security, a statistic 
that underscores the considerable PSC presence.29 
It is likely that this integrated approach that draws in PSCs and thus 
poses challenges to RDAs will continue. Certainly, the general supply, de-
mand and ideational reasons that brought about this private presence have 
already been well documented.30 But more specifically, the increased US 
reliance on executing policy through ‘à la carte multilateralism’ and ‘coali-
tions of the willing’ tailored to the task at hand, rather than consistently 
through established organisations such as NATO, means that PSCs will oc-
cupy a key role because of their abilities, flexibility, and lack of political 
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qualifiers. As identified in important guiding documents such as the Quad-
rennial Defense Review, the US does not wish to rely on state allies to the 
degree that it once did. From one angle, for reasons related to cost and strat-
egy, many of the US’s traditional allies have not maintained ready deploy-
ability or interoperability with US forces.31 From another angle, as made 
plain in the Balkans and elsewhere, the maintenance of good relations in 
alliances often comes at the price of lowest common denominator decisions 
that complicate operations and sometimes lead to suboptimal outcomes.32 As 
for Iraq, the US faced outright hostility from many of its closest military 
partners. In Iraq, the 20,000 PSC personnel collectively serve as a major 
component of the overall foreign presence given the services they provide to 
many clients, RDAs included. If PSCs can be considered as the coalition, as 
I have argued elsewhere, in terms of their overall presence or vis-à-vis other 
state contributions, then RDA/PSC interaction will not offer separation from 
the conflict dynamics in regions where there is a substantial and integrated 
operation headed by the world’s superpower.33 
Legitimacy Concerns 
While PSCs can work for a wide roster of clients, both state and non-state 
actors, it has been argued that RDA clients are particularly appealing.34  Be-
cause of RDA prominence in international affairs, and especially because of 
the normatively positive nature of humanitarian endeavour (the problems 
noted above aside), RDA/PSC interaction offers a degree of legitimacy to 
the PSC industry.  Michael Barnett’s general argument about the salience of 
post-Cold War humanitarianism, confirms the specific advantages for PSCs 
of an RDA clientele: ‘Humanitarianism became so popular that everyone 
wanted to be a humanitarian and to label their activities as humanitarian.  
The result was that humanitarianism became caught…in broader activities 
and practices’.35 
One can argue that many RDAs have been reluctant to provide this le-
gitimacy. First, sanctioning the PSC alternative seemingly reduces pressure 
upon states to be responsible for maintaining the humanitarian space. RDAs 
are, in fact, more likely to first highlight state failure than they are to con-
sider alternative security arrangements.36 Second, because of the unsavoury 
character of mercenary activity in the post-colonial age and how the PSC 
industry represents a diffusion of control over violence, RDAs have been 
reluctant to provide sanction. This stems from both ethical concerns and the 
desire not to offend donors in what is a very competitive environment for 
relief and development funding.37 
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This fear of implication extends beyond a particular conflict to en-
compass past or current operations in other areas of the world. For instance, 
Defence Systems Limited (DSL), which is now ArmorGroup, has attempted 
to woo RDA clients through both public adherence to the Code of Conduct 
of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent and attempts to maintain a 
positive international image: ‘[W]hen we sneeze in Africa, we catch a cold 
in Asia’.38 Nevertheless, in May 2000, great controversy amongst RDAs 
surrounded the decision by the United Kingdom’s Department for Interna-
tional Development (DFID) to grant DSL a £1 million ($1.87 million) con-
tract to remove unexploded clusterbombs and landmines in Kosovo. Of par-
ticular concern was DSL’s earlier contract to guard oil installations for Brit-
ish Petroleum in Colombia. This was because of accusations that DSL pro-
vided training in counter-insurgency techniques to Colombian soldiers who 
violated human rights, and fed intelligence on environmentalists and com-
munity leaders to the Colombian police and military. Even stronger allega-
tions concern the importation of weaponry. The DSL contract, therefore, 
seemed to be antithetical to the goals of humanitarian demining.39 
This particular RDA distaste for PSC services has come about despite 
the call for realistic comparisons between PSCs and other actors found in 
contemporary conflicts. Oldrich Bures, for one, finds that there is consider-
able overlap between what UN peacekeepers and PSCs perform and that the 
private option is often qualitatively superior. This assessment echoes that of 
the United Kingdom’s Foreign and Commonwealth Office that finds UN 
peacekeeping forces from the developing world ‘are often of poor quality 
and badly equipped’.40 The ICRC’s Yves Sandoz asserts that there is no 
reason to believe that PSCs would be worse than any other actor. In fact, the 
International Peace Operations Association (IPOA), a PSC advocacy group, 
contends that even with criticism of the PSC industry, the scale and nature of 
problems are not comparable to UN and state-led activities. Finally, though 
one can focus on violence perpetrated by white mercenaries in 1960s Africa, 
this pales alongside the violence perpetrated by states in the 20th century – 
‘the Age of Genocides’.41 
Recognition that RDAs operate in a larger contracting environment 
for PSC services, one in which they are smaller players, must be made. 
While the PSC industry is a global one in terms of its operations and sourc-
ing of personnel, it is focused particularly around a number of strong states 
in the developed world. In particular, because of the number of US-based 
PSCs and the degree to which Washington relies upon PSC services (as 
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noted above), one should perceive the US as central to ‘the market’s ecol-
ogy’.42 
If the world’s only superpower utilises PSCs and publicly recognises 
their contribution, then this enhances the stature and legitimacy of PSCs on 
the international stage. What is more, these factors financially sustain the 
industry. This presents a number of issues for RDAs to ponder. If PSCs are 
generally legitimised, does this make it easier for RDAs to employ PSCs, 
especially given that many of their key donors are states – the very actors 
that utilise PSCs? If not, what criteria for RDAs must be satisfied that are 
different from the standards and guidelines, set out informally and formally, 
through state/PSC interaction? Finally, is the issue moot if the PSC industry 
is increasingly geared towards the marketplace provided by states? Have 
RDAs lost the opportunity to use their collective market power to shape the 
PSC industry to conform to their interests? 
Cultural Divides 
In relation to the above, though RDA/PSC interaction usually entails the 
movement away from the acceptance approach towards security, a further 
concern is that PSCs do not understand the security needs of RDA clients. In 
other words, there is a cultural divide between RDAs and PSCs because 
other PSC clients instinctively want ‘hardening’ and PSC personnel are 
drawn from the ranks of state security sectors with a mindset of physical 
force protection. PSC understanding of RDA operations is important to en-
sure feasibility and appropriateness of security advice to facilitate a humani-
tarian agenda; humanitarian clientele demand a different approach due to the 
need to be close to communities in need. Nevertheless, PSCs are not often 
keen to ‘learn’ about humanitarian requirements, preferring instead a more 
uniform approach towards their client base.43 
Beyond the aforementioned issue of state dominance in the market-
place, a further reason to affirm that PSCs will not readily ‘learn’ in the fu-
ture is based on military appropriation of ‘humanitarian’ activity. To explain, 
just as RDAs are increasingly becoming integrated into state strategies, mili-
taries are increasingly entering into the provision of humanitarian and devel-
opment assistance, albeit not necessarily with the humanitarian ethic in 
mind. Assistance has become instrumentalised because maintaining the sup-
port of the populace in a counterinsurgency campaign is key. A ‘hearts and 
minds’ approach pursued through aid and development projects is required 
for security reasons and for the gathering of intelligence in order to prose-
cute military campaigns. 
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While earlier arguments suggested that the PSC industry was largely 
facilitated by a manpower bubble created by the Cold War’s end that would 
eventually subside, PSCs have continued to acquire contracts and thus draw 
personnel away from state security sectors.44 Therefore, the individuals who 
will be filling the ranks of PSCs now and in the future will have this particu-
lar military mindset regarding the utility of aid and development activities. 
This stance is manifest in evolving doctrines for civil–military cooperation 
(CIMIC) amongst developed world militaries. It can be seen in the concept 
of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan. It is evident in 
the ‘Three-Block War’ (3BW) concept coined in 1997 by the then US Ma-
rine Corps Commandant, General Charles Krulak, and now found in US, 
Australian, and Canadian army doctrines, amongst others. In 3BW, armies 
must be highly versatile with the ability to slide between three functions: 
high-intensity combat, stability operations, and humanitarian activity. 
Of particular note for RDAs is that PSCs are often managed and 
staffed by personnel garnered from the Special Operations Forces (SOF) of 
developed world militaries, a trend that has become more pronounced in the 
21st century.45 While firms may rely upon local manpower to cut costs, this is 
frequently balanced with SOF expertise for qualitative, manpower, and mar-
keting reasons. Certainly, SOF have become the vanguard units in current 
operations. This is made clear in the resolution of many states to bolster their 
SOF and in the Bush Administration’s January 2003 decision to assign the 
United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) primary responsi-
bility for prosecuting the ‘Global War on Terrorism’. This distinction is im-
portant for RDAs because of the assumed flexibility of SOF, as described in 
1998 by General Peter Schoomaker, then USSOCOM commander: 
Decision-makers may choose SOF as an option because they provide the 
broadest range of capabilities that have direct applicability in an increas-
ing number of missions, from major theatre wars to smaller-scale contin-
gencies to humanitarian assistance.46 
In addition, the traditional SOF tasks of training indigenous forces and 
providing assistance to locals for the sake of intelligence-gathering, force 
protection and offensive operations reinforces the strategic value of certain 
populations over others – a stance strongly condemned by humanitarians. 
Though the Australian, British, and US militaries have all instituted meas-
ures to better retain their SOF expertise, it is likely that PSCs will still main-
tain a certain SOF character. As a result, RDAs must recognise that PSC 
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personnel will not only have particular ideas about security, but also about 
the nature and importance of humanitarian assistance. 
Conclusion and Recommendations 
It is obvious that in an age of terrorism, non-state actors and counterinsur-
gency, one very different from when traditional humanitarianism came to the 
fore in the 19th century, the security of RDA operations can no longer be 
taken for granted. As stated at the outset, this chapter’s goal has been to pro-
vide context regarding the evolving nature of RDA/PSC interaction in the 
hope of allowing for reflection about opportunities, trade-offs and challenges 
in RDA security management. As Peter Singer argues, RDA/PSC interaction 
is not a priori bad, ‘[b]ut, it clearly carries both advantages and disadvan-
tages that must constantly be weighed and mitigated through effective policy 
and smart business sense’.47 This weighing and mitigation are made all the 
more difficult by changes related to operational implications, legitimacy 
concerns, and culture divides. The irony is that although RDA/PSC interac-
tion, at first glance, concerns international organisations, corporations and 
NGOs and the diffusion of state authority on the international stage, it is the 
policies and activities of states that in many ways further complicate RDAs 
contracting PSCs. 
In light of this study, there is a need to explore several policy options.  
In order to create a standard RDA marketplace to which PSCs might better 
respond, inquiry first into the degree to which RDAs might cohere around 
uniform policies regarding PSCs is required.  This investigation would de-
termine if RDAs possess the ‘security savvy’ to properly engage the PSC 
industry.  Similarly, it would ascertain the desire of RDAs to sacrifice their 
operational autonomy and independence to achieve such commonality.  Here 
a consideration of the ICRC’s role would be important because it straddles 
and influences both states and RDAs and has an interest in the PSC issue 
with respect to international humanitarian law. As well, examination of other 
endeavours to manage PSC activity, such as the interaction between PSCs, 
states and corporations involved in the extraction of renewable and nonre-
newable resources, would be helpful in developing a common RDA ap-
proach towards PSCs. 
In the final analysis, RDAs will continue to confront a number of 
challenges as they struggle to maintain their unique identities and humanitar-
ian profile in the face of state integration of humanitarian endeavour on the 
one hand and a lack of respect by indigenous combatants for RDA opera-
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tions on the other.  The introduction of PSCs into this situation, though per-
haps providing some benefit through their protection and deterrence capa-
bilities, also presents additional and shifting complications and trade-offs for 
RDAs to evaluate. Though the subsequent policy requirements will be sub-
stantial tasks for analysts, RDAs and PSCs alike, they are urgently required 
so that RDAs are best able to protect their personnel and assets and thus 
assist communities in need. 
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Private Security Actors, Donors and SSR 
Peter Wilson 
Introduction 
There are two distinct elements to any discussion of the role of the private 
sector in Security Sector Reform (SSR). The first is to see the private sector 
as a target for reform, and in particular to develop a country’s ability to regu-
late and control the security activities of the private sector.  The second is to 
understand the positive contribution that the private sector can make as im-
plementers of reform, in particular in providing training and advisory ser-
vices to governments and donors. In this regard, it is important to distinguish 
between ‘internal’ and ‘external’ private sector actors, both of which in dif-
ferent ways have significant implications for democratic security sector gov-
ernance. 
In order to examine both the positive and negative roles of the private 
sector in security governance we need to tackle some underlying issues that 
have become problematic for all aspects of donor-supported reform in de-
veloping countries. Almost all reform practitioners acknowledge the essen-
tial role of local ownership and the need for sensitivity to the local political 
and cultural context.  But if we are serious about this, what role is there for 
outsiders? Can anything useful be said in general about ‘reform’and are there 
any principles that can be applied globally, or must everything be country-
specific? Can donors and other external actors be flexible and knowledge-
able enough to contribute to locally-driven reform?1 
This paper aims to apply these general questions to the issue of how to 
regulate the private sector and also to the question of how the private sector 
can help implement reform. It focuses mainly on the latter question, that is, 
the role of ‘external’ private sector actors, and in particular on the shortcom-
ings that donors and governments have in harnessing the potentially positive 
contribution of the private sector. It then assesses these issues from the per-
spective of security governance and concludes with a number of recommen-
dations drawn from this analysis. 
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The Private Sector as a Target for Security Sector Reform 
SSR advocates have long espoused the basic principle that donors should not 
aim to impose their own security sector blueprints or doctrine on other coun-
tries. In general, donors should restrict themselves to facilitating the discus-
sions of local actors and supporting the implementation of locally-made 
decisions.2 This approach has been justified by fundamental ideas of self-
determination3 but also for pragmatic reasons – external consultants rarely 
know enough about the local political situation to make sensible recommen-
dations, and solutions that have been devised externally will struggle to 
achieve local buy-in and proper implementation.4 
Good SSR practitioners have stuck to this principle even in those 
fields, such as policing and military reform, where there is broad consensus 
on the proper roles of a police force or army and extensive international ex-
perience in regulation, legislation and oversight. The process of local analy-
sis, consultation and debate is seen as an important factor in embedding re-
form and encouraging democratic ways of working, even when the eventual 
solutions look similar to those adopted elsewhere. 
If such a self-limiting approach by donors has proved valuable in the 
relatively mature fields of police and military reform, it will prove even 
more important in the immature and contested field of regulation of private 
security actors. Attitudes to the private sector’s role in providing security are 
highly political, morally-charged and emotional, and often rest on culturally-
specific attitudes to the right and wrong reasons for individuals to exert force 
over others.5 Whilst we may feel distaste towards people who exert force in 
return for money, exerting force for the sake of ideology or power does not 
have a very honourable history in many countries either. In this context there 
is no global consensus on the ‘correct’ role of the private sector in security 
provision and certainly no standard technocratic solution to questions of 
regulation and control.6 
Any debate on the proper role of the private sector in a country has to 
be rooted in local security concerns and conducted by legitimate local insti-
tutions. In particular, it is impossible to distinguish between the positive and 
negative uses of private security until you have some consensus on the 
threats the nation faces, the security capabilities that will be needed to 
counter those threats, and the links between security sector reform and wider 
development. Creating a space for private security companies may have 
some negative outcomes but may be the only way to fill a capability gap or 
attract the foreign investors who could underpin economic development. Or 
regulation of private security may be considered useful but of relatively low 
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priority for a government with more pressing concerns7 and limited capabil-
ity to create and enforce legislation and oversight .8 Deciding how to balance 
these trade-offs is a fundamentally political decision and cannot be made 
solely by theoretical discussion of the possible negative impacts of the pri-
vate sector or by over-reliance on evidence from other countries at different 
stages of development. 
SSR practitioners in most developing countries have until now rightly 
not focused on the specifics of private sector regulation, but have worked 
instead on the more fundamental issues that could underpin local decisions: 
 
• Does the nation have a clear vision for its future and understand the 
potential security threats to that vision? 
• What security capabilities will be required to manage those threats? 
What are the gaps between current and required capabilities? Is it real-
istic to assume that the state can fill these gaps without external or 
private sector support? 
• Do legitimate and competent institutions exist to debate and decide 
these issues? 
• Do agencies exist which can competently prepare and enforce legisla-
tion and regulation? 
 
In the countries that are most in need of SSR, the answer to these 
questions is often ‘no’. There is a danger in jumping ahead to the technical 
complexities and controversies of private sector regulation and adding yet 
another topic to the growing list of subjects to be covered by SSR, regardless 
of a country’s ability to enforce what is ultimately decided.9 Instead there is 
a generic requirement to develop local institutions that can fill the govern-
ance gap and which can then develop private sector regulation as one of the 
many issues they have to tackle. 
The Private Sector as an Aid to Security Sector Reform 
The private sector is already heavily involved in providing research, training 
and consultancy services to donors and governments on security sector re-
form. ‘Traditional’ Private Military Companies (PMCs) and Private Security 
Companies (PSCs) are certainly entering the sector. But we should not forget 
the array of academics, NGOs and individual consultants (often with an op-
erational background in security) who operate under commercial terms and 
who currently dominate the field.  
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It is sometimes argued that the ‘private sector’ (used in this case to mean 
only PSCs and PMCs) has ‘captured’ SSR in its own interest and in particu-
lar has promoted a military-centric approach10. But this ignores the fact that 
the real private sector is full of different consultancies offering a variety of 
individuals with different backgrounds and different approaches who could 
contribute positively to SSR.  If it is only private military and security com-
panies that have so far been attracted to the table, this may be because do-
nors and governments have not yet created demand for the other, subtler 
forms of private sector consultancy that could contribute to SSR. We discuss 
some of the possible reasons for this below.  There is also often an unspoken 
assumption that private companies are bad, NGOs and academics are good, 
but as we argue below they are all subject to the same incentives and it is 
difficult to argue a priori that one part of the sector is ‘better’ than another.11 
What defines PMCs, PSCs, academics and NGOs as private sector is 
that they are employed on a contract basis rather than as permanent employ-
ees of a government or donor. We can therefore simplify the debate on the 
role of the private sector in supporting SSR to the easier question of ‘do 
consultants operating under contract have the right incentives and manage-
ment arrangements to support SSR effectively?’ 
In particular the fundamental question for a government or donor 
seeking to employ an outsider, whether it be a PSC, a university department, 
an NGO or an individual, is whether it is possible to manage the consultant 
in a way that delivers the desired results. In particular, is it possible to write 
an arms-length commercial contract that will secure the right outcomes and 
be sufficiently robust to weather changes in the operating conditions and 
political situation? 
This problem is not unique to SSR and indeed has become a funda-
mental question in economics. Contracts are finite documents that cannot 
possibly envisage all eventualities12. In particular, contracts cannot exercise 
the sort of nuanced management of behaviour that can be implemented 
within an organisation, where employees are motivated not only by payment 
for performing a specific task but also by a desire to be promoted and re-
spected within the organisation. Disputes or under-performance within an 
organisation are rarely settled by legal action but rather by day-to-day man-
agement and oversight, training and incentives for improvement. Many 
economists understand an organisation as a means of bringing in-house those 
people who cannot be managed by contract and who need a subtler set of 
controls and incentives.13 
The decision on whether to use a permanent employee or an outsider 
is therefore an important one. Outsiders bring diversity, flexibility and spe-
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cific skills, but using a contract as a method to manage them is very much a 
blunt instrument. The more intangible and subtle the task, the harder it is to 
write a contract that adequately captures and rewards what you want the 
outsider to do. 
We would not want to exclude all outsourcing simply because con-
tracts are difficult to write, and there is much we can do to improve the qual-
ity of contractual arrangements. Whilst contracts can never be perfect, they 
will be improved if the desired outcomes can be defined precisely and if it 
can be clearly observed whether or not they have been fulfilled. Ultimately, 
in case of dispute over payment, it is helpful if these can be so precise and 
clear that they can be determined in a court of law. Sadly, it is precisely 
these twin criteria of definability and observability that are so problematic in 
SSR and make contracting for SSR so difficult. 
Definability 
It is common to sit in seminars and listen to long lists of SSR activities that 
have been undertaken in a given country. ‘Workshops’14 have been held, 
legislation has been passed and committees have been formed. But people 
rarely talk about the fundamental indicators of whether all this activity has 
been successful – despite all the SSR activity in Jamaica15 it continues to 
have the highest per capita murder rate in the world16 (OSAC, 2006) and 
despite the fact that we often hold up Sierra Leone as a model of SSR suc-
cess,17 it still languishes at second-from-bottom of the UN Human Develop-
ment Index (UNDP, 2005). In management consultancy jargon, we are 
measuring outputs not outcomes. 
SSR practitioners will argue that these high-level measures are unfair 
criteria by which to judge an SSR programme. SSR is a long-term activity 
that may not produce immediate results and SSR is only one factor that can 
influence the level of crime or the overall level of human development. But 
this is precisely the problem in contracting for SSR. No sane person in the 
private sector would agree to be paid in 10 years’ time for outcomes over 
which they have at best partial control. But the alternative is to pay for short-
term outputs that may or not eventually contribute to our ultimate desired 
outcomes or, even worse, to pay a daily fee to someone simply for their time 
(which means we are now paying for inputs, not outcomes or even outputs). 
What is needed are some intermediate measures that are not limited to 
measuring the number of workshops held but are not so high-level and long-
term as to be outside of the SSR practitioners’ immediate influence. The lack 
of such measures has been the subject of a recent general criticism of SSR18, 
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but filling the gap will be especially important if we seek to continue to use 
the private sector to deliver reform. 
As Peake and Scheye point out, the problem of lack of measures is 
caused by a more fundamental lack of conceptual clarity about what SSR is 
for. There is a high level of agreement that a good society would be charac-
terised by human security, economic opportunity and a high level of auton-
omy19 and a sense that these elements are related. But often this is no more 
than a list of good things with little understanding of how exactly they are 
related or how they might be achieved. At the other end of the spectrum we 
believe, based on our experience in the developed world, that good govern-
ance or human security might be helped by legislation or committees or in-
stitutions, but again with little clarity about how our specific activities to 
develop these will ultimately contribute to the desired high-level objectives. 
In short, perhaps because SSR is such a young discipline, there is as yet no 
real cause-and-effect narrative of how our practical activities lead over time 
to a genuine change in welfare.20 
How, then, do we define and communicate what we want from the 
private sector? If we have proved incapable so far of writing it down in a 
policy document or academic paper, what chance do we have of writing it 
down in a contract in a way that might be understood by a procurement de-
partment or a commercial court? 
Observability 
The second problem is one of observability. Even if we could clearly define 
the outcomes we required, could we practically observe whether or not they 
have been achieved? 
There are some basic problems about observability in SSR. Does a 
donor sitting in his headquarters have any way of monitoring the activities of 
a consultant in a far-flung police outpost? If a task is not achieved, can the 
failure be attributed to the consultant or to one of the many factors outside 
their control, such as local capacity or local politics? Can the donor be well-
informed enough about the local situation to distinguish between excuses for 
failure and genuine mitigating factors? 
There is a particular problem in measuring the important questions of 
transfer of knowledge and development of local ownership. What matters in 
SSR is not that a consultant achieves a task but that he develops the capabil-
ity of a local person to do so. Style and tone are important,21 and the consult-
ant needs to be a mentor not a do-er. Sadly, SSR practitioners often find that 
it is easier and faster to do a task than to mentor someone else to do it, and if 
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their contract is paying them by the basic tasks they complete then they have 
every incentive not to waste time on mentoring. 
Problems of definability, observability and overall evaluation are rife 
in the development world and are of course not restricted to SSR or the use 
of the private sector. In 2000 a World Bank Report stated ‘…despite the 
billions of dollars spent on development assistance each year, there is still 
very little known about the actual impact of projects on the poor’.22 Whilst 
efforts are being made to improve evaluation of development activities, there 
is as yet no clear answer on how to do it properly and even some resistance 
to doing detailed evaluation because of a potential negative impact on politi-
cal support for overseas development.23 
SSR is likely to be one of the most difficult fields in which to conduct 
proper evaluation. The traditional development challenge of producing and 
measuring economic growth or poverty alleviation is, if anything, relatively 
simple compared to the task of producing and measuring human security, 
and is at least backed up by decades of rigorous economic research and the 
ability to attach some numbers to income or economic activity. So whilst we 
should certainly work to improve our understanding of cause and effect in 
SSR and aim to develop some useful measures, there is unlikely to be a 
magic bullet which will solve the problems of definability and observability 
very soon. In the meantime we must find other ways to overcome the limita-
tions of contracts for managing tasks that will always contain some intangi-
ble elements. 
Filling the Gaps in Contracts 
The private sector is full of examples of companies outsourcing ill-defined 
or unobservable tasks. A major corporation might employ a management 
consultancy to ‘change corporate culture’ or ‘introduce innovation’ with no 
particularly reliable way of measuring whether the programme has been 
successful. However the methods that companies use to overcome incom-
plete contracts – by creating ‘trusting, long-term relationships’ and develop-
ing ‘a reputation and in-house style’ – are not yet well-developed in the field 
of SSR and in some cases are specifically excluded by policy or legislation. 
In the commercial world, clients will typically develop a ‘trusting, 
long-term relationship’ with their consultants.24  Project plans and activities 
will be amended in real-time, as client and consultant learn about weak-
nesses in the initial project design or respond to changing conditions. Con-
sultants are content to respond to these changes, and indeed will seek regular 
reviews with the client because they hope that bonuses, reputation and future 
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contracts with the client will result. There is huge flexibility on exactly how 
a set of outcomes is delivered, and the client will often be a senior individual 
with the power to set payments and offer further work. 
This flexibility is all but ruled out in the world of SSR donors. Pro-
curement ‘good practice’ and regulations such as the EU’s Official Journal of 
the European Union (OJEU) rules deliberately distance the people who 
award and administer contracts from the donor specialists who oversee the 
project.  Contracts are awarded on spuriously objective grounds which allow 
little room for personal judgement, real-time renegotiation, performance 
bonuses or rewards for flexibility. It is no surprise that donor desk officers 
spend much of their time breaking projects up into small chunks so that they 
will not come under the OJEU rules and be handed over to the procurement 
department. They rightly do not want to set in stone one single large contract 
which might then be awarded on the wrong criteria by people who do not 
know the subject. Such a contract then proves extremely difficult to change 
or break if the design or the consultant selection proves to be wrong or the 
circumstances change. 
The linear procurement process of analysis followed by project design 
followed by contract allocation followed by implementation followed by 
review may be right for general government procurement of hardware or 
infrastructure but, as we have argued, is not right for the subtleties of SSR 
consultancy and has no similarity with how the best private companies man-
age their procurement for these type of services. Worse, it underpins a gen-
eral linear approach to SSR projects which is already being criticised for 
failing to deliver effective reform. An OECD-DAC meeting to draft SSR 
implementation guidelines, which took place in Ghana in December 2005,25 
expressed widespread dissatisfaction with SSR programmes which commit-
ted to large-scale, long-term projects on the basis of a short scoping study 
and which had little flexibility to deviate from the initial project design. It 
was felt that the sort of subtle political and cultural insights required for ef-
fective SSR could not be captured in a short self-contained report at the be-
ginning of a project and instead would only be achieved by a trial-and-error 
approach of observing the results of project activities, learning from the cli-
ent and becoming embedded in the culture and politics of the host nation.26 
The meeting therefore recommended an experimental approach which would 
put more weight on the insights that the project management staff developed 
over time and would allow them to respond to what they had learnt by 
changing the project design, and would see the initial scoping study as 
merely a set of initial ideas and hypotheses that needed to be tested against 
reality. 
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Clearly if we are to adopt such an iterative, experimental approach and 
involve the private sector in implementing it, we will have to become far 
more flexible in our procurement systems. We will also need to assess the 
value of learning and relationship-building when assessing the outcomes of 
specific activities – it is quite possible that some activities will have little or 
no immediate development impact but will instead contribute to the prepara-
tion of more sophisticated and effective future programmes. Host and donor 
governments will need to understand and agree to what is an unconventional 
approach for civil servants, and constant communication will be required to 
ensure that the programme changes being made are acceptable and based on 
strong evidence. Officials will need to start accepting the language of uncer-
tainty and resist the temptation to seek rapid results, particularly in post-
conflict environments where there is understandable pressure for instant 
stabilisation. 27 
The second way in which the wider private sector manages the con-
tracting of intangible tasks is by consultancies developing a ‘reputation and 
in-house style’. When a large corporation employs the management consul-
tancy McKinsey, it knows that they will deliver a different approach from 
Accenture or KPMG. A client does not have to write in a contract exactly the 
way he wants a project to be delivered because he knows broadly what ap-
proach each consultancy will adopt. The consultancy has a strong incentive 
to develop a unique house style, and instil it in all their consultants, because 
it offers an alternative to competing against similar competitors solely on the 
basis of who has the lowest fees. 
The economic eco-system of different consultancies offering different 
approaches to SSR28 is under-developed. There are some individuals and 
institutions whose work is known and who have developed their own ap-
proaches, but there are many more individual consultants coming to the field 
who may have operational security experience but who lack a track record in 
consulting or development. If they are not associated with an institution, or if 
they are associated with a consultancy which manages the logistics of their 
deployment but not the substance of what they do, then there is little way of 
knowing how they will perform and little way of monitoring their activities. 
The existing PMCs, PSCs and other consultancies who would be well-
placed to build distinctive house-styles, develop their own SSR doctrine, and 
provide training for newcomers to the field are tentative about what re-
sources they should allocate to SSR.29 They can achieve higher daily fees 
and, as argued above, deal with more sophisticated customers by using their 
security knowledge for the benefit of corporate clients rather than donors. A 
commitment from donors to more flexible procurement practices and more 
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engagement with the private sector during policy discussions and pro-
gramme design phases would do much to convince companies to allocate 
some resources to the field and reassure them that donors were working to 
overcome the current market failures in SSR. 
Security Governance and the Private Sector 
What do these various failures and gaps mean for security governance in 
developing countries? There is no doubt that private sector actors will rush 
to fill the gaps in security provision created by a disfunctional state and in 
particular will respond to demand from individuals, companies, donors and 
NGOs for security that the state is unwilling or unable to provide. Such pri-
vate sector actors may exploit holes in regulation and control, and in an un-
regulated environment unethical companies may rapidly dominate the mar-
ket at the expense of more responsible competitors. But such private security 
activity should be seen primarily as a symptom of state failure rather than a 
cause. The weak state has a generic challenge to secure a monopoly over the 
exercise of force – seizing the initiative from the private sector but also more 
pressingly from militias and criminal gangs. We should not jump ahead to 
the technicalities of private sector regulation until we have legitimate bodies 
that can debate the underlying political and security issues and until we have 
state agencies that can enforce regulation and, most importantly, meet the 
demand for effective security. To try to suppress the private sector before a 
legitimate and effective state alternative has been created is to risk opening 
the field entirely to wholly illegitimate criminal actors. 
These pressing tasks need to be supported by donors who are flexible, 
responsive to the local context30, and who have a clear understanding of how 
their practical activities contribute to overall development objectives. There 
is a general push for donors to become better at these questions, and the pri-
vate sector could contribute to this by bringing a wider range of country and 
subject experts, experience from change management in other fields and a 
diversity of approaches. But  none of this will happen if reform practice is 
determined by procurement rules rather than vice versa. Involving the pri-
vate sector in reform before we have the systems to reward an experimental, 
non-linear, locally-responsive approach simply risks reinforcing the rigidi-
ties and failures of current donor practice. 
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Conclusions 
The current emphasis on developing generic solutions to problems of private 
sector regulation may be misplaced if they ignore the prime role for local 
analysis and discussion. The higher priority is to develop the local institu-
tions that can devise and implement their own reforms. Such institutions 
need to go back to first principles and ask: 
• What are the security needs of individuals, companies and institu-
tions? 
• Why are they not being met by the state? Where is the state abusing its 
power? 
• What security roles could legitimately be played by the private sector 
and what should become or remain a monopoly of the state? 
• What capabilities will we need to develop in order to deliver effective 
regulation and control of all non-state actors? 
• What capabilities will we need to develop in order to deliver effective 
security? 
There may also be an important positive role for the private sector in 
supporting SSR. In order to manage this potential contribution, donors will 
need to develop a more precise description of the outcomes they expect from 
SSR and will need to be more flexible about the means by which they are 
achieved. Such improvements are already being discussed in the general 
approach to SSR but will be particularly important if we wish outsourcing to 
be effective. Donors could also contribute to a wider eco-system of suppliers 
by encouraging the involvement of experts from other fields, clarifying the 
likely demand for SSR services and analysing the weak points of their cur-
rent contract and procurement arrangements. Too often, an open conversa-
tion with the private sector to discuss these issues is prevented because do-
nors see the sector as part of the problem and not part of the solution. Instead 
of generic labels of ‘private sector’, ‘PMC’ and ‘PSC’, donors and govern-
ments need to identify the specific activities that they wish to encourage and 
the specific activities they wish to control. 
In return, the private sector needs to offer distinctive house-styles and 
the development of doctrine and training rather than just act as ‘body-shops’ 
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and do not have a service delivery mindset. However he argues strongly that the alterna-
tive of imposing external solutions is likely to be even worse. See Nathan, ‘Operationalis-
ing the Principle of Local Ownership in Security Sector Reform’, op. cit. 






Applying a Security Governance 




This volume has broadly focused on the trend in which security is increas-
ingly being provided, and in certain cases eroded, by non-state actors, both 
within states and transnationally. It has attempted to encompass two distinct 
trends under the rubric of privatisation. ‘Privatisation from above’ has been 
used to refer to the top–down dynamic in which the responsibility for certain 
security-related functions formerly performed by formal state institutions is 
delegated to other private sector actors, usually through outsourcing or con-
tracting out those functions to commercial firms. ‘Privatisation from below’ 
has been used to address the bottom–up dynamic whereby central state re-
sponsibility to provide security for citizens is weakened, whether by the 
autonomous actions of militias, guerrillas, tribal groups, and other armed 
non-state actors which pose challenges to central state authority, or by indi-
viduals, firms, communities and other social groups that seek to procure 
protection and security services from non-state actors, perhaps most com-
monly from private security firms.  
This concluding chapter seeks to place the insights and findings from 
the preceding chapters on the privatisation of security into the broader aca-
demic and policy discourse that is emerging on security governance. This 
chapter will focus chiefly on privatisation in the domain of internal security, 
where the trend has gone the furthest, but will also identify relevant lessons 
for the transnational domain. As several contributors to the volume have 
noted, privatisation is part of a wider evolving process in which the state’s 
traditional responsibility and presumed capacity to act as primary provider of 
safety and security to its population is challenged. Various policing experts 
now subscribe to the view that during at least the past 30 years a global 
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transformation in the nature of policing has been underway, in which the 
provision of security to society is no longer performed exclusively by the 
state. Security is becoming pluralised, characterised by various types of ac-
tors beside the state who seek to procure security and who seek to provide it. 
What we are seeing, in other words, is the pluralisation of security, both 
within states and transnationally. This phenomenon is visible in the context 
of mature developed democracies, transitional and weak or failing states and 
in areas where states and societies are being reconstructed after armed con-
flict.  
That transformation is linked to the gradual shift from government to 
governance, or the diffusion or fragmentation of political authority among 
various public and private actors at the local, state and international levels. 
Governance encompasses shifting networks or constellations of actors who 
may interact formally or informally and at multiple levels.1 The pluralisation 
of security refers to the multiple types of authorisers and providers of secu-
rity that include state (public) authorities and institutions, non-state (private) 
actors and hybrid or mixed forms.2 Security governance today, then, con-
cerns the management and control of the process by which security is being 
provided by multiple types of agents and actors beyond the state. 
This chapter examines the emerging security governance framework 
as a means of better understanding the challenges and opportunities pre-
sented by the privatisation and, more broadly, the pluralisation of security. It 
draws on insights and examples from the various national and thematic case 
studies in this volume, as well as the wider literature, particularly in the po-
licing domain, concerning aspects of this phenomenon.   
The Pluralisation of Security 
Pluralisation trends have become apparent in both internal and external secu-
rity, across a broad array of states. The state has traditionally been seen as 
the main provider of security, a view that can be traced to the Hobbesian 
concept of the legitimate government created by the consent of the people 
through a social contract, and the Weberian notion of the state's monopoly of 
the legitimate use of physical force. Together, these views constitute the 
main philosophical pillars of received wisdom of the proper role of the state 
in creating and maintaining the monopoly of force. However contemporary 
empirical evidence across a variety of states indicates that security is in fact 
being provided by multiple actors. In addition to state security institutions, 
there are also security providers from the private sector, local communities 
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and civil society, and mixed entities that combine public and private attrib-
utes. While the state remains a crucial actor in the provision of security, it is 
not the only actor, and sometimes or under certain circumstances, it may not 
even be the most important one. 
Certain close observers of policing and security have characterised 
this trend as the pluralisation of the 'auspices' and 'providers' of security.3 
That is, the state can no longer be considered the sole element authorising 
security provision (auspice); other non-state actors have assumed the respon-
sibility for their own protection and exercise the power and capacity to ar-
range for and procure their own security, transforming the nature of security 
governance. Security is moreover being provided by actors additional to or 
other than the state, which may include commercial firms, community-based 
actors, non-state agencies and non-governmental organisations. 
Pluralisation is most obvious with the proliferation of contract private 
security firms who sell their services to members of the public, including 
businesses, homeowners and banks. In countries across the world, the num-
ber of private security personnel outnumbers public police, sometimes by a 
factor of 2 or 3. Individuals, communities, firms and other groups are arrang-
ing for their own security through the use of commercial security firms, or in 
the case of commercial enterprises, often the establishment of their own in-
house security departments.  
Underlying the pluralisation of security are profound economic and 
social changes, resulting in neo-liberal market reforms, cutting back the 
state, privatisation and outsourcing of functions formerly considered gov-
ernmental. A related factor linked to the pluralisation of security is the emer-
gence of the 'risk society' in the contemporary era of advanced modernity, in 
which individuals have become highly focused on personal safety and secu-
rity, including the need to protect themselves from the risks that result from 
human and technological developments.4 The globalisation of market dy-
namics and the emergence of risks that cross jurisdictional boundaries and 
are very difficult to manage require specialised expertise from both public 
and private sectors. Together, these factors have engendered a mentality of 
managing risk (hazards or adverse consequences) through preventive gov-
ernance. 
There is simultaneously more emphasis on (and acceptance by) indi-
vidual citizens and communities taking responsibility for their own security 
and safety, something that sociologists have termed ‘responsibilisation’, or 
the effort ‘to spread responsibility for crime control onto agencies, organisa-
tions and individuals that operate outside the criminal justice state and per-
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suade them to act appropriately.’5 That is, rather than a direct approach to 
crime control through state agencies (police, courts, prisons, etc), members 
of society individually and in local communities, as well as non-
governmental organisations, are encouraged in the belief that they share in 
the responsibility to reduce crime.6 This may result in people and organisa-
tions deciding to engage the guarding or protective services of private secu-
rity companies, install security devices for their homes or businesses, or hire 
security risk management consultants. Responsibilisation also promotes 
greater citizen involvement in community-based voluntary security initia-
tives like Neighbourhood Watch schemes. Thus pluralisation of security is 
also visible in the proliferation of civil society-based forms of policing, no-
tably community policing in which public police develop relationships and 
cooperation with various sectors of the community, including religious lead-
ers, business groups, neighbourhood associations and other citizen self-help 
groups. 
While some view responsibilisation as the ‘abdication’ of state re-
sponsibility for providing security to the private or non-profit sector, others 
are more sceptical about the supposed retreat of the state. Some scholars 
view the move towards pluralisation of security in terms of a move towards 
‘governing at a distance’, in which the state develops or retains an oversee-
ing or meta-regulatory role while the actual implementation of security 
measures and other functions is taken over by other actors. This has given 
rise to the notions of ‘rowing’ and ‘steering’ with regard to security, or the 
ability of central governments to steer or determine overall frameworks and 
standards while entrusting the rowing – the actual security provision activi-
ties – to other actors such as corporate entities supplied by the market.7 The 
role of the state in this vision is to regulate the activities of non-state actors. 
The responsibilisation trend also implies the increased acceptance and 
legitimation of security provision by non-state and commercial actors. The 
state itself has played a fundamental role in the legitimation of the role of 
private actors in the provision of security through decisions to privatise for-
merly governmental functions, and through recognition of the expertise and 
knowledge the private sector can offer through its pursuit of public–private 
partnerships, the outsourcing of military support functions, and collaborative 
relations with civil society and the private sector in managing crime and 
security, including the post-9/11 drive for systematic cooperation in counter-
terrorism and critical infrastructure protection. 
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Blurring of Public and Private 
What is becoming increasingly apparent in terms of security in ad-
vanced democracies and equally in developing states is that the line between 
public and private is blurring. The growth in consultative public–private 
sector relationships reflects a blurring of the distinction between the catego-
ries and their integration through network relations and practices. Private 
security is used by public authorities (governments) now as well as by pri-
vate authorities (individuals, firms, organisations). For example, security in 
public places is increasingly undertaken by private actors, as is seen in the 
widespread use by governmental authorities of private security firms to 
guard courthouses, military bases, nuclear power plants and embassies, and 
in the management and operation of prisons.  
The emergence of hybrid policing and security structures that incorpo-
rate elements of both public and private also contribute to blurring: joint 
public–private policing initiatives, governments and other public agents hir-
ing private security firms, and personnel exchanges and flows between pub-
lic and private bodies, as well as the adoption of corporate management 
practices and the commercialisation of services by public law enforcement 
and security agencies, one common result of which is the ability of private 
interests to hire public police on a fee for service basis.8 Indeed, there is in-
creasing recognition that the public–private or state–private sector dichot-
omy is the wrong way to view security more generally today; rather, some 
observers claim that since there are hybrid forms of policing and security 
provision, it is more correct to replace the dichotomy between public and 
private with a continuum. 
A visible manifestation of the blurring of private and public is pro-
vided by what is termed 'mass private property', such as shopping malls, 
business and industrial complexes, campuses, gated communities and sports 
venues, which are privately owned but which large numbers of people have 
daily access to in order to work, play, trade and live in. Owners of mass pri-
vate property tend not to rely on public police for security, but typically hire 
private security firms or develop in-house security departments responsible 
for providing for the safety and security needs in relation to the property and 
its users. 
Blurring is also suggested by the increasing collaboration and coop-
eration between, on the one hand, public police, armed forces and other state 
security providers, and on the other hand private security actors. This has 
become more apparent in the US and other Western states following the 
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terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 and subsequent bombings in Madrid 
and London. With greater attention focused on anti-terrorism and internal 
security, private security firms and businesses are increasingly being asked 
to join with state authorities in developing plans and coordination for possi-
ble attacks and disasters, especially those involving critical infrastructure. 
For example, experts support the development of consultative relationships 
between the private sector and the public sector, better information-sharing 
about vulnerabilities and threats between security intelligence agencies and 
key stakeholders in private sector facilities, and the establishment of stan-
dards for protective security and resilience.9 Further, private sector owners 
and operators of critical energy infrastructure would be expected to ‘embed 
security into the design of critical infrastructure facilities, to decrease vul-
nerabilities, and mitigate consequential damage.’10 
It has become increasingly dubious whether it is possible to clearly 
delineate public and private roles in security governance. These develop-
ments are not limited to advanced Western liberal democratic states, al-
though the blurring may take different forms in other contexts. In transition 
states such as post-communist states of Central and Eastern Europe, public–
private blurring and hybrid forms of policing and security provision are also 
visible. As discussed by Hiscock (Chapter 7), hybrid institutions have devel-
oped in some post-Soviet states that provide private protection services 
while enjoying the status of formal state institutions. The role of such institu-
tions in the regulatory process for private sector security firms raises ques-
tions of impartiality given that they compete directly with private sector 
firms for contracts. These structures are also more susceptible to corruption 
due to their close links with the private security sector.  
Moreover, the growth of transnational private military and private se-
curity companies and their increasing involvement abroad is further blurring 
the distinction between public and private. Not only are PMCs and PSCs 
providing a range of services and support for national military forces de-
ployed abroad, but they are increasingly involved in the training, profession-
alisation and reform of foreign states’ armed forces, police and security ser-
vices (see Isenberg, this volume).   
An important consequence of the privatisation of security and the 
blurring between private and public spheres is the existence of state–non-
state networks of security governance in which it may be impossible to de-
marcate the exact division of responsibilities between them. A corollary of 
this blurring is resulting problems and ambiguities in terms of accountability.  
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Security Governance 
Given the pluralisation of security and the blurring of public and pri-
vate roles described above, security governance appears to be an appropriate 
framework with which we can better understand the challenges of security 
management today. Governance suggests deliberate efforts to shape and 
influence the behaviour and field of action of individuals and groups in sup-
port of certain objectives. In policy studies, it is commonly maintained that 
governance extends beyond government, that is, it implies more than a single 
set of actors (such as state political institutions) in shaping a field of action 
and behaviour. Security governance suggests that security is provided not 
only by state institutions like the armed forces or state police, but by a 
broader range of non-state actors which may include voluntary groups, 
community-based associations, citizens’ forums, commercial or corporate 
entities, militias, rebel groups, regional and international organisations. Thus 
the security environment is diverse and disparate; the state is one actor (al-
beit a very important one) among various actors at multiple levels – local, 
state, regional, transnational – who supplement, augment, replace or enrich 
the state's provision of security. 
Governance does not necessarily imply a normative agenda. Govern-
ance merely refers to the existence of multiple actors who interact and con-
tribute in the provision of security. Their actions may or may not be moti-
vated by the public good; state actors are not necessarily or by definition 
serving some politically neutral notion of the public good, although this is 
often assumed to be the case. As discussed by Hiscock in his examination of 
post-Soviet states, members of state institutions may be motivated by their 
individual self-interest. In the case of the Ukrainian state institution involved 
in providing and regulating private security, members may act in the entre-
preneurial or corporate self-interest of that institution. Even government 
cannot be assumed to always pursue policies in the public interest; state gov-
ernments advance partisan interests, whether democratically elected or not, 
because they are formed by groups seeking to address the concerns of spe-
cific constituencies.11  
The multiplicity of actors now involved in governance of security 
clearly poses an even bigger challenge to the notion of the collective good – 
i.e. How can citizens ensure that ‘the actions of the various commercial and 
civil partners engaged in governance accord, as much as possible, with the 
collective good’?12 For some experts, that points to the essential and pre-
dominant role that the state should play in providing the public good of secu-
Marina Caparini 270
rity – ie. Retaining or re-establishing the monopoly of force (see Schneck-
ener and Schnabel, this volume). Others believe that in the contemporary 
environment, the proper role of government should be as a facilitator of the 
provision of goods and services, providing guidance to the array of actors 
involved through active rule- and standard-setting; in other words, the role of 
the state should be less 'rowing' (actual provision of security) than 'steer-
ing'.13 The role of the state in regulating non-state actors to protect and serve 
the collective good is central to this debate. The complementary idea of the 
'regulatory state' is that in tandem with neo-liberal inspired trends such as 
privatisation and bureaucratic downsizing, governments have sought to exer-
cise control, but control ‘at a distance’. Yet as Gill underscores, the proc-
esses of privatisation, downsizing and restructuring increases the resources 
available to non-state actors and thereby their capacity to resist state control 
when they choose to.14 
A critical question that arises with regard to security governance is 
how security can be delivered effectively by a multiplicity of actors and 
agencies, but also with respect for democratic principles and values. Democ-
ratic security governance is an explicitly normative approach that suggests 
that security should be provided in a way that is equitable, legitimate, effec-
tive, accountable and responsive to the needs of its consumers, while allow-
ing for a multiplicity of security providers. Some objections to privatised 
security stem from democratic principles – namely that privatised security 
often means only those who can afford it can get it. Thus security, which is 
often described as being a public good and a key responsibility and function 
of the state, becomes a commodity monopolised by the rich and powerful 
and is distributed unequally among the citizenry. There is also the concern 
that private security is not accountable to government and can operate at the 
margins of legality. In looking at the growth of public-private partnerships 
and privatisation of functions such as security, the Canadian Office of the 
Auditor General (OAG) has suggested that 'new governance arrangements' 
involving public and private actors in a parliamentary democracy should 
respect two principles: first, parliamentary accountability remains vital 
whenever discretionary authority is used to spend public funds or to execute 
public authority. And second, any programs that deliver state programs and 
services (i.e. are outsourced) involve 'stewardship of the public trust' and 
accordingly 'must respect the public trust, observing public sector values of 
fairness, impartiality and equity.'15 
Another important but sometimes overlooked factor, however, is that 
security has a strong political and symbolic importance – that is, the extent 
to which it is perceived to be a common interest and good and right to which 
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all are entitled helps create communities of feeling and identity.16 Due to its 
role in helping to produce the civic trust and cooperation which is a founda-
tion of democratic political societies, the state’s central position in security 
governance is said to be both necessary and virtuous. If a society derives 
common identity and understandings of the state and its legitimacy from the 
provision of security, security governance is intimately linked with legiti-
macy and the constitution of the social order. 17 
However close observers of private security and state policing main-
tain that there is a legitimate role for private security in security governance, 
including in transition states, and that the private security industry approach 
can be complementary to that of the state's police institutions.18 The private 
security approach to security governance is preventive in focus because it is 
more closely dependent on the instruments of property rights and liability 
law. In comparison, the public security function of the state police and 
criminal justice system focuses on punishing past transgressions and relies 
on criminal law. Further, private security used by local agencies tends to be 
more directly responsive to the needs of local populations, which is also a 
democratic principle. Given the benefits that the private security industry can 
bring to security governance, the state should not only look to legally regu-
late the industry, but should seek to involve it in the broader project of facili-
tating access to security for all citizens. 
The collective good may be served in part through local ownership 
and community-driven initiatives, with solutions to security problems stem-
ming from local definitions of the problem, local knowledge and local ca-
pacities. In Wulf’s terms, this could be considered the challenge of subsidiar-
ity. Promoting local ownership of security in an environment of an array of 
security providers suggests the need for cooperation and consultation among 
members of local communities, including businesses, voluntary organisa-
tions and local authorities, and state institutions and statutory agencies. 
While the local ownership challenge is not a concern with regard to the en-
gagement of local private security firms by local actors, other environments 
clearly need security governance networks that systematically involve local 
actors in planning and oversight of security provision. For example, transna-
tional PMCs contracted by Western governments to work with developing or 
post-conflict states’ armed forces and state police in security sector reform, 
training and security institution capacity-building should seek local input and 
respond to local concerns. Otherwise, the contribution of such commercial 
firms to democratic governance of security is minimal. 
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Regulation and Accountability  
What the preceding sections make clear is that while security governance has 
become more complex and has many possible types of actors and providers, 
government has a strong interest in retaining the responsibility to safeguard 
the public interest and in promoting certain values in the delivery of policing 
and security to members of their societies. In a democratic society these 
values may include equitable distribution, accountability of service provid-
ers, protecting human and civil rights, and setting standards of quality of 
services provided. In order to safeguard the public interest, then, govern-
ments must seek to regulate the provision of security, even where this is 
performed by a multiplicity of actors, and especially to ensure its provision 
supports democratic values.  
The rapid growth of privatised security and its involvement across the 
broad spectrum of policing and security tasks, domestically and internation-
ally, has raised serious concerns especially concerning its accountability. 
State police in established democratic societies are typically subject to vari-
ous overlapping oversight and accountability mechanisms, in particular with 
regard to their coercive and intrusive powers and capacities to restrict the 
freedom of citizens. Governments in democratic states generally develop a 
system of checks and balances that, at least in theory, work to reinforce ac-
countability of state security. However that is generally not the case for pri-
vate and non-state provision of policing and security, whether domestically 
or transnationally. Private security providers tend to be primarily account-
able to those who have hired them – i.e. their clients. While governments can 
and do become involved in regulating aspects, this occurs invariably to a 
lesser degree than government regulation of those state institutions formally 
charged with security functions.    
Regulating transnational private military and security companies 
which operate in unstable, conflict-ridden or post-conflict environments is 
considered to be particularly challenging, and only two states – the United 
States and South Africa – have developed legislation specifically governing 
the commercial export of military- and security-related services. As dis-
cussed by Ghebali in this volume, efforts to create a legal definition of a 
mercenary in international law have proven highly problematic and are un-
enforceable, and have failed to delineate the differences between mercenar-
ism and private security activity. Regulation is also said to be challenging 
since these companies in theory can re-locate their headquarters from a 
state's jurisdiction if they find the regulatory environment there too onerous.  
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It can be argued that in tandem with the move from government to 
governance discussed above, regulation has undergone a parallel shift. The 
emergence of the phenomenon of governance has entailed 'the dispersal of 
capacities and resources relevant to the exercise of power among a wide 
range of state, non-state and supranational actors.'19 Governing, that is, is no 
longer seen as the exclusive preserve of the state but is conducted by various 
actors at various levels – local, national, regional and global. The state's role 
as a regulator has grown, but regulation in the context of neo-liberal market 
reforms aimed at cutting back the state and outsourcing functions entail 
steering and coordinating. As with the emergence of governance, the idea of 
the regulatory state (which emphasised hierarchy as a means of control) has 
been replaced by the idea of a new or post-regulatory state (in which there 
are other bases of control). In other words, regulatory control is no longer 
exclusively undertaken or controlled by the state, but is more diffused 
throughout society with a plurality of regulators and regulatory methods. 
Similarly, not only firms may be the subject of control in post-regulatory 
governance, but individuals, selected segments or dominant players in an 
industry, high-risk players, or the government itself may be the subject of 
control.20 In the new or post-regulatory state, regulation is a layered web 
joining the actions of public and private groups, with strands or nodes com-
posed of state agencies, professional and community organisations, indi-
viduals, and international organisations in increasingly influential globalised 
regulatory networks.21 
It is too simplistic an approach to deal with the new reality of plural-
ised security through state regulation alone. Much regulation of policing and 
security can now be said to be conducted by non-state actors. At the sub-
state level, actors with a role in regulating the provision of security include 
professional associations, industry bodies, accreditation agencies and labour 
unions. Similarly, other businesses also can have the capacity to monitor the 
behaviour and compliance of commercial security firms. Thus, banks and 
credit-rating agencies can provide some means of control over firms' behav-
iour and compliance with certain standards.22 Insurance companies can also 
play a significant role in shaping the behaviour of private security firms, 
whether through the requirements imposed on the clients of private security 
firms through insurance agreements to provide for the security of the goods 
or property insured, or through the requirements imposed on the firms them-
selves as a condition of coverage. 
Beyond the state's parameters, new forms of regulation are globally 
exercised by international organisations such as the IMF and World Bank in 
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imposing conditionality especially for post-communist and developing 
states, but also the WTO and other regulatory bodies that affect state behav-
iour.23 The European Commission is also an actor that may play a role in the 
regulation of private security in EU member and candidate states, as de-
scribed by Gounev’s (this volume) description of the impact of EU pressure 
on Bulgaria to address its weak judicial system and corruption problems as 
conditions of gaining EU membership; both problems were closely linked to 
the private security industry. Another type of control is processes of stan-
dard-setting, such as private standards institutes or standardization bodies at 
the EU level. Another locus of control may be the capacity of an NGO to 
monitor compliance and 'name and shame' a firm that has failed to abide by 
norms or rules or standards.  
As discussed in the chapter by Taljaard, in seeking to regulate PMCs 
the South African state has adopted the classic command and control ap-
proach, which uses the force of law to prohibit certain forms of conduct and 
to lay down conditions or sets standards for legitimate activity in a sector.24 
The licensing process is intended to function as a gate, screening entry into 
the sector. The command and control regulatory approach sends a clear po-
litical signal that the law is used, both symbolically and practically, for the 
public good. In the case of South Africa, however, the regulatory system has 
proven largely ineffective at preventing prohibited activity. In part, this is a 
result of definitional problems in the legislation, difficulties of monitoring 
the activities of South African PSCs abroad, challenges in gathering evi-
dence for prosecution, and sanctions which have been too weakly imposed. 
While the United States similarly regulates the export of commercial 
military and defence services using a command and control approach em-
bodied in a licensing system, the outcome is much different. This is rooted in 
various factors, among which include the clear position of the US Govern-
ment that sales of military and defence goods and services should support 
US foreign policy goals, the extent of privatisation and outsourcing of public 
functions, the 'revolving door' phenomenon in which high level officials 
move between government and industry posts. It might be argued that this 
latter factor raises the spectre of 'regulatory capture', in which close relation-
ships between the regulators and regulated result in outcomes where the 
regulated firms' interests are advanced rather than those of the public. Regu-
latory capture can also result when the regulating body relies on the regu-
lated industry or firms for information in order to carry out the function of 
regulation. This can be seen in arguments that the US Government has not 
made provision for adequate personnel resources in terms of contract moni-
toring for outsourced services. Outsourcing brings with it the danger of los-
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ing in-house expertise and experience, increasing reliance on the firms hired 
to provide those services. That reliance is a form of leverage that over time 
can produce regulatory capture.25 
Another mode of regulation the transnational private military and se-
curity industry is self-regulation. This can be done by the industry itself, as 
through industry associations, or at the level of the firm. Self-regulation has 
been criticised as being ineffective because it is voluntary. It is typically the 
largest firms that undertake self-regulation, and this is perceived as a means 
of driving out smaller firms and reducing competition. In industry self-
regulation, an industry sets standards for itself, often through voluntary in-
dustry associations. This, for example, has been the case with the British 
Security Industry Association, whose self-regulating activities have been 
encouraged by the British government. At the level of the individual firm, 
self-regulation occurs when the firm sets and applies standards to itself. 
Sometimes derided as an inadequate means of holding private security actors 
accountable, there have been very few empirical studies to date on self-
regulation of the private security industry. Nevertheless, some of the very 
few recent studies undertaken indicate that self-regulation can have a posi-
tive impact on internal accountability and the level of training, education and 
professional standards.26 Corporate compliance with norms of democracy 
and human rights can stem from the rational process in which firms seek to 
establish their legitimacy and maintain their reputation, both with clients 
(and potential clients) and with broader public opinion and the mass media. 
They may also be constrained by practical considerations relating to possible 
litigation (liability and duty of care considerations) and meeting require-
ments for insurance coverage. 
The reluctance of the private sector to share information is a function 
of its for-profit orientation. Companies will not want to release business 
information that could be exploited by their competitors and hurt profitabil-
ity. Further, sharing information with public police raises the possibility in 
some countries that it could become public through freedom of information 
procedures. Conversely, law enforcement agencies may be unwilling to 
share intelligence with companies owned by foreign interests, and may in-
deed be legally barred from doing so.27 The information problem, in which 
states rely on firms to provide the information essential for their regulation, 
is the key one in the challenge of monitoring the behaviour of private firms. 
This is exacerbated by the readiness of most states to respect commercial 
confidentiality and proprietary information.28 
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Implications for Security Sector Reform 
Proponents of security system reform (SSR), the relatively new approach in 
the development and democracy-promotion communities that advocates the 
establishment of both effective and democratically controlled and account-
able security sectors, initially tended to focus on state institution-building 
and capacity-building. In this, they were joined by international financial 
institutions (IFIs) such as the World Bank and IMF and international organi-
sations (IOs) which were also oriented towards building up the state capacity 
of developing countries. Original SSR approaches thus tended to uphold the 
traditional notion of the state as holding the monopoly of legitimate force as 
proposed by Max Weber.  
In fact, this is a very questionable assumption regardless of the context 
or region considered. In many developing countries, private security compa-
nies have emerged and provide protection and security services that the state 
is unwilling or unable to provide.29 While there may be unfortunate conse-
quences of private security markets in some states – such as the tendency of 
private security markets to reinforce racial and economic divisions in South 
Africa30 or the tendency of Bosnian private security firms to reflect and rein-
force existing ethnic divisions31 – these private security providers are meet-
ing real needs which state institutions are unable to meet. In Western coun-
tries, as has been discussed above, there has been a growing tendency to use 
commercial security and community-based actors to fulfil policing roles 
formerly performed by state agencies and to fill various military-related 
functions such as training, maintenance, logistics and operational support at 
home and abroad through the use of private military and security firms. In-
ternationally, private security companies are increasingly involved in recon-
struction and reform efforts in post-conflict environments.  
While it is understandable that in post-conflict contexts there is an ur-
gent need to re-build the central state and its capacities for providing basic 
public goods, much of the emphasis in SSR has focused exclusively on the 
state rather than the more dispersed institutions and actors that are now rele-
vant to security provision. That is, rather than looking at what exists and is 
actually happening in terms of security provision, SSR has tended to proceed 
from the assumption of the state monopoly of force, with the resulting ten-
dency to focus on law and formal state institutions. 
The provision of security by non-state actors, especially commercial 
actors, can meet basic human needs for safety and security when the formal 
state institutions are unable to do so effectively or equitably. In that sense, 
private security can help to enhance societal stability and help to reassure 
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potential investors and other economic actors in weak states.32 Moreover, 
security that is provided directly by locally-based agencies will be more 
responsive to the conditions and needs of the individual, community or or-
ganisation that has hired them, and responsiveness to local needs is a key 
component of democratic policing. On the other hand, only those who have 
the means to employ private security usually enjoy its services, and this can 
reinforce security deficits for poor and marginalised populations, further 
entrenching divisions within society and possibly undermining state legiti-
macy. Security in this scenario is no longer a public good, but a commodity 
available only to those who can afford it. This is arguably what has occurred 
in South Africa (and other states), where the proliferation of commercial 
security has resulted in a 'new apartheid' or neo-feudalism characterised by 
fortified islands of security from which undesirables are excluded.33 
What is needed is a realistic approach in which policy-makers – in-
cluding international donors who may be instrumental in shaping a state’s 
SSR programme – recognise the broad range of non-state agencies involved 
in filling security and policing functions, and seeks to facilitate access to 
security for all of citizens while ensuring that whatever mode or actor is 
involved is also accountable.34 One vision sees private and non-state actors 
in security and policing linked up in a network to meet needs flexibly and 
provide more equitable and democratic policing to all members of society. 
One of the central ideas to come out of the security governance litera-
ture intended to address the pluralisation of security is to shift the focus from 
institution to activity, that is, from police to policing. This would have major 
implications in terms of the state's budget and coordinating framework for 
public security, and would tangible support for a network of security gov-
ernance. This idea was put forward in the Independent Commission on Po-
licing for Northern Ireland's recommendations for police reform. The key 
means would entail creating a policing budget, rather than a police budget, 
thus enabling money to be spent on a range of actors playing a role in the 
provision of security including the public police but also paid private secu-
rity agencies, community-based grass-roots organisations and individuals. 
Moreover the budget would be administered by a policing board, rather than 
a police board, and would seek to coordinate the network that provide public 
security and that monitors policing to ensure accountability. The Patten 
Commission further called for the ability of local policing boards to collect 
taxes for locally provided and directed policing. It is based on the idea of 
giving local, especially poor, communities the resources to solve their own 
security problems, and hence empower them in terms of security govern-
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ance.35 The Law Commission of Canada, in a study recognising the extent of 
plural policing in Canada, has recently put forward a very similar proposal 
for the creation of policing budgets.36 
A similar networked approach, albeit one which keeps the public po-
lice firmly at the centre of the process coordinating non-state security pro-
viders, has been mooted in Great Britain by Ian Blair, who proposed ‘a posi-
tion in which the police service puts itself forward, first, as the central point 
for inter-agency co-operation designed to strengthen communities and, sec-
ondly, as the centre-point of a coordinated system of patrol services, carried 
out by a mixture of police, volunteer, local authority and private sources. It 
is not abandoning a monopoly of patrol – it is admitting that we haven't had 
one for years and then moving the discussion on.'37 
More broadly, if the aim in transition states is to achieve democratic 
policing (policing that mobilises local knowledge and capacity, and policing 
that is responsive to local needs, is transparent and accountable), then both 
state institutions and non-state (private) security services must be made ac-
countable and responsive to citizens.38 One way to regulate private security 
actors and make them more accountable is to involve more local actors to 
monitor and check their activities. 
Notwithstanding the general neglect of non-state security issues in 
SSR, there are very recent efforts to shift towards a 'development approach' 
to SSR in fragile and post-conflict states in which security is viewed 'not 
only in state or military terms but takes a more people-centred understanding 
of security and justice based on democratic norms, human rights principles 
and the rule of law.' A draft OECD guidance document notes that up to 80 
percent of security and justice services are delivered by non-state actors, and 
that SSR programmes should not be focused on either the state or non-state 
actors but take a balanced approach.39 The document also advocates taking a 
less technical approach and one 'more focused on providing support to non-
state actors to enhance their scrutiny of security affairs and preparing the 
political terrain and understanding of SSR.'40 As indicated by the number of 
transnational PSCs who now offer SSR as one of their services, it is likely 
that private security companies will become increasingly involved in SSR as 
providers of advice, training and other consultancy services pertaining to the 
reform of security approaches. The OECD-DAC guidance document re-
minds us that not only are there various types of providers of security, but 
that there exists the potential for pluralisation of oversight through strength-
ening of non-state institutions and mechanisms.  
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Conclusion 
The volume has drawn on scholars and practitioners with a rich diversity of 
experiences and backgrounds and participants in the ongoing debate about 
how changes in the distribution of power are affecting state's capacities to 
govern. The result is interdisciplinary but focused on providing insights and, 
where possible recommendations, for policy – i.e. for actors who structure 
and inform the responses of states and societies to the contemporary security 
context. 
Given ongoing privatisation and, more broadly, pluralisation of the 
provision of security, a security governance perspective offers helpful in-
sights into a complex and shifting environment. As evidenced in this vol-
ume, the debate among security experts about the proper role of the state in 
security is ongoing. However it is telling that many practitioners and those 
concerned with the legal parameters within which policing and security oc-
cur recognise that our received frameworks are no longer adequate and that 
we must move on conceptually and in practice to incorporate these new ac-
tors and trends in governance patterns. Not only does private policing occur 
in virtually all realms in which public policing has operated, but policing 
experts maintain that effective policing must entail some collaboration or 
networking between public and private security providers.41 Private sector 
firms can, and increasingly do, play a significant role in policing and secu-
rity provision, whether at the local, national, regional or international level. 
This chapter has underscored that the empirical reality on the ground – 
i.e. the multiple actors now engaged in producing security – must be the 
basis of any attempt to coordinate or control security governance. There 
remains a vital role for the state in providing security, but it is also clear that 
this is no longer an exclusive role; many other actors are now acting as secu-
rity providers in developing and developed states, and can contribute to 
oversight and control. The state remains a vital actor in the governance of 
security and in defending the public interest. Most practically, a strong cen-
tral state is needed in order to secure the budgetary revenues that can then be 
allocated to a community or locality for provision of policing services from a 
variety of actors that it determines.42 At a more strategic level now, the state 
should aim to facilitate access to security for all of its citizens, recognising 
the plurality of actors able to fill security functions. In helping citizens to 
enjoy security through a multiplicity of possible actors, the state should also 
seek to identify and enforce suitable standards of democratic accountability 
for policing and security providers.  
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Despite the clear evidence of privatisation of policing, social control 
and other means of security, mainstream criminology remains preoccupied 
with the administration of security and justice by states, just as mainstream 
defence studies remains preoccupied with the management of external secu-
rity by the state's armed forces. Focusing too narrowly on state institutions 
limits our understanding of what is being done and what can be done to gov-
ern security. Security and order have been understood traditionally using a 
state-centric point of view based on a Hobbesian conceptualisation of gov-
ernance. What is required is that both law and policy adjust to the transfor-
mation that has occurred in security through the growing involvement of 
private security companies and other non-state actors. Services provided by 
the police and the armed forces in democratic societies have striven simulta-
neously to respect the democratic values and fundamental legal principles on 
which these societies are based. As domestic policing and transnational secu-
rity provision become pluralized through the growing involvement of corpo-
rate entities, governments retain the responsibility to ensure that these activi-
ties are performed in a manner consistent with core democratic values. 
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International Organisations and the 
Governance of Private Security 
Jonas Hagmann and Moncef Kartas 
Introduction 
The international regulation of non-state security providers centres around 
two debates.1 On the one hand, there is the discussion whether such security 
providers allow for an effective provision of security. Drawing strongly on 
the idea of global governance, the main thrust of the argument is that de-
centralised regulation and provision of security provides superior effective-
ness to centralised, government-sponsored approaches.2 This debate high-
lights that the security sector has been transformed into a non-centralised 
collective of security providers comprising a multitude of different actors 
with non-hierarchical relationships in many regions of the world. On the 
other hand, there is an ongoing debate about the means by which such non-
state security providers can or should be held accountable to international 
humanitarian law (IHL) and international human rights law (HRL) in par-
ticular. With their traditional focus on states, these legal frameworks often 
fail to address non-state actors. 
Both of these discussions accept the notion of security governance. 
Yet in so doing, they fail to address the important issue of democratic con-
trol and oversight. Although the first debate draws on the concept of global 
governance, it omits that concept’s widely discussed corollary on representa-
tive control. Critics of the global governance concept argue that its emphasis 
on non-centralised and non-hierarchical relationships curtail the ability of 
parliamentary oversight in particular.3 In contrast, proponents of global gov-
ernance argue that citizens can influence networks by participation, and that 
the superior output efficiency of networks provides for ‘output legitimacy’. 
Taken together, proponents of global governance thus argue that a new form 
of cosmopolitan democracy is emerging, which does not rely on formalised 
state and parliament-centric notions of democratic control.4 In turn, account-
ability promotion efforts under IHL and HRL do not consider issues of de-
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mocratic accountability. Such control is fundamental to the security sector, 
where the absence of democratic control often caters to favouritism in secu-
rity provision, privileging some interest groups and marginalising others. 
Trends in the privatisation of security services diffuse responsibilities and 
thus make democratic control an especially difficult endeavour at the na-
tional level.5 Yet at the same time, the shift from government to governance, 
the trend away from state-centric provision of public services such as secu-
rity and towards network- and private sector-centric provision, allows inter-
national organisations to play a role in the regulation of security governance.  
This synopsis maps different approaches by intergovernmental organi-
sations to non-state security actors with the aim of identifying patterns and 
lacunae in international security governance. Since the 1990s, international 
organisations have been given wide mandates on ever more numerous issue-
areas, so boosting the tendency towards international top-down regulation.6 
In parallel, the trend towards international regulation was reinforced by a 
perceived failure of nationally operated regulatory systems. In looking at 
international organisations’ approaches to non-state security providers, this 
synopsis considers the following four questions: (1) How do different inter-
national organisations define non-state security actors? (2) Are these actors 
understood as competitors or as contributors to security? (3) Is the aim of 
international regulation to provide efficient security sector governance, to 
increase accountability to IHL and HRL, or to boost democratic security 
sector governance? (4) In the absence of explicit regulatory approaches to 
private security, what are the potential entry-points for such regulation that 
are capable of addressing aspects of private security ‘through the back 
door’? 
International Organisations and Private Agents of (In-)Security 
The United Nations, International Law and Private Security Actors 
The United Nations as the universal political body plays a central role in the 
creation and codification of international law, and would be prima facie the 
appropriate international organisation to formulate a policy towards the 
commercialisation of security and military services. However certain inter-
national norms, although not codified by the United Nations, play an impor-
tant role for the governance of private security actors by the international 
community and are therefore also considered. 
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Mercenaries 
In the literature on private military and security companies, disagreement 
exists as to whether these companies represent a modern form of mercenar-
ies in corporate guise or a new type of business that emerged concomitantly 
to the wave of professionalisation of national armies.7 In contrast to the gen-
erally pejorative understanding of the term ‘mercenary’ in ordinary lan-
guage, customary international law does not criminalise the fact that an indi-
vidual is by definition a mercenary.8 The international law of armed conflict 
first addressed the issue of mercenaries in the Hague Convention V Respect-
ing the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of War on 
Land providing that neutral states cannot allow the recruitment of mercenar-
ies on their territory. This obligation relates primarily to the principles of 
sovereignty and territorial integrity rather than mercenary activities.9 
Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions does not outlaw 
mercenaries but clarifies their status in situations of armed conflict. The pur-
pose of international humanitarian law, however, is to protect as far as pos-
sible civilians in armed conflict. Therefore, the definition of a ‘mercenary’ 
provided in Article 4710 has been drafted in a minimalist way to ensure that 
no civilians could come under that status: hence, international humanitarian 
law underlines that states have no obligations to grant mercenaries combat-
ant and prisoner-of-war status, but remains silent on the use of mercenaries. 
In the context of decolonisation, the UN’s approach toward mercenar-
ies experienced a gradual shift. Security Council Resolution 239 of July 
1967, addressing developments in the Democratic Republic of Congo, con-
demned states allowing, facilitating, or tolerating the recruitment of merce-
naries ‘with the objective of overthrowing the Governments of States Mem-
bers of the United Nations’.11 Leaders of decolonising countries deplored the 
role of mercenaries in destabilising nascent governments. The UN approach 
therefore adopts a perspective based on the peoples’ right to self-
determination. The General Assembly highlighted the link in its Resolution 
2465 (XXIII) (1968), which not only condemned the violations of the territo-
rial integrity and sovereignty of independent African states, but also linked 
the recruitment or training of mercenaries with the impediment of the strug-
gle for self-determination, freedom and independence.12  
While previous resolutions underlined the state obligation to refrain 
from the use of mercenaries, the evolving perception by the UN of mercenar-
ies as a threat to human rights and peaceful relations among states13 led in-
creasingly to the criminalisation of mercenarism (i.e. the use of mercenaries 
to destabilise and overthrow independent governments) and mercenaries. 
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This was made clear for the first time in the General Assembly Resolution 
3103 (XXVIII) on 12 December 1973 stating that the use of mercenaries 
against national liberation movements was considered a criminal act and that 
mercenaries should accordingly be punished as criminals.14 
The International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financ-
ing and Training of Mercenaries of 1989 which entered into force on 20 
October 2001 constitutes the culmination of the UN’s efforts to outlaw mer-
cenaries and mercenarism at the international level.15 The Convention prin-
cipally expresses the state obligation to prevent mercenary activities (Article 
5). It also establishes individual criminal liability for mercenaries and for 
any person who uses mercenaries (Article 2-3). However, this rule is not 
self-executing but requires transformation into national legislation. Such 
national legislation could be applicable to employees of private military 
companies (PMCs) if they were engaged in mercenary activities and if they 
fell under the jurisdiction of a signatory state. However, PMCs operating 
outside armed conflicts or not threatening the self-determination of a people 
or territorial integrity of a foreign state would not be covered by the Conven-
tion.16 Finally, it should be highlighted that the Convention aims to prohibit 
and penalise mercenaries and their use. Therefore, the Convention stands in 
contradiction to the current debate on regulation and oversight. Yet, the prin-
cipal problem of the convention remains its definition. First, the treaty draft-
ers based it mainly on the mercenary definition provided in Additional Pro-
tocol I, which, as stated above, has a different purpose. The focus of the 
definition on the individual’s motivation, nationality and non-membership of 
the armed forces of a state make it easy for employees of PMCs/PSCs to 
take appropriate measures to evade the definition. What is more, the defini-
tion covers only individuals used or offering their services for acts of vio-
lence committed against a government or the integrity of a state. The use of 
foreign military services by a government or with its consent on its own 
territory is therefore hardly covered by the convention. 
The Special Rapporteur mandated by the UN Economic and Social 
Council (ECOSOC) and the Commission on Human Rights has adopted a 
human rights perspective to the issue of mercenaries. Until 1994 the Rappor-
teur’s reports did not mention security companies, but focused only on ‘tra-
ditional’ forms of mercenaries.17 The activities of Executive Outcomes and 
Sandline International in Angola and Sierra Leone in 1995–6 drew attention 
to the practices of private military and security companies in Africa.18 Yet, it 
took the General Assembly considerable time to broaden the mandate of the 
Special Rapporteur. In fact, the General Assembly only expressed in 1998 
the conviction that, ‘notwithstanding the way in which mercenaries or mer-
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cenary-related activities are used or the form they take to acquire some sem-
blance of legitimacy, they are a threat to peace, security and the self-
determination of peoples and an obstacle to the enjoyment of human rights 
by peoples.’19 This confined the Rapporteur to a very state-centric approach 
focused on the state's duty to protect human rights. Yet, neither the General 
Assembly nor the Rapporteur tackled the issue of mercenarism and private 
security and military services in the framework of security governance.20 In 
fact, attempts to formulate a new definition still aim at defining a specific 
group of people, but make no explicit mention of corporate entities and do 
not offer a clear picture of the line separating legal and illegal services.21 
Prima facie security governance being first an issue of domestic political 
organisation falls within the ‘domaine réservé’ of states. Yet, in other fields 
(e.g. human rights, peace-building) the UN has crossed the line of ‘internal 
affairs’.22 Probably the framing of the issue of privatisation and commer-
cialisation of security as mercenarism, thus referring mainly to a discourse of 
territorial integrity and sovereignty, closes the door to questions of national 
security governance. 
In 2004, a new Special Rapporteur asked member states for a debate 
on the governance of the use of force. As she states: 
The legal definition of a mercenary can be decided only after a policy de-
cision has been reached on the fundamental question of whether States 
wish to continue to be solely responsible for the use of force, for declar-
ing war and for sanctioning the use of force within certain internationally 
acceptable rules of engagement. 23 
However, the report indicates an evolution in the UN’s attitude to pri-
vate security actors which may help to address the issue in terms of security 
governance. This would include considering international monitoring 
mechanisms, developing minimum standards, and establishing the responsi-
bility and liabilities of contracting states. 
PMCs and Peacekeeping 
Although the International Peace Operations Association (IPOA) which is an 
industry organisation sponsored by PMCs argues in favour of using private 
security services for peace support operations, the UN Secretary-General has 
rejected the idea.24 In fact, recourse to private military personnel, beyond its 
operational implications, would be in contradiction to the reservations 
against PMCs expressed by the Special Rapporteur in diverse reports to the 
General Assembly.25 Nevertheless, in 1996 the UN Department of Peace-
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keeping Operations reviewed the option of hiring a PMC to enforce peace in 
eastern regions of the Democratic Republic of Congo.26 Up to this point, the 
UN had not hired private military or security companies to set up a peace 
operation although single tasks had been contracted out as PMCs registered 
with the UN Common Supply Database were contracted to deliver security 
expertise as well as supply and demining services.27  
It has also been argued that private security companies could provide 
crucial security services to humanitarian relief operations.28 With the in-
crease of complex civil wars, the safety of civilian and humanitarian staff 
has become a central challenge for the UN as well as the Red Cross and 
NGOs. In fact, in 1998 for the first time the number of casualties among UN 
civilian personnel exceeded those of military personnel. The UN’s approach 
to the safety and security of UN personnel is based on the principle of the 
responsibility of the host government as articulated by the ground-breaking 
1949 ‘Reparations’ advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice 
and the subsequent Vienna Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of 
the Personnel of the UN. Due to a rise in attacks on civilian UN personnel 
the Secretary-General sponsored the 1994 Convention on the Safety of UN 
and Associated Personnel. However, this is an essentially  state-centric 
stance to a policy and operational challenge raised principally by armed non-
state actors.29 The 2000 report of the Secretary-General on the safety and 
security of UN personnel does not address the issue of private security ser-
vices.30 It seems that the use of commercial services is principally governed 
by a security directive disseminated on 9 January 1996 on the use of armed 
guards by organisations of the United Nations system31 requiring authorisa-
tion from the United Nations Security Coordinator, who is principally re-
sponsible for the security of UN personnel. 
Nevertheless, private security companies have been commissioned by 
some UN departments and specialised organisations to review and advise on 
security management strategies.32 Furthermore, recent studies have high-
lighted that UN specialised organisations such as the UN High Commis-
sioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian 
Affairs (OCHA), and the World Food Programme (WFP) are increasingly 
making use of commercial security services.33 International or local security 
companies provide services which include primarily the protection of prem-
ises, risk analysis, staff security training, and crisis management advice but 
also in certain cases mobile security for humanitarian transport or personal 
protection of humanitarian staff.34 The use of PSCs has so far been irregular 
and highly contingent on the specific context of the intervention which itself 
raises certain concerns. The contracting of commercial security services by 
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UN agencies proved to be very ad hoc in nature. In fact, no centralised (for-
mal) procedures and guidelines exist on the hiring of private security ser-
vices. Furthermore, the UN agencies and their staff have proven reticent to 
admit to or speak about their use of PSCs, hampering the possibility of ex-
changing information and experiences on the quality of services provided. 
In sum, a significant divergence is apparent between the attitude of the 
UN’s main political bodies and the practice of its operational departments, 
and specialised organisations. Obviously, the UN’s state-centric and legalis-
tic approach to the phenomenon of private security actors redirected the fo-
cus from an ‘activity-based’ to a legal–definitional approach, which has 
avoided the need to draw a clear line between legal and illegal private secu-
rity and military services. 
Private Security Actors and Small Arms 
The issue of small arms and transnational organised crime further highlights 
that the UN may develop a differentiated approach towards private security 
actors. In certain cases private security actors have been involved in the pro-
liferation of small arms and light weapons through their links to transna-
tional organised criminal groups,35 a fact that the General Assembly in its 
various resolutions on the use of mercenaries has highlighted.36 Several UN 
instruments are thus relevant, including the UN Firearms Protocol accom-
panying the Convention on Transnational Organised Crime which under-
lines the connection between illicit trafficking and terrorism, transnational 
organised crime, and mercenary and criminal activities.37 
The UN raised the issue of the proliferation of small arms and light 
weapons for the first in time in a 1995 General Assembly resolution.38 This 
led to the establishment of two expert groups which issued reports on the 
subject. At a UN conference in July 2001, participating States adopted the 
Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat, and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in 
Small Arms and Light Weapons, in All Its Aspects (PoA). To this point the 
PoA does not refer to private security actors and the 2006 UN Conference to 
Review Implementation of the PoA ended without an agreement.39 
In sum, private security and military actors are neither particularly 
targeted by international regulations nor by the UN’s current programmes. 
Nevertheless, the net of varying policy issues covered by the UN and of 
specific concern to transnational commercial security providers is gradually 
becoming tighter. The mainly state-centric approach of the UN bodies to 
security issues limits considerably the governance of commercial security 
services. 
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European Union and Council of Europe  
The EU Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Council of Europe’s 
human rights regime are affected by the activities of private security actors.  
It is therefore useful to assess the approach and policy of the European Un-
ion (EU) and the Council of Europe towards the privatisation of security. 
Private Military Companies 
Neither the European Union nor the Council of Europe has taken concrete 
action to regulate and/or oversee the activities of private military companies. 
Two different perspectives play an important role. The first relates to ‘do-
mestic’ private military services like the maintenance of equipment, the 
management of facilities or technical support for high-tech weapon systems. 
Although the build-up of a common European intervention force appears to 
be primarily a domestic political question on the scope of privatisation and 
professionalisation of the armed forces, it will require a minimum of har-
monisation. 
Second, the contracting of PMCs outside the EU remains an issue that 
has been concretely tackled neither by the European institutions nor by 
European states. The UK issued a Green Paper outlining policy options for 
regulation of PMCs in 2002, but no draft legislation has yet been presented.40 
Nevertheless the European Joint Action of 22 June 2002 concerning the con-
trol of technical assistance related to certain military end-uses should be 
applied by national governments. The EU guidelines, however, centre prin-
cipally on the production of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).41 Al-
though regulation could be applied to other types of technical assistance 
including private military services, it neither provides clear guidelines nor 
provision for a monitoring regime. 
Arms exports are controlled by overlapping national and international 
regulations. To be workable or at least to be more effective, however, there 
is a need for coordination and harmonisation offering important international 
actors like the UN or particularly the EU the opportunity to set up more 
comprehensive control mechanisms.42 In this context, the EU Code of Con-
duct on Arms Exports could offer a feasible and realistic entry point for regu-
lation.43 This would correspond more or less to the approach adopted by the 
US in regulating private military and security services under arms exports 
laws. Yet, such an approach rests on an analogy between goods and services 
that is quite problematic. Companies and individuals require a totally differ-
ent quality of oversight than the use of goods, especially in regions with low 
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levels of governance where states have very weak institutions and limited 
bureaucratic capacities to enforce rules and ordinances. Further, arms export 
legislation in most European countries generally forbids the export of mili-
tary goods to conflict regions. Yet, as the cases of Iraq and Afghanistan 
show, Western armed forces rely in conflict situations on private security 
and military actors.44 That is, PMCs/PSCs are not contracted by a foreign 
government, but are policy ‘actors’ of the sending governments. Thus, the 
accountability aspects related to services are far more complex then those of 
goods. In this vein, fraudulent use of imported military goods falls within the 
responsibility of the perpetrator of the offence. States are responsible for the 
illegal activities of a company hired to provide services falling under the 
sovereign duties of the state, such as the provision of security. Hence, the 
fundamental governance issue with respect to private security actors relates 
to the possible function of commercial security services within a democratic 
society and the possibility of adequate democratic oversight. 
Private Security Companies 
In contrast to other industries, national legislation on the private security 
industry within EU member states has not yet been harmonised. However, 
the Confederation of European Security Services (CoESS) and the European 
trades union body (UNI-Europa) are pushing for the diffusion of minimum 
industry standards in Europe regarding licensing and training of PSC staff 
and management, and have developed and promoted a code of conduct. Al-
though such attempts at self-regulation are highly desirable, they can have 
only limited effect. As highlighted by the recent interim report drafted by the 
Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces on behalf of the 
Council of Europe, there is a risk that companies not adhering to the princi-
ples might outbid (through lower costs) those companies adhering to a code 
of conduct.45 Additionally, such codes are by definition not enforceable and 
rely on the rather abstract oversight mechanisms of the free market. 
The European Convention on Human Rights and its diverse protocols 
constitute the minimum human rights standards in the area of the Council of 
Europe. At the national level these norms apply fully to the private security 
industry and particularly to its personnel. However, in terms of governance 
an important difference between public and private security forces is the 
application of parliamentary control mechanisms to the former. Public em-
ployees or civil servants are immediately bound by the prerogatives of the 
Convention, while PSCs and their personnel are bound primarily by com-
mercial, civil and criminal law. 
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Finally, the argument that national legislation regulating private secu-
rity and policing services would also apply to companies exporting their 
services does not take account of the realities of the business. For example, 
the ‘British’ company Erinys, contracted for the protection of oil facilities in 
Iraq, operates as an Iraqi company under the name of Erinys Iraq and em-
ploys mainly Iraqis.46 In fact, the company has close links to Ahmed Chalabi 
and his former militia and has been awarded contracts by the Coalition Pro-
visional Authority under allegedly dubious conditions.47 Erinys Iraq did not 
exist before the invasion of Iraq in March 2003 and is not registered in the 
UK where it would be subject to licensing requirements. Yet, until now, Iraq 
has not adopted legislation on the control of the private security industry.48 
The enforcement of rules has been extremely limited to date.49  
African Union and ECOWAS 
The absence or inadequacy of security provision from state authorities is 
perhaps most clearly visible on the African continent, which has been 
scarred by rebel insurgencies since the end of the colonial era. More re-
cently, conflicts in countries such as Eritrea, Kenya, Uganda, Sierra Leone 
and Angola have focused attention on the increasingly widespread use of 
technologically well-equipped and predominantly Western private security 
firms in terms of their origins, utility and legitimacy. Some argue that PMCs 
respond to African state failure, rampant gang violence, and a general milita-
risation of African politics, balancing off the end of superpower interven-
tionism.50 In this light, private security is seen as a tool to foster the rule of 
law in regions of disorder. Others stress that private security services aggra-
vate the divide between ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’, and that they perpetuate 
situations of insecurity.51 With its human rights regime and the 1977 Con-
vention for the Elimination of Mercenarism, the African Union is an interna-
tional organisation with two potential entry-points for international regula-
tion of armed non-state actors. Also the Economic Community of West Afri-
can States (ECOWAS) features agendas against transnational crime and 
small arms trafficking which might be expected to address the issue. 
The African regional human rights system falls squarely under the au-
thority of the African Union. It comprises five treaties, the 1969 Convention 
on Specific Aspects of the Refugee Problem, the 1981 African Charter on 
Human and People’s Rights, the 1990 African Charter on the Rights and 
Welfare of the Child, the 1997 Protocol on the Establishment of an African 
Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the Protocol to the African Char-
ter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women. The treaties 
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institute two implementation bodies, the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) and the Committee of Experts on the Rights and 
Welfare of the Child. To fulfil its functions, Article 25 of the African Char-
ter stipulates that the ACHPR may resort ‘to any appropriate method of in-
vestigation’ including hearing whatever person it deems necessary. Individ-
ual complaints are receivable after the exhaustion of national remedies. 
Problematically, however, the court has not yet started to function, and the 
system remains targeted at states’ human rights protection responsibilities, 
so omitting direct references to non-state security actors.  
In contrast, the Mercenaries Convention straightforwardly addresses 
the issue in article 1(1) defining a mercenary as  
..any person who is specially recruited locally or abroad in order to fight 
in an armed conflict, does in fact take a direct part in the hostilities, is mo-
tivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the desire for private 
gain and in fact is promised by or on behalf of a party to the conflict ma-
terial compensation, is neither a national of a party to the conflict nor a 
resident of territory controlled by a party to the conflicts, is not a member 
of the armed forces of a party to the conflict, and is not sent by a state 
other than a party to the conflict on official mission as a member of the 
armed forces of the said state.  
Under the Convention, all mercenary activities are qualified as threats 
to state stability and sovereignty. The convention therefore seeks to rule out 
rather than regulate. Accordingly, states are required to prevent the shelter-
ing, organisation, funding, equipping, training or any other form of assis-
tance to mercenaries. An important weakness of the Convention is, however, 
its narrow focus on mercenaries. By looking only at one set of non-state 
security actors, the Convention fails to integrate others such as PMCs, PSCs 
or rebel groupings into potential accountability mechanisms. What is more, 
the Convention has been ineffectively implemented in practice, arguably 
under the pressure of strong northern interests in the PMC industry.52 As 
such, African regulation of private violence at the regional level is much less 
potent than the best national approaches.53 
Regional regulatory approaches also lack teeth. For example, the 1999 
ECOWAS Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, 
Management, Resolution, Peace-Keeping and Security establishes that cer-
tain private security actors pose concerns to the regional community. Article 
46 asks for cooperation against transnational organised crime, and Article 51 
calls for effective actions against those who traffic in small arms, a practice 
that is often intimately linked to the issue of private security. Yet, the Proto-
col does not address the issue beyond these two general articles. Similarly, 
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the 1998 Declaration of a Moratorium on Importation, Exportation and 
Manufacture of Light Weapons in West Africa was weakly drafted, omitting 
any provision that would refer to effective implementation of that morato-
rium.54 In March 2006, the UN Commission on Human Rights’ Working 
Group on the use of mercenaries called on ECOWAS to promote the effec-
tive transposition of its regional framework into national legislation.55 Pend-
ing this transposition, the privatisation of security has not been addressed 
effectively by ECOWAS so far.  
4. Organisation of American States  
Latin America also has important experiences with armed non-state actors. 
Various countries in the region have experienced powerful rebel movements 
while several states have sponsored private security actors such as the auto-
defensas in Colombia.56 Despite the occurrence of such ‘top–down’ privati-
sation, it is rampant crime and corruption which are cited by Latin American 
security analysts today as the primary and legitimate drivers for private pro-
tection even if the same analysts concede that their pacifying effects prove to 
be highly ambivalent.57 The Organisation of American States (OAS) is an 
important regional organisation comprising all 35 states of both Americas.58 
With its Permanent Council, General Assembly, Ministerial Meetings and 
various committees it plays important norm-setting and regulatory roles in 
the realm of poverty reduction, human rights protection, security cooperation 
and democracy promotion.59 Although the OAS does not formally address 
and thus not officially define armed non-state actors, its human rights, de-
mocracy promotion, counter-narcotics and small arms mandates in particular 
provide for potential entry-points into this debate. 
The OAS human rights system was instituted by the 1948 American 
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, yet it was the work of the In-
ter-American Commission on Human Rights, founded in 1959 which sig-
nificantly expanded its realm of jurisdiction, and which led to new instru-
ments such as country reports, on-site visits and a petition system for indi-
viduals. Such pro-active extensions of the system were repeatedly formalised 
by the General Assembly at the 1965 Second Special Inter-American Con-
ference of Rio de Janeiro, via the 1970 Protocol of Buenos Aires and, cru-
cially, via the 1970 American Convention on Human Rights. This last treaty 
instituted the Inter-American Court of Human Rights whose decisions may 
be binding on states. With these mechanisms and institutions the OAS hu-
man rights system is considered as one of the most elaborate of its kind.60 
Yet only 25 of the 35 member states have adopted or ratified the 1970 Con-
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vention on Human Rights, and fewer have accepted the Court’s jurisdiction. 
What is more, the system is still focused on states. Although individuals may 
file complaints with the Commission, it is states which are held responsible 
for eventual human rights violations. The difficulty of holding non-state 
actors responsible under OAS rules strengthens the case – as in Africa – for 
more effective national legislation. And indeed, such legislation is required 
by Article 2 of the 1988 Additional Protocol to the American Convention.  
Another potential entry-point to international regulation of private se-
curity actors is the OAS democratisation agenda. Throughout South America 
there is a strong consensus that non-state security providers undermine de-
mocratic institutions. Indeed, the democratic control of such forces is explic-
itly described as a matter of broader democratisation.61 Contrary to many 
regional organisations, the OAS has a traditionally explicit democratisation 
agenda which was particularly vigorously enhanced after the end of the Cold 
War. Then, the OAS General Assembly Resolution 1080 (XXI-0/91) of 1991 
established that threats to democracy would be responded to collectively. Six 
years later, the 1997 Washington Protocol allowed the suspension of mem-
ber states whose democratically-elected government had been overthrown. 
Finally, the 2001 Inter-American Democratic Charter provided a catalogue 
of fundamental democratic rights and obligations.62 In operational terms, the 
OAS Department for Democratic and Political Affairs hosts a Unit for the 
Promotion of Democracy which seeks to enhance democratic governance in 
the hemisphere. Although regional security experts clearly frame the pres-
ence of private security as a problem of democratic governance, the Unit has 
not taken up this issue as of today. 
The OAS counter-narcotics and small arms mandates also serve as po-
tential if unused entry points for international regulation. Article 19 of the 
revised statute of the 1986 Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission 
(CICAD) stipulates a need for regional action programmes which reduce the 
supply and use of drugs, curtail drug trafficking and strengthen national con-
trol institutions and regulations. CICAD makes a clear linkage between the 
production, trafficking and sale of drugs and the emergence and subsistence 
of armed non-state actors. In its preamble, the 1997 Inter-American Conven-
tion against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammu-
nition, Explosives, and other Related Materials (CIFTA) acknowledges the 
various links between SALW (Small Arms and Light Weapons) trafficking 
and terrorism, transnational organised crime and mercenarism. Although 
CIFTA names such private security actors, its thematic focus makes it im-
possible to regulate such actors from a governance perspective. What is 
more, Article 3 of CIFTA underlines that its implementation is based on 
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national legislation to the point of making it hard to qualify the OAS small 
arms agenda as a purely international regulation effort.  
Although there is a strong agreement in the OAS today that the prolif-
eration of private security actors poses both security threats and challenges 
to democratic governance, the organisation has so far abstained from ad-
dressing this development directly. The relative novelty of private security as 
an OAS agenda item may explain this lack of direct action. As long as these 
actors have not been addressed directly, the sophisticated cooperation ar-
rangements of the OAS in the domain of human rights, but also its democ-
racy promotion, counter-narcotics and small arms limitation mandates could 
serve as powerful entry-points to the regulation of private security that, de-
liberately or not, have not been fully exploited to date. 
5. Commonwealth of Independent States 
The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) regroups 11 former Soviet 
Republics.63 Initially, the CIS was created to facilitate the non-violent disso-
lution of the Soviet Union. Today, the CIS serves as a forum for cooperation 
in the realms of economics, defence and foreign policy. The CIS features 
several charter and branch cooperation bodies such as the Council of the 
Heads of States, the Council of Defence Ministers, the Economic Council, 
the Interstate Bank or the CIS Inter-Parliamentary Assembly. 
In November 2005, the Defence and Security Commission of the CIS 
Inter-Parliamentary Assembly adopted a model law entitled On Countering 
Mercenarism. Drafted by independent experts, this model law serves today 
as the single regional framework for private security actors and activities. 
The model law’s first two chapters lay out the fundamental provisions. 
Chapter 1 provides two definitions of mercenarism. The first looks at per-
sons who are not state officials, but hired by states or international organisa-
tions with the purpose of participating in armed conflicts. Importantly, these 
actors must be motivated by material compensations or ‘a desire for private 
non-material gain in any form’. The second definition draws up a list of 
vague mercenary activities such as the overthrowing of governments or the 
undermining of territorial integrity. Chapter 2 posits an organisational 
framework for countering mercenarism. Centrally, its Article 5 prohibits any 
form of mercenarism. However, its remaining articles do not explain how 
mercenarism should be countered. Rather, these articles vaguely define the 
countering of terrorism as including preclusion and prevention, primarily 
through the work of executive agencies. 
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It is still too early to judge the effectiveness of the model law today. 
Its merits are the inclusion of non-material gains in the definition of merce-
narism and the obligation of CIS member-states to notify each other in case 
of mercenarism. The model law’s acknowledgment that it is poor socio-
economic conditions which are the root causes of mercenarism, remains 
debatable. Private security firms which are the product of a deliberate priva-
tisation of public services are not covered. As such, the model law only 
looks at a limited segment of the private security sector. In so doing, it pro-
vides not for a regulatory framework but for an outright ban. 
Conclusion 
At least since the time of the League of Nations, international organisations 
have played an important role in regulating global security. More recently, 
the same organisations have also acquired regulatory powers that could 
touch security governance on the non-state actor level. With the ongoing 
shift from government to governance in international relations, the major 
regional organisations such as the European Union, the African Union, 
ECOWAS and the Organisation of American States have acquired an in-
creasingly important role in the regulation of private security. Similarly, 
other regional organisations such as Commonwealth of Independent States 
(CIS), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Arab 
League, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), Mercosur or the Southern 
African Development Community (SADC) are in the process of expanding 
their authorities.  
Yet, the international organisations analysed here have not established 
effective regulatory frameworks for private military and security companies. 
Approaches to private security are indirect and partial. They cover only se-
lected private security actors, mercenaries being the most often addressed. 
The approaches of international organisations also tend to be un-coordinated, 
operating through various entry points such as human rights law, mercenar-
ism, democratisation, counter-narcotics and small arms. Furthermore, non-
state security provision is generally addressed as IHL and HRL problems, 
not as concerns of democratic accountability. As such, international organi-
sations have not adequately taken up this important and controversial corol-
lary of the security governance concept. This conclusion points to a substan-
tial need for coherent and regionally-informed agendas for the democratic 
control of privately-sponsored armed forces. In most international organisa-
tions, the various entry points to such agendas already exist today. 
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